I thought QE was the lead ship :confused:

More importantly where do we find the dock space to build two in tandem!!!

does the UK really need US permission to fire cruise missiles?

No, but, US technical assistance in strike planning has been extremely valuable in taking our TLAM shots. In a coordinated strike the US has ISTAR assets that we simply cant match so we would have to shoot without the kind of pre-strike reconaissance that would support us if we had the US onboard.

The US Govt also has the right, naturally, to veto sales of replacement weapons to us if it wished to express its displeasure. Naturally that would have a knock-on effect the next time they wanted support in an action somewhere, so, it, presumably, would be a carefully thought out decision to deny the sale to us!.

It is for the former reason, lack of deep ISTAR, that I really like a comment that Distiller made about BrahMos a few threads ago. Not the Indian Navy antiship version he was discussing, but, the Indian Army’s precision land-attack variant. If that weapon is as accurate as its cracked up to be a 300km very short target-to-strike cycle weapon could offset the lightness in land attack that we will have post-GR9 Carrier Strike and until -35C is worked up in the early 2020’s. Would be interesting to see how BrahMos VLS compares to strike-length Mk41 or Sylver A70 in terms of ship impact..

Absolutely. I make no comment about them being likely scenario’s, plausible ones or ones with a particularly good chance of success!. I’m simply stating that it is dangerous to look at a scenario through just a single filter.

As for threatening a nuclear power – do you think any democratically elected government would survive threatening the innocent civillians of even a hostile state with nuclear annihilation if they themselves were not threatening us in the same way?!. Perhaps you forget the furore that the idiot politicians in this country stoked up over the Belgrano!.

Uh, no, in the 2015 timeframe all we would have to do is stick 3 type 45s down there fully loaded out and it could stop their entire airforce, and any 2 SSNs could stop their entire navy.

This is of course if we have warning, if not then I think the typhoons at MP would get a lot of work and go through a good chunk of their missile stockpile.

The guy on ARRSE is hard to argue with. There is always the unforeseeable and that needs preparing for, but, nearly anyway you look at this conventionally the worst case is that an entebbe or pebble island style SF attack takes out MPA’s ability to operate aircraft and severs reinforcement from UK. A follow up seaborne assault then lands heavier forces that are singularly unable to bring enough combat power to reduce the british forces in their lodgements.

Problem that has is that it fails to cover the unconventional approaches.

Me, i’d use the SF attack to cover, and prevent a british move against, a lodgement on west falkland. MPA without the airstrip is defensive. If the strip is out for a few days then arg forces dig in hard with every antiair weapon they possess. Then claim equal right of sovereignty in the UN and start a claim on the oil rights based on possession.

Or, if I want to play nasty, I take west falkland and hold the islanders as illegals and threaten their wellbeing if the uk doesn’t vacate. Without the forces to go offensive its a fait accompli for the british. Wont win argentina any prizes for humanitarian concerns, but, 3bn in oil buys much forgiveness!.

I expect the RAF now sees the F35C purchase as replacing the Tornados in the 2020s. The question is will there be a Fleet Air Arm? It has long been the RAF’s aim to get rid of the FAA, I think they are on the verge of success.

I agree. STOVL brought a chance of true jointness between the services.

CATOBAR means, as predicted, one service loses big time. We now have 7 years or so of the RAF doing their damnedest to strangle carrier strike at birth. Scrapping Joint Force Harrier while being allowed to keep this notion of joint ops for JSF is a hell of an achievement for the light blue. Makes you wonder how they got away with that.

All those who were whining about payload range and internal carriage of larger weapons you now see how meaningless those values are and what the real costs of CATOBAR could be.

Mod Edit: Quoted post deleted.

So you think that out of even a 40+ aircraft purchase using the lowest number publically mooted (with the gap now predicted before service entry numbers are likely to be significantly higher than that) that only 12 airframes could be kept deployable?.

Just who do you think you are trying to kid?.

The only thing i’d say though is Cameron definitely didn’t seem to want the 2nd carrier. Anything can happen in 9 years, hardly worth worrying about it.

The good news seems to be a return to REAL carrier aviation for the first time in 42 years, less of a hit on the surface fleet than feared and the retention of all the amphibs bar possibly Ocean?

BBC reporting that we lose Ark Royal a few years early though.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11570593

Old,

For pity’s sake man read who wrote the article before flashing it up as credible. The author is hardly unbiased is he?.

The underlying message in his commentry is that RAF pilots aren’t maritime specialists, to use an americanism, ‘well duh big wed twuck!’. The answer to this is professionalism and good leadership until the inexperienced become experienced. No different than would be necessary to bring novice FAA pilots through.

The whole idea of crab pilots not wanting to go to sea is, historically, accurate but, like the author, somewhat rearward facing. Joint Force F-35B, were it to happen, would be a sea/land based outfit from its inception therefore ANY light blue pilot opting for F-35B as a career path would KNOW that it would include deployment afloat.

I’m very surprised Ward fails to mention the attraction of naval life especially to young pilots without family/dependants. That attraction certainly had a hand in putting me in a dark blue suit at 18 so I can speak from personal experience when I say Ward is selling the service short. It does seem to be unimportant in his drive to rid the navy of any RAF influence though. I’d suggest that this article is far more to do with that mission than it is a fair appraisal of the possibilities for Joint Force F-35B.

Chox,

Even if you accept (as indeed I do) that carriers were needed in 1982, that does not provide a case for buying carriers now.

The problem is that carriers aren’t a pick-up and put down solution. To say that a carrier capability is needed today but not tomorrow is nonsensical. If you accept that carriers have been crucial in the expeditionary roles that the Govt has undertaken you have to accept the need for that capability in the order of battle.

Its absurd to say that the Govt simply shouldn’t take part in military actions we cant afford to be entangled in. We have obligations and responsibilities that we just cannot brush away because they are now difficult to meet. What happens if we ditch our allies in the fashion you suggest and then find we need them one day – when we need a friendly escort to cover a NATO slot for us while we ramp up ops in the South Atlantic or if we need urgent satellite imagery of sites in Guatemala?!.

Naturally, anyone could claim that any potential future scenario might require carrier power but there are two key points here – firstly, this doesn’t mean that our participation in any of these future conflicts is essential, and secondly, even if we have the capacity and will to participate, what kind of significance is a dozen F35s if not merely over-priced tokenism?

The CVF’s are designed to support a sortie rate of 108 sorties first day dropping to 70 sorties per day for the next couple of weeks followed by half that for another couple of weeks. A 32 plane group can service that sortie rate with margins left over for attrition or planes inadvertently slipping off the deck in bad weather!. Even the smallest numbers for the purchase of F-35 leaked to the media is sufficient to put those aircraft on the carrier deck.

Either way, the concept of sacrificing so much for so little is just ludicrous.

Yet you have still to detail despite repeated, and genuine, requests from several posters what sacrifice the GR4 actually represents?. At least in terms of your UK mainland defence agenda anyway?.