They will not deter, but are part of a arms race in South East Asia, which makes are conflict THERE more likely (but as far as I know Britain has no claims to the Spratleys and I guess it would not like to defend e.g. Vietnam against China).
Britains relevence there is hard to fathom?. I have provided a clear example where maritime resources are driving re-armament. There will be an arms race for those resources…..that was my point all along. The alternative is that Vietnam de facto cede their claim on what they perceive as their part of the Spratleys. They dont seem to like that idea….hence the frigates. Perhaps you can tell them they are going the wrong way about this and they just need to resolve the issue politically. Dont worry if they tell you they’ve been trying to do that for decades and its not worked…..you can always tell them you know better and they simply aren’t trying hard enough.
Why they there are not as overstretched even those their fleets are also constantly reduced? And why should have Britain have more tasks than e.g. France?
So, effectively, instead of increasing the power of the RN with all the associated benefits that come with that for our manufacturing base, for our ability to honour our commitments etc, etc we should actually reduce our foreign policy goals and commitments so we can shrink down our Navy???.
Maybe, when you talk to the Vietnamese, you shoud keep that bit of advice quiet…..I dont know what the local equivalent of a loony bin is over there but I cant imagine its Hilton standard?!.
Actually the French Navy appear to have very similar problems, see e.g. their outdated surface fleet, only one carrier, even though it would like to have two etc….
Odd that isnt it?. More so for the fact that they have been running to ‘two-tier’ hi/lo escort mix you have been championing for years. Maybe its a very delicate balance to strike?.
The La Fayettes are designed to be also part of carrier battlegroups in a high risk environment, but are not designed to fight alone in a high risk environment.
The Lafayette design is a 25knt patrol frigate. Its job is patrol not fleet duties. The French have the F70’s and Horizons for carrier group duties and the Aviso’s/Lafayettes and Floreals for patrol. They are designed to accomplish lone patrols economically. They are not designed to keep pace with a fast carrier group conducting Fleet ASW ops etc?.
They were designed to the political requirements of the last (post Cold War) decades, in which no western power ever had to face strong military opposition. The Type 45, Horizons, F124, LCF, Arleigh Burke etc. were designed for a political environment (Cold War), which is not existing anymore and is very unlikely to return in a near future.
How about the medium future?. Dont tell the Vietnamese about this either….if they think there might suddenly be lots of spare LCF’s, T45’s and Burkes on the market they might not buy any more ships from the Russians and that might make the Russians angry at you!.:cool:
Leon
That are possible conflicts – but currently these are still possible political conflicts and except someone going completely crazy, they will be very unlikely future wars. In most cases these problems could be solved without even thinking about the use of military power.
Maybe you want to go and have a look at the new Russian frigates that the Vietnamese have just bought on the belief that the Spratleys wont involve military confrontation. You dont seem to realise that conventional military deterrence, even if only local, has a major part to play in political interaction. Remember what I was saying about Defence Diplomacy missions earlier. A warship doesnt have to be firing to be a powerful and effective unit.
17 first class destroyers and frigates is much more than most navies have – including navies of states, which are economically stronger than Britain.
So what?. Do these states have the same tasking requirements we do?. Are they as overstretched as we are?. I’ve already pointed out to you economics doesnt factor in to this. We could afford a dozen BAE Khareef-type OCPV’s from just a fraction of a SINGLE years SURPLUS from the Social Security budget and do it without depriving the NHS of a single gold-plated tap. The determination to keep the fleet as it is is political not economic.
France have e.g. only 12 – most of them are much older than the current British ships. Additionally France has 20 cheap frigates and avisos, but half of them are also very old. But they had built cheap ships, e.g. the La Fayette class and Floréal class, ships which alone cannot survive against a first class military thread.
France has the right model for the post-cold war world – core warfighting elements with a second tier patrol fleet. The problem is that they have suffered the natural disaster that comes with such a formation. That their Treasury is far happier buying the cheap ships than the expensive ones. Consequently those unsurviveable La Fayettes have been finding their way into French carrier battlegroups for a very long time. Its likely this lesson that has kept the RN from going the same route. The cheap ships are no replacement for the core warfighters they are an augment nothing more.
Leon,
Today there is nothing comparable. Or do you know something?
Have you not been paying attention to the ongoing disputes over mineral wealth exploitation in the Spratley Islands, off the Falklands or the bizarre underwater territorial flag marking activities in the Arctic. The maritime environment is going to be the big flashpoint in the coming decades. Thats well recognised now is it not?!. Those nations not prepared to overwatch and protect their claims will be very much the sorrier for it.
