JonesyWhy would anyone think Artisan is a full PESA or AESA?. The ships its being fitted to have no need of an expensive MFR set do they?. So why would they be fitted with one?.
The name of the set even gives this one away – ARTISAN-3D. Its a mechanical azimuth electronic elevation 3D search/track set with TI capability!. The pull through from MESA as I understand it is in the processing and is significant!.
JonesyTrue, but unless they’re regarded as disposable, why would you need to carry six of them? The German Braunschweig corvettes will carry two each.
Not disposable but cheap and compact enough to allow 6 to be embarked. Why 6?. Simple persistence. Look at the missions the UK vessel will need to undertake. Solo deployment MIOPS tasking, force protection of slow HVU’s. To keep this in context of the defence review we will not have all that many ships out on station, so, each ship we have out has to have some capability about it.
A 6 S-100 airgroup allows for the escort to put 3 up simultaneously, each covering a 120 deg. arc on the 30km ring, at the rough extent of the surface search set range, and exert complete control of a bubble of seaspace about 80km in diameter….just over 5000 sq.km!. Each flight is on station 6hrs and while one flight of 3 is up the other can be regenerated for permanent presence or sat at readiness in an armed configuration to fly off should a surveillance platform identify a threat.
JonesyJonesy, what about the helicopter & UAV capability?
Just a very quick answer to a polite question (before draconian mods swinging axe descends :)). Flexible airgroup obviously dependent on tasking and what the RN can afford!. I would look at one of three capability mixes though:
Convoy/HVU Escort – 1 Lynx & 1 Boeing A-160
Force Protection (1) – 1 Lynx & 2 RQ-8 Firescout
Force Protection (2) – 1 Lynx & 6 Scheibel S-100
The Boeing A-160 would be Seaspray7500 equipped and a capability shared with the Type26 fleet. It would be a fleet-level organic, persistent, AEW/ISTAR resource supporting independent deployment and LACM/indirect fire ashore. RQ-8/S-100 would be tactical MIOPS-class mission force multipliers.
I guess if we wish to further examine the composition and options available for small combattants ships flights going forward a new thread on Naval Aviation may be called for? 🙂
JonesyPropulsion?
What would you expect the dimensions, tonnage, crew (different for each variant, I know), endurance & range to be?
Propulsion would be diesels. I’d look at something like twin Wärtsilä 16V26’s as principle drive units with auxilliaries.
Dimensions would be roughly a 10% expansion of the Khareef hull. Bout 108m, 3000tons. I’d be looking to achieve something on the order of 4000nm@16knts as a target with endurance around 30 days.
Basic crew complement I’d aim at 85ish with accoms for around 20 mission specialist crew (MCMW ops or Droggies) for the OCPV – obviously the specialist crew would move with their mission kit between the hulls. For the PF version the specialist crew would be the warfare team and permanently embarked – with additional WAFU’s – topping out at perhaps 110ish.
Jonesyassuming a Holland-style ship is adopted, in the manner you suggest, in patrol frigate & OCPV variants, how would you see them being armed & equipped? Perhaps you could start with the Holland-class as a baseline. Good sensor fit, capable of supporting & hangaring a decent-sized helicopter (certainly an NH90) but fairly lightly armed (1 x 76mm, 1 x 30mm, & MGs) & relatively slow. How would you change it, & how would your variants differ from each other?
Swerve,
I’d start with a stretched VT Khareef as baseline and I would, I fear, break the cardinal rule of ship design and build pretty close to the margins!.
Batch 1 OCPV would closely ape the Holland in capability. MCG forward plus AUTSIG DS30 mounts on each beam plus the ubiquitous miniguns as the extent of the armament. I’d fit the ARTISAN set owing to the nature of the vessels deployments and the simplicity in the support system. Outfit DLH standard fit.
Structurally the big difference between the two units would be aft. Mission Deck space and garaging for RHIBs, UUV’s and USV’s would occupy a large section aft. A chopper platform with a modest, possibly retractable, hangar immediately forward of that mission deck would likely take the superstructure up to the mainmast.
Batch 2 PF would retain the MCG and add a FLAADS VLS mounted in a foredeck extension immediately forward of the bridge. The AUTSIGs would carry over from the batch 1 design – armament rounded out with a Phalanx covering the stern arc mounted atop the hangar. ARTISAN radar plus a full ESM/CESM fit and Outfit DLH. Aft the mainmast the vessel would be optimised for air ops with the flight deck/mission deck layout removed in favour of a med chopper+UAV’s sized hangar and a Merlin capable flight deck. Aviation support facilities and air ordnance provision would be expanded to the fullest extent practical. ASuW and ASW weaponry would be chopper deployable.
