But even for a STO the F-35B turns the exhaust of the main engine down to face the tarmac directly.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nptpR11liZM&NR=1
No it doesnt. While the airframe is stationary the jet blast is direct aft. Its only as the airframe is rolling and near ‘rotate’ point that the nozzle defects downwards and, even then, its not the full 90 degree vector and its not focused on one spot. You can see the nozzle deflect on lift off on the above testing clip.
For expeditionary use, it might be easier to get local lower quality concrete to patch up existing holes in a runway, than it could be to built an operational area of high quality concrete for the F-35Bs
Then again recent history shows it might not…again…Kandahar is the clear example. STOVL and slow movers only. If it was so simple to effect temporary repairs and stage conventional types there why didnt they?. The point is that F-35B can use existing concrete surfaces even if they are too short for conventional types ie taxiways, aprons etc. Again using the exaple of Port Stanley airfield from 82 – there you had a hard surface strip too short for conventional fastjet ops. It was long enough to get a STOL airlifter like C130 in to though. Perfect forward base for F-35B.
And some people are going to believe all the STOVL hype no matter what reality has shown.
…and what has been shown in your reality Ben?. In mine STOVL has put fastjet tacair support in to operational areas where none would be otherwise in two major conflicts since 1980.
Its tantalising to consider the reach a carrier based son-of-Taranis armed with a couple of son-of-storm shadows would give the UK. Even land based all the rumours are pointing to very long, strategic level range. Its the one area of defence devlopment/procurement where the MOD has actually demonstrated real level headedness and fore thought. Its going to be interesting to watch this develop, especially with so much going on out of sight.
Its the ‘out of sight’ stuff that needs to have the fullest attention on this though – GlobalHawk has trailblazed for transoceanic range unmanned flight and low observables are not quite the technical challenge they once were. Combining the two is a job for engineers now not theoretical physicists.
The tricky part, for us, is developing the capability to be able to exploit the range such a system would offer. ISTAR, at depths of 1000nm plus from the carrier, is just something we wont have without a paradigm shift in the UK’s realtime strategic techint means. In short satellites and lots of them – realtime multispectral imaging and comms birds first and foremost otherwise the only asset we will have for ISTAR at, effectively, strategic reach from the carrier will be the UAV itself and the transit-to-station time will always be an issue for rapid targetting and engagement.
Runway repair has not been an issue in any modern war. Even the Iraqis were patching them faster than the allies could punch holes in them.
Yet it took NATO what 5 years to get the runway at Kandahar into a fit state to operate conventional types?. Runway repair, to acceptable tolerance, is not a 5 minute job.
As for burning holes in the runway cast your minds back and remember what STOVL means. Short Take Off Vertical Landing. The takeoff, under max thrust at max weight, is not vertical it is just the same as any other jet with the efflux direct aft….its just shorter than most. With SRL techniques spalling can even be minimised on landing.
The point, as Swerve has patiently explained, is to enable the use of hard strips unsuitable for conventional aircraft like Port Stanley airport or Kandahar International. Perhaps using a suitable length of taxiway if the main strip is unuseable. Seeing you are on an airfield that needs to have its main strip relaid I’d not think a bit of surface scorching on a taxiway, IF VL had to be used, would be such a issue would it?!.
Absolutely!. Most expensive to buy and most expensive to run!. Some people will have to hope that 35B comes in very expensive and 35C really cheap or their predictions of ‘cheaper and more capable’ CATOBAR ops are going look extremely dumb!
Jim,
Whenever somebody says that the F-35 is overkill for a mission type someone else always rolls out the what if senario of an opponenet being equipped with large numbers of double digit FSU SAMs…How many nations actually operate these and of these how many can be reasonably be identified as possible adversaries and how many systems do they have.
Question: Which is easier airspace control or airspace denial?. For airspace control you need the positive control elements of wide-area surveillance, ground and airborne, plus the C2 elements in the backend, plus the air combat elements and support infrastructure. For denial you need a few batteries of advanced SHORADS and a halfway contempory GSM network. Which will be the more likely to be faced.
Double Digit SAMs have become the bogeyman for the stealth lobby. Yes they a believed to be effective but most are over a decade old and I wouldn’t be surprised if many nations have intel on their capabilities and developed active countermeasures.