Jonesy: the Royal Navy is not overstreched because of its peacetime tasks, but because of all the wars, it was and is used – and which costs caused further reductions in fleet size. For the peacetime tasks there is no big fleet of first class warships necessary.
What utter nonsense. The whole point is that we do not have a big fleet of first class warships. If we still had dozens of frigates and a dozen or more high end multirole destroyers and cruisers then perhaps you’d have a point. We have 6 DDG’s and, soon, will be down to 13 FFG. We have been gapping taskings with more than this today!. Its not a case that we have been left with the wrong ships its that we dont have enough ships of any kind right or wrong!.
There has to be a core warfighting element in the Navy, surely that doesnt have to be explained to you, that means enough assets to throw a screen around our HVU’s the carrier(s), amphibs and/or work with friendly assets. We have to provide force-enhancement to the low-end patrol units we already have out on task. We have to deploy competent warships in home waters in support of the deterrent patrol and to counter surveillance and intelligence gathering operations from peer-states. To manage all this and upkeep of training, maintenance and upgrades with 6 destroyers and 13 frigates is a huge ask.
As said before a class, similar in concept to the Danish Thetis, of Oceanic Capable Patrol Vessels would be absolutely fantastic so that the FFG’s, especially, can have their useful life preserved for the core warfighting mission. The S2C2 study confirmed, officially, that this would be desireable under the heading of the C3 OCPV component. This obviously needs MORE money in the budget and not less as you would contend and, last I heard, this was being pushed into the long grass.
Leon,
Once again. Look at the level of commitments in the real world that we have to cope with. You cannot just dismiss these saying that we should not be doing them so they are meaningless. We have got to honour our obligations otherwise what value are we as ally or friend?. If we want to be a member of strong and respected alliances then we have to contribute meaningfully to them and that means committing quality assets. There will always be a raft of taskings on the Navy that require comprehensively equipped naval vessels.
The very abidingly simple fact is that we, far from having too many units, have quite a number too few. This is nothing to do with threat levels – actual or perceived. Our current force structure is barely adequate to handle our ‘peacetime’ taskings as witnessed by us sending out RFA hulls, with temporary hangars, on some of the lower threat-level patrol taskings. If we did have a significant blue-water threat the ramp up, from where we are, would, by necessity, be dramatic.
Leon,
Seriously stop this now. You dont know what you’re talking about…..you have made that plainly clear.
“”Defence diplomacy” is also something for the 19th century (gunboat politics) and why you need currently ELINT/COMINT? There is no Cold War any more.”
Defence diplomacy is a key part of alliance membership as well as a way or representing your interest and value to friends and, even better, would-be friends in distant parts of the world. Like it or not, a ship is still a big impressive symbol of intent and commitment. If, that is, it is a big impressive ship of course!. Why was it, you think, the Russians sent a nuclear powered battlecruiser to Venezuela recently?. Do you think it was to offer support in defending their coast?.
Why the need for COMINT/ELINT?. Honestly?. You think we only develop intelligence during time of hostilties?. You dont think that, perhaps, intelligence is more important to gather during peacetime to help avert hostilities in the first place.
I dont say this very often but I think you are on the wrong forum Leon. I think your message might find wider appeal where the contributors are a bit less knowledgeable.
Compare the Royal Navy to other European countries with an economy of a similar or bigger size and you will see that the RN is oversized. And: ask yourself, if all these commitments are necessary or part of a policy, from which actually nobody benefits from (e.g. Iraq War).
Irrelevent!. The commitments exist!!!. They are there and they require units tasked. You can say ‘well if we didn’t have to do x or didnt have to do y then perhaps we could do with less’ but its meaningless nonsense. The fact is these are the taskings we have to cover and we dont have enough to cover them now.
If you think all that a Navy does is patrol around the coast waiting to fend off the next Viking invasion then quite right we are wildly over-equipped. The problem is though anti-smuggling patrols, anti-piracy, defence diplomacy, alliance taskings, sovereignty patrol, deterrence patrol, ELINT/COMINT etc all fall under the Navy’s remit and require assets to undertake. When you understand that and, as I said, look at the actual overstretch we face trying to do everything today then maybe you’ll see how massively you misunderstand what you are talking about.
Leon,
You honestly think that, because there is no Nazi Germany or Soviet Union that a Navy with 19 frontline escorts is excessive?. Have you, by any chance, taken a few minutes to look at the number of defence commitments we have?.
Someone mentioned earlier that we now have alliances to protect us. Well alliances work by member states committing resources to them. We have obligations to provide units such as escortsn minehunters and UNREP capability for alliance operations. We may not be the big colonial power anymore, but, we do still have overseas dependent territories. We have a moral responsibility to those dependents if nothing else. An RN presence is, I happen to know, a valued and visible sign of the UK’s ongoing commitment to those territories.
