Please feel free to cite any of your huge body of evidence that Polaris did not end up costing CVA01 any time you like. I would point out that “central budgeting” is not the magic money tree you seem to think it is. If the Secretary of State was trying to keep defence spending under £2 billion, it does not matter what folder the money comes out of, once it’s gone, it’s gone. Frankly, I am only surprised that you don’t think this is the case, but if you have any evidence to the contrary I would be interested to see it, I like to keep an open mind.
See Annex C – http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-101-c-97.pdf
So, instead of a sum estimated up to as high as £115mn in 1967 £’s going straight into the US economy in return for 144 Skybolt missiles, we spent £160mn roughly building the R class bombers at Lairds in Birkenhead and at Barrow. Clearly we needed to cancel CVA-01 after that kind of financial blow to the budget.
You’ve been told how this works John there is no separate ‘Navy budget’….there are allocations from the core budget. The ‘£20bn’ tasked to Successor SSBN will come out of this and will mean projects for all three services will be pushed to the right or otherwise amended on a case-by-case basis so we arent going to see T26 cancelled so we can get Trident!!!.
Also, once AGAIN, that money is going back into the manufacturing sector of our economy so we will see all the indirect benefits from investing in our own industry. Not least the direct taxation revenue from the yard itself and the, speculated, 20000 jobs it supports in the wider local community for the duration of the build!.
Your saying that SLCM are not an option does not make it true. Nor does not building Trident boats mean that Barrow closes, if you decide to build more SSNs.
If it was just me saying it John you might have a point. Truth is though John you havent bothered to research whether TLAM is a viable deterrent or not because, basically, you dont care if it is or not!. Hence your earlier comment on this thread that you weren’t aware of TLAM going wayward or being intercepted.
Basically all you want is more frigates, destroyers, MPA’s etc and the deterrent is the most sacrificial thing you can find. That and you remain fixated on the fact that savings from one will somehow filter into the other. You cling to this yet appear to be someone who likes to fallback on his history which I find a very odd combination….answer this question – Did the RAF get a lot of service out of the F-111’s they believed they would get after their complicity in successfully undermining CVA-01?.
Is the penny dropping yet?.
BAE have threatened to close Barrow without a steady stream of sub orders several times. Hard to see where fresh orders for SSNs would come from to keep Barrow going when Astute numbers have been set at 7. VPM Prompt Strike might change that but its vapourware right now and little is surfacing regarding the effort dedicated to it. Ironically the biggest chance for Astute-8 being built has come about because of the need to keep Barrow working until the Successor bombers are ready to start build!.
In saying that the only nuclear weapons it is worth having are the 4 SSBNs of the Cold War era you are failing to think creatively. Four new Tridents would indeed be nice if the money was there, and that’s the rub. The cost of Trident could be such that we lose vital conventional capabilities which we need, in return for a notional nuclear capability which we do not.
To say that creative thinking is required shows a staggering lack of comprehension despite the fact that several people have explained this to you already. The nuclear arsenal we had was tactical and strategic in nature. I can not for the life of me conceive of any necessity whatsoever of a tactical nuclear arsenal today. Your point then, on that, is more than just elusive. The only nuclear weapons we have a requirement for is a strategic deterrent for all the reasons that have been painstakingly laid out for you. TLAM is not a replacement for Trident and without that one simple factor you have no point to make as any other solution would cost more than Trident.
If you can’t see how preposterous it is that a navy which has too few ships to carry out some of its most basic functions is meant to be landed with the bill for a Cold War era Moscow busting nuclear missile force, then so be it.
John for the 3rd time there is no cheaper option than Trident that maintains deterrence that is of higher magnitude of destructive force than Trident or lesser magnitude. The ability to flatten Moscow or not is irrelevant as there is no less powerful system that is available to us cheaper than Trident. If you believe otherwise please tell us what the system is…and TLAM is not a viable option before that floats up again!.
The 20bn figure for Trident is for the submarines, warheads and basing. Remove that and the only things that happen are that we end up with four less submarines, the Astutes shift to Guz, Faslane/Coulport gets closed and BAE close Barrow.
The issue you seem to have a pathological need to rant about doesnt get changed a whit. In fact things get far worse for us conventionally as, not only do we lose a useful naval base, the next time we want nuclear Fleet subs we have to spend huge sums with the Yanks or the French to buy their designs built in their yards. That is money that goes straight out of the economy…not kept largely inside as with Barrow.
I think a key point is being overlooked which, if the pun can be forgiven, muddies the waters to a large degree.
Thats the very important point that the ASW mission is now a very, very different one to that which was undertaken by the Neptune, Tracker, Viking, P-3, MR2 and ATL communities throughout the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War period where everyone just kept on doing what they’d always done because…..er….!.