Double digit SAMs are the BASELINE of the threat going forwards….the absolute minimum threat level that must be reduced by any comprehensive CAS/BAI designs that are intended to be in service into the 2030’s. Its not just the Russian kit either….look at the likes of VL Mica…a system that can be eaily dispersed, passively cued and volley off half a dozen, high performance, fire and forget SAMs in seconds. This isnt the 80’s anymore and you cannot rely on knowing where the SAMs are if they are mobile and well deployed/redeployed.
A single battery of a contempory system like VL Mica, well sited, could render ineffective the modest-sized expeditionary tacair forces that countries deploy now. You minimise that risk by building ‘disposable’ tacair…which means unmanned in any western service…or by building as much capability in to the manned platform as possible. If you have the luxury of being able to build a, seperate, low-rent capability for that environment where your principle CAS/BAI striker is overkill then all power to you, but, you build that IN ADDITION to a comprehensive strike capability and not INSTEAD of it.
But how many opposed amphibious assault against well equipped opposition have the USMC conducted since Korea?. I cannot think of one. Chances are that if the Cold War had hotted up these sort of operations would have been few with the USMC being moved to theatres like Norway and fighting as convention formations.
That last sentence, swapping RM for USMC, is almost a direct quote from John Nott in 1981. Its even more absurd in context of the US armed forces than it was regarding ours. The USMC’s forced landing capability was of significant value in Op Desert Storm. Even if no landing was eventually made the presence of the capability was a significant force multiplier for the coalition forces as it drew significant opposing forces out of the real operational theatres. For a country who’s whole military credo is the, very sensible, one of fighting on the other poor beggars territory, so you dont risk damage to your own, removing the all-areas rapid deployment potential offered by the USMC over-the-beach capability would be beyond stupidity.
Operations against high level opposition will not be conducted without USN CVNs in support and lower level operations like Somalia etc can be more than adequately supported by rotary assets.
This is the point through and through Jim. You dont need for the situation to be high-level to face advanced SAMs going forwards. A battery’s of Tors ‘lent’ unannounced by Ahmedinejad to Hezbollah would have a major impact on the ‘adequate’ rotary assets you would see the USMC left with in that low-intensity theatre.
As stated before the USMC has historically used a high-end and low-end tacair capability with Hornet and Harrier. They are replacing that with a single type to streamline ops….you cant replace the high-end with a simple CAS type and the USMC, understandably, want independence from the CVN’s that have to look after their own issues before the USMC’s. The answer is very simply the F-35B.
John,
The original point made was that the USA offered a carrier, which would indeed have taken a long time to work up (though in 1982 the Royal Navy still had the men with the experience to do it). But when I pointed out it was the much simpler LPH which was on offer, some people don’t seem to be willing to modify their views. Fair enough.
What you are not getting here is that it is completely academic and irrelevent whether an LPH is more or less complex than a CATOBAR aircraft carrier. If neither would have been available to the task group within the weeks immediately following the loss of the RN deck then it doesn’t matter one jot if the LPH would have been RN crewed faster than a theoretical CV.
At the time of year we were fighting we had, perhaps, 4-6 WEEKS after the period when we actually defeated the opposition in which we could manage modestly high tempo combat ops owing to deteriorating environmental conditions. Thats it. No, unfamiliar, replacement vessel could have been brought in in that time without it being crewed for us by its original owners.
Hopefully that will put into context the utter pointlessness of your argument and the relative merit, however generous, of Cap Weinburgers offer IF in fact he ever made it.
Yes, but close air support is a key USMC mission, and are they really going to be happy using a $100 million F35B as a bomb truck?
If the things they are dropping bombs on have, hitherto undetected, double-digit battlefield shorads covering them I’d expect so yes.
Possibility the fact that 35B would be replacing both Harrier and Hornet in USMC squadrons is being overlooked here?. Plus the fact that not all FEBA’s will be as benign to operate in as that over Afghanistan?.
Perhaps someone can correct me if i’m under a misapprehension here but I understood the marines asked for an f18 that could be deployed independent of the USN’s carriers. Looks to me that F35B hits that dead centre.
You are both wrong, and that is NOT what it says on the links you posted.
If you build a home or other property in a foreign country, it does not make it community property in which anyone can enter or use as they please and for any reason. Unless you live in a police state, it is called trespassing without your expressed written or spoken consent, except when you sign an agreement that says otherwise in clearly defined words.
You build a house on someone elses land you do it with their consent and subject to the laws and dictats of that land…not yours. You break the rules and you can suddenly find that you are unwelcome on that land.
