116th ACW E-8C JSTARS out of George AFB. Nice pic!.

Numbers are not the issue here Dragut. Its the capabilities:

Until the TF-2000’s there is no area air defence organic with the group…at best you have decent PDMS installations and very, very modest capabilities facing streaming/saturation attack. Now, in the Aegean, you could say that you are under the umbrella of friendly tacair….you’re also under the umbrella of potentially unfriendly tacair though….more importantly you are under unfriendly sensor coverage.

Most High Value Unit naval tactics revolve around the concept of mobility and information denial to prevent the opposition fixing you and directing concentrated air and seapower. In the Aegean you haven’t the searoom for mobility nor the distance from opposing sensors to undertake much in the way of information denial. Your only option for successful deployment of a HVU will be with sustainable firepower and sensor superiority and that demands significantly more powerful platforms than Meko200’s or FFG7’s. In terms of combat persistence I’d imagine it would demand something like an APAR-equipped Burke – TF-2000 is going to have to be really something!.

The Type 209’s are good news from an ASuW and battlespace monitoring perspective in that theatre, but, SSK’s as ASW tools in those waters will be a chancey game. Shallows and flow noise will give hunter and hunted a pitching playing field and the protagonists will shift role with the advantage. Choppers with FLASH type dipping sonars would be the answer to the ASW problem and the best use for those Perry’s would be to carry them!. Pulling the Mk13 forward and replacing it with a pair of Mk41 modules for VLA and ESSM would be seem sensible if the plan is to retain the FFG7’s for much longer.

As for the Aviso’s and Meko’s some form of anti-FAC SAG effort perhaps, until opposing airpower was concentrated in sufficient strength to overwhelm the individual units point-defence capability – otherwise they are doing little of value to support the HVU.

Contrast that with the Spanish Fleet, which is actually balanced to provide area air, surface and subsurface combat potential, in its chosen theatre of operations, and you’ll see what the difference is between simple numbers and fleet composition.

But one shouldn’t overlook that it deletes 50% of the offensive capability. And looking at the mission characteristics of an AAW vessel, I really don’t see the need for more than a smallish platform for UAVs – max! On an ASW vessel on the other hand, a lot of today’s aviation complexes are too small, and their mission capability would profite from a larger complex.

I understand that perfectly, we’re on the same hymn sheet for the most part, what I think needs to be illustrated though is that there is an element of the ‘family car’ about the ships flight that really should place it in a slightly different category when assessing its value and ship impact. Ships flights have dozens of uses in routine peacetime ops as much as in combat operations. Traditionally the extension of the ships organic surveillance capability has been all the justification necessary – its accepted that rotary UAV’s can now undertake this but they are still in their infancy an there are few guarantees. MIOPS, Force Protection, VERTREP, CASEVAC etc, etc are all far more achievable when you have your own chopper in the garage back aft and, to a ships company, that can add significantly to the general shiny-happy feeling aboard.

I mean, there was a reason why the original Burkes didn’t have a hangar – but then they didn’t go all the way and do a dedicated AAW escort version, and a dedicated ASW escort version. The mission characteristics of AAW and ASW are so different, that packing it into basically identical vessel designs makes little sense, and tasking the same ship with those two very different jobs could be outright dangerous.

Again, same hymn sheet. I am a firm believer in single-role warships or, at least, specialist warships with secondary and tertiary capabilities. The Burke design is case in point – it was understandable that someone would point out that a ship on AAW picket on a blue-water transit would be in the right place to undertake ASW barrier duties simultaneously. The question of which warfighting team wins the ships head in combat scenario has always amused me though. The RN has PWO’s (Principle Warfare Officers) at the head of their respective disciplines warfare teams. Whatever the equivalent is in the USN would, surely, have gunfights if a subsurface threat was plotted simultaneous with a large element air threat. Does the Air warfare officer get to jam the engines to the stops to position the vessel to engage the air threat or does the Surface/Subsurface officer get to drop off the sprint, go-quiet, and prosecute his contact?!.

Jack of Alltrades was never a very smart guy….so the saying goes!.

And regarding the modularity of the LCS: Is there any document describing the level? I think that “modularity” is on shipyard level, not plug-and-play in the field. ASW/anti-mine version and land-attack version with special coachwork each, and an utility version with real containerized plug’n-play modules (e.g. special forces delivery, ELINT) – three core versions.

