this is the best summary of the information on the web (re operational sovereignty) that i can find-

http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=11566

UK ‘confident’ over JSF software
Wednesday, December 09, 2009

The Ministry of Defence has said it is confident it will receive software code that controls the Joint Strike Fighter, despite US assertions that they will not deliver the source code to any of the programme’s international partners.

An MoD spokesman said: “The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is progressing well and the UK currently has the JSF data needed at this stage of the programme, and is confident that in future we will continue to receive the data needed to ensure that our requirements for operational sovereignty will be met.”

“This remains the basis of the agreements reached with the US in 2006.”

Jon Schreiber, who heads the JSF programme’s international affairs, told Reuters in November that no partner country will be getting the F-35 source code. “That includes everybody,” he said.

Although withholding the estimated 8 million lines of onboard software code needed to operate the F-35, the US is setting up a ‘reprogramming facility’ at Elgin Air Force base in Florida. The facility will be responsible for “electronic warfare mission data creation and rapid reprogramming for US military and foreign military (Coalition) partners.”

“New operational flight programmes will be disseminated out to everybody who’s flying the jet,” said Schreiber.

“Nobody’s happy with it completely,” he said, but “everybody’s satisfied and understands.”

In 2006, Lord Drayson had threatened British withdrawal from the JSF programme if the US did not provide the software.

Later that year, Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George Bush announced that Britain would be able to “successfully operate, upgrade, employ and maintain the Joint Strike Fighter such that the UK retains operational sovereignty of the aircraft.”

As I understood it from last I was in Wharton, admittedly several years back, was that we would have access to the compiler platform and the code as it related to things like weapons and systems integration, but, that we would not have access to flight control, engine management and basic platform source code.

Notionally that doesnt sound great, but, there is the observation to be made as to what we’d do with the flight control source code if we had it?. Its fairly standard practice in the comms game that if someone not manufacturer qualified tampers with kit then its support is voided. I dont know how much benefit there is to us in having access to 8 million lines of code without first having access to the team that wrote it?.

I’d agree that if we dont get the code and training to make the changes we, reasonably, could make use of that the F-35 program DOES need serious review. I wouldnt throw the thing away on the strength of not having complete source code access when it wont necessarily do anything for us to have it though.

Nocuts,

I am not sure if you suggesting that I am agenda lead or what I have read is agenda lead.

The latter I assure you!.

Finally a bit of topic but I find it rather ironic that for the price of CVF’s the UK could have likely brought 3 BPE’s type carries plus enough F-35B’s to operate from them

Problem with that alternate approach though is that 3 BPE’s couldnt match the UK Carrier Strike requirement. STOVL CVF can.

and for a serious increase in ground crew (see Jonesy’s posts) – this could easily exceed capital costs of £1/2 billion per carrier plus at least 20 odd extra deck crew, and if the UK copies US practice then the shooters will all be officers, so not particularly cheap deck crew either.

Ah no…USN CVN’s have upwards of 150 crew embarked solely for the operations and maintenance of the launching and recovery systems. The USN historically overman every role, because they can, even so though I’d be suprised if we could get that below 100 extra bodies embarked. Then we have the training pipeline to support those 100 bodies, then the upfront installation costs, then the sparing and year-on-year operational costs etc, etc. Over, say, the first 15 years of operations or so you’d anticipate the extra costs being in the £100’s of millions.

Nic,

The GR9 didn’t need to be based in Kandahar in the first place, and if you need to base CAS assets close to the combat zones then you can use Tigre gunships like the french are doing, or Apaches for the brits.

Catobar makes so much more sense, as would Hawkeye instead of seaking.

As for CVF, could it be that the RN wanted a STOVL design that they purposely made big enough to become a CATOBAR carrier, and once the design was frozen went: “Well it’s big enough to be CATOBAR, let’s buy F35Cs instead”. Could very well a RN scheme to get conventional carriers that they could not get otherwise.

1, Our requirement was for fixed wing AS WELL as rotary air support and the simple fact is that GR9 with STOVL was the ONLY option we had for the reasons previously given. Its that simple.

2, CATOBAR makes sense when there is a threat requirement that demands it. There isnt one. Keeping up CATOBAR costs – as your guys know too well. How many times have Aeronavale Hawkeyes made a critical contribution on ops and really earned their place?. Would a FREMM or two have been saved from cancellation if you’d have been deploying a cheaper STOVL-based carrier solution?.

You will say that you had no choice to do that when CdeG was being designed – rightly so – but we DO have that choice.

3,CVF is the size it is to support the sortie rate set in the Key Requirements phase. In many ways we drew lessons from the operational experience of your CVN…the same ones your designers brought forward for PA2. The size of the ship actually makes little difference to its cost…its the systems you put in it that bite. Better to have the ship big enough to do the job thats required rather than make it small and try to make do.

Oldnotbold

STOVL F35 B was the RAF’s, not the RN’s choice. F35 B has faced some military opposition in the UK for some time.