Built off the common hull, with largely common machinery and ancilliary equipment, logistics and support are nicely streamlined. We get an OCPV that has just enough gunboat about it to provide coercive presence in small-scale situations and, anywhere higher threat, we can have the PF on station able to provide a surviveable tripwire presence and, through its embarked flight/ESM/CESM fit, provide crucial on-scene persistent ISTAR on the developing situation – as well as the ability to make small-scale/MIOPS interventions on its own.
Beauty of it is the benefit to the shipbuilding industry. A drumbeat of three hulls completed every two years or so would keep industry occupied for a good couple of decades. Building in phases starting in 2015 or so, after the glut of CVF work has tailed off, could pan out as follows:
Phase1 7 C2 hulls replace all T22/T42’s by 2020-21
Phase2 8 C3 Hulls replace all Hunt MCMW’s by 2027
Phase3 5 C2 hulls replace remainder of non-2087 T23’s by 2031
Phase4 8 C3 hulls replace Sandowns and remaining droggy hulls by 2037
Obviously a rough idea only and room could be made in that timeline for, with luck, a few export orders etc.
JonesyThe MoD budget is one pot and it is the MoD on the whole who decides where the money goes. Money is readily shifted from programme to programme an none of the services have a ringfenced or dedicated budget.
The ‘one big pot’ is a convenient myth intended to give the impression that the budget is dynamic and responsive. You know very well that there are distinct ‘pots’ of money within the budget allocated for various tasks. One example would be the RN operational budget that was so publically nearly exhausted a couple of years back forcing escorts to remain tied alongside for lack of resource to sortie them. I agree that there is very little in the way of strict ‘ringfencing’ and these resource pools arent set in stone, but, to say they dont exist is an inaccuracy.
The capability requirement for a platform to operate off the CVF if high priority. If the SDSR decides that the F-35B is unaffordable and a CTOL or CATOBAR option is pursued money planned to be allocated for the F-35 will be used in a F-18 purchase.
Carrier Strike is a flagship enabling capability agreed. If the F-35B is considered too expensive, and the Treasury can be fooled by the sleight of hand necessary to hide the recurring costs with CATOBAR, then money from the -35B allocation WILL be used for the Hornet buy of course. The rest of the money saved though will be subject to close scutiny by the Treasury – after all the point of saving the money on the 35B’s is to meet the 10% (or whatever) cut demanded by Govt. You would hope that, should we shift to CATOBAR, the RN can get a claim in on the Hornet funding pool, before it vanishes, for the carrier CATOBAR gear and some contribution for O&M otherwise the RN will be left to hold that baby too!.
THe RAF will still need additional airframes and purchaseing T3B typhoons is the logical choice with funds partially coming from the reduction in the Tornado force and also funds from the F-35 pot as well.
Again I think you have to look at the reason for the, potential, cutting of perfectly serviceable GR4 squadrons and the reason the -35B may be considered unaffordable before considering that Typhoon buy a done deal – they have effectively been written off once already!. If the GR4 squadrons CAN be scrapped at all then its going to be very easy for the Treasury to ask why they need the ‘additional airframes’ you speak of.
Lossiemouth was originally a FAA station, being where the Phantoms were based so it would be being returned to a previous owned.
Irrelevant – its an RAF station now. Manned and operated by the light blue…if the GR4 force disappears why are they going to continue to operate the base?. Just for the benefit of a dark blue strikefighter force?. IF its a shared capability fair enough but the RAF are not going to spend resources on Lossie if it does transfer back to its previous owner. They are very likely to say “here’s the keys…..enjoy!”.
You can say that shutting down Culdrose might free resources to stand up Lossie as the FAA fastjet base, but, the practicalities involved in closing a base and shifting operations 400 miles north are significant. How much money will be wasted in that exercise and what impact will it have on personnel retention?. Remember the choice of Lossie for F-35B was originally a political one to benefit Labours standing in Scotland – there is no real, operational, reason why Lossie has to be it.