Modularity seems to have naturalised as the art of getting a small hull to be multirole some of the time. For some things like UUV based MCMW it could be argued to be effective…for others its quite clearly not. I dont know whether modularity, in yard terms, is quite what you mean….design flexibility would seem closer. That is only semantics of course though.

The LCS’ anti-air capability is purely defensive. As the big escorts (Burke, Ticonderoga, ff) do area and theatre defense, there is no need to doublicate that capability on something that can only be an inferior platform.

Disagree heavily there. If your area air shield in 20nm over the horizon back with the amphibs then, no matter what its firing, its shooting at the arrows not the archers attacking the LCS’s in the weeds. The ability to place a couple of units each embarking 48 area SAMs backed with the 57mm plus RAM right up with the littoral forces raises the groups virtual attrition potential from the kickoff. Forcing the opposition to concentrate assets and firepower on the group in the littoral is a great way to get them to unmask those systems to the theatre-level weaponry back out to sea.

Generally speaking I have a hard time seeing a 3500 tons vessel of LCS’ mission as multirole (even FREMM sized units). The closest modern day multirole vessel of LCS size is the La Fayette, which are very nice ships, but unsuitable against a “peer competitor”. And the USN doesn’t want to keep LCS in the stable when the dragon roams, right?

Personally I think the Lafayettes have some gaps and leave a little to be desired – other than that your point about hulls too small for aggressive multiroling is undeniable.

Well there you go….I might know something about the hardware but it shows I know nothing about marketing!

To my mind this 3A undermines Davide/DART quite measurably. They are hardly complimentry systems!. After all who would choose to engage an air target, at very close range, with a couple of guided projectiles which could miss when you can put an 8 round burst of 3A out and dump nearly 100lbs of shrapnel right in front of the target?. The guided-round project team must be seething!.

Anyway this does change the complexion of the 57/76 argument quite measurably. It does appear that the Super Rapid should have a real performance edge over the Bofors. I think I would still be opting for the 57 but thats on personal choice only for the rate of fire, the excellent engineering and supportability of the mount and on a few things I heard on the OTO from RN experience with the Compact.

What strikes me has a bad decision his mixing the Sylver 50 and 70 VLS. Just use 32 “70´s” and here you go, a decent long range land strike capability, or decent AAW area “firepower”.

Thats pretty much what we’ve all been saying – the design is too compromised. If there is a space issue why bother with the A70 modules when, for the numbers embarked, tactical aircraft can do a better CASOM job. If you want to give the ship a decent area AAW capability why are you giving half your space over to LACMs and A70’s when A50’s will do – and why, if it is an area-AAW escort, is there no VSR?.

And i do think that the Royal Navy would be pretty happy to receive a few of these “Greek” ship´s, for the size/cost they are quite capable. Actually the RN will be extatic if they get anything to replace the Type-22B3…

No chance. We’ll take T45’s 7 & 8 over these ships. I’d much rather one T45 than two of these ‘Greek’ ships. These specific FREMMs may be ‘quite’ capable for their size and cost but they fall a good way short of anything we need IMO. They are certainly no kind of replacement for the 22B3’s. Besides it’s very unlikely that we will replace the 22B3’s like-for-like and, in fact, I hope we dont – that is an old conversation topic though!.

The reason for a 76mm vs a 57mm gun is the assumed absence of a anti-surface combatant missile (like Harpoon or NSM)…But since such a missile would probably be part of a missionized package, and not permanently installed, the LCS should have a somewhat larger gun to have a longer reach against FACs and costal fire bases with visually aimed AShM or anti-tank missiles.

Whether the FAC is in range of a 76mm or a 57mm is irrelevent…its too close anyway.

If its a pop-up threat you are probably about to have to sweat out 4-8 inbound AShM’s with precious little warning and taking potshots at what has just become a 300ton ‘gunboat’ with poor stability as a gun platform will be about your last concern!. In that situation I want the Bofors gun anyway. A weapon pumping out 3P ammo fused for gated frag at the full 200rpm down the threat bearing is just what you’d wish for!. Stuff the OTO’s range advantage!.

