Again though Wan apart from the SF300, which is scarcely a FAC(M) in the conventional sense, which boat there has more than the most rudimentry of ASW capability. You cant take a FAC(M) hull and build an ASW boat off it thats worth much. A subchaser maybe but, nowadays, we have choppers for that because they are much more capable of jumping ahead of the contact and not getting themselves blown to tiny little bits in the hunt.

In your own littoral, which is the only operational area for these boats, and within range of your own medium choppers there is very little that a FAC can offer that the choppers cant do with much greater safety and with the potential to cover a LOT more territory. There is a difference between a competent hull and a hull that has had a couple of secondary bits of kit bolted on in hopes that it does a ‘better than nothing’ job.

Your own quote above indicates that the ASW potential added to the Stockholms was a backfit job to add a needed capability where precious little existed before and you are seeking to back that up with the technology and ASW prowess of the Saudi and Malaysian Navies???.

HK,

IMHO, the idea that the RN is suddenly going to relaunch the Cold War-style DDH concept, when every other navy in the world has abandoned it, is just a pipedream.

Not so. The LCS-2 is an aviation heavy concept that is in the water. BAE have drawn up stretched 9500ton Daring versions with expanded aviation capability and the UVX escort concept which is DDH+. Just because the Japanese and French have evolved towards the through deck solution (as we did back in the 70’s with the CVS’s) doesnt mean there is no merit in the DDH platform or that it has been discarded in any way.

Kev,

I would of thought integrating Fireshadow into Sylver’s would make a better bet for use on C2’s to be honest, it’s been suggested as a possible upgrade for the T45s anyway…………

Very much. A loitering munition that can provide its own ISTAR product and relay that to the ship could be extraordinarily useful in high persistance, elevated threat scenarios. Be interesting to see if it can be made to fit a Sylver cell.

I think what you are arguing is in terms of opportunity cost. Now here, it might not be that fantastic as for similar costs, you can get a burke/Type 45 equivilant yourself. That would be true in that destoryers can be used for far missions then and FAC, so FACs = fewer destroyers, so the opportunity costs are high.

I am thinking in more direct terms as in the cost in lives and material to take out a modern destroyer.

You are quite right of course that value of one solution over another isnt an absolute. Many factors come into play as to what comprises a good solution to a state’s naval threat scenario. You may be able to buy 3 Khareef-class ships and 5 new build SH-2G’s for the same money as 6 Pr1241.8 missile boats and 4 MPA configured Be-200’s, but, geography may mitigate to one solution or another. You may not have a skilled pool of chopper pilots that you can keep deck qualified. You may not have the technical base in your service to keep an embarked chopper operational etc, etc.

What I would say as a generalised point though is that the most inherently flexible a solution you can get is usually the optimum one. The missile boat solution I indicated above would, probably, be my choice where I to need a coastal defence force based on limited infrastructure. Basically, especially if I can get the new A-190 gun installed, I get some manner of local patrol and fire support capability from the hulls but retain the ability to present a technically superior opponent with heavy saturation fires sufficient to provide a virtual attrition pause to that opponent.

The problem though is that the oppositions threat reduction exercise is greatly simplified because the limit of operations of my capability are clear. The radius of operation from home base is reasonably easily defined and the flotilla is obliged to stay roughly together to present volume of fire. The ISTAR capability is similarly tied to fixed operating locations and its radius of operation relatively quantifiable. As an opposing force then I can programme my operations with a fair degree of safety as to when I can put my forces into Defence Watches and stand them up to the threat etc.

Oceanic capable ships change that calculus though. If I can get the Khareef-class boats and an organic chopper capability for the same money my effectiveness is increased hugely. The opposition force now has to face a threat, with organic OTH targetting capability, on transit not just in theatre. Simply put the opposition has a harder time as they have to sanitise a much greater swath of seaspace before they can be guaranteed safe theatre-entry. Wheras you may need the concentrated missile fire, from a number of FACs, to defeat an alerted destroyer force if you can suprise an enemy unit with half a dozen missiles down an unexpected threat axis you can achieve just the same results.

