Trident

A split buy of early F-35B deliveries, to be followed later by F-35Cs would appear to offer most of the benefits without the drawbacks. Commit to buy a smallish number of STOVL airframes now and complete the first carrier unmodified, operate both until the second carrier (to be fitted with EMALS and E-2Ds) and CV F-35s come online. At that point, put the first ship through refit into catapult configuration and turn the F-35Bs over to the RAF, who can still reinforce the air group (STOVL aircraft can after all operate just fine from conventional carriers). Would that push the spending commitments for the redesign etc. out far enough?

That approach offers the most flexibility with the minimum up-front costs. It also allows for the operational service evaluation of F-35B STOVL in UK service and for the capability to be shaped by the developing global threat environment and the, theoretically, improving national financial stance.

The advantage is almost 200 miles (more than 40%) according to LM and carrying StormShadow or external fuel will compromise RCS somewhat.Also, as I have mentioned a few times already, longer maximum radius means longer loiter at short ranges.

The last figures I saw released were a predicted combat radius of roughly 550nm for F-35C and 400nm for F-35B have these now been officially revised?. As I have mentioned a few times F-35B can offset 35C’s loiter advantage with its lower fuel reserve requirement back over the carrier. F-35B cannot conceivably bolter, so, the need to maintain recovery reserves for go-rounds, as an arrested recovery type is obliged to maintain, is simply not needed – thats fuel that is mission useable. Stormshadow carriage RCS increase is only marginally an issue because the aircraft doesnt need to travel the last few hundred km’s with the missile!. The external tank option would, presumably, see the tank fuel used first and the airframe being ‘cleaned up’ prior to target ingress.

I find it rather baffling that the RN considers its ISTAR capabilities insufficient for long range strikes while simultaneously insisting that those same assets are capable of supporting a sortie rate which mandates a 65000 ton ship.

Why?. The kind of ISTAR you need to support near-realtime targetting 600-700nm, beyond practical support from the carrier group, deep is expensive. You are looking at imaging satellite’s and, possibly, LO HALE UAV’s. Nothing that might be considered organic to the carrier group. If we see the development of Mantis-style UAV’s in the naval environment we will see plenty of capability at shorter depths, as governed by LOS/OTH Comms relay, from those kinds of persistent platforms. In short ISTAR over the tactical battlespace and its approaches is a genuine feasibility. Strategic-ISTAR we wont be able to afford for a while. Again, if we are shooting at fixed targets, why are we sending a manned fighter when we have perfectly adequate TLAM?.

and then there is the sticky issue of AEW – wouldn’t Hawkeyes launched from catapults alleviate the ISTAR concerns?

No. You wont have enough E-2’s embarked to risk them anywhere near an exposed position. Hawkeye is good for air/surface surveillance and air battle management. Great, I’d actually say near indispensible, for blue-water sea control. Not much use for targetting ashore though. Which is the raison d’etre for CVF and UK carrier Strike. We need something different for ISTAR off CVF.

No, but it takes the basically well-known concept of power transmission by shaft beyond the familiar envelope in lightweight applications (clutches and gearboxes with similar ratings are exceedingly rare in the aerospace world).

Hardly unknown though. Mi-26 dumps 22000shp through its gearbox, CH-53E pushes over 12000shp through its. This is a new slant on well understood basic technology and it has been testing for a decade now. I dont think I’ve read anything yet of a -35B pilot reporting a horrible grinding sound just before the whole fan unit jumped out of the airframe!.

I think you implied EMALS was more risky not long ago and that is indeed a very pertinent example, but not in the way you intended. Actually, the issue in both cases is the same – the fundamental principle (turbo-shaft powertrains and linear electric motors, respectively) is well understood, but both projects face the challenge of scaling it up to unprecedented levels.

I’d disagree with the idea that linear motors are well understood in context though. As stated people have put powerful turboshafts in aircraft and pumped the power through transfer boxes before. No-one has ever put a linear motor of the EMALS magnitude aboard a ship before. I dont doubt that EMALS will result in a catapult of sufficient throw-weight. I do have serious doubts as to the impact of an EMALS launch impulse on the multitudes of unshielded ‘non-critical’ ships systems. I have doubts as to the ability of the team to manage the external ‘broadcast’ EM spike and I am a little concerned about EMP effects on the aircraft on the catapult and on its weapons and systems.