The FJCA downselect was MoD’s choice not the light or dark blues. The view in JFH is that F35B will do quite nicely and their lordships in the Admiralty are quite happy to have the RAF involved with the carriers and not opposing them quite so vigourously as last time. Apart from a few diehards on both sides who either want the FAA back as it was (and hang the expense presumably) or who want the RAF to be the sole aircraft operator in HM forces who is opposing F-35B?.

Ordering less aircraft allows EMALS to be fitted to the QE Class Aircraft Carriers, which would make very good sense. It also gives the RN back control of the Fleet Air Arm, from the RAF, again, good sense.

No. Ordering less aircraft allows the Defence Budget to be reduced at a time of fiscal tightness. The RN cant afford the renaissance of the Fleet Air Arm as some seem to be thinking of here. We NEED ships, we NEED SSN’s, we are ‘apparently’ fighting to keep hold of amphibs we’ve already paid for. STOVL WILL do the job for now because Clancy’s Backfires really aren’t just about the wrest control of the Atlantic for the Red Banner Fleet!.

The best outcome, for the UK, is the one that preserves the MAXIMUM operational capability and flexibility in BOTH the RN and the RAF. That is not achieved buy chopping the RAF to bits in order to stick a couple of squadrons of Super Hornets on wannabe Fleet Carriers who fulfil the Carrier Strike role no better than STOVL CVF would.

Ok so bottom line you contend its cheap, proven and flexible. What factors are you using, genuine question, to base those conclusions on?.

As stated, despite objective attempts to generate a solution, I cant get the same tasking coverage 56 F35B can undertake with less than 72 of any cat type. Is the Hornet anticipated to be so cheap that an extra 16 airframes wont change the equation?. I thought the australians were paying three billion quid plus change for 24?.

Then we have to add in immediate costs to shift to cats and the wholelife support costs associated.

Apart from some notional individual unit fly away cost which, surely, every serious observer of procurement knows is largely unrelated to the eventual package cost – what is there to base so much faith in Hornet’s that we look the other way when the real cost to deploy is considered and charge off headless to redesign the ships?.

The GR9 training piepline hasn’t drawn down, you misunderstand me. 20(R) sqn has gone, the Harrier training sqn is now 4(R) sqn formerly IV(AC)sqn. The way things are going, the next sqn to train pilots for carrier ops will be 899NAS once more…;)

No I got your meaning Russell I’m just of the opinion that the disband of 20 was related to the fact that GR9 is in its ‘twilight’ years. Would a frontline sqdn be given the tasking if GR9 wasn’t in its last few years of service?,

A new type would obviously necessitate a reformed OCU. The tie in to Wittering and its expeditionary emphasis seems too logical to pass up. The simplest and cheapest option is going to be to stand up 20 again and transition 4 sqdn directly to frontline F35 status with pilots fed through directly from the colocated training squadron.

I know what you are saying about 899 but we cant afford that!. Not when we are facing a possible austerity package on escorts and need to find money for an extra SSN or two.

Edit: IIRC GR9 was the only type that could operate out of Kandahar initially as it was too rough to take Tornado in its unprepared state and Jag didn’t have the hot and high margins to be of any use. STOVL will always give deployment options that conventional aircraft dont.

AKA “We know what you’re doing”.

Which is what makes the statement all the more bizarre. Russian subs staking out bomber bases in scotland goes back to the days of polaris and holy loch. We’ve never publicised the fact before for very obvious reasons!. Unless this is a message to the russians to say ‘look dont even bother anymore’ releasing this is a massive own goal for us.

Nocuts,
Dont forget that a component of ‘joint force lightning’ would still be the naval strike wing. Keeping the current squadron structures work fine for an initial capability at least.

NSW of 14 cabs plus 1, 4 and 20sqdn’s established with 12 a piece gives a requirement of 50 plus a small attrition reserve of half a dozen aircraft. That gives us the land and/or seabased capability envisaged.

Operationally you would have NSW routinely deployed with the active carrier. One light blue squadron would be on active shore duties while the other is in a training standdown cycle. Pilots and airframes could be cycled through from the OCU as necessary. Especially to keep the basic afloat squadron refreshed.

Edit: Any way I work through this to get the same operational flexibility with a cat type I end up needing an extra squadron or a gapping of the shore duties to allow the squadron to undertake carrier work ups. I dont believe 3 catobar squadrons would be able to cover the same taskings. Obviously I have a bias here so if someone can prove me wrong i’d love to see it?!

Which studies and with what criteria?. Cost neutral between a reduced buy of F35B and an equal number of of a catobar type?. Does the study cover airframe life over the wholelife of the capability?. Does it include the costs of covering the shore based capability 35B provides concurrent with its afloat role?.

Usually the answers to those questions are ‘no’ and its why the downselect has always come back with stovl.

I’ve seen contingency plans for stovl failing, but, absolutely NOTHING credible for a direct change.