For my money, if you can do blue water ops you do blue water ops. Your not going to stop USN battlegroups with a few 2500ton light patrol frigates but the FAC(M) navy next door wont be troubling you much!.

Maskirovka,

During the cold war these “missile trucks” were at least used live numerous times in chasing Soviet submarines in Swedish waters. Or patrolling the waters outside Soviet Baltic gathering ELINT/SIGINT.

And today the Swedish FAC HMS Malmö caught 7 somali pirates off the coast of Somalia. So I´ll guess they can be used as something else then just a “missile truck”…

…and what is the actual ASW capability of a Stockholm class boat then?. Against a determined SSN do you think that one of these boats would even get a real sniff of an Akula, 688 or Trafalgar before a HWT disintegrated it?. The answer is no and at what price does the minimal ASW capability possessed by the boat come at. You have a dipping sonar and a few LWT’s bolted on plus support and training costs for starters and then you have a primary antiship platform chasing around pretending its a subhunter!. How many Stockholm hulls do they have again???.

Likewise you can catch Somali pirates with boarding teams from Fleet Auxilliaries does that say anything about the fighting potential of the general fast fleet UNREP ship!!!.

I see that you are trying to make a case for the Swedish Navy and, as I’ve said, their tactical situation is one that lends itself readily to FAC(M) operations. That doesnt mean that a FAC(M) is anything, realistically, more than a floating missile truck though.

If memory serves the Sheffield shots were taken BVR or at least out of visual contact owing to adverse weather conditons and the low altitude release.

Syrian Osa and Komar class boats launched P-20’s at beyond visual ranges in ’73 at Latakia. Which is the only case I can recall clearly where a long range shot has been taken by a missile boat. Those shots being ineffectual owing to Israeli softkill.

Operation Praying Mantis saw the release of a Harpoon by an Iranian Combattante-II FAC(M) this however wasnt quite out of visual range. Again the shot was ineffectual in the face of softkill.

I think many navies and sailors would disagree with such a statement. Most pretty modern FACs are quite multirole. The Swedish Stockholm- and Göteborg-class FACs for instance has an emphasis as submarine-chasers. There are offcourse many tasks a modern FAC can do, anything from just patrolling your waters, laying mines and doing SIGINT/ELINT work to anti-ship/sub warfare. It´s not just a “missile truck” on water…

The Swedish example is somewhat unique, but, the same basic principle holds. They are missile trucks just trucks that are fortunate enough to be able to lurk behind convienient lumps of rock sticking out of the water.

You make a good point suggesting that as technology has improved more capability can, and has, been built into the modest hulls. As I said though start adding stuff and watch what that does to the sticker price of your cheap ‘asymetric’ warfare platform.

Yes, but they will be used to having an auxiliary deck by the time any PdA replacement enters service.

They’ve spent effort & money to add that capability. A single CTOL replacement for PdA would imply abandoning it. It also has implications for aircraft purchases & ship ordering schedules. One must consider both the remaining life of PdA & of the Harriers. Selection of F-35B gives more options for the transition.

I see JC1 as a statement of intent, & a victory by the JSF supporters within the Armada. It gives them additional arguments to use against the CTOL supporters.

On the first point possibly, but, more likely not. As you say the Harriers will transfer to JC during the Principe’s major refit around 2011. That refit will only take Principe through til about 2020-22 when she’ll be thirty years in commission.

Will she need much yard time between the end of major refit and decommission?. If not I’d imagine that JC is going to be much too useful in her primary role as an amphib to be spending much time playing aircraft carrier.

They have spent money adding the ski-jump to JC but that vessel is still very much an amphib with STOVL capability rather than a ‘proper’ CV with commensurate performance. So they’ve not really put all that much effort in to reinforce the F-35B lobby. Likewise I’d call it a very, very modest victory for the STOVL lobby in the Armada at best.

I dont disagree that F-35B is the likely solution for the PdA replacement. Just the point has to be made that Spain is in a very different situation than Italy here. The Italians have nailed their colours to the mast with Cavour and have clearly declared the F-35B aquisition. Spain has a few years left and can be a little more creative if she sees value in it!.

