the best defence against a sub is another sub.

Nearly. The best defence against subs is heavy sonar netting backed up with SSNs, high endurance ASW aircraft and escorts embarking lots of choppers.

Lets evaluate China’s potential along these lines. If there is a PLAN equivalent to SOSUS or SURTASS I’ve never seen or heard of it, so, initial detection is a matter of an ASW team component ‘stumbling’ over a contact.

HAN Class SSN’s are limited and known for having a low discretion rate and would be fortunate, or very well handled, to get shots in on a Swiftsure let alone a Trafalgar. An SSK ASW picket based on PLAN diesel boats is not a high pecentage operation either owing to the nature of those boats. Their endurance and limited sensor fit (on most – though obviously not all – units) do not lend themselves to discrete ‘tripwire’ operations against an opponent with ears as sensitive as those on an S or T class SSN.

Now the information I have on Chinese airborne ASW assets is a few years old but last I heard there was a mix of about 40 total Kamov’s and Z-8/Frelon’s and maybe half that again of the ASW Z-9 variant. Fixed wing ASW being limited to a dozen or so flying boats of Russian and indigenous manufacture. As a force trying to track down a number of very discrete SSN’s over a wide oparea in the littorals or deep-water I dont see that as being sufficient to the task I’m afraid.

As for ASW escorts the PLAN fleet is obviously heading the right way but there are still lots of 053’s and Luda’s that are barely competetive!.

Have to get up very early in the day to catch one of these bad boys!

Mike Echo/SteveO

Glenn has the point made correctly here. Missiles are only one facet of ASuW strike. In fact they are not regarded, really, as anything other than a contribution to the surface warfare battle by the Royal Navy. The prime ASuW system, in the minds of the good folk of the Admiralty, is the Fleet Submarine with its heavyweight torps.

As to the withdrawal of Sea Eagle and UGM-84 Sub-Harpoon from the fleet that is simply a matter of there being an insufficient target-set in blue water to warrant the retention of those systems. Its a case of evaluating the threats out there really: a) How many area AAW escorts with decent long range SAMs exist and b) how many of those vessels are in the hands of someone we could conceivably end up squaring off against?.

The answer to those questions are, in order, few and none!.

In this environment the money that was required to service the entire Sea Eagle stock to keep it operational seemed like a bit of a waste. Also given the strictures of today’s CNN-framed warfare taking shots on targets without a positive ID is very unlikely to happen lest collaterol damage occur. Taking submerged Harpoon shots on a vague CZ contact is therefore very unlikely to be permitted. If your sub has to close the range for a positive accoustic signature match before shooting its just as practical to use a torpedo to do the job and dispense with the Harpoons altogether!.

Gents, if there is one thing you should take with a pinch of salt in the UNCLAS world of published statistics it is speed and range values given for warships!.

Those figures, if obtained accurately by an adversary, would give away a SIGNIFICANT tactical advantage to that adversary. There is little chance therefore you will see anything verging on reality therefore.

Whilst it is true that western SSN’s do discretion over pace it must be remembered that speed runs, for rapid deployment, are one of the primary advantages of the nuclear Fleet submarine. No SSN navy, barring perhaps the French historically, would allow the performance advantage of those boats to be compromised too heavily. It is too significant a capability to be wasted.

That PAPA may have been timed at 44knts and claim some form of record, but, that was a one-off hull and the Russians may have seen some more advantage in the PR of that claim than the letting slip of tactical data on one ‘white elephant’. That is, of course, dependent on the fact that the PAPA could actually maintain its 44knts for a practical timespan without blowing its reactor out the stern!!!.

There’s not much thats magical ’bout 40knts on the clock.

Steve

The role of escorts is to defend against air, surface and submarine threats.
All these roles are best done by aircraft, so I think it would be better to spend money on ships which operate useful numbers of aircraft.

Couldn’t disagree more with that conclusion I am afraid.

Aircraft are without doubt vital to the prosecution of any ‘forward-from-the-sea’ campaign. They comprise the greater percentage of any groups striking power against target sets ashore, are vital to securing the outer air engagement zone beyond the fleet MEZ so critical in preventing threat aircraft getting into AShM release range and, most importantly of all, are critical in establishing AEW&C, battlespace management and strike direction.

This said though aircraft are, by nature, complex limited endurance platforms that are vulnerable to mechanical failure and adverse environmental conditions. Embarking them on naval vessels does little to mitigate these factors. Aircraft also tend to be quite bulky and awkward to stow aboard ships in significant numbers, so, using up limited airgroup capacity on medium/heavy ASW choppers, for example, to provide your only significant ASW screen not only places the bulk of your ASW capability at the mercy of the least competent matelot aboard or the next inconvenient fog bank, but, it detracts from the strike potential of the battlegroup – surely the whole point of the groups deployment in the first place.

Surface escorts, comprehensively equipped, will always be the only reliable method of providing a defensive screen in all conditions. I do agree with you that enhancing the aviation assets attached to a battlegroup is a worthwhile endeavour, particularly now that ASW choppers are becoming such powerful independent tools, but IMO that simply means that escorts should now be being designed with greater and greater aviation capabilities to take the rotary-wing load off the carrier decks.

A type that leads to a dead end. They have chosen to go the short takeoff and arrested landing route.