If the U.S. had said no, there would have been a very different kind of war over the Falkland islands.
Yes….we’d have had to stick one of our oilers off Ascension feeding the truck relay to the airfield instead of the American provided one and the RAF crews wouldnt have been able to buy beer in the US commissary. I imagine that last one would have changed the entire complexion of the campaign…god only knows what the light blue would have hit had they been sober!.
Grey – message received loud and clear. I’ve made the points I wanted to and will shore this up here.
This is getting abit tedious, because the fact is that Britain would almost certainly not have operated an Iwo Jima LPH in 1982. But if we had, under wartime pressures, none of the things you seem to think are huge problems would have been insurmountable. The Task Force sailed south three days after the invasion. In wartime things happen quickly. The Iwo Jima class were simple, straightforward ships, there is no getting round it.
Likewise, I am well aware that the Rusty B was in a poor state. So what? If it was an emergency, she would have been used, even if bits were falling off. Or are you saying that hundreds of men were not working on her as the Falklands crisis unfolded for that very reason?
No this is getting absurd. When you are in a hole man stop digging. You clearly have never crewed a ship or have any concept of how one is crewed. Stop guessing at things you know absolutely nothing about.
Wartime does not change the length of time it takes to learn how to operate a totally unfamiliar vessel’s systems. To deploy that LPH within the window of the conflict we would have HAD to have scores of USN advisors embarked to show our lads the how’s, why’s and when’s. That would have been unacceptable to everyone….especially in view of the ‘South Africans’ who helped mate Shrike to the Vulcan force.
Bulwarks inspection stated that she was beyond viable recovery to operational status is that not clear enough for you?.
The UK can use the base and the island whenever it wants. The USAF built and run facilities were ‘lent’ to the UK in 1982, but had the US said no to their use that would have not made much difference. Honestly people this stuff is not hard to look up.
Happy to stand corrected….thanks PJ. I knew from an old conversation with a chap from the ministry that the US weren’t ‘holding a trump card’ with regards to granting use of the runway, but, hadn’t got around to looking it up to be honest. Thanks for saving me a job.
Should the USMC be allowed to operate F-35B’s from USN CVW’s???
What is the real question here Scot?. Are you asking whether F-35Bs could operate from a CVN or whether they will ever form part of a USN carrier air wing?.
The whole reason for the USMC putting in a request for a STOVL F/A-18C….that led to F-35B….was to be independent of USN carrier decks and the operational priorities of the navy where they, naturally, differ to the priorities of the Marine Corps.
F-35B in operational terms could easily deploy from a big deck carrier. Using a STOL takeoff and short rolling landing technique the flying programme needn’t be disturbed at all and the baseless hysteria regarding jet downblast should be mitigated.
That said the aircraft has shorter legs than the USN C variant and the Super Hornet so its embarkation will force the carrier closer inshore than it would otherwise need be. Something that will not please the carrier boss. So, in effect, you would have a situation where the USMC are unhappy being tied to a carrier deck they dont control and the USN being unhappy about the additional limits of manoevre that -35B would bring. With no-one being happy with the concept I cant see a motive force, from anywhere, driving forward routine deployment of 35B in the CAW.
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It wasn’t just French AF Mirage interceptors that bested Sea Harriers during ACM practice. RNZAF A-4 Skyhawks also killed many Sea Harriers with missiles during a 1992 training exercise in the South Pacific. There was a big difference in technical capability of the Skyhawks used by Argentina and New Zealand. The Kiwi A-4 was of later manufacture, upgraded with HOTAS cockpit, improved avionics, more powerful engine, far superior APG-66 radar, and armed with the AIM-9L Sidewinder missile.
So what?. SHAR FRS1 took down F-5’s, F-104’s, F-15’s and MiG-29’s on exercise. FA2 with Vixen embarrassed the best the USN had on offer in the Purple exercise serials over the US side of the Atlantic. DACT is a learning lesson thats always painful for someone.
Argentina had been embargoed by the U.K. and U.S. long before the Falklands war, cutting them off from technical support, upgrades and spare parts for aircraft and weapons sold to them earlier. There is no doubt that if the Argentina’s air forces had the latest bombs, missiles, radars and fire control systems (like those issued to frontline American, French and Israeli pilots) the British invasion fleet probably would have withdrawn from the Falklands after several days.