Wittering will go in all probability with the end of the Harrier
So we pay to close down one perfectly operational air base in Wittering in order to pay to stand up another in Lossie…and we wonder where the MoD’s money goes???. Rather than spending all this money in infrastructure isnt it smarter to spend it on the actual aircraft?. Wittering is perfectly capable of taking the 800sqdn based NSW, 1 & 4 sdns reformed with F-35B and the -35B OCU. It doesnt need more spending on it to achieve this and wont even take much effort to rehome the present Cotts sqdns there – what is it 20 miles down the A1 from Cotts to Wittering?.
Having worked in the MoD for 15 years in the aviation logistics branches I have quite a good handle on the art of moving money between programmes. The above will actually result in an overall save especially with additional base closeurs and with the remainder of the Tornado fleet going once the FAA is up to speed
I’m actually a little horrified by this to be honest Jim. I used to wear a dark blue suit and my antipathy towards certain elements of the RAF is long on record on this site. I have no special love for our light blue bretheren, but, you are talking about culling out 3 Harrier sqdns plus another, what, 6 frontline GR4 sqdns and replacing them with 2 frontline Super Hornet sdns and maybe, if the funds can be found, another couple of Typhoon sqdns?.
I’m sure replacing 9 frontline squadrons with 4 WILL result in an overall saving….it’ll also decimate the UK’s attack capability though!.
JonesyIf the F-35B is not proceeded with I am sure the RAF will be compensated with the Typhoon T3B buy allowing then to stand up 6 frontline squadrons. The funds would be diverted to the purchase of a platform to operate from the CVFs as that would now be the highest aviation aquisition and a F-18 buy would probably be the cheapest.
The Govt are boundless in their generosity in this scenario it would seem?. Not only are they reinstating Typhoon 3B, but, are additionally providing the RN with F/A-18’s. Sorry, again, I dont quite see where the optimism for that level of spend comes from?.
Lossiemouth has already been shortlisted for the FAA fixed wing base and Wittering and Culdrose would be added to the closure list. Half the Tornado fleet could be retained until 2020, based at Marham
The RAF having just lost 3 squadrons of Harriers and another 3 or 4 of GR4’s would be overjoyed to host 3 naval strikefighter squadrons gratis at Lossie???. Somehow I dont have your faith in the RAF’s benevolence.
It is not the case of the RN carry the financial burden as funds would be moved form programme to programme as is done now. There would be no problem slotting into the USN logistics grid as we have done in a similar way with the C-17.
The Treasury are behind the running of this exercise to recover money from the defence budget. Money saved from a program will not be ringfenced for reinvestment in the defence budget. Money that could otherwise be used for the Fleet would have to be allotted to this Hornet force. Operationally the money to ramp up Yeovilton and base the fighters would come from the RNs budget allocation alone.
What do you mean we could slot into the USN logistics grid?. The USN dont have a logistics grid for Hornet in the UK and I cant imagine they will be disposed to go to the expense of setting one up for us just because we ask them nicely?.
One thing that perhaps bears challenging from all this is that STOVL is intrinsically cheaper than CATOBAR as an option. I am sure this is true some of the time but I don’t think this is quite as straight forward as is assumed.
Yes it is. It makes no odds, really, whether we buy 50 F/A-18E or Rafale or F-35C or whatever the costs are the same with CATOBAR because they are all tied up in support infrastructure and training overheads. We have to pay them regardless by virtue of the system. With STOVL we aren’t obliged to pay anything more than the number of aircraft we decide we can afford at this time. The irony is the one point that everyone is clamouring about, plane unit cost, is only readily quantifiable factor with the STOVL type!.
Finally are you suggesting that the USN is rather rash in trying to get EMALS in service by 2015?
No I’m saying that we would be well advised to let the USN build up some operational history with EMALS before we go hook line and sinker after it!
JonesyBut what happens when one of these overgrown OPVs encounters, say, an opponent with anti ship missiles – a weapon that has been used by terrorists (Hezbollah) on 2006?
Some sort of AAW capability seems to be necessary if we want these vessels to survive.
They do what the Israeli’s singularly failed to do – deploy softkill – as has been successful every time that it has been employed against a radar guided antiship missile!. Dont have to be an AEGIS cruiser to defeat inbound missiles.
The OCPV would be anticipated to mount a basic decoy system at least…the Patrol Frigate a full FLAADS capability.
