I might also add that it seems like 5th generation fighters are moving away from using a dedicated AEW aircraft to a more network centered set up.
if you have 1 awac its a large target. if you have 5 stealthy F-35s widely separated and on different vectors, then what 1 sees they all see.
There was a lot of talk in a Lockheed presentation awhile back about F-22s/F-35s still lingering around after having used up there missiles to relay target data to legacy platforms.
I agree that distributed assets are definitely the way forward. Not so much because of the 1 large target, but, more for the issue that 1 aircraft can only be in one place at one time, pretty much, doing one job. If you can only have 3 Hawkeyes in your airgroup you are going to, understandably, be fairly careful with their deployment.
To support Carrier Strike we need persistent multirole, all-weather, ISTAR and not just airborne radar. Personally I prefer a navalised MALE UAV carrying a Searchwater class radar capable, as seen with the ASaC7, of SAR spot/strip imaging as well as area surveillance and, most critically, expendable or, rather, riskable if the situation justifies it. In otherwords a platform that you can forward deploy to support your operations ashore other than just hold back covering the fleet assembly area.
My solution to fleet ISTAR coverage, in lieu of Hawkeye, would be a hi/lo mix of carrier borne ‘BAE Sea Mantis’ MALE UAV’s plus escort based radar-equipped Boeing MQ-18’s netted into a Merlin ASaC as offboard discrete C3 node. You get the persistance, you get the flexibility, you get the operational discretion and, if you lose a platform, you get to VERTREP a few crates over from your fleet logistics area and assemble the replacement in the hangar with minimal impact to operations.
STOVL came about because the RAF did not think their Airfields would last very long in the face of a Soviet attack. The RN only got into STOVL, after the CVA Carriers were cancelled -with the help of the RAF ‘moving’ Australia.
Irrelevent when its the performance of the STOVL type that you are lionising isnt it?.
My point about the Roc was that the FAA had it because, as is always the case, the RAF does not care at all about aircraft at sea. The RAF had ‘owned all the RN’s aircraft in the 1920’s to late 30’s.
You can talk about the 20’s and 30’s all you like. I’ll talk about the financial realities of today. The F-35B deal is win-win for both the dark blue and light blue. The RAF get expeditionary strike capability they would lose almost completely with Jaguar and Harrier, they get it half funded by the navy and they get the ‘jointness’ credentials to shield it behind. The RN get carte blanche to progress with the carriers without light blue interference and only have to pay a percentage for the airwing. They get to leverage light blue assets if the need for a surge capacity occurs and get away with lean ops costs during peacetime.
You sure you wanted to quote that article?
By the end of July, Lockheed’s four STOVL flight-test aircraft had completed 74 out of 95 scheduled flights. Stevens had attributed the flight-test delays to poor reliability on key components, such as thermal cooling fans, door actuators and power system switches. The F-35B’s reliability problems do not require “fundamental engineering” changes and the aircraft “has a good flying character”, Stevens says
74 test flights doesnt seem to indicate the thing is not airworthy does it?. No fundamental engineering changes required?. Not quite the picture of doom and gloom being hinted at is it?.
Well since they ended up with very poor aircraft largely as a legacy of RAF control of FAA aircraft in the 1920’s and 30’s, I think they might get the current debate rather too well actually.
And of course the SHAR was a Fleet Air Arm Aircraft, that was prematurely retired -leaving the RN with no Fleet Air Defence Fighter- with the formation of the joint Harrier force…
Can you not see the irony in how deeply you are contradicting yourself here?
You are eulogising on the record of the fleet air arm, denigrating stovl, when it was a compromised stovl design that gave the fleet air arm their finest hour in recent decades!.
F-35B is still a low observable, supersonic, BVR capable fighter with advanced sensor fusion. Its scarcely comparable, relatively, to a fighter obsolete at the start of ww2 like the Roc!.
In reply to your comment about proper AEW. Its easier to field a few battery’s of double digit SAM’s than it is to field the capability to search and target a naval group at sea. Consequently we will need the ability to face advanced air defences more than we need hawkeye.
I am absolutely sure that the poor sods who had to fly Rocs and Barracudas in WW2 would recognise that attitude 😉
Yet the task force was very glad of SHAR in 82. Funny how times change isn’t it?
Edit: nocuts you are right on the mark with the meteor comment.
You miss my point Jonesey,the F35C has longer range to start with so …ergo if you fit the same tanks to it as you do the F35B then the ‘C’ will still have longer range…n’est pa ??
Range/endurance is always critical with a military jetMind you …if thay do go catobar with cvf – they could do with ditching the silly Aft Island…it will get in the way of Angled Deck ops 😉
Not so mate I understood your point perfectly. I’ve seen the same goalpost shift done before! 🙂
People fixate on one plane being better than the other and decide that its important. Truth is that its the whole capability that is important and that individual aircraft performance values are way down the scale.
