JonesyNo, your math is just plain wrong. You are averaging the number of missions, but failing to average the number of aircraft lost. By your logic, if there had been 8 Harriers which flew a total of 360 missions (for an average 45 missions per aircraft) and lost 5 aircraft the results would be the same. Clearly that is not the case.
As part of the 80 deployed there were 8 that would have flown 45 missions. 5 of them could have been shot down it makes no difference. We know how many aircraft there were and how many missions were flown. The issue is the risk factor per aircraft per sortie. Total sorties to loss rate doesn’t account for the difference in numbers deployed.
The sorties were spread out over more airframes, but so were the losses. Again, the correct measure is losses per sortie.
That is already factored in though isn’t it?. The a10 flew a specific number of missions per airframe and lost 5 aircraft. The Harrier flew a specific number and lost the same. The point is that the sortie count is misleading as a marker of the surviveability of a type without quantifying the risk to the individual airframe.
By your logic you could have five hundred aircraft fly just 16 missions each and claim that it was a superior design because of the lower sortie/loss rate. Its hardly legitimate to compare one aircraft type with another thats been exposed to higher risk.
JonesyUh, no, the number of airframes really doesn’t matter in this case. The metric is loss rate, which is the odds of losing an aircraft per sortie. The number of aircraft isn’t really relevant unless we’re talking about a vastly different sortie rate per aircraft. But the sortie rate per aircraft wasn’t that much different: 148 A-10s with a 95% MC rate flew 8100 sorties, while 80 AV-8Bs with a 90% MC rate flew 3300 sorties. Over those totals, the AV-8B force lost the same number of aircraft, which makes the AV-8B’s loss rate 2.5 times that of the A-10, simple arithmetic.
Phaid,
The relative numbers of aircraft deployed do count though.
This is because the actual sortie rate per aircraft was only 20% different between the two. Put very simply the average warthog flew 57 sorties in the campaign and the average Harrier flew 45. With equal losses to both types the actual risk to the individual aircraft of surviving the mission was about 20% worse for the jumpjet. Not the 2.5 times indicated by the simple figures.
The A10’s flew more sorties but those were spread over near twice the number of airframes. Risk is cumulative.
JonesyIf we’re looking for austerity, the Royal Navy is better of just scrapping the CAMM and going for an existing, proven solution like the ESSM or Aster-15. The main argument behind developing CAMM is that it will be a British system. But from an economic POV insufficient.
Nope. The main argument behind developing it is to provide a joint service weapon for the RN, Army and RAF. There is as yet no land-based ESSM that I have heard of and air-launched Aster doesnt exist and isnt likely!.
JonesyMostly in the seeker Loke. With a semi active missile longer range high altitude targets can be engaged because the bearing rate, of a crossing target, is acceptable for the missile director. At close range the director has to track the target very quickly to keep the missile on target so a head-on target i.e one flying right for your ship is what you want to try and engage.
As I understand it the Aussies, with their CEAMOUNT director, have developed some kind of local area capability for ESSM.
Jonesyif they manage it would you say that the MOD should check it out as an alternative to CAMM just in case?
No. The mechanical launcher is a step back and we dont use Mk41 to use the insert 4-pot launcher. I’d rather we looked at options for quad-packing VL Mica in to existing Sylver cells than go for a completely new weapon. That said I dont expect CAMM to pose any serious problems and that that would be an academic consideration.
I have a very hard time swallowing RAM as an area weapon and we saw VL Mica intercepting drones at 12km+ a couple of years back. If we need an emergency fall back position in the event of CAMM falling apart I’d rather opt for the proven kit.
JonesyCant wait to see the tests proving that claim Stan. From what I can see the missile is too slow, its a passive seeker and, unless it uses the infill launcher that occupies a Mk41 cell, its needing to be laid on bearing and elevation by a mechanical training launcher.
Dont fancy it much as an area weapon, but, it will be interesting to see if Raytheon can back that one up!.
JonesyWhat about the HAS mode – doesnt that take into accuont that – the ability to take helicopters and planes down as well as strike land based positions. The ability to take down helicopters and planes is local air defence!
The difference is that FLAADS is a requirement for local AREA air defence. Area air defence means the ability to engage and defeat a weapon heading for a different vessel in your group i.e a crossing target. Point defence weapons, like RAM, are designed to engage targets coming right at you. Targets heading for you are usually much easier to defeat as they usually have very modest bearing rates. Crossing targets usually demand more of the missile as the weapon has to get out in front of the target in order to make the intercept.
Flanker,
CAMM seems to be an ASRAAM-based development. Would VL Mica meets the FLAADS requirement?
The active seeker of the weapon suggests that it should be feasible IF the kinematics are there to get the missile downrange quick enough. the only question I would have would be whether Mica has enough energy left in the endgame, at intercept point, to stay with a manoevering target.
JonesyBonehead question time Jacko. Can you outline why it takes 5 full squadrons in order to maintain 2 QRA pairs, 4 on a det down south and presumably some larger number of aircraft at a few hours readiness for UK AD tasking?.
