I’d guess at an attempt at signature manipulation – I’ve seen the same approach on a couple of other Spanish designs. Active Radar seekers like to look for low-high-low-high-low profiles to get their orientation on a target. If the afterdeck is offering little above sea-returns a seeker could be confused as to the target aspect.

Essentially without that last transition from high-low profile an inbound missile could misjudge its approach and planned intercept angle, thinking the target may be more fine on its course that it actually is. i.e a superstructure masking of the afterdeck causing minimal returns. Coupled to conventional softkill distractions such a measure could give traditional seeker designs enough of a headache to induce a miss.

The original essay is an good piece of work as far as it goes and, without doubt, extremely logical and well presented.

Unfortunately the most important and pertinent factor in the whole analysis piece is wrapped up in the first few lines of the third paragraph:

What is a Littoral Combat Ship anyway?
Damn good question.

Kato makes as good a fist of expanding on the problem of definition as anyone else here and he’s very correct in underscoring the difference between the old ‘colonial gunboat’ littoral presence ship, as pred points out now coyly termed a ‘stabilisation frigate’, and what the USN concept of littoral combattant is in terms of a vessel intended undertake active measures against asymmetric threats.

The two differing types have similarity only in where they would be expected to patrol and nowhere is this seen best than in the comparison between F125 and the US LCS boats. Absalon is neither of these and, as stated earlier in the thread by Tinwing, isnt a littoral optimised combattant in any regard. Absalon is an OPV with a modest amphibious component and most of a frigates combat systems. Unfortunately its not fast enough to actually be a frigate nor does it have space enough for an EMF, solely, to be of any real value as an amphib.

The answer to the original premise is quite simple then, though it does much to undermine Planeman’s obvious labours, that the best LCS out there is going to be decided between the two US designs and the best ‘colonial gunboat’, seeings as the French Floreals probably dont count anymore, will likely be the ship designed for the task – the F125.

I would think the 1022 and 909 would stay, the long range radar is a handy asset even for a ship with no surface to air capability and the 909 are needed for the Mod 8 Gun.

If memory serves Southampton has already deployed once without her 1022 operational and the after 909 array could not be employed to direct the Mk8. So, if needed, the radars could be landed with little real impact.

That said, I’m told, Southampton isnt scheduled for any deployments outside of UK waters for, effectively, the rest of her remaining service life. She’s been stripped of her CIWS too. Effectively therefore she has been decommissioned from active service – barring a major conflict.

Actually whilst I’m thinking about it I hope at least one of the Type 42 are saved as a museum ship.

There are still a few of the Batch1’s in afloat storage at Pompey including HMS Glasgow who’s performance in the Falklands merits some accolade. The most sensible ship to pass to the Imperial War Museum would be the Exeter though. Falklands veteran and in better materiel shape than any of the Batch1’s. Given the unhappy gestation and birth of the T42’s I can think of a few people who might not be too happy to see memories of the 42’s lasting after their final demise though!.

Wanshan

Expensive little opv you got there, pal!

Gee thanks! 😎

As I understand it the launchers and the magazine handling gear are going to be landed presumably held as spares for the remaining GWS30 ships. Which does make sense as, otherwise, you would still have to deploy WEA’s with GWS30 skillset just in case something broke on the unused, but still powerful, machinery. Wonder if they’ll land the 1022 and, at least, the after 909 arrays too?!.

Cant see the spaces being modified into anything useful (apart from additional stores space – perhaps) simply as I dont see anyone spending any more money on these boats. Wouldnt mind a swap draft on to one of them though….got to be good contenders for a West Indies deployment soon!.

Fedaykin,

Actually has anybody got any pictures of the proposed four round Sea Wolf launcher.

There was a cracking photo of a LWSW launcher firing on the wall of Sherval Divisions messdeck at Fisguard Sqdn back at HMS Raleigh. Unfortunately I didnt think to try and pinch it!. The Bristol Aerospace Collection at Filton have an exhibit with a LW SeaWolf mockup and, as part of another project, I’ve asked them if they have a couple of images that they may be willing to send over?.

Fitz,

But it does matter because it impacts everything else regarding the size and characteristics of the ship. More space for essentially the same payload means you need a bigger boat. A bigger boat might be slower so now you need more power to drive it at the required speed. But then it might not have enough endurance so your going to have to push something else off or make the boat bigger again.

I seem to ask this a lot on here these days…..you are serious arent you???.

I thought it was already established that the Mk41 was a physically bigger installation than Sylver?. The spacers on Sylver are inconsequential in terms of ship impact.

Look at the figures, assuming that the 6m2 figure for a Sylver module is 2m breadth by 3m deep for ease of calculation (it matters little if those relative dimensions are off by a few cm’s one way or the other), a 2 module wide x 3 deep row of Sylver A50, as found on T45, with a 1m space between the rows has a deck footprint of 9x5m or 45m2. For the Mk41 ‘block’ installation, oriented the same way, is 5.2m x 10.2m or a little over 53m2.