Errr…please sir…what happens if you bolt those same external tanks to a F35c…cor fork me it goes even further 🙂
So what Baz?. Everyone is saying that the F-35C’s range is critical – well F-35B is doing the same with tanks!.
except when it does of course !!
When is that then?. When we have to oppose regimental strength Backfire strikes….oh er no thats right they dont exist anymore. How about when we face off against the mighty Chinese blue-water fleet…….oh yeah thats right….thats 20 years away and we arent likely to be doing that alone. Er how about…..hmmm. See the point?.
This is what I’m saying Baz….we need the capability to do Carrier Strike ONLY right now. We have a window before other players come in to contest blue-water transit that will DEMAND we have a Fleet Carrier capability. We also have a funding crunch because of objective financial realities.
YOU are talking about nice to have contingency capabilities – just in case they are needed. We cant afford them. We get the carriers and they can be modified later as we need them to be – when the threat environment develops. For now you are asking for luxuries when we will be doing well to get the basics.
Actually the decision on the F35 variant isn’t for a year or two. As has been mentioned, its perfectly feasible for the CATOBAR kit to be integrated if the decision is taken pre-final asembly/fitout.
The decision was made in September 2002. It was for F-35B.
It can be reviewed within a year and if F-35B is unsat at that time we can look at CATOBAR and make a decision on EMALS. At present if the decision was taken it would be for C13 steam cats and the RN dont want them.
Haven’t we covered all this nonsense of payload/range, support aircraft and costs multiple times?.
Why are some of you persisting with the idea that any of this matters?.
Payload range is a tactical issue only. More important is aircraft availability in the first place. After all the superior payload/range figures of F/A-18E over F-35B dont mean a thing if the Hornet is sat on its base in Scotland while its pilot is doing CATOBAR workups in the US!.
As stated, ad nauseum, the difference in range between the 35C and 35B models is about 150nm on the radius. Big deal!. We get that back by giving the 35B external tanks to be jettisoned after launch….or by having it carry Storm Shadow. There is your 150nm back.
As for Support aircraft unuseable because of STOVL. Who cares?. STOVL doesnt need the kind of support tanking undertaken organically in the fleet anyway. STOVL doesnt need twenty minutes to form up strike packages and doesnt often see bolters on landing.
I dont know how many times people have to be told this but CVF isnt a fleet carrier and isnt meant to be a fleet carrier, despite its size, so it doesnt NEED a blue water relevant AEW platform like Hawkeye. The Charles de Gaulle could have undertaken every mission that its steamed on, in its operational history, without E-2’s aboard….I see no reason why our deployments would be any different. There is no blue-water threat and none on the horizon that SSN’s cant deal with as well.
Lastly costs. Its simple, simple logic. STOVL loads the costs of deployment on the aircraft and CATOBAR loads it on the ship. This means that with STOVL reducing the aircraft buy reduces the wholelife costs of the programme. CATOBAR forces you to pay for the deployment costs whether you buy ten planes or a hundred – its a fixed cost and is recurring.
Immediate land/sea deployment options for STOVL are a MASSIVE force multiplier. As I’ve said running the numbers for this is instructive. To maintain the Joint Force Harrier capability of concurrent expeditionary land and sea deployment, with F-35B, takes 56 airframes:
Naval Strike Wing – 14 airframes
1 sqdn – 12 airframes
4 sqdn – 12 airframes
20sqdn – 12 airframes
Attr/Res – 6 airframes
This allows the deployment option of NSW to the duty carrier. One of the frontline RAF sqdns to a shore duty and the second to be on standdown. NSW would need to keep maybe as much as a 2-1 ratio of pilots to airframes and would need to periodically cycle airframes through the OCU and attrition reserve to maintain peak efficiency.
To generate this combat power with F/A-18 or Rafale takes 72 aircraft in 6 small (9a/c) squadrons as far as I can work it out. At least I cant do it with less while still leaving a meaningful detachment on the carrier at any one time.
Essentially you would have to cycle sqdns between Land duties, carrier workups/sea duty and a surge reserve/standdown state at 3 month cycle times. 2 squadrons being tasked to each at any one time to allow one to rotate off and leave a ‘worked-up’ capability in place. To clarify:
800 – 9 airframes
801 – 9 airframes
802 – 9 airframes
1sq – 9 airframes
4sq – 9 airframes
617 – 9 airframes
899 – 12 airframes
Attr/Res – 6 airframes
Cycle1: Sea task – 800/801; Shore task 802/1sqdn; standdown/training 4sqdn/617sqdn
Cycle2: Sea task – 617/800; Shore task 801/802; standdown/training 1sqdn/4sqdn
Cycle3: Sea task – 4sq/617; shore task 800/801; standdown/training 802/1sqdn
etc
This allows us to have 18 aircraft immediately available on the carrier deck, with 9 guaranteed to be fully worked-up at all times, plus another 9 deployable from the standdown pool that had just rotated off – for a ‘surge’ capability of up to 27 airframes aboard ship. Additional airframes coming from the OCU/alternate squadrons as and when pilots could be deck-qualified to deploy them.