Right now EMALS is not an option for the RN. Until its at sea and working reliably the only choice we have, for cats, are steam and C13’s which nobody wants.

The F-35B will work eventually, but there may well be some unanticipated problems that cause delays and cost overruns along the way, it is also very likely to be somewhat more expensive to operate than the other versions.

The extra operating costs of STOVL support being more than offset by the cheaper costs of operating the carriers.

What kind of opponent requires VLO stealth to penetrate his defences and high sortie rates but lacks any blue water capabilities whatsoever?

All those countries that rely on the ‘terror’ of imperious double-digit style SAMs to cover their territory while scarcely being able to field a competent frigate flotilla or a Maritime Patrol force worthy of the name!. Think Op Allied Force!. Much easier to dot a few S-300 batteries about than build up a sea control force capable of continuous coverage 200nm offshore.

The Carrier Strike concept appears to result in a carrier which is expensive overkill for Afghanistan-type scenarios, yet ill-suited to high-intensity conflicts. Bizarrely, it seems to be sized for the latter but mostly equipped for the former which is what probably confuses most people (me included).

You may be forgetting how the Afghanistan operation started. Almost all the tacair over theatre was carrier-based. It is perfectly suited for Afghanistan style air campaigns. It is perfectly suited for a latter-day Falklands style operation. With half the airgroup landed and an enhanced EMF plus Commando Helicopter Force transport and attack chopper elements aboard its perfectly suited for Seirra Leone type ops with only a T23 and an RFA for company. Its perfectly suited for Op Allied Force style operations. In short its a ‘cheap’ carrier that will do everything required of a carrier, and more, apart from the Red Storm Rising scenario against the massed Backfire Regiments and the mighty Red Banner Fleet. If someone can tell me why, genuinely, that is a problem I’d love to hear it!.

The reason I asked about Gripen is that it has a STOL capability.You suggested that the only aircraft that could have operated at an austere or restricted forward base is the Harrier, and presumably in future the F-35, because the runway length to launch conventional fighters wasn’t available. I was wondering if the Gripen could also have operated under those conditions.

Again Flanker the question is one of relevence. Gripen possibly could operate from the unprepared strip that we found in Kandahar. Sea Gripen likely could be anticipated to be able to fly off a CVF-length deck. Thing is that, at the time, we had neither Gripen or CVF we had GR9 and CVS so STOVL allowed us to deploy a capability were we wouldnt have been able to otherwise….not for the first time.

The other question is whether the proposed Sea Gripen could operate off the CVFs, and if this alternative would be cheaper than the F-35B/C or F/A-18E/F options.

Would Sea Gripen, in place of F-35 or Super Hornet, allow us to carry forward the kind of expeditionary capability we’ve employed while still providing aircraft for the carrier airwing. Probably yes it would…if it existed. It doesnt though – which is a problem.

Thing is that STOBAR, with an already short-legged aircraft, is foolish as it demands a number of buddy-stored aircraft to keep a strike package topped off while it launches. Even if that weren’t the case the thing is that, like the idea of LCA(N) being a solution, these latter-day Skyhawks are unnecessary. The only reason we will need another solution is if STOVL folds and, even then, we have the ‘luxury’ of rolling on with GR9 and STOVL QE while we evaluate options for PoW and the future shape of the capability.

By the latter half of the decade funding a Sea Gripen, near from scratch, for a roughly 30yr old airframe design may not look to offer so much promise if we want 20yrs out of whatever we go to. Rafale and Hornet would be similar in terms of development life and residual capabilities but would, at least, offer proven and mature operational credentials. By the late 20-teens we should be through the worst part of the current financial turmoil and, so, our options should be broader than they are today. I cant see how either of the naval light-fighters would offer anything we really want by that time?.

The response speed of a Super Tuc or an AT-6B would be similar to that of an A-10, which is said to be the most popular and successful CAS aircraft operating in Afghanistan.

So you are agreed the word ‘slow’ applies then?.