Presumably training and maintenance will leach away some percentage of the capability, but, 5 squadrons to cover 8 active aircraft, 4 of those on det outside of UKADR, and some nominal figure at extended readiness seems a lot to the uninitiated.
JonesyJust wanted to know what people’s thoughts where on CAMM vs RAM.
In this age of Austerity should the UK be looking to put CAMM to bed and join the RAM group.
With the following put in place
Doesn’t the RAM offer an of the shelf solution that will cost less overall and offer a system that is good to go now. It also has little impact on the ship design.
RAM and CAMM are different types of weapon. CAMM is the result of the FLAADS requirement and needs to provide local area air defence. RAM is solely a point defence weapon.
JonesyI would most likely be fighting a localized insurgency equipped with Cold War era weaponry and possibly with limited foreign backing.
OK based on that I’m envisaging a Sri Lanka/LTTE type operational scenario and I’m assuming I have the infrastructure and logistics for ongoing ops. I want the following:
Should be ample change from $2bn for that lot. If there is an insistence on feeding single prop trainer aircraft to the insurgents trashfire envelope, and I have no idea why you would, I’d mount gun pods on some of the F-260EA’s that would serve as my primary trainer and send out pilots that I didnt like very much!.
JonesyTo do this sort of thing you need a lot more of the background mythology!.
For instance the Kiwi’s, last I heard, still have a package of 17 well looked after A-4K’s and 17 Macchi MB-339CB’s that were available for around the US$150mn mark. Now there is every bit of the all-weather PGM-capable striking power you need bundled in with the necessary advanced training and secondary light strike capability. Thing is though you need the people and infrastructure to support fast jet, complex avionics, guided weaponry and all the rest of the toys to get the value out of the purchase. If your state doesnt have the core of skilled technicians in its services a bargain like the Skyhawks and Macchis is just a waste!.
Then you need to fill in terrain and infrastructure details. Are you a country the size of, say, Kenya with neighbours who are sponsoring the insurgency you are combatting or are you a country like the Phillipines with the logistical challenges of offshore island chains. Do you have a well developed infrastructure with a network of well established airbases, good quality and secure road, rail and comms links and a network of regional airfields or are you going to be limited to austere basing with poor comms and logistics?.
What kind of insurgency are you fighting and how are they supported?. Are they like the Hezbollah well financed, state sponsored and capable of fielding the odd piece of advanced kit or is it a more local-based religious insurgency with lower orders of organisation and weaponry?.
All of these things will change the equation as to what you need from your $2bn.
JonesyDidnt rephrase it…just added the numbers when I found them. The logic is simple – one airframe flying three sorties per day is open to greater risk than three airframes flying one sortie.
Its an oversimplification of course, as there always is with pure numbers, as things like damaged airframes written off dont get worked in. The simple figures say that the A-10’s flew about 20% more sorties on a mission capable airframe-airframe basis – 57 for the A-10 per mission capable airframe against 45 for the Harrier over the duration of the conflict. The ratio of sorties to airframes is nowhere near 2.5 times in favour of the A-10, but, it still is in favour of the A-10 of course.
JonesyMake it an apples to apples comparison. The same number of AV-8Bs as A-10s were lost to enemy action (5 each) but the A-10s flew 8100 sorties vs the Harriers’ 3300. So the Harriers’ loss rate is two and a half times as much.
That only works if there were an equal number of airframes deployed though doesn’t it?. If there were 2.5 times more warthogs than Harriers in theatre then they were exposed to less risk in individual sorties per airframe. Are there any figures for mission ready rates for the A10’s in that conflict?.
Edit: Answered my own question 148 A-10’s with a 95% capable rate against 80 AV-8B’s with 90% rate. So it comes down in the A-10’s favour by a margin based on the simple numbers…that margin isnt 2.5 times though!
JonesyThe Pegasus doesn’t have near the airflow requirements that a F135 would have.
Look at the size and location of the intakes on a Harrier. They’ve always been FOD hoovers – anti FOD procedures are rigidly adhered to on the CVS’s. The relative airflow requirements are academic. If the environment was as heavily disrupted as stated Harrier would have suffered – british and american Harrier’s have flown from there for years.
JonesyAre you sure, I would have said they have rotated in down at least 45° at the start.
Kandahar had a very broken up runway and apron. The FOD damage was big and I can not see how F-35B would do much better in that department, apart from needing less clean runway, but maybe also putting more strain on the already very fragile concrete.
Airport like Port Stanley are F-35B heaven without a doubt and for the IDF/AF it makes extreme sense to get some. For the expeditionary role though I am not fully convinced.
I dont know how far we’ll get debating the precise nozzle angle here mate. For me it seems obvious that, with a rolling takeoff, the heat load on the surface is going to be much reduced over the requirement for a VTO.
Similarly Kandahar had enough hard surface to operate fixed wing slow movers and uav’s so I dont know if your description of a totally disrupted site is absolutely accurate – plus the Harrier’s where able to operate there and they weren’t vtol’ing it and weren’t sucking up intake fulls of FOD.
There are hundreds of small regional airfields the world over like Stanley that couldn’t support a Typhoon sqdn but could cope with a stol capable type like F35B. Expeditionary ops are what the plane is all about and it gives planners options and flexibility.
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