The only alternate I can see to this is to recreate permanent naval squadrons. Perhaps 800, 801 and 899 all formed with 14 airframes. With the same attrition reserve that means 48 aircraft, but, with the fun aspect that the RN get to pay for them all. Plus the small detail that we lose a sqdn level expeditionary capability from UK strength.
Using ‘flyaway’ unit costs is moronic, but, seems popular in the ‘top trumps’ culture on these boards these days. Using objective values of 100mn for a F35B and 75mn for an F/A-18 or Rafale means that the F-35B buy would be £5.6bn of which the RN may have to find 2.8bn. The joint force hornet buy would be £5.4bn of which the RN pays £2.7bn but then has to go and buy 4 EMALS cats at £20mn a piece for starters!. Or the 48 Hornet Fleet Air Arm renaissance plan that costs the Navy £3.6bn and all those lovely recurring CATOBAR expenses.
So, rough rule of thumb, the CATOBAR FAA-only solution is an easy £billion more expensive. Thats either Astute-8, T45’s 7&8, maybe as many as 3 T26’s or perhaps a scratch developed Sea Mantis UAV i.e things a whole LOT more useful than an aircraft who principle advantage is a mere 150nm in range.
CVF-UK took the selected Thales’ CATOBAR design and had them come up with both CATOBAR and STOVL configurations of the same ship.
Not to engineering build blueprint level!. Once again FJCA downselect in late 02 defined what the carrier was to be built as. Margins were to be added for the later inclusion of CATOBAR if and when necessary. It doesnt mean that its a damned button push and we start build of the alternate layout!!!.
Do you know how much work goes in to producing the detailed engineering designs that the ship will be fabricated off?. We haven’t paid for a full set of blueprints for CATOBAR arrangement just on the off-chance that F-35B doesn’t work. We also are not going to kick F-35B into the long grass just on the basis that LockMart need to specify more resilient door actuators for its airframe!.
I know some of you are hoping for a rebirth of the Fleet Air Arms glory days but, honestly, boys and girls this isn’t the budgetary climate that is going to happen in. I know, for most, it is out of a genuine desire for the RN to be approaching USN levels of capability but, before we try to recover the old Britannia rules the waves bit, lets get the ships and subs we need first eh?.
The flashy Fleet Carriers that let us rebuild the grand fleet may happen in the future but, right now, STOVL fits the bill for Carrier Strike and the RAF are willing to pay their share….thats a huge win for the RN ok?!.
Actually you have it backwards. Its a CATOBAR design that’s been adapted to STOVL. There is room specifically for the catapults, arresting rear, an extra gas turbine for extra power production, and a steam generation boiler. They decided it it was a lot easier to bolt a ski-jump onto a CATOBAR carrier than end up screwed with a pure STOVL design if something went wrong with the F-35B.
Nope. There is margin for catapults and arresting gear – I did state as much myself (Note: that was margin left for steam cats and conventional arresting gear as the requirements for EMALS are, still, something of a variable). They did not design a catobar carrier and remove the catobar bits as you assert though.
CVF-FR took the baseline STOVL design and ADDED two C13’s, auxilliary boilers and arresting gear, plus other changes, and added about 9000tons to the deep load displacement to make it all fit together. Voila Porte Avions 2.
Dont talk wet, if that was the case the govt would have had to have ordered the JCA at the same time as the carriers and confirm its comittment to the F-35B and CVF. It DIDN’T, why because it has the slack in build program to allow the F-35B to prove itself before the final format carrier features enter the construction cycle.
FJCA downselect was the project milestone that determined how the carrier was going to be built. When stovl was chosen the theory was that we’d be running on with SHAR and GR9 for the first few years anyway. CVF-01 could be completed as STOVL regardless of the cancellation of the then nebulous X-35B. Catobar could be designed into cvf-02 and those plans used to retrofit the first ship at first major service.
You dont honestly think we’ve paid bae to create a full set of engineering blueprints for a catobar layout that we’d only need if stovl fell through?.
I dont think you quite appreciate the international implications of STOVL JSF failing do you?. Nor the subsequent pressure on LM to ensure that doesn’t happen!.
PA2 and CVF are not common designs there are a number of significant differences between the two. I’d encourage you to look into that before making silly statements.
We are not building the PA2 design so the C13 and arrestor fit from that design will not directly port across. We dont want steam cats, as the french went for, anyway for the reasons earlier stated.