Even with the spacing between the rows then the Sylver installation is the more compact and lighter one, but, not to any degree that would be meaningful in a propulsion calculation for the kind of vessel that would fit such a large VLS!. Of much greater significance would be the kind of sensors that would be required to employ the contents of the VLS, masthead height requirements and the beam necessary to maintain stability etc.

Hull size increases owing, solely, to the few sq.m difference in VLS fits would be utterly inconsequential compared to above-maindeck weights and the effect they have on the designed beam. THAT has impact on the installed propulsion in the hull. Switching from Sylver to Mk41, even if it did have a lesser ship impact, is hardly going to mean you could leave off a GT shipset!!!.

That is all well and good if that’s what its for and there is in fact such a need. But what if it isn’t? My suspicion is the space is utilized for other below-decks equipment associated with the launcher, not maintenance access. With no moving parts there shouldn’t be a lot of maintenance anyway. Reliability does not seem to have been an issue so far with Mk 41. From a maintenance standpoint Mk 41 certainly is a huge advance on what came before.

To state that a VLS is lower maintenance than any mechanically-trained launcher is an obvious truth. That does not mean that there isnt basic maintenance to perform – just that there is little, although not none, mechanical maintenance. Having all your missiles hidden away in cannisters inside VLS cells is naturally less desireable, from a serviceability standpoint, than having them on shock mounted racks in magazine spaces.

VLS silos are conveniently placed, usually, in a wonderful spot in the hull to take poundings from heavy seas and electronics do not always take too well to vibration. For illustration grab hold of your PC’s base unit and give it a damn good shake…most of you will be ok….some will not be back on the net for a little while!.

Now missile damage will have to wait til the boat is alongside no matter what, but, cannister or launcher physical/electrical damage or accident effects will be something that the engineering team will be trained to look for and it is very much easier to do that when you have some space to work in.

Otherwise the issue is, you can’t compare Mk 41 and Sylver based on the specs of a single module but rather have to consider the ship impact of the entire installation. With launcher modules more spread the apparent volume advantage of a single Sylver module would appear to be diminished. It may even disappear. Certainly there are ramifications in terms of available volume within the ship. The question really is, how many cells can we get within X footprint, not how big is an individual Mk 41 module as opposed to a Sylver module.

What?!!. The number of cells required in the VLS will be determined at the design stage not after the ship is built to then try and squidge the maximum number of cells in????. If the requirement is for 48 cells and the space is left in the design to spread smaller VLS modules with a metre spacer rather than larger (deck area) VLS modules flush fitted what does it really matter?. Personally I’d rather serve on the Sylver-equipped ship….especially if some bright spark hung some ballistic curtain material between the VLS modules to stop accident/battle damage causing a rather unfortunate chain reaction!.

Choosing to criticise the smaller, more space/weight efficient Sylver launcher on the strength that the in service modules aren’t as tightly packed as Mk41 installations is a bit of a stretch Fitz. Stick with the angle that Mk41 offers quadpack and hope that MBDA/DCNS dont announce a quad or dual pack for VL MICA with the A43 or A50 modules anytime in the near future!.

Crikey how many times do we have to endure ill-educated claptrap about the Upholder class Patrol sub.

Once and for all the Upholders were only just entering service when they were discarded. The initial boats that went through proper shakedowns were fine. The later boats didnt get this and then got tied up, without maintenance, for a decade. You take the very finest ship money can buy, dont subject it to proper sea trials, then let it rust for 10 years with scarce maintenance and see what the result is!!!.

Love to see your justification of ‘inherently flawed and poorly built’ Tinwing. Given that three of the four boats were built at Cammell Lairds, my brother QI’d on them, and I saw them being built I will TELL you, from first hand observation, that those boats were built properly and by people who cared about the quality of their product.

As to the reason why Patrol subs were discarded?. Really its the same reason as to why the Royal Navy has no interest in them now. No mission for them. Patrol subs do what they say on the label – for us they were great for trolling up and down the GIUK gap at a few knots above steerage and laying in wait for Red Banner Fleet units coming steaming down into the Atlantic approaches. No need for an SSN on that one, ‘specially not when there are dozens of MPA’s and SOSUS pushing out your sensor range for you.

When it became obvious that the Red Banner Fleet threat was disintegrating with the Soviet Union the patrol subs lost their real raison d’etre. We could use them to patrol the western Med from Gib, possibly forward base them in the Gulf or down in the Falklands, but, really they would be resource intensive platforms that offer little really worthwhile capability – certainly not capability that cant be better addressed in other ways.

The littoral battlespace is not somewhere to send your own SSK’s to as transits take time and support – look at how long it took HMS Onyx to get down to the oparea in the Falklands and that was predominantly a surface transit on diesels. Not always wise to use your own SSK’s to challenge enemy SSK’s either as, usually, they would have home field advantage. Best to use LFA sonar and lots of FLASH-kitted choppers to create a ‘beaten zone’ to keep enemy SSK’s away.