Well, we seem to be going round in circles. How can I make this any more simple?

You have no problem with communication skills Chox. Your problem is your message not your ability to get it across. Talking twaddle with perfect clarity is still talking twaddle I’m afraid!.

Citing all of the conflicts in which Britain has engaged is entirely specious. Since WWII all of the military engagements pursued by Britain have been those of choice, not necessity. Afghanistan is no different. The only possible exception was the Falklands and as I’ve said repeatedly, that was a result of flawed foreign policy. In no way does that conflict justify buying a new carrier.

Yes you have expressed those views clearly. The military conflicts we have been involved in have been to service our foreign policy. We can abrogate our security responsibilities for our dependents and we can elect to withdraw from NATO. That will save us a few billion on defence. The costs of such a retrenchment will last a generation though. Why do we need squadrons of strike/interdictors when we have committed to a buy of 180 swingrole strikefighters?. The Danes get by defending their airspace with a mere 60-odd F-16’s…if we step down from the global stage and just accept that we are a ‘small island of the coast of Europe’ why do we even need 180 Typhoons when others get by with quite a lot less?.

Continuing to participate in operations like Afghanistan can only be done at the expense of other capabilities. Fox can claim that there is no threat to the UK for which such capabilities are needed. Problem is, like everyone else, he has absolutely no idea what the future holds.

If we have no policy to involve ourselves in global operations we have no justification for the kit you want to hold on to either!. Can you not see this?. If we retrench we dont just lose the bits you want to see dispensed with so that the RAF can get more of the cake for its fastjets!. We have no ability to protect any capability above the absolute minimum for home defence. Did you miss the whole CVA-01 episode perhaps?. The last time that the Govt undermined an RN carrier buy, with the able assistance of the RAF, did the RAF get the aircraft they hoped would be suddenly funded with the saved budget?. Nope….they got the hand-me-downs from the carrier fleet!. You do seem intent on trying to repeat the same idiotic routine!.

Put simply, carrier power is a great asset if one can afford it. Clearly we cannot, and what we will get is a hideously over-priced token asset which can achieve nothing, but simultaneously drains the remainder of our true defence capability. It is a dangerous and flawed concept.

Done properly the carrier power is an ENABLER for the rest of our defence capability. If people had any sense the RN and RAF present the common front of CVF and Joint Force F-35B each supporting the others acquisitions so both end up preserving the maximum RELEVENT combat power they can in this budgetary climate.

Instead what do we get?. Idiots like Nigel Ward banging on about CATOBAR and how we could get better payload bloody range with F-35C – when we havent even secured the future of the ships to operate them from and the likes of you making out that the Falklands didnt happen or, somehow, doesnt count because your beloved RAF didnt get to play!. The lack of cogent thought here is staggering. It doesnt matter a bean if the Falklands WAS the result of stupidity in the Foreign Office….do you think you can preclude the possibility of that happening again?. Isnt it the most clear of common sense to prepare for exactly that kind of eventuality confident in the knowledge that another British Foreign policy goof, of the type so often bailed out by HM forces (and RN carriers on several occasions), is almost guaranteed, so, the forces we need are those that are flexible and adaptable enough to react to the widest possible, and practical, range of threat scenarios.

You’re not serious are you? I thought we weren’t going to try point-scoring?

How is it point scoring to ask you, relatively politely, to explain your most contentious position?.

Again, you’re not serious are you? I mean really, you’re not serious, are you?

Again in YOUR context we have gone isolationist, withdrawn from our defence commitments and dropped our dependents as unaffordable. We are now the small island off the coast of Europe and have no presence on the international stage. Why do we need the same, 180-strong, fighter force as a big European state like Germany to defend airspace a fraction of the size?.

Chox recognise when you are losing an argument!.

You have deliberately ommitted half of Swerves post….the part that qualifies his initial comments about Aden, Malaya etc. You have, on another thread, denigrated the UK’s still-pertinent role in the world dismissing reality as ‘romance’ because it doesnt fit in with your particular derisory view of the country.

You have contradicted yourself, massively, by stating that Britain need only the forces necessary for her own defence but, at the same time, state that a Cold War interdictor, Tornado GR4, is a vital asset to be saved. Who do we need GR4 to defend against Chox?. Germany?. You talk a lot about history….perhaps you think the dastardly hun is still a threat?.

You talk of relevance and of removing unnecessary capabilities with spurious justifications yet the assets you deem essential require the most fanciful leap of logic to imagine a threat that they could be called on to oppose?. Especially in regard a threat to the UK home islands.

Will you please stop this pointless and idiotic attempt at justifying your position and simply state that you want the RAF to keep its toys for no better reason than than you favour the junior service.

I’ve explained the position so I’m not going to repeat myself. All of the subsequent points raised here have already been addressed in my comments so if anyone wants a serious answer (rather than entering into a point-scoring exercise), my responses can be found within my previous posts.

Only thing I would add is that the carrier advocates might be best advised to drag themselves away from television and news pundits, and the ramblings of aircraft enthusiast magazines. Take a look at Britain’s real military history and current posture and Britain’s lamentable financial situation. Also take note of the fact that almost every politician on both sides of the House accept that the new carriers were a bad idea.