Talk has been coming out of Spain for absolute years that there is a strong movement for the Principe’s replacement to be a non-STOVL design. The often-touted BSAC design being the likely root-cause!.

Speaking in pure hypothetical UK CVF studies always placed the notional ‘Sea Typhoon’ in the STOBAR category. The notional PDA-replacement with a Spanish design to the same, rough, brief as the Indian IAC need not be outrageously unaffordable for them. Share logistics with the AF and training with the RN Fleet Air Arm and, at face value, you can see some merit in the concept.

If, for any reason, UK MoD fell out of love with F-35B, the Joint Force structure and wanted to revisit Sea Typhoon would the numbers be there one wonders?. You would ballpark it as roughly 50 for the Spanish Armada to support a 24-plane airgroup and probably 100 or so for front and second line FAA sqdns to support surge ops of 30 planes for both carriers.

Obviously the real-world chances of this actually happening are utterly negligable and the operational considerations of shifting CVF to the, much maligned and unloved, STOBAR technique would be significant. In simple numbers terms though would those knowlegeable in such industrial concerns consider a 150 aircraft order sufficient to make the enterprise commercially enticing?.

You really don’t know what you are talking about do you? The calmer waters of the Pacific? Are you serious? Oh I get it, they named it pacific because it was so calm.

The Atlantic Campaign primarily constituted repeated oceanic crossings in th face of a developed sub and air threat. The Pacific Campaign was a series of set piece surface engagements that became primarily a littoral island hop amphibious campaign. You tell me which was easier on a poor seakeeping hull.

But, just to satisfy your stupidity what about ships like HMS Capel or USS O’Flaherty (DE 340). both drew 11 feet of water? They and literally hundred of other similar DEs successfully conducted ASW in the North Atlantic. None of them had particularly deep hulls in fact they all had, ready for this …… flat bottomed (what we call) semi planning hulls.

What about them?. They were all horrific sea boats, significant percentages of the crew would be debilitated through seasickness routinely. They were never dry internally and in a seaway were generally terrible gun platforms. Do you think, for a single second, that their successes in the battle of the Atlantic translate to anything meaningful in today’s operations?.

Want to talk about the trimaran? As for the rest of your post, I can’t be bothered but the your comment on where most of the Iowa’s weight was shall we say a real knee slapper.

The trimaran is a different story and one I haven’t discussed at all. The trimaran hasnt been selected as LCS though has it?. If it does get selected, as I strenuously hope, the situation changes in hull terms. Not sensors though. There is still no utilisation offered by LCS-2 to a battlegroup, on transit, beyond its flight deck. It is still not an FFG replacement. As for the Iowa comment I didnt say anything about where most of the Iowa’s weight was?. I said it had a lot of topweight and therefore suffered for it – the Iowa’s like most BB’s had a lot of weight above the waterline. Simple statement.

You mean it broke the speed record going across the ferocious Atlantic Ocean? How on earth did it do that? The water must have been like glass those few days.

At any point have I or anyone else said that a semi-planing hull cant transit blue water?. I started on this stating that the LCS could self-deploy. What point do you think you are making here?. There is something of a difference between transit and operations.

Convoy escort duty may have gone away but there are still carriers and gators that need ASW. The need remains, LCS does perform it in a different way.

Yes on transit, in blue water, this is provided by SSN’s and DDG’s. In the littorals this is provided by LCS. Not a complicated force structure really.

Distiller,

Seastates above 4 are not so common. I remember a presentation on the Seabase and connector and SS4 covers more than 95% of the year in the mainstream potential theatres.

What were the mainstream operational theatres discussed do you recall?. Gulf? Med? Baltic?. Places where a Seabase might use as OpAreas?. A 95% ratio of conditions below SS4 in the Atlantic is just not correct. That goes doubly so in the Southern Oceans. In littoral regions I wouldnt dispute it though. Which was probably the justification for the LCS-1 semi-planing hull!