If, as should be the situation, you have the littoral battlespace monitored whilst your sat in it you put up a chopper with a light AShM and pot the FAC from a good long way beyond 76mm range therefore obviating any necessity for the heavier gun.

On the carriers (and other vessels) they now use a naked KBA mount, which is crazy since it exposes the gunner to harassment fire. A remote controlled system like Typhoon-G gives integration with EO sensors and you can’t hit the gunner with an AK-47. Smaller calibers, like 50cal mounts are not interesting. A 3500 tons ship should have more capability than a dhingy loaded with PKM and RPG shooters.

Harrassment fire from what though?. A speedboat with a PKM?. Blatting along at 30-40 knots most speedboat passengers are doing everything they can to just hang on to the boat. Speaking as someone who holds an ICC in powerboats and has happily blatted along at those rates of knots in all sorts of light vessels I’d say your PKM gunner would be doing quite well to hit a 3500ton ship at all let alone pick out a rough 2x1m target standing behind a 25mm cannon!.

Then there is the issue that if said PKM gunner is possessed of sufficient balance and fortitude to pick out the KBA gunner then, with a denser volume of fire, could very easily damage the Typhoon mount EO sensors then what value is your stabilised mount?!. It may sound callous but a wounded KBA gunner can be replaced by another fairly quickly and the mount be brought back into the fight.

Thing I’d like to know is how to integrate a sonar with a 40kts+ hull. Towed is not an option for littoral ops. Anti-mine and anti-torpedo systems as part of the permanent self-defense suite will be vital if the LCS shall have any chance to survive low-speed ASW missions in littoral waters.

The thinking is for it to be offboard isnt it?. This Advanced Deployable System or whatever its called. Essentially this rapid deployable net of SOSUS buoys that the USN is meant to be trialling at the moment?. Wasnt LCS meant to be one of the key assets is the littoral ASW game and scheduled for deployment capability of ADS?.

The interesting thing, for me, off the Greek proposal is the seeming absence of conventional CIWS.

Either that means:

a) not only a complete loss of faith in the rapid-fire 20-30mm systems, but, a lack of belief in the new mid-calibre programmable/guided munitions

OR

b)VL MICA (probably backed by first-class softkill – emitter arrays to port and starboard of the mainmast?) has proven to be highly reliable and highly effective against AShM-representative targets. For a system that, owing to a limited guidance refresh window, not all that much was expected of that would be quite a result.

Apart from that the design looks hideously compromised to me. Whats it supposed to be?. 16 Aster30 do not maketh much of an AAW ship as has been correctly pointed out. 16 SCALP-N is equivalent to the striking power of a tactical fighter sqdn or two which might sound something, but, the Greeks already have (memory serving) air-launched SCALP, tactical fighter squadrons to employ them and most importantly targets for them mostly within tactical strike fighter range. The need to embark a few more aboard surface vessels who’s LACM reload/reattack cycle will be measured in days, against hours for the fighters, eludes me completely.

Especially so when those silo’s could be productively filled with more Aster30’s and the ship could have a significant land-attack capacity off the 5″ OTO gun and the shore-attack mode on the MM40s.

The San Giorgio is obsolete and due for replacement in the next decade – hence the Italian Navy’s LHD program. In any case, the bow doors have been sealed on the San Giorgio for many years, which serves to prove the point that a LST/LPD hybrid is a bad idea, a point that further indicated by the scrapping of two out of the three Ivan Rogov class.

The last of the the San Giorgio’s, the San Guisti, was built to a modified design omitting the bow doors and was only commissioned in ’94 so I think your ‘obsolete’ criticism is a more than a little unjustified!. Also the Italian Navy are now looking at a much more expeditionary capability, re-roling from the Cold War Med-engagement model it was built on, in that context the larger LHD’s make obvious sense.

To say that there is a difference in the roles addressed by the Italian and Turkish navies would be so facile as to be almost insulting so I wont. All I will say is that in the Eastern Med/Aegean context a large high value unit like a Dokdo or BPE is a poor choice to address amphibious force projection.

Though it has to be said, in the strictly Aegean context, I think even a small LPD might be a marginal choice as well to be honest!. The large capacity Russian hovercraft with heavy land-based tac air support is probably the correct solution in that theatre….thats another point entirely though!.

All round the smaller San Guisti design LPD is the more sensibe choice for the requirement all round IMO.