The ‘sensor dwell’ of these turboprops – six hours endurance – would seem more than adequate, and while they can carry less ordnance than a fast jet, the trend in Afghanistan has been towards smaller, precision weapons, rather than big bang bombs, so is that a problem?

Are you saying that an AT-6 can carry a Sniper pod, worthwhile ordnance load AND still put in 6hrs in the air?. I would be quite suprised by that if true!.

As for vulnerability to ground fire, presumably they could operate in similar fashion to the A-10s and/or AH-64s, standing off beyond DshK range?

They cant operate similar to either as they aren’t as tough as the Warthog and cant fly through trashfire to locate their targets and if they stop to observe terrain/sites, as an AH64 would, they’ll have certain issues with several well established laws of physics!.

Flying STOVL aircraft from conventional bases, like during the first Iraq war or in Afghanistan, is not STOVL ops.

Nope. We couldnt operate Jaguar GR3 or Tornado GR4 from Kandahar and we had a requirement for fast jet CAS in support of deployed forces. By any token STOVL was an enabler for capability deployment where none would have existed, with UK forces, otherwise. Could we have bought A-10’s or another short-field capable type and used them from an ‘unprepared’ strip instead of Harrier?. Yes – but we dont get the sea-basing option we do with Harrier. So its a stupid option. STOVL is proven for expeditionary ops and as a land/sea base force multiplier.

Saying its not pure ‘STOVL ops’ does nothing to reduce the usefulness of STOVL.

That’s what helicopters are for, and what developments like the Sikorsky X2 will make even more performant in the future.

Apples and Oranges. A helicopter isnt doing the high-end taskings that a STOVL-F18C equivalent is doing. You cannot replace the single STOVL jet without buying the Sikorsky AND a high-end platform.

But building a large carrier for STOVL ops is simply pointless. And if COSTS are the main driver for going STOVL I can only refer to another of my posts on that topic: http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showpost.php?p=1638265&postcount=752

Fundamental misunderstanding of CVF there. We are building a large carrier to support the sortie rate…..not the STOVL jet. If we want the sortie rate we have determined necessary we have to build the carrier large as a smaller ship, whilst capable of operating the jet, will NOT do the job required.

Sounds like this is the second phase of the Army’s inter-service strike campaign. First was Dannat with his absurdities and now we see a more ‘moderated and reasonable’ press leak that sees the army keep most of its capability. That based on the back of an Afghan campaign that the other services have already noted has a finite timeline.

Dont think this one quite rings true.

The RN could certainly offer up the remaining 42’s for 5 hulls, but, for the next few years the T22B3’s (presumably the other 4 in our noble sacrifice) will be needed for their C3 facilities not to mention a few less well-publicised tasks they are well outfitted for.

Dropping even the 42’s wouldn’t come without a price either – losing 5 hulls would likely see one of our permanent taskings dropped. Seeings we cant drop APT(N) or (S) it would likely have to be a NATO slot or the IO tasking. Thats going to cause some ripples with the less well-off nations asking why we are shirking our duty!.

The question then geogen is, if F35 is going to try to bypass tough SAM defences, same as Hornet would have to, as opposed to engaging them isn’t that advantage F35 regardless?.

Hornet, in your concept, is significantly more restricted in its flight envelope in non permissive air simply owing to its higher signature.

Also who said we would pay for Meteor integration with super hornet?. As was pointed out on the last thread the Aussies are taking -9X over their ASRAAM’s to avoid integration costs!.

Your Hornet configuration there is VERY notional!

We are. The question is whether it is worth challenging ignorance or not.

Simple answer is that we needed more capability than AEGIS/SPY-1/SM2 offered when the competition was run.

The SPY-1x/SPG combination is vastly inferior, in ship-to-ship terms, than UKPAAMS. The BAE Sampson array is seeing further over the horizon and the active missile has no fire-channel constraints.

To the USN this is no issue as they have the simple expedient of just deploying more and more AEGIS ships until the threat is met – also they can rely, pretty much, on the presence of a friendly E-2D and CEC. The RN cannot rely on such luxuries being present so the need is for the shipboard system to be making up some of the shortfall.

Had the offer, at the time, been equal participation in SPY-3 and an offer of SM-6 then, perhaps, the decision may have been different, but, that is the level of capabilty we required and that is what we have with Sea Viper.