Very, very nice. Sincere thanks for sharing!. That second shot of the Witte De With is pure artistry – would you mind if I borrowed it for a desktop?!!.

Severodvinsk

Again I’m not talking about driving SSNs right into China’s 12 mile limit!. What I am saying is that it is perfectly feasible for RN SSNs to perform sea denial operations to enforce an economic blockade of China’s sea lanes. For this there is no need to operate inside Chinese territorial waters!. Neither is it necessary to stake out the eastern end of the Malacca Straits with all the obvious targetting headaches that would create.

Simply put an operational area, as one example, in the South China Sea, north of the Spratleys, would allow for a watching brief to be kept on traffic that would be predominantly Chinese in origin or destination. If the PLAN instituted a convoy system then that positive targetting issue just gets easier.

The real-world scenario then is that, if Chinese warships are present shepherding merchant vessels, they (the merchies) can be reasonably assumed to be Chinese. If there are no warships there then there is little reason to believe that an SSN would have a problem getting to 8000yds or so to make a visual ID of a target before firing. After all HMS Conqueror took its shots on the ARA General Belgrano from 2000yds with straight-running torps!.

Personally I wouldn’t try to get my SSNs near China… These guys have LOTS of SSKs out there. These subs might be old, but if operated in group, they might pose a Wolfpack-threat. Also, these old Mings are being complemented now by 8 Songs, 4 Kilo’s of which soon there will be 8 extra and something that can be seen as a modified Kilo now. The area around China is not that hard to defend and up to Singapore, they might be able to put their SSKs out.

I’ve already covered the probelms SSK’s have against SSN’s. The advantage is very heavily with the SSN as it has one great asset on its side – time!. SSN’s do not go charging into battle at 30knts with active sonar blasting away. An SSN can remain on station for weeks, prior to a blockade, plotting SSK patrol zones, UNREP intervals, sonar performance (ownship and opposing) and endurance. It will be able to do this as, however discrete or advanced an SSK is, it is obliged to snort and as soon as it does, with a competent SSN anywhere nearby, its found!. AIP is an option that can extend the snort interval a short while but is limited, usually, by a finite onboard fuel supply.

Chinese helicopter forces are increasing, now they have about 8 Kamov-28s, but I think a large order might follow, otherwise all their new ships wouldn’t have this especially high helo-hangar, which is certainly not meant for the Z-9 only. And 8 Kamovs isn’t enough for all these new ships.

Excellent news for them. The issue is though that, today, they have nowhere near the ASW helicopter capability to mount an intensive ASW hunting campaign in their EEZ in fact they barely have enough to cover their 12 mile limit. The RN SSNs do exist though!.

RN will not be capable of harming China, well harming it, yes, but killing it: no. RN simply lacks everything for that. Their force is just too small nowadays to do anything like the Malvinas, let alone attack China.

Well leaving aside the 4 Vanguard class boats and their, obvious, country-killing capability I did not suggest for a second that the RN (or all of UK Forces for that matter!) would be capable of killing China!. Enforcement of an economic blockade with two patrol areas and 4 or 5 boats on a rolling deployment is certainly sustainable for at least 6-8 months though. Note I’m NOT saying this is anywhere near a real likelihood – I am saying that, as an academic exercise, it IS possible and an illustration of the ASuW capability SSNs provide.

Was almost sure it didn’t Fantasma – just seemed like it could be someones wry sense of humour at work!

A184/Blackshark information

An exerpt from Janes on the A184/Blackshark

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In the late 1980s, the A184 was trialled for the US Navy’s low-cost Anti-Surface Warfare Torpedo (ASuWT) programme. Although the trials were successfully concluded, the US Navy decided not to proceed with the programme.

In 1998, WASS revealed it was developing an upgraded version of A184 for the Italian Navy with the objectives of improving passive and active acquisition ranges by factors of 300 and 200 per cent respectively, increasing speed by 150 per cent and endurance by 200 per cent. The weapon was originally designated A184 Advanced, although by February 1999 this weapon had been renamed Black Shark. This weapon features a new seeker, which has been under test since the summer of 1998, and which was selected by Chile for its new ‘Scorpene’ class submarines which are scheduled to enter service in 2004. Sea trials of the weapon are scheduled for 2003 and submarine launches in the following year.

At Euronaval 2000, WASS and France’s DCN International announced they would combine development, production and marketing of a new heavyweight torpedo based upon Black Shark having signed an industrial co-operative agreement in July 2000. This has received the provisional designation Black Shark/IF 21 (Italy-France, 21st Century). Sub-systems have been tested since 2000 and a complete prototype is scheduled to begin tests in 2003 with production beginning in 2004.