Today’s principle ASW threat is still the nasty little diesel boat it was a decade ago and those still mostly hide in their own states coastal waters where they get home field advantage. You’re not really going to send your MPA, however wunderbar it may be, into the oppositions fighter coverage and have them orbit round while the onboard team are listening into a few buoy lines.
The ASW mission therefore is not the key driver for MPA that it was a few decades back. Eliminate that and the need to go wavetop low and slow carrying a hundred sonobuoys disappears. Then you are free to concentrate on the important mission which, immediately and near-future, is maritime surface recon. The surface recon mission has three key drivers….high persistence/endurance, high sensor range/resolution and good onboard comms.
The US has already deployed the optimum platform for meeting these factors in the shape of the MQ-4C. The USCG has a variant more equatable with our depth of pocket in the form of Guardian. If not just one but two US organisations have twigged to the fact that open water surveillance is a radar equipped UAV’s tasking (not to mention various other nations like India, Israel etc) it does baffle me how its so studiously ignored here. I dont know if BAE have to paint little pictures of Nimrods on the side of Mantis to get the message over but the answer to our, immediate need, marine patrol requirement is very clear. Whether, or when, we need to reconstitute a fixed wing long-range ASW capability is something that we can concern ourselves with when we see evidence of an increasing blue water sub threat.
DJ
It buzzes the rooftops of your adversary’s financial stonghold while wrecking the banking computer networks with high power microwaves. Then it flies out to sea to ditch in 1000m of deep blue.
I work for major network integrator….I’m suddenly deeply in love with this weapon and approve wholeheartedly of its development and frequent deployment.
I’m also now off to price up fruit baskets……
….and then again maybe someone will build us just that SSN deployable missile:
John
We want to have the capacity to destroy a large chunk of the planet, but can’t afford a frigate to patrol the West Indies or the coast of Somalia? How does that even begin to make sense?
You seem to have a talent for finding the most irrelevant of points. Once again there is no direct connection between our conventional force mix and our nuclear deterrent….no matter how tightly you cling on to that illusion it will not make it reality. Cancelling Trident is in no way guaranteed to put that frigate off Somalia!!!.
Once again there is NO cheaper alternative of greater or lesser destructive force that will perform an adequate deterrent role. Deterrence is not simply nuclear delivery…it is assured nuclear delivery. Short of someone developing a strategic-range ballistic weapon for us that will work with our existing SSNs, a philanthropy that I would not hold your breath waiting for, we will not get cheaper than Trident.
Great weapon for a defence company to manufacture….one that forces clients to buy multiple weapons systems of each type for redundancy purposes. Suspect that BAE, Thales, IAI etc, etc are sending fruit baskets to Boeing heirarchy already!.
Serious question though how is this concept to be employed?. Cant be in direct support of a strike package or the strike, presumably, gets EMP-whacked too?. Cant be too far ahead of the package either or the serious opfor gets chance to wheel out redundant, shielded, units or switch out fried PCB’s and gets systems back up. The ramifications, if the follow-on strike package believes the target is in the stone age and then a clever opponent lights them up at close range, could be quite tragic!.
Is this a ‘peacetime’ weapon for use against soft targets or maybe a psyops tool???
Cold War or post Cold War is irrelevent John. Simply put as the Americans are pretty much paying for Son of Trident we get to spend most of our Trident budget on the delivery platform. That part is UK industry and, so, the money stays in our economy. That makes it cheap and, financially, a damned good idea.
Operationally I think its sub-optimal but from an industry standpoint we couldnt get a better deal.
As to whether Trident represents overkill to what is needed that is also irrelevent as there are no substantially cheaper options to replace Trident with. There is simply no economic-based argument against Trident that makes a whit of sense – if we intend on keeping the deterrent.
John,
Again any way that we do the nuclear deterrent its going to be expensive. In terms of pure economics Trident IS likely going to end up as the cheapest option. This is very simply as you have to look where the infamous £20bn is going to be spent. Flippantly BAE Barrow, in the main, being the answer!.
The allotted amount while sizeable is predominantly staying in the UK economy. Any other theoretical solution is very likely to see a larger proportion of the deterrent funding disappear overseas.
Technology moves on, who is to say that stealthy SLCMs would not be an option soon? Even with current techology, if even 50% of SLCMs were to get through (which is probably a very low figure) then that sounds like a deterrent to me.
Actually though, we are not too far apart. Like me, you seem to be saying that you disagree with the concept of having 3 or 4 dedicated SSBNs patrolling the North Atlantic on an endless deterrent patrol. Given that our surface fleet is arguably less powerful now than that of Spain or Italy, both of which also have MPAs where we do not, the idea of dedicating scarce resources to rebuilding our Cold War deterrent still strikes me as absurd.
It still leaves us needing to develop a stealthy strategic-range cruise missile with an associated nuclear warhead though John. Then mating that up with the SSN force. Please deposit several billion pounds when you hear the beep!.