Ahh a type that leads to a dead-end right up until the point where a STOVL PAK-FA appears on the horizon eh Garry?!. I’d already stated that the more advanced FA2’s for the IN was just for the near-term, to maintain the viability of an aviation capability they already possessed, but that the STOBAR decision had made the point moot.

The improvement to the Mig-29 fleet if they choose to upgrade their aircraft to near Mig-29MK standard (which is basically near Mig-29M2 standard) will both save a lot of money and greatly improve performance.

Fine, but they still have to get maintenance afloat sorted out and may not have planned for the expenditure of re-engining and reworking the avionics of their airforce Fulcrums IF that process is as simple as you portray it?. I have no information on what it would take to bring one of the IAF Fulcrums to -29MK standard but I cant imagine that it would be cheap!. Will such expenditure jeopardise the MCA expenditures for example?.

Yes, of course… an angled deck is impossible to build on land… I guess the facilities at Saki were made by supermen of a long forgotten age.

…and a shore based ski-jump is all you need to train STOBAR carrier pilots isnt it?!. Didnt know the Russians had a short strip shore base that routinely pitches twenty degrees and has huge wind machines to simulate carrier approach conditions. Better hope they do (or they can get Kusnetsov patched up again) or the modest number of Mig-29K’s in the IN is going to suffer a little from attrition. Any news on the Eskem system being fitted to the Fulcrum-K yet?.

Could say the same about the naval F-35.

Could you?. I dont see how?. Who’s reporting that USN or RN operational training is under way with the F-35B or C models?.

No one else will be operating ADS’s either…

Ah but the ADS is indigenous and, one would hope, they should be able to produce most of their own spares. The Kiev class ship is most definitely not and is not exactly a current production hull is it?.

I guess they will be expensive to operate too? The potential for commonality is shown with the use of some of the avionics commonality with the IAF SU-30s. If this cuts both ways then the IAF will be getting lots of upgrades for its Mig-29s. Imagine that… a Navy and an Airforce flying largely compatible types… the US couldn’t do that.

Largely compatible types?. You mean the avionics are nearly the same?. Fantastic – so in your estimation if the IN Sea Kings and ALH’s mount the same type of radar and dipping sonar fit then they a ‘largely compatible’ are they!??.

PS I like the way you concentrate hard on the benefits of commonality here Garry after studiously ignoring the fact the the ‘new’ Indian carrier fleet of 1 Kiev and 2 ADS’s (as opposed to 3 ADS’s) is anything but long on commonality. More double standards Garry!? 😀

Problem with that Steve is that it only works in the current threat environment. Should we end up in the littoral of someone who has a navy…worse still a few SSKs…or a modestly competent airforce a lightly escorted carrier might be a bit of a gift.

Even in the unlikely event that threat is the only one our carrier fleet ever faces there are basic manpower requirements that come with a 4 carrier fleet that, even with an escort hull reduction, would be difficult to meet with our current and projected manpower levels.

Seems like I could’ve jumped the gun a bit here and someone in the MoD, though I can barely believe it, has looked objectively at our carrier utilisation and determined that there really is still enough life left in Invincible to merit her retention in the Fleet.

I’ve heard from one, well placed, RN source that Invincible is going to be kept on in reserve status probably as a backstop for HMS Ocean when she refits. The recent defence statement from MoD is still valid in that there will only ever be one carrier fully operational at any one time, but, having two additional flight decks at varying levels of readiness for deployment in reserve would be VERY good news compared to what we were all staring down the barrel of a few weeks ago!.

Wolverine,

both apprently convinced that the SHAR makes sense for IN. it really dosent. it dosent even make sense for RN anymore. there is no short term solution as far as CVs go.
the only short term solution IN has is the Virat. and they will keep it in service until AG and ADS are onboard. i dont see the logic of buying yet another logistical nihtmare for a few years that dosent fit the requirements anymore.

Seeings the damage has already been done with the Gorshkov’s acquisition going through it seems a bit pointless for me to pursue this one much further!. I think I have clarify the position I took to correct what you wrote above though!.

I said that, in my estimation, the Gorshkov offered little usable capability in terms of the missions it could accomplish, as an independant unit, over Invincible with her FA2 airwing. Now, with the IN set on the STOBAR course irrevocably, there is little sense in them acquiring Invincible other than as a method of stretching every last bit of service life possible out of the SHAR infrastructure they already have, as an augmentation of the Gorshkov capability until its airgroup becomes fully operational (some years after the vessel commissions naturally) or ultimately as an ASW carrier/LPH.

Are those reasons sufficient to warrant the expenditure of several hundred million dollars?. No, to be honest, I dont think they are.

The only justification that has significant merit there, IMO, is the blue-water ASW role – a mission the IN have to start taking a great deal more seriously if its thinking of competing with the PLAN over the next couple of decades. For that mission though, as I’ve said before, the JMSDF are the ones setting the pace with their DDH escort proposals and the IN would be well advised to look to following that course rather than looking at a full through-deck CVH.

Essentially then, with the development of events being what they are, SHAR FA2 is now very much less of a viable proposition for the IN. Given my recent track record though that probably means they’ll be purchasing them next week!.

Most important Ja – you have a missus that is into warships???? 😮

Also Ja enlarge that first photo you posted a few times. Something doesnt quite look right there!. Either the ship or the helicopter or both do not look like they belong in that scene!. It may not be just the nationality of the ship that that website may have a little screwed up!.

Presumably the ship is chopped to the command of NAS Pensacola and is used for the provision of basic flight deck experience.