Basically just do yourself a favour before you come on a site with military personnel, ex-military and plenty of committed observers find out how overstretched those services are, what the operational tempo is like, how many ratings are trying to swap drafts to avoid yet another 7 or 8 month deployment etc and then tell us how over equipped we are.
This is no answer, why is there are need for this 😉
The answer there is clear.
Yes – in a case of a real need this would be done very fast.
Are you serious?. You think you can reconstitute a naval force in a year?. If you dont happen to get a years advance notice of an event requiring a strong naval presence then what?. Like I said you might want to think about this a bit more.
Perhaps you should realise that Britain is in regard of the living standards of a great part of its population not that rich anymore, but actually poor (compared to developed countries) – and one reason is the decline of industry and the constant cuts in spending by the state because of constant tax reductions.
So completely ignoring the huge surpluses in the Social Welfare budget – google it before making spurious and incorrect statements!?. We can afford a stronger navy that is very clear. The decision is a political one that we dont have that navy. If you are serious about this debate understanding that point is important. If all you want is a thinly-concealed platform for an anti-UK diatribe though – go elsewhere.
I see no reason, why there is a need now for a T45. Most countries have no such a ship near their oil resources – even there are conflicts about them. If you mention the word “ignorance”, you need a lot of more arguments than only this statement.
It doesnt surprise me that you dont. The answer is sensor persistence. Unless we want to keep a detachment of E-3D’s, a tanker det and a greatly enhanced Typhoon contingent, with all associated support and logistics, in theatre a T45, with its MFR/VSR and organic chopper capability is the best way to put enhanced coverage over a group of maritme coordinates.
This was exactly what was made in cases of a real emergency, a real need for such ships. But today there is none, therefore such a built takes a lot of time etc. Such a ships could be built in probably less of year, if it would be really needed (compare it to capital ships of earlier times!).
A year. To build. IF the yard is manned up and properly tooled to start the job. Perhaps you want to go back and think about that again.
Today such OPV would be much more useful compared to Type 45 destroyers – and considering the economic situation of Britain, which is not capable to spend enough for a lot of urgently needed things in many areas (e.g. education, health etc.), a hugh fleet of Type 45-like ships is not affordable at all. You should remember that also one of the reasons for the cuts in defence are the gigantic spendings for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which overstreched the British and American capacities.
What gives you the idea that we dont have the capability to spend the money for the things you state and a comprehensive Naval service?. You are aware that we run a YEARLY surplus in the Social Security budget of £8bn in means tested benefits alone?. If you add unclaimed tax credits you can add in another 6bn. Enough to buy two aircraft carriers, that will last up to 50 years, plus enough airgroup to keep the duty carrier at full strength permanently.
We choose not to spend the money that way. We very definitely could if sense prevailed.
No cuts,
I didn’t say the Falklands. I said Falklands oil resources. No guarantees that future oil fields down there will be conveniently located just off the coast.
For sure. But for attacking Libya you do not need six Type 45 and 13 Type 23. Two or three such ships would be sufficient (plus the same number as replacement). Libya also show that Britain is high likely not fighting wars alone, but with allies – e.g. France, which additionally decrease the need for first class warships.
Most British ships in the last decades were used for “showing the flag”, patrols against pirates or even not armed commercial vessels (“war against terror”) or some fights against third class navies and air forces (e.g. Iraq or Libya, remember also that in both cases Britain was the attacker). Except of the last cases cheap OPV would be enough – and cheap OPV would have been still sufficient and would have survived e.g. in war against Libya, because there was no attack by something stronger than fast lightly armed launches.
Britain has with his current strength still a oversized navy – both for its economic capabilities and for its needs. We are in the 21rst century – not in the times of the World Wars or the Cold War.
Leon I’m afraid you will now be used as the perfect example of the problem we face here. Widespread absolute ignorance of military matters and the lack of hesitation to voice an opinion by those living in ignorance.
You say 6 destroyers is quite enough yet, were we to have to station a T45 365 days a year to cover Falklands oil resources, in response to an escalation of tensions perhaps, we would need to task half of that destroyer force to keep just one on station. All it then takes is a mechanical casualty to one of the others and, all of a sudden, we are looking at issues in dispatching the carrier group owing to the question mark over its escort screen.
The other thing you miss, Leon, is that, in 5 years time, you cant just throw a few hundred million quid at a shipyard and tell them to build you another T45 same as the last lot – like you’d order a Big Mac!. Ships take preparation to build and the workforce and facilities have to be reconstituted at the yards to accomplish it. T45 hull #6 may cost £650mn including PAAMS. Adding a hull 7 in 2017 because we find ourselves short of numbers could cost £1bn+. Mistakes and miscalculations really cost in this field.