Nocuts I disagree. There’s no reason why converting from STOBAR to CATOBAR would cause that much disruption. The design is sufficiently flexible to allow either option at either build time or when either ship is in refit. BAE via the aircraft carrier alliance is building large parts of the ship, and it also submitted a design to those specifications. BAE design, meet BAE manufacturing. Ok so it’s Thales design that’s been built but the principle remains the same. Manufacturing and Design departments knew at the point of submitting the proposal that it could be one or the other.
So you simply activate the alternative plan the second you know about it and have it signed in blood in triplicate by the UK government. You then re-forecast your purchasing requirements. If you’ve not yet authorized a supplier to start a particular phase or work, and for critical parts it should be micro managed to ensure quality, then you don’t have a problem as you simply don’t authorize any continuation of STOBAR specific parts for the CATOBAR ship. If the supplier knows they won’t be paid for any new work beyond what has been already approved, contracted for, and underway or too far down range to call off then you can guarantee they won’t work on something they’re not being paid for.
Long lead time items will sit around whatever you do. They’re long lead time for a reason such as complex manufacturing process or complex design process so you can’t change them at the drop of a hat, nor would you want to. Schedules can be adjusted and you’re assuming that switching to CATOBAR affects long lead time items to begin with. We’re talking about conversion work that could be done during a re-fit (yes it’s better to not change your mind and do it all during initial construction) but however you do it, those parts will spend some time in someone’s warehouse during the build.
I’m highly doubtful there will be workers sitting around with nothing to do during the build if the switch is made and components delivered to time and to quality. You simply activate your alternative project plan and re-forecast resource where necessary.
We aren’t talking about lego here gents!. Nocuts is exactly right here!.
Margin has been left in the design for the instalation of catapult and arresting gear, but, the carrier is designed as a STOVL ship. That was the point of the FJCA downselect!.
Adapting the design to cat ops will require new plans to be drawn up and modification far below the flight deck. Spaces would be needed for additional personnel, additional engineering workshops and stores and thats before we get to the power and control systems to run whichever type of cat we go for.
Remember the cat decision is far from an easy one as well. Stories abounded just last year that EMALS wasn’t going to scale up at all. Its a long way from guaranteed that it will enter service. Steam cats are not a real option for us as we haven’t had high pressure steam in the surface fleet since the Fearless was decommissioned. Dont underestimate the difficulties involved with your ‘simple’ switch!
The problem as far as I can tell (and I have only done casual research on this) was the F-35B was seriously overweight back in 2003/4, this meant it would have difficulty operating off the CVF’s and did not quite have the desired combat radius. They have sorted the problem now, but I believe one of the sacrifices was the size of the internal weapons bay.
The weight issue was resolved some years back. There was an issue with anticipated bringback weights stemming from that, but, these are mitigated with the SRL techniques referred to with the VAAC work.
Currently the issue is, allegedly, component reliability. LM are reporting multiple minor sub-systems experiencing failures….door actuators and the suchlike. Sounds like fairly normal developmental issues to me and the sort of thing that is exactly the purpose of the testing program to find.
There was meant to be a serious issue with heat dissipation and thermal management in the airframe with the heat exchange system not dumping waste heat into the fuel as it was supposed to. Seeings that they have just staged two -35A’s on an extended ferry flight as part of testing though I’d assume that the heat issue has been fixed!.
Why do we want access to the code without access to the development team? To ensure that the UK can produce upgrades and add-ons for a competitive price. If LM decide to charge a 10 billion for access to the team and code, its impossible to compete. Having access to the 8 million doesn’t mean we have to use it all.
Can we produce upgrades that sit neatly inside the 8mn lines of code happy in the knowledge that one of our new upgrade lines doesnt break something else later on?. Happens all the time in civvy coding….lost track of the number of serious faults I’ve seen introduced in code by seemingly innocuous bug-fixes. If I had a pound for every time I’ve heard ‘THAT shouldnt have happened!!!’ I’d be typing this from a much happier mental state!.
Do we need access to flight control? Well depends how the flight control works really. If we hang a missile on the side, will the flight control compensate? Or does it need the dynamics of that missile integrating to the FCS? Weapons and systems integration are the most important and useful to us though.
No intent to sound sarky but I would expect part of the agreement for weapons/systems upgrades to include the airframe interface!. Bit of a swizz if we dont have that included isnt it?!.
Super Hornet is, relatively low cost and very low operational risk. F35B is high risk and might very well be very high cost. One is a certainty and the other a gamble
Not really. Super Hornet necessitates CATOBAR so it definitely brings high operational costs and the, potential, risks associated with EMALS.
F-35B we KNOW avoids those costs, massively simplifies training and operational deployment by virtue of STOVL. The only risk is that it fails its operational criteria as we have, I believe, seen a production standard airframe undertake the full range of flight operations.