Think the kiddies have been snorting the goofballs again. This thing is a shiny disco ball in comparison to the Arleigh Burke, let alone the…

[ATTACH=CONFIG]250970[/ATTACH]

Anyone can “reduce” RCS for something that sticks out like a city on radar, but only a few teams are implementing actual “stealth” levels of RCS reduction.

This goes for the PAK FA as well. The attention to detail in signature reduction on it is primitive and clumsy compared to what has been done with the F-35.

– Little/no attention to surface discontinuity management (even the Rafale handles this better)
– Fat, rounded leading edges.
– Horrible surface alignment, especially for the side facing surfaces.
– Portions of the side surfaces almost vertically facing.
– Protrusions exposed directly to the sides
– No buried canopy frame.
– Exposed, forward facing blockers (a feature that F-35 designers only deemed suitable for the F-35’s butt).
– Non-VLO, forward facing IRST
– No airframe masking of IR signature (F-22 addresses this with flat nozzles, F-35 addresses it with single, small nozzle hidden behind a widened central airframe)

In a stealth-on-stealth type of fight where detection ranges are well within both sides’ NEZs, the first to detect the enemy will prevail almost always. Racing into the fray, blind, at M1.8 will not help either, it will only reduce the pilot’s reaction time and options when the missiles start appearing in front of him, not to mention giving away the fact that he’s an aircraft and not a decoy drone.

Actual stealth is sharp where it needs to be sharp, rounded where it needs to be and has thresholds on how vertical surfaces and edges are allowed to be.

[ATTACH=CONFIG]250971[/ATTACH]

T-50 still has decades to go to catch up to 1980’s level stealth.

[ATTACH=CONFIG]250972[/ATTACH]

As for the scaled mission effectiveness, ect, the methodology is not as well explained, other than stating that some evaluation was based on simulators, ect. (it is possible that how they evaluated effectiveness on criteria that has been omitted from the publically available report)

That is exactly what was done. In the report, the segments where they discussed specific capabilities to justify the scores have all been scrubbed from the document.

[ATTACH=CONFIG]245927[/ATTACH]

In regards to overall evaluation approach for the survivability and effectiveness.

The scenarios reflect a new Danish fighter possible task portfolio that can consist of task solution within the full conflict spectrum. There is thus evaluated on puzzle-solving in both peacetime and in times of war and crisis at the time, where the first kampfly can be expected provided (2020). The selected mission scenarios, which are the basis for evaluation, includes both monitoring and search tasks, defensive air defence tasks and offensive tasks.

In addition, evaluates candidates ‘ survivalability and mission effectiveness in varying weather and light conditions (in cloudy weather, in daylight as well as at night). This means that the evaluation of the candidates can illuminate both forces as weaknesses in a so-called multi-role combat aircraft that can be used globally in both defensive and offensive missions and in full conflict spectrum. Since the intended task complex takes its starting point in the full conflict spectrum, mission scenarios are weighted equally in relation to the ranking of the candidates in the field of overlevelsesevNE and mission effectiveness.

However, the missions, as a fighter jet are traditionally designed to be able to carry out, are in the high end of the conflict spectrum (in crisis or times of war). In order to be able to illuminate any design possibleand restrictions are therefore evaluated the candidates in more high-intensity mission scenarios than in scenarios with lower threat and carbon intensity. The conflict spectrum and the used of mission scenarios are illustrated in Figure 3.2.

Russia will not have to pay rent for Crimea naval base. It will no longer subsidize gas to Ukraine. It will be built new pipeline routes to avoid paying rent to Ukraine.

Nice story. Unfortunately, actual reality is that to-date, the invasion of Ukraine has cost Russia $600 Billion and continues to cost them $140 Billion per year. This will get far worse for Russia as time goes on and Europe weans itself off Russian gas and oil.

Also as unfortunate, out of that 2 million people gained by Russia, a vast majority are non-productive and the Crimean region prior to 2014 was running at a $1 billion economic deficit, with a GDP of a mere $4 billion. This was before their invaluable tourism industry completely collapsed. Don’t bother trying to spin that the acquisition of Crimea was economically beneficial to Russia. It has been an economic disaster.