Description

The A184 is a dual-purpose (surface vessels and submarines) torpedo which, externally, is a long slim cylinder with rounded nose, four rectangular fins and exposed contra-rotating propellers.

Internally, the digital SEPA AG 67 active and passive mode seeker is in the nose. This has two semi-circular electro-acoustic transducer arrays, one vertical and the other horizontal. The Alenia guidance unit calculates the target’s exact location. Behind it is the 250 kg HBX warhead with magnetic influence and impact fuzes. The centre of the torpedo contains the silver-zinc oxide batteries. The rear third of the weapon contains the electronic guidance package, the gyroscope and guidance wire dispenser and the 93 kW electric contra-rotating motor driving skewed direct-drive propellers with seven and six blades. The weapon is capable of two speeds: 24 and 36 kt.

The A184 may be launched from swim-out or water-pulse submarine torpedo tubes and it may also be launched from the B 516 torpedo tubes (See B 515/ILAS 3 and B 516 entry in Weapon Handling and Launching Systems section).

Commands carried by the guidance wires include: course, depth, acoustic mode (active, passive and combined), enabling range, stratum allowed, speed, impact and influence fuze setting and torpedo stop. Replies from the weapon include: course, distance, depth, acoustic mode, speed and other data on interrogation. The fire-control system displays the tactical scenario, acquiring data from onboard sensors and allows the underwater weapon selection, check presetting, start and guidance against the designated targets. The fire-control system is modular, each module capable of being used independently in case of failure in the others.

The latest production version is Mod 3 with the improved torpedo sonar (TOSO) which incorporates the Intel 486 processor to permit operations in a multi-target situation with strong reverberation environment and despite the use of counter-measures. TOSO, which operates in the 30 kHz range, also provides the Mod 3 with both a wake-homing and a re-attack capability.

DCN and WASS are developing Black Shark (formerly A184 Advanced) with the Astra seeker and fibre-optic wire guidance. The new ASTRA (Advanced Sonar Transmitting and Receiving Architecture) seeker features a flat planar array and for longer ranges can operate at 15 kHz. Signal and data processing will include spatial and frequency filtering, echo elongation, angular extension and spatial coherence analysis together with DEMON analysis. These parts and the afterbody will be produced by WASS. The brushless drive motor will permit speed changes in 1 kt increments and will provide a higher maximum speed. improved range and less radiated noise, power being provided by Aluminium-Silver Oxide batteries, exploiting technology of the MU 90 Impact (qv). French sources suggest that lithium-ion module batteries might be considered for future torpedo programmes which might include IF 21. The motor section together with warhead and fuze system will be produced by DCN.

At the Underwater Defence Technology conference in Hamburg in June 2001, Whitehead representatives suggested that heavyweight torpedoes could be used to extend sensor ranges but this would require better, lower speed control. They suggested this might be achieved by adapting the vertical control surfaces and improving the control software. This too might also be applied to IF 21.

Some 500 A184 torpedoes have been produced and the weapon is still being marketed but it is in service with only two customers. Export sales of the weapon probably total about 100 weapons with an estimated Italian requirement for about 100. In late 2002 the manufacturers were offering the weapon to the French and Greek. Peru ordered A184 torpedoes but the contract encountered problems and none were delivered.
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Not heard much about an encapsulated anti-torpedo torpedo, sounds a bit bizarre to me. The Russian UDAV system utilising rapid-deployment barrier minefields and offboard seduction decoys sounds infinitely more efficient, simple and sensible to me.

An interesting project, with applications for littoral anti-torpedo work, being examined in the US is DARPA’s Water Hammer program. This is an evolution of the work done on LFAS (Low Frequency Active Sonar) in the US and can, probaby, trace its lineage all the way back to the old Julie/Jezebel explosive sounding charge ASW system from the S-2’s.

It uses an explosive mixture to generate an low-frequency sound pulse in a sequence of shock-tubes. These tubes focus, amplify and direct the accoustic pulse into the water over a narrow bearing and, effectively, create a high-pressure (circa 2000psi) directional shock pulse. A pulse of that magnitude is expected to be able to disrupt mines and would, obviously, knock an inbound fish back bloody hard!.

I cant argue with the logic from the Industrial standpoint. I’ve worked with BAE lads and I’ve seen the thinly-veiled doom and gloom written on their shipbuilding intranet site. A steady order book would be something their senior people would sell dearly loved relatives for!.