JonesyLook at the work that’s done by some RN frigates at the moment: chasing drug smugglers in the Carribbean and pirates off Somalia. All that’s needed in situations like those is an OPV carrying helicopters and boats: full-spectrum high-intensity warfare ships are gross overkill.
Thing is though, as Kev rightly states, the useful parts of the warfighting frigates in counter-narcotics missions and MIOPS have been expensive bits. Radars, comms, medium calibre guns and ships flights.
I’ve long been an advocate of a dual-tier escort fleet along the same Fleet/Patrol split model we used to use in the Submarine force. The French have used this model well for years.The key, as it ever has been, is the accurate definition of the required Oceanic-capable Patrol Vessel – the so-called ‘C3’ capability.
Oceanic-capable defines a size of hull longer than 90m for pitch performance. The Dutch OCPV Holland class are 107m long – a similar length to the old Leander class frigates boats known for their excellent seakeeping qualities. Our OCPV will need to be in the same ballpark to get the performance and incorporate the kinds of mission deck/garaging spaces identified as desireable in the design.
Once you have a high-endurance 105m+ hull displacing 2500+ tonnes or so you have the foundation to build off and you can do a lot with that to turn a basic OCPV into a comprehensively equipped patrol frigate…which is essentially what the requirement for C2 is.
Batch 1 of a 100m+ hull setup as the OCPV variant with Batch 2 the patrol frigate with common machinery and ancilliary equipment fits and you get the hulls to do the routine taskings and provide stabilising presence just like the old ‘gunboat diplomacy’ days.
The trick here is numbers – just like we were getting T23’s for £130mn by the time we’d built more than a dozen – if you build enough you get the economies of scale. Build 30 hulls between the two ‘batches’ and it becomes viable to bolt an Artisan radar onto the OCPV because BAE will give you a price that makes it little different to the cost of changing the design and supporting a ‘cheaper’ less capable commercial set for the more basic hull. Net effect is that, for little additional cost, you end up with a far more capable ‘cheap’ OCPV. Such pull-throughs are a natural byproduct of a joined up programme. Hopefully this is starting to be realised now.
JonesyIf the GR4’s are disposed of they will not be being replaced with anything in the near term. The requirement for the GR4 replacement hasn’t even been fully scoped out yet – FOAS fell on its face a long time back!.
The US might have EMALS in the fleet by 2015. By 2020 it may be mature enough to be adopted on the CVF!. The technology is a very long way from proven in operational terms.
Edit: no any savings from the RAF will go to the Treasury not back into the Defence budget.
JonesyIn the meantime, stick with the Harriers, including if necessary buying a batch of ex-USMC AV-8B+s for the Navy for the fleet air defence and general AtoA role.
I’d say there is far more merit in that proposal than the F/A-18 buy. The significant issue exists that there aren’t any ex-USMC AV-8B+ Harriers available to buy though and it is conceivable that the USMC would be less than accomodating if they see the unit cost of their -35B’s climb because we renege on our buy!.
JonesyI still think the RAFs need for a STOVL platform is going to be the decider here. IF the SDSR decides that this is a nice to have but not essential capability then the RAF will have to chose a CTOL platform, possibly the F-35A
I think this is a key point also, but, one the SDSR isnt going to touch unless it really targets the RAF.
The RAF have a simple choice to go F-35B or lose 1sqdn, 4 sqdn and 20sqdn without replacement and add Wittering to the loss of Cottesmore. GR9 will not be replaced by another non-STOVL type in the Light Blue – there is no need to – even if it were the answer is the simple one of reinstating the Typhoon tranche 3 part deux buy thats already contracted for – not buying in any variant of Hornet or anything else. GR4 is expected to soldier on until 2025 according to current plans and pushing the spend on replacing that out to the right is the attractive move at the moment….not bringing that spend forward!.
The RN, should STOVL be binned, is suddenly left having to, solely, fund the acquisition, basing, and ALL operational costs, ashore and afloat, of two frontline and one expanded OCU/2nd-line fastjet CATOBAR squadrons. It is nowhere near ready to handle that today and the funding to support this capability would have to be drawn from the same pot that is funding the new Escorts, SSN’s, OPV’s etc. Seeing that CATOBAR is absolutely unnecessary to undertake the MoD Carrier Strike requirement the Admiralty will NOT fight for it.
