You’re assuming a torpedo equates a submarine equates a human decision to fire. However, if it’s a seamine (with encapsulated torpedo) and the SK navy ship ventured somewhere it isn’t supposed to venture and triggers the mine, who’s committed the act of war? You just can’t jump to conclusions like that in matters as serious as these.

Seeings as that level of damage is the work of a heavyweight torpedo Wan its a fair assumption. I cant think of an encapsulated torpedo weapon, off the top of my head, that incorporates a HWT?.

They use one for takeoffs and the other for landing so what are they going to do with a third?

….thats the one they are going to reserve for Greenpeace to block.:diablo:

Good find – the block diagram is more a way of roughing out what is needed to fit into the hull, and how much hull you are likely to need to contain it, than any kind of finished-article design piece. Whats interesting in that is the elements that have been deemed ‘desireable’ to be fit into the hull. I wonder if this is the ‘downselected’ block diagram or one of a number of similar images with various possible loudout permutations.

The thing thats jumped out on me here, and maybe I’m being clinically thick, but why are we looking at a mission-bay on C1?. It was my thinking that C1 was the ASW/GP warfighter and the patrol hull ‘stabilisation combattant’, that requires the mission bay, was the C2?.

Seeing the vessel in these images has a towed array installation and the mission bay are we now looking at the merging of C1 and C2 requirements into a single hull?. Back to square one with FSC or what???.

True, but was not that the case for past conflicts, despite that Iran never even threatened Oman

The key difference, of course, that future action in the region would likely see Iran being the targetted party!. The fact that a very real flashpoint potential exists for Oman is very clear.

A few initial thoughts….

Response 1. Cats can be skinned in a number of ways!. There is no need to develop identical systems to every opposing weapon just for the sake of having them. In antiship terms the NATO services appreciated the difficulties of taking long range missile shots in terms of target acquisition, tracking and identification. The systems we bet on, SSN’s and naval tacair, reflected those difficulties.

Response 2. Gun systems (small calibre), no matter how fearsome-looking, can only be shooting at a single target at any one time. They are easily saturated. 57mm weapons and up, firing smart ammunition, can redress this to some extent, but, aren’t in general service yet as close in missile defence weapons. SHORADS missiles with terminal passive or onboard active homing seekers do represent the current, operational, best solution to saturation antiship missile fire.

Response 3. The Hoover was phased out when the Soviet submarines that they were arrayed against largely disappeared. Some commentators have suggested that the USN has let ASW drift, but, the US SSN fleet, backed by SURTASS and SOSUS was considered equal to the remaining blue-water submarine threat. This is differentiated from the littoral ASW threat as the two exercises are dramatically different. In blue water detection ranges are long and consequently weapons are long range to allow early engagement and minimisation of exposure in the opposition sensor envelope. In that framework S-3 works. In the littoral detection ranges are very, very much reduced for both sides. Persistence and sensor dwell is more important than range or speed. A chopper with a FLASH-type pinger is more useful than an S-3 in that regime.

Response 4. VL Asroc is still an important weapons system aboard USN escorts I thought?. Subroc/Sealance were blue-water optimised systems. In the littorals detection ranges of 70k yards are extremely unlikely – especially against a discrete SSK. Offboard targetting, in tactical terms, doesnt really work for submarines for obvious reasons so the target set that needs a Sea Lance to service is very, very small.

Response 5. The Russian Navy needs, probably, a generation to recapitalise its fleet. It has a handful of competetive submarines at deployment readiness and perhaps 20 surface escorts worthy of the name in a very unbalanced force mix. As an opponent to the USN it is not in the same league. Similarly the PLAN at its current state. They can build a ship in a year and a bit – but you dont build the ‘tradition’ by throwing money at it. They need the experienced operators to work up their ships as proper fighting units. That will come in time, of course, and the Chinese are nothing if not patient but, again, as opponents they do not score highly. The need to run about flapping about some latter day ‘bomber gap’ is decidely not here yet and not really all that close.

Response 6. TLAM. Sending manned bombers on deep strike missions into ever more fiercely defended airspace is a game of diminishing return. Fair play if you have a couple of squadrons of A-12’s to do it, but, if TLAM, plus a few LO UCAVs, can do most of the job for cheaper costs in men and materiel why not let the robots do the suicide missions?. In new weapons like RATTLRS the USN’s deep strike could also be much faster reacting than a manned subsonic striker could achieve.

I’d factored all that lot in as “Labour”. What I meant is that there isn’t any capital product involved, or vast test beds. Still looks a good deal IMO, especially if it includes the integration. All these pre-designed systems have to work together in sync and harmony, as well you know no doubt. A big and difficult task.

PeeDee you have to remember this is just the design costs. Looked at objectively why are we cutting a successful hull down?. High length to beam ratio is good for hull efficiency. Without the Sampson mast the hull wont need all that beam but a roomy hull is a good thing….you need more propulsive force to push a higher displacement hull…..but we have a good, economical, power plant available in T45’s IEP. So where is the problem in leaving the T45 hull as intact as possible and redesigning the stern module to incorporate this mission bay and an expanded hangar for a pair of Merlins or a Merlin and a couple of UAV’s?.

Why do we need to sustain 300 people for 5 years to redesign a hull that seems pretty well designed in the first place?. Is it for operational reasons or is it to keep 300 people in employment for 5 years?. I have no problem with the latter, I like the idea of the skills being maintained in-country very much, but let that £127mn come from the Dept of Work and Pensions budget and not the Defence budget!.

127 million sonar conforms the hull noise/props so they don’t drown out everything when subhunting, lays out the wiring, sets out the blocks and build shedule, rf shielding, it pays for the in computer performance models , the tank test for the hull while towing, onboard system eval and selection, future growth space etc etc etc.

frankly if we can get all design work done at that price and get the boats themselves close to cost at a fixed price I’ll call it a win.

The whole superstructure is different for gods sake, tha means it has to be designed, not only with seakeeping in mind, but radar and comms issues too, that means material analysis taking into account expected conditions and expected lifespan.

Oh, and they have to create the expected refit schedule and outline upgrade paths too.

I’m probably forgetting some things, but it’s late

Thats exactly what I’m talking about look at what you have listed. Tank trial serials for TA validation. RF propagation modelling etc are about the only real areas where there is no pull-through from T45. Acoustic discretion figures for the hullform will already be on record and the existing propulsion system already lends itself to ownship signature reduction.

Onboard systems eval and selection?. Use the HVAC from T45!. If T45’s installed power gen is surplus for T26 who cares….its automatic future-proofing and would cost to change it for lesser powered systems – even if the machinery is a bit more expensive than absolutely necessary its more than made up by the single logistics train to support 26/45!.

Materials analysis on what?. This is the entire point – whole sub-systems will be lifted as a block from the Dukes to be re-used here – the materials analysis will be done at a much earlier stage.

So 127 million pounds, the price of a full-up T23, to tinker with the T45 superstructure – something that, realistically, needs little more than a reduction in the radar mast height, an increase in the hangar/flight deck module plus internal layout changes. Plus some towing analysis, plus some EM modelling. Use the same propulsion layout and you get the same lean-burn performance and streamlined support costs with the T45 fleet…something that will easily, whole-life, offset the costs of the plant in the first place. You also get to draw on the already-developed T45 service schedules!.

Compared to the costs of a full, keel-up, design Mister I agree 127mn isnt a lot. You could easily look at 3 times that spend. The point I’m making is that, when so little NEEDS to be designed as new, 127mn represents a lot of spend for very little really necessary work.