….and if they had nuclear weapons, SSN’s and all the bells and whistles the garrison on the Falklands wouldn’t have been a few squads of Royal Marines with light weapons would it?.
They could barely withstand the pounding they received anyway, despite all of the dud bombs and missiles that hit British shipping.
Again you need to understand why the bombs were dud. There were few problems with the quality of Argentine ordnance, much of it was British after all, the freefall bombs were, largely, not exploding because they were released out of envelope. Had they flown the attack profiles necessary for successful ordnance deployment they would have been exposed to the full defensive fires from the task force. It was a direct consequence, of RN action, that those bombs that got through weren’t fusing.
As for ‘barely withstanding’ that’s an irrelevance isn’t it.They withstood it and completed their mission and in ships that were fitted for the cold war battle of the Atlantic NOT for expeditionary ops in a littoral 8000 miles from home port.
It was in the sense that the British pilots had them and the Argentine pilots did not. Even your Prime Minister was able to recognize that technological advances in weapon systems was more significant than any difference in the airframe that fired them.
Right, so, its your assertion that the US won the Falklands War for Britain because our pilots had the warm snuggly feeing provided by having ‘slightly more reliable’ missiles under the wings of their fighters. Thats a unique viewpoint I guess.
If Reagan told her to forget about using U.S. facilities on Ascension, I don’t believe that Thatcher would press the issue over a meaningless pile of rocks in the South Atlantic, whose few human inhabitants were not actually British citizens.
The forces were en route to the Falklands before the Haig shuttle diplomacy failed. You can work the rest out yourself from that one simple fact.
The Prime Minister could not hide that inconvenient fact from the general public forever, and it was not worth starting a pissing match with the Americans.The Argentine junta was not a threat to British national security, it was only a threat to Thatcher’s national pride.
So you have shifted your position now from “Removing the Argentine armed forces was strictly impossible without military aid and technical support from the United States” to the statement that it wasn’t worth fighting to recover the islands anyway. Presumably this shift has happened because you now understand that the US’s role in the conflict, to use Adm Woodwards words, was that of a friend ‘holding our coat’ and nothing more!.
Hawker and British Aerospace were deeply frustrated by the poor export sales of Harrier throughout the history of production. They were so desperate for new customers that Harriers were offered to unsavory dictators in places like Red China, Iraq, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. All of them politely declined. McDonnell-Douglas got a similar response when they tried to attract more buyers for the AV-8.
I’m sure they were frustrated. Sea Harrier was always going to be a niche aircraft built off a niche aircraft though. As for limited export success I can only think of one other design we sold to the US off the top of my head and that was the superlative Canberra. The fact that those operators with a requirement for STOVL wanted more of a light striker than a fighter was proven when McDD hung those barn doors on the side of the fuselage and created the bomb-truck Harrier II. As for doing deals with dodgy regimes you have turned a blind eye to Peace Pearl maybe?. Your feted APG-66 in the pointy end of J-8’s not ringing any bells?. Shall we stop throwing rocks while we are in the greenhouse?
Because they were simple ships. They were very straightforward designs. In 1982 the Royal Navy had loads of sailors who knew how to operate an LPH, flight deck operations would have been no problem, nor would the steam plant. But anyway, it’s a moot point, I’m quite sure that Bulwark would have been used as a replacement carrier if needed, and Illustrious was completed ahead of schedule as well, so Britain would have had another two carriers if necessary.
Where to start against this level of ignorance?. In 1982 the LPH in question was already 21 years in commission so had wear and tear, she was fitted with USN standard systems from the galley fixtures, to the heads, to the gearing, to the HVAC, to the internal comms etc, etc.
The RN had familiarity with none of those systems. We had good people who would have learned how to store the ship, how to work the galley systems with the skill necessary to dependably feed the ships complement, how to fault-find on the ships internal comms, what the lubrication points and schedules were for the gearboxes….and a thousand and one other unfamiliar things to sailors untrained on US kit. It would have taken MONTHS to get to the level of competence in basic ship husbandry and handling necessary to consider embarking an airgroup though.
When you understand that perhaps you will stop spouting twaddle about an RN crew being able to take an ex-USN LPH into action within the duration of the Falklands action.
As for your comment about Bulwark being in such a condition that she could be brought to operational readiness within the same timeframe…I’d recommend researching the materiel condition that she was in by 1982 before making statements like that in public.