For the services the status quo is optimal – it really is this simple boys and girls. With F-35B the RAF get to keep their squadrons and get to keep the expeditionary capability they proved with the fast deployment of GR9 into the ‘ghan. They also get to show their ‘purple’ credentials and commitment to jointness which always looks good pumped through the light blues spin machine.
The RN gets to offload a good whack of the costs of deploying fastjets by letting the RAF pay for the shore-side support infrastructure and at least a good percentage of the airframes and the pilots!. This preserving the funds, notionally at least, for the escort recaptilisation and other genuine fleet needs.
So what we have is a situation where the RAF have to fight to save their squadrons and the RN have nothing to gain in fighting to take them away. Guess which way that goes.
if it is decided that in the current frugal climate stealth is also a nice to have capability that can be met at a later date then the key reason for F-35 buy goes up in smoke and a whole new ball game begins,
That is far too narrow a focus. It matters not one bit whether stealth is in or not, whether one aircraft has a bit more range or not, whether one aircraft is £15-20mn more expensive than another or not.
The issues are the wholelife capability, cost to deploy that capability and its mission-effectiveness. STOVL is cheaper to deploy as a capability and offers more operational flexibility than CATOBAR. This was the reason STOVL was downselected in the first place and nothing has changed since….not even the price to any significant degree.
I for one would be quite happy for a limited buy of betwenn 50 and 60 F-18s for operation form the CVFs with the RAF purchasing T3B Eurofighters and waiting to see how the F-35 matures and how UCAVs continue to develope.
What does that accomplish though?. The Joint Force Harrier structure is dispensed with automatically so the RN is immediately faced with the bill for standing up Yeovilton as a fastjet base able to accomodate and support the new squadrons. It then, over the next 5 years, has to try and recruit, what, 30 or so new pilots to replace the light blue contingent and form operational squadrons. Then it has to rebuild QE for steam cats freshly purchased from the States, as EMALS isnt going to be there before 2020, and start a new training pipeline for HP steam to support it afloat etc, etc, etc.
All to support a ‘cheap’ interim capability?. Sorry Jim but its a nonsense – we have the structures to support STOVL and we have a requirement that can be met by STOVL. If you buy a CATOBAR type you load the costs on the infrastructure and they are unavoidable and recurring. If you buy STOVL the price is loaded on the plane and we can always, initially, buy fewer planes.
For my view the inital buy should be of 50-60 F35B’s with the commitment to buy a second tranche of either more B’s or the remainder as C’s, if the threat environment changes, in 10 years. It will take LM a decade to deliver 60 F-35B’s anyway!.
If, by 2020, we have a bluewater threat emerging that demands CATOBAR and Fleet Carrier capability both carriers will be in their refit cycles and can be adapted for the, by then, mature EMALS tech – if it works under operational conditions. The RAF adopt all the F-35B’s and retain a surge capability to the CVF’s as well as a rapid deployment capability to be able to exploit short field forward basing ashore. The remainder F-35C buy provides naval squadrons, an OCU and probably a squadron or two for shore based deployment if necessary to augment a, likely, UCAV buy replacing GR4. If the threat environment doesnt change we buy additional -35B’s and cycle the airframes to get maximum service life while counting the savings made.
JonesyThe UK is never going to buy Super Hornets.
Agreed – with the caveat ‘while F-35B is an option’. The ONLY way we move to CATOBAR of any description is if we have no STOVL option whatsoever.
It really is that simple. As I’ve said before – the RN will oppose steam cats and EMALS is just too far off being mature under operational conditions. Choosing the latter pushes QE back to 2020 and we dont want to be relying on Ark and the remaining GR9’s til then. Anything but STOVL is a non-starter at this time.
Jonesyhttp://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/08/17/navy_catobar_pilots/
Good old Lewis Page – reaffirming the fact that he just isn’t in touch with reality!.
JonesyThanks for replying to my post Jonesy but what about the second part of my point?
There is nothing really constructive I can reply with to that question!. The answer, superficially, is ‘not very much’ though I would have to check how much she time was actually in refit during that period. The situation is diametrically opposed to where we are now though….that was a capability winding down against a backdrop of much higher squadron numbers.
Like I said we had the structure developed then to have a seperate Fleet Air Arm and, for a residual period anyway, to have adequate RAF and RN resources ‘independent’ of each other. That situation doesnt exist now. We NEED squadrons to be more flexible than that because we simply dont have the spare capacity to have strike squadrons sat on a base doing ‘nothing’ anymore.
Sign In