That would be fine if you had actually answered any of the points put to you. Your basic response is that anywhere we’ve used an aircraft carrier was an avoidable conflict – a statement so divorced from reality as to be entirely fictional. The simple fact is that we WEREN’T able to avoid those conflicts and that there, without a carrier force, would have been nothing we could have done about them.

We HAVE defence commitments that require the projection of force to meet. Now you can barter or denigrate them away if you wish, but, the measure of Britain to the outsider is in how we match our actions to our rhetoric. If we abrogate our responsibilities on the basis of expedience we lose more than territory or dependents.

The Falklands showed the world that we were as good as our word that we would risk blood and national treasure to keep our promise. That sent a clear and abiding message to friends, allies and enemies alike. In the same vein if you cant see that the Afghanistan operation, for all its hacked-up errors in execution, is now carrying the credibility of the western world on its back then I find that lamentable for you. If we leave Afghanistan no better than the rats nest it was pre-2001 NATO comes out of it looking the busted flush, like the Soviets at the end of the 80’s, and the NATO powers lose so much of their credibility in the process. That directly impacts the influence we all have in global events. If we lose that influence then we are fated to perpetually have to react to events rather than take a hand in shaping them….which is unpalatable to say the least.

This simple relationship scales down to nation-state level as well. If we lose the ability to participate in global events then we, very definitely, lose our say in them. For a nation with our commitments and capacity that really is an absurdity. To lose that to save a few squadrons of Tornado’s is a greater absurdity. To lose that in the service of some Trenchardian concept of jeopardised home defence, especially in the face of an air threat to the UK which amounts to the hit/miss interception of a couple of Blackjacks every other week, is beyond absurdity.

PJ

So did I just imagine the Falklands? pretty sure that was UK territory… As one tag says on here (obi wan?) “If you ain’t got carriers your just a coast guard.” They are so much more than a luxury, I think you fundamentally misunderstand what carriers are for and why we need an RN, its definately not to “strut”.

Its typical nonsense from someone with an irrational airforce bias. Any action that has relied on carriers is an anomaly and to be discounted!. Common idiotry is the statement that we should never have had to fight the Falklands campaign. The simple fact being that regardless of any other consideration we DID have to fight it!.

It is also studiously ignored that the last time we had a direct land-based air threat to the uk the debate of the day was whether to fly big wings or not!. Soviet Frontal Aviation had most of western europe to get past to hit the UK after all.

Also studiously ignored is the fact that carriers are as powerful in defence as attack. Seeing as there is no land based option to attack the home islands, without an aggressor subduing our continental NATO partners first, then the sole feasible attack vector would be seabourne. A carrier group leading an amphibious force to attack the UK would not be able to leave a royal navy carrier group operational in theatre for very obvious reasons. The aggressor would therefore have to develop bluewater dominance capability before even starting to plan such an attack. This is a concept called virtual attrition and is well known to military planners the world over!. Just not to some airforce enthusiasts it seems!.

Sorry I got to the parts saying that carriers were useless and STOVL unnecessary and stopped reading. Both views are proven wrong by recent conflicts. What is needed, for the uk right now, is something that enables flexible deployment of tacair between sea and land basing. That is STOVL. Its no more complex than that.

In the future we will need more capability at sea, not less, as maritime resources become more important. Search argentina, oil and falklands if you are in any doubt about that!.

Given that a serious shortage of FJ assets is predicted but the USN, wouldn’t it make sense for the USMC fixed wing assets to be all CTOL (F-35C), supplimenting the USNs CAW to a greater extent than they do now. It is inconcevable for future USMC operations to be conducted without a CVBG in support and in the current financial climate it is unaffordable for the USMC to have a STOVL fleet. They should be able to make do with rotary CAS for which there are plenty of platforms available to operate from and easier to deploy ashore. The USN should then have enough FJ squadrons available to fill its CAWs.

I think you are making the same assumption that Verbatim is here – that the USN’s position is the only one that is important. The USMC has a role for its tactical airpower that doesnt include backfilling modestly occupied USN flight decks. The point of USMC tacair is to provide the required level of supporting firepower to the deployed rifleman within a specific timeframe.

It cannot be doing this if the carrier it is sat on has to, for example, respond to a report of an opposition surface action group going after the groups UNREP/logistics vessels 600 miles away!. If that happens the USMC fighters either cant fly in support of the forces ashore or have an hour transit back to provide support. This is the issue for the USMC – they want their airpower on call to their troops where they can respond in timely fashion. Placing them on a CVN takes away the control they have on the availability of those assets.

The ability to either use a smaller flightdeck that will be a permanent feature in the operational theatre, like an LHA, or to push the fighters ashore to a damaged airstrip or a small regional airport capable of accepting a C-130 but not a non-STOL fastjet (i.e Kandahar or Port Stanley airfield) is a considerable one for establishing that tacair as a permanent and reliable feature in the operational area.