That said though there is a strong mentality in BAE that the government ‘owes them a living’ and should keep throwing work to them irrespective of some hideously poor performances in the past. I am NOT happy with the government being forced, by BAE’s near-monopoly on naval shipbuilding, into pouring massive amounts of funding into projects that BAE say they can bring in for a decent price – only to go miles over budget and then threaten other essential projects through the funds drain. I find BAE’s threatening of massive job cuts every time the government tries to seek redress for these shabby performances infuriating as well.

The real issue that makes my blood pressure bounce off the scale though is the lack of effort BAE, especially when compared to someone like Vospers, put into winning export contracts when they have some truly world-beating products that could sell well on their quality alone. My brother is a QI at Cammel Lairds yard in Birkenhead and he’s supervised work on vessels of many different nations. He has distinct things to say about what he’s seen of ships from certain parts of the world when compared to those of UK construction. I am careening well off topic here though!.

Ironically with Type45, Astute SSN’s, CVF, FSC and MUFC all stacking up in the next decade-and-a-bit lack of yard work shouldnt be the real problem. True theres a bit of a gap between T45 and CVF work but its hardly unbridgable if they do a bit of work and pick up some, modest, export orders. Most other companies have to go out and win orders to survive after all. 😡

As you might have guessed shipbuilding has been in my family for quite a few generations and this is a bit of a raw issue for me!!. Rant over I promise!.

Bigger may be better, but I think smaller is more practical.

Smaller doesnt work for power projection though and that is the bottom line for the UK Future Carrier capability. We need sustainable high sortie rates and for that bigger (circa 60k ton) is the only way to go.

You wouldnt find SSN’s operating within the Chinese 12 mile territorial limit thats for certain.

IF the PLAN is only strong inside of its territorial waters though that does give rather a free hand for SSN ops against the two major shipping lanes just to the east of the Paracel’s and west of the Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea – the waters there being a minimum of 200m depth. Cutting those neatly severs China’s oil lifeline to the Persian Gulf.

The same could be said for the East China Sea off Shanghai. The bathymetry of the waters there is extreme to say the least but, while there are areas as shallow as 50m which would be virtually impassable to an SSN wishing to remain covert, there are also areas extending down past 3km deep, just perfect for a lurking sub, inside of the Ryukyu island chain.

Shallow water restricts movement, allows for mine fields, reduces sonar performance and brings the danger of visual detection from the air.

Shallow water also creates flow noise that degrades passive sonar and presents the advantage to the vessel with the better DSP’s in their sonar. Visual detection of a submerged sub requires something to luckily overfly the boat and be looking down at the right time. Visual detection is a very short-range solution and relies on the sub being near-enough periscope depth as makes no deifference. Minefields aren’t too popular in shipping lanes!.

Active sonar and convoy tactics would be used to reduce SSN’s chances too.

Medium and high frequency active sonar, such as those fitted to PLAN ASW escorts suffer very badly from topography reflections in shallow water. Low frequency active sonar is the way round that but the PLAN arent there yet.

i really doubt anyone would be willing to blockade chinese shipping, not unless WWIII breaks out. china is simply too great a part of the international economy.

Like Indian said this just shooting the sh1t and I could not conceive of the geopolitical situation that would place RN SSNs in the kind of role we’re talking about. As a strictly academic exercise though, if a selective blockade were to be pursued, interrupting the circa 2 billion barrels per day oil imported by China, would be a feasible proposition for the RN sub fleet

any likely sea conflict will focus exclusively on military targets, with the RN’s subs tasked primarily to deny the PLAN the use of the sea. cant do that hiding in the deep.

Not necessarily. Such a blockade would seek to serve a political objective and targetting Chinese-flag tankers, for example, to impact on China’s military operations could be a viable course of action in a limited scenario. The defintion of Sea Denial is the prevention of an advesary’s free use of the sea for its own advantage after all!. Just potting warships doesnt necessarily do that!.

…and convoy tactics would be used to reduce SSN’s chances too.

Convoy tactics really depend on the quality of the escorts you have to form the convoy with. This is not the 1940’s in Western Approaches anymore and the attacking boats are not likely to come steaming in on the surface to be picked off. Convoy’s can be useful against attacking SSK’s by use of co-ordinated manoevering – zig-zagging and the suchlike – against an SSN with far superior manoverability and advanced HWT’s though a convoy without heavy organic chopper support is a nice compact concentration of targets.