The strategic value of the peninsula is even questionable with modern weapons used today. With the Black Sea completely surrounded and entrances controlled by NATO and its allies, the ships of the Black Sea fleet are quite literally fish in a barrel.

The Sevastopol lease was only costing $4 billion a year.

Survivability Summary

It is clear from the figure that the Joint Strike Fighters survivability only to a lesser extent affected by a rising threat level, and that the aircraft generally have a good Suvelsesevne in full conflict spectrum. Eurofighters and Super Hornets the survivability decreases in line with the increased complexity and composition of threats and are generally worse in the high end of the conflict spectrum.

A Danish F-16 aircraft are evaluated in the light of the same mission scenarios to provide a known reference basis. Therefore, the results from the evaluation of F-16 aircraft’s survivability in Figure 3.3. F-16 aircraft survivability is generally good on the the first two mission scenarios, but evaluated on subsequent missions generally to be worse than the three candidates.

Summary – mission effectiveness
In General, it can be concluded that Joint Strike Fighters mission efficiency seems to be unaffected by an increasing mission intensity level, and that the plane can therefore solve the problems in the full conflict spectrum, while Euro fighters and Super Hornets mission efficiency is smaller by an increased mission intensity level.

Looks like some of the technical detail on how the various aircraft achieve their mission has been censored as expected, however the document mentions right near the start that Stealth and Situational Awareness/Integration combined are the distinctive advantages the F-35 has over the competition.

I think given the Rafale has no real electronic systems advantage over the superhornet (and none at all over a Growler) in a modern, high threat environment and has inferior flight performance to the typhoon (except perhaps in a 1v1 training dogfight at low speed which is not operationally realistic), I’d say it would fare no better than the other legacy fighters that were evaluated by the Danes.

It certainly would not fare any better than the other legacy types in other aspects that were evaluated in detail such as:

Strategic Relationships
– Political relationships – Who needs to work closer with the french? They’ll just surrender when push comes to shove anyway 🙂 Better to be friends with the guy who carries the biggest stick.
– Availability of time critical support from other users – There will be far fewer Rafale users than F-35 users to draw expertise and timely support assistance from in the european (and Asian) regions.
– Ability to work within the new operational framework of NATO – Turning up with your Rafale with its obsolete comms gear and observable signature to a NATO operation is like being that vegetarian at the dinner party who forces everyone else to cater for their limitations.
– Ability and willingness to develop – Byproduct of economies of scale. More collective experience being gathered by the fighter type’s community, better standardization > more process and technical refinement.
– Training – Again, more operators = more experience gathered = better training and refinement.
– Joint training opportunities – Rafale operators need to send just a few aircraft at a time + tankers half way around the world to fly with other operators. F-35 operators are all over Europe. Something Canada needs to consider as well.

How do you draw the conclusion its a “pipe dream”?

I haven’t seen any bragging from anyone saying they’ve detected a stealthed f-22 from long range. The French made a lazy claim about it during exercises where the f-22 was confirmed being fitted with the LL. The Brits and Germans both claimed their typhoons simply couldn’t find it until they were locked onto (ie. Well after they’d already been fired on). The Iranians didn’t even know one was flying in close formation with their fighters for several minutes until it made its presence known.

F-22’s have been operating in Asia, Europe and Mideast and the first people who would claim they’ve caught the F-22 on radar if it happened (Russia, China, Iran, NK) … haven’t.

Sure, let me just get my list ….. pff seriously?

But no, they don’t “copy” nearly to the degree or in the manner that a large cohort of the English-speaking internet alleges.

You simply don’t have a clue. My company recently transferred two staff from our Chinese offices over for some temporary project work. Within the first week both people were asking local team members to escort them into high end watch stores.

Both had admitted to not being wealthy at all, yet they were looking for very specific, very expensive makes and models of watches.

Not only do the Chinese encourage copying, but they actually have a very organised program for acquiring western products to copy.