In short the requirement of the USMC is not the same as that for the USN and different criteria are important to each service in their turn. It is a mistake to try and judge one through the lens of the other.

Having read the thread, one question that comes to my mind is how good is the F35C at STOL, the larger wings give more lift, lower landing speeds and the more robust undercarriage etc might make it ideal for a “non ideal” forward base. This combined with what is assumed to be the lower maintenance requirement of the F35C over the F35B might make it far more suitable for the USMC.

Remember that larger wings, more fuel, stronger landing gear etc all add weight…added weight is going to hurt STOL characteristics. A good STOL design, others have correctly mentioned Gripen as an example, could probably do the short-field expeditionary job same as the F-35B. They will have a problem doing the LHA ops though!!!. If you can have both as, plainly, is possible with F-35B why not have both?. If F-35B where to fold though something like the conceptual Sea Gripen, based on USN CVN’s and transferred ashore when forward basing is established, could be an interesting alternate I suppose???.

Verbatim

This is best explained by Col Robert D Loynd, USMC paraphrasing his full article credited below

(credit: USN Proceedings – http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-07/dont-cherry-pick-magtf)

“Transition to the F-35B
The F-35B will not only contribute to lethality and precision with its low-observable, penetrating strike capabilities, but more important, to the commander’s overall situational awareness on the battlefields of the future. Whether providing dedicated support to the MAGTF or supporting the joint force air component commander per the Omnibus Agreement of 1986 (a joint agreement that affirmed the use and apportionment of organic Marine aviation assets between the MAGTF commander and the joint force air component commander), the Marine Corps’ F-35B will also be capable of maintaining and distributing a single, integrated air-ground operational picture. This information will supply immediate, real-time intelligence and target discrimination in the MAGTF and joint battlespace, providing invaluable input to a commander’s decision cycle. This information will be distributed from multi-functional command and control centers, across cockpits, and down to our distributed ground maneuver forces, providing for a level of awareness and decision-making never before achieved and facilitating MAGTF and joint force integration, coordination, and employment.

By 2014, the Marine Corps F-35B will be the only fifth-generation TACAIR platform capable of STOVL operations from either an expeditionary sea-based platform or austere forward operating base, complete with a forward-deployed aviation logistics package. Ground forces engaged in myriad operations will have organic TACAIR F-35Bs forward-deployed with them, ready to apply time-sensitive effects. The F-35B’s capabilities will improve air-ground integration through enhanced situational awareness, multi-spectral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, information distribution and exchange, digital interoperability, digital close air support, and the application of precision weapons with the low collateral damage Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) II.

The F-35B will also contribute advanced airborne electronic attack capabilities as part of a networked, system-of-systems approach. Through employment of the emergent Next-Generation Jammer system and digital interoperability with other distributed electronic warfare capabilities carried as payloads on Tier II and III unmanned aerial vehicle systems, the F-35 will be capable of providing airborne electronic attack that is proximal to the threat and on-call to the lowest echelon commander on the ground.

All of these TACAIR capabilities will foster advancements in battlefield command and situational awareness for the MAGTF and joint force. Bolstered by the aviation combat element, the MAGTF is postured to execute responsive, persistent, lethal, and adaptive full-spectrum operations in any environment or operational phase, anywhere around the world.

Our Marine combined-arms force is a vital asset that the joint force commander relies on to achieve his operational and strategic objectives for our nation. Marine TACAIR is inextricably linked to this whole, regardless of the mission, level of conflict, or area of operation, and its role is secure. The Marine Corps cannot allow itself to become fixated on any one component or a single mission. As Lieutenant General Trainor correctly exhorts us to “assess and define” our TACAIR requirements, we must ensure that we properly articulate these requirements within the context of our larger MAGTF organization”.

USMC high-end fastmover tacair is not solely intended to be deployed at the whim of the USN and its carrier force. As it very definitely is now. STOVL gives wider deployment options on LHA’s and hard-surface shore bases that conventional types would not be able to operate out of. The concept is to put air support organic with the ground forces and NOT organic with the naval group.

As has been said many times on this thread and others Kandahar International is all the proof of this sort of thing you need. Able to operate STOL capable transports, choppers and manned/unmanned slow-movers until its improvement. STOVL allowed RAF and USMC Harrier units to deploy to the base and constitute the only fast-mover capability in the area until the runway was improved sufficiently to allow RAF GR4’s and, more recently, USMC F/A-18C’s and D’s. To quote Wg Cdr Hedley, CO 3sqdn, before they transitioned to Typhoon

The unique flexibility of the Harrier is ideally suited to the missions and was the only fast jet able to operate from Kandahar’s failed runway.If we had not been war fighting, the airfield would have been closed.

STOVL gives rapid deployment forces options that, otherwise, they simply may not have. F-35B most certainly doesnt need a USN CVN to be deployed successfully and usefully. Modern combat aircraft have re-written the paradigm that wing level deployments are necessary as well. With enhanced sensor fusion allied to reliable pgm’s you simply dont need to put huge numbers of planes across a target to ensure its reduction.