I think we still need submarines with a ballistic weapon on deterrent patrol. I think, though, that the need for a heavyweight multi-MIRV SLBM has lessened. I think if we can put ‘Astute Payload Modules’ in 5 Astute batch II’s following the current run and cycle 3 of the 5 through a Continuous At Sea Deterrent status…with a 2 boat surge capability we’re job done.
I think we’ve covered the disconnect between nuclear forces and conventional forces already.
“As far as I am aware, no SLCM has ever been shot down. “
In fact quite a few have been brought down, got lost, crashed and otherwise ended up in all sorts of peoples hands as a result. Not brilliant if a W80 armed one goes the wrong way on a journey into Iran and ends up crash landing more or less intact in Al Qaeda’s backyard eh?!. TLAM-N is not an option to base a deterrent capability on. You can use it as a nuclear delivery system but not a deterrent if you see the difference?.
As I said I’m all for using SSNs with a UK derivative of the VPM as a launch platform. I agree they are, or could be, much more useful than dedicated bombers. The VPM tube dimensions appear to be about 2.2m diameter by about 10m deep. Rough working out the means we’d need a ballistic weapon about 10m long and a metre in diameter to triple pack in a single tube. It would need a throw weight of about 250-300kg for an RV, bus, penaids and guidance module and probably somewhere near 2000-2500nm range.
Ironically the dimensions fit the rough form factor of the cancelled Northrop Grumman KEI…interesting to see if that basic vehicle could be converted to a surface-surface role!.
Realistically though the only difference here is that we are spending money on developing a weapon instead of spending money on developing a submarine for an American weapon!. Savings on the £20bn are unlikely either way…but with the SSN system at least we can use the boat for other taskings when its not scheduled for deterrent patrol.
Wan,
Interesting. I’m a little suspect about the maindeck level VLS on this hull, per the alternate artwork, as my view would be that the US designers wouldnt have gone with the on-deck ESSM fit had space been available below for at least self-defence length silos. The minimum-change theory was why I’d have looked at A35 tubes or FLAADS bespoke maindeck up, with a deckhouse thrown around, for the ship the way I had it.
I see what you are saying with the RAM F122 style. Indeed that would look like a solution and a much simpler one than needing to fit the VLS forward. A Strales mount forward plus a Mk144 launcher on each beam atop the hangar would make the ship a somewhat tough nut to crack from the air. I have to admit my concept was leaning in the direction of FLAADS and screening of MSO ops in an extended ‘local area’ against an air threat as opposed to pure point defence!.
Edit: Hadnt seen the model with a VLS for’d of the bridge before!. Makes me the idiot! 🙂
John,
You are making the classic mistake here. You want a cheap nuclear deterrent in the belief that saving money there would lead to more money pushed into the conventional forces budget. There are three main problems with this:
1) A nuclear deterrent must be capable of reaching target or its not a deterrent. A delivery system that can be countered with readily available defensive weapons does not provide deterrence. Developing either a new weapons system to fit our existing subs or developing new subs to fit an existing/developed weapon is going to be expensive either way.
2) The UK could already put more money into conventional defence than it does right now. The cap on the number of frigates etc is defined by our ‘need’ according the limits set by our political leadership. No proof exists that cancelling the nuclear deterrent will see an extra penny invested and, based on past performance, its far more likely that the savings would be held back by the Treasury. As cancelling the work on future submarines would likely see BAE close Barrow DWP would probably have a good call on some of the savings for a kickoff!.
3) Nuclear submarine design and fabrication is a strategic national requirement. Coupled with the obvious geographical constraints of the UK’s landmass any nuclear deterrent MUST have a submarine component of some description to guarantee second strike.
When you put this I was reminded of the following exchange from the recent Avengers film:
CAPTAIN AMERICA: “We need a plan of attack.”
IRON MAN: “I have a plan, attack!”.
All of the above hardware could carry tactical nukes as could RAF aircraft. On the other hand and playing Devil’s advocate, let me put this suggestion, what if we don’t have a nuclear deterrent?
Much as with that film I think there is a degree of subtlety thats being missed here. The point of deterrence is to prevent an opponent taking action that forces a response with tactical systems….this is why they are called ‘strategic’ weapons.
If we lost the nuclear deterrent tomorrow there would be no immediate effect. 5 years down the track there may be no effect…maybe we lose our permanent Security Council seat?. 10-20yrs down the track though who knows…and thats the problem. The nuclear weapons that were pointed at us havent gone away and, as America’s best mate, we are still less than popular in certain quarters.
I think it would be foolish to say with certainty we will never be threatened with nuclear weapons again and as long as it is possible we could be targeted faster than we can re-generate a strategic weapons capability we will be at risk of coercion. For a country with our international engagement that is intolerable. If we want to do away with the deterrent we dial back our foreign policy and our desire to have a say in world events.