Is there a case for a two tier Patrol and Fleet composed RN?. Yes, frankly, there is. A ‘cheap’ Leander-sized OPV with a Mk8, light guns, standard MRR and organic chopper capability could do the job we’ve seen LIVERPOOL doing off the Libyan coast at much lower cost. The issue though is that such a capability would be needed to augment the warfighting fleet component and not replace it. We would end up with a more efficient and capable Navy NOT a very much cheaper one.
Strength is a relative term. With the force mix you outline we could complete the Falklands action in 96hrs at the outside. How we’d fair at slamming the front door to the Atlantic against dozens of hostile SSN’s, SSK’s and SSGN’s with the same force mix I’m not so sure though?.
In 82 we had, just, enough to accomplish both – today – I’d say it would be one or the other but not both. I think we are more potent at what we can do now…..but I think back then we were capable of doing a lot more simultaneously.
Although a carrier often (depending upon wind direction) makes it easier by turning round at regular intervals and going as fast as they can into the wind. This makes them easier to overtake and easier to hear,
True it slows down the general rate of advance, but, it does add the extra unpredicatability on course changes meaning that the sub has to be careful to balance speed and sensor performance. Echoing Kilo’s sentiments the point I was making was that SSNs are powerful ASuW platforms but they have to put a lot of work into what they do.
Was it one or two modern SSNs that couldnt fint the 25 de Mayo? (yep, I went there:diablo:)
Yep it was one Spartan…..and she did find her in the end…..just when she was already clearly on the way back to port. Conqueror obviously had a bit more luck with her surface group, but, nearly lost her track as well at one point.
Its a difficult question to answer comprehensively as the only alternate carrier group, to the USN, set up for organic sea control was French with either the Clemenceau’s largely SEM airgroup supported by a few Alize or, perhaps, the CdeG’s group with a sqdn of early blk Rafales, a couple of SEM sqdns and a short det of Hawkeye. Both would need surprise and some sleight of hand to slip the E2/BARCAP/AEGIS trap and slam AM39’s into ships flying the stars and stripes.
The Russians dont count in this as antiship was never a design function of their airwing – the antiship firepower was the ships P-700 battery and the area surveillance was supposed to be space-based from the Legenda platform. So carrier-on-carrier, in terms of airgroup composition, doesnt work between Kuznetsov and a US CV. As others have said anticarrier the Soviets intended to do with submarines.
That’s not at all the case, only for conventional subs. A modern, quiet, SSN can chase down a CVN and get well within torpedo range without being detected in open sea.
Just to clarify the SSN cannot ‘chase’ a surface group down. Running at speed to overhaul a surface group transitting is pure suicide for even a modern SSN. At speed the sub is deaf and wont always be able to tell if a surface ASW escort has chopped power to have a listen for a trailer.
An SSN will try to leapfrog ahead of a surface group, using its high sustained underwater speed, and try and predict where the surface group will be that it can get to first to lay ambush on the bows or forward quarter. Its never a good idea to fire torpedoes in tailchase unless you are close and/or have very fast torpedoes!. Obviously if the surface group changes course a few degrees, while the SSN is leapfrogging to set its ambush, then the SSN is going to get nothing for its endeavours. Getting position to make an attack on a surface group can be a frustrating and prolonged exercise and shouldn’t be underestimated as a challenge.
This is just initial manufacturers sea trials. She wont even be fully fitted out yet. They are taking the, entirely proper, steps of making sure they have a working ship before they think about getting it working as an aircraft carrier.
If carriers are so vulnerable, why build one?
Two reasons:
1) AShBM and a carrier group would be complementry systems. The carrier group can provide persistent ISTAR at strategic, theatre entry, ranges and the AShBM can provide heavy, short track-to-effect cycle, firepower to augment group fire.
2) Simply because an aircraft carrier is every bit as powerful a defensive platform as an offensive one. An aggressor can not leave a Chinese carrier task group unregarded and roaming at will while it moves to conduct operations against the Chinese coast. The cost to attack China, once a carrier is fully operational, would be increased significantly by the need to locate, track and reduce the PLAN carrier group while near-simultaneously conducting strike operations ashore. Just by existing and being deployable the carrier is providing conventional deterrence.
As someone said they, soon, get the excitement of starting out along the naval fastjet aviation path. They have a lot to learn and it will take them, likely, the best part of a generation to get the hang of operating and supporting fastjets at sea to the point where they have all of their own specifc standard procedures defined. Everyone has to start somewhere though….here’s hoping they do it without the attrition that most of the rest of us have suffered. At least it appears they have a nice big, comprehensively outfitted, deck to start their training on!.