The over-wing devices (speedbrakes/lift dumpers?) are free to move and could be lifted and damaged by winds. Weighted tires stop that happening without damaging the structure or the painted surfaces.

Andy

Never been tempted to take the Colt there. Minimal all round vision doesn’t sit happily with some of the tales I’ve heard of chaotic arrivals and circuit joins.

A bit late for this year’s event now. But I had always wanted to do the PFA by air, just to get a tick in the box as it were. Did that PFA and Cranfield, and at Kemble. Wouldn’t do it again by air – if I desperately wanted to go again, I’d go by road as arriving by air just doesn’t deliver anything extra for me.

Procedures set out in the AIC work well up to a point. However, on each occasion we flew in to the rally (both locations) there was some muppet who had seeming decided that the joining procedures did not apply to them and that they could join straight in on final, or that they need not take the recommended route but would go waaaay wide. The ensuing chaos resulting from the other compliant flyers trying to make it all work out behind or ahead of the idiot whilst still trying to fly within the AIC on each occasion resulted in go-arounds, etc.

Direct experience of non-compliance with the PFA AIC, along with repoted TRA busts, are the two things more than anything else that makes me wonder how some people actually manage to get pilots’ licences.

Andy

The more you think about this incident, the more it becomes apparent that it was a difficult situation to resolve.

Firstly, to counter the arguments of Bmused55 and others – you have no choice but to trust airport security and assume that passengers who have passed through it are “OK”. To do otherwise would require you not to fly, as it isn’t reliable to assume that anyone who “isn’t OK” will show behavior traits that give themselves away – anyone could be a threat, not just those who behave strangely, and thus we have to accept that airport security perform their role reliably.

Secondly, if the situation is as reported, by taking a decision to offload the passengers it could be argued that the captain also undermined airport security screening – unless the decision to offload the two was taken for reasons of flight safety (i.e. passenger riot whilst airborne), then by offloading the passengers the captain has implied he doesn’t trust the security screening either. That is not at all good for the industry.

However, there is some validity to the point that we (or in this case the passengers) have a right to challenge behavior we see as suspicious – we might do this if we saw suspicious in our streets at night, so why not at an airport? Of course, whilst we have a right to challenge suspicious behavior and where we can explain our concerns adequately to have those concerns followed up on, we do not have the right to be the judge or jury – others with more experience of law enforcement must take on that role, and this is where the situation in Malaga starts to become difficult.

The “suspicious” passengers ultimately travelled albeit on a later flight, so in this case it seems reasonable to assume that the passengers worries were investigated, the “suspicious” passengers were checked out and found not to be a threat and allowed to continue on that later flight. However, the problem remains that security checks already performed were undermined by the decision to offload the passengers, and that isn’t at all good for air travel in general – how many more security checks will be questioned needlessly, how many more flights disrupted, how many more innocent people subjected to unnecessary suspicion or scrutiny?

My opinion now is that for the good of all – the airline, the passengers who were worried, the passengers who were offloaded, and for the perceived reliability of air travel security – the two passengers should have been rescreened (again) and then allowed onto the flight. Once re-screened, those passengers who were worried should have been advised that the passengers had been rescreened, were found to be OK, that they were travelling, and that anyone who didn’t like it was welcome to offload themselves. This action would have (a) proven to all the concerned passengers that the “suspects” had been thoroughly screened, and (b) would have emphasised that the airline and the crew still had confidence in the screening process after considering and investigating passenger concerns. I think it important that it had been done like this and the flight delayed by however long it took rather than putting the “suspects” on a later flight to demonstrate that mob rule and passenger prejudice cannot and will not be allowed to take precidence over the normal security screening process.

Andy

As for the 3″ reduction in hand baggage, perhaps it is easier for the security personel to search, which in turn leads to getting people through easier with less hassle.

Ah, at last we’re getting somewhere! :rolleyes: Its got nothing to do with security, as you say its just “easier for the security personel”. Well done! The second part of your sentence only covers a part of the story though, the other half being that the airport operators have shown a woeful unwillingness to provide appropriate levels of staff to cope with the increased number of searches. Now maybe you understand where Michael O’Leary is coming from.

Andy

I never claimed or said i worked in the airline industry!

Neither did I suggest that you did. If you actually read what I’d said, you’d have noticed I was referring to someone else up there.

But at the time there was a threat, to which the government acted upon at very short notice to the information availble at the time!, Yes it did cause chaos, but its not like the terrorists let people know what dates they are going to do it. 1hours notice to drag in extra staff, brief them on the situation, inform them on the new restrictions. and if you combine it with Europes busiest airport to boot NOT THAT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND IS IT!

Michael O’Leary isn’t talking about what happened last week which was in many respects justified for the very short term, he’s talking about the rules and restrictions that are NOW in place – “Ryanair has issued the government with a seven-day ultimatum to restore airport security measures to normal or risk being sued for compensation.”

i’ll repeat, how many of you truthfully thought that terrorists could operate in groups, and each carry a piece of bomb, which on there own single parts would look harmless, but combined would be devastating?….please answer this honestly!!! SIMPLE ANSWER YES/NO

Its an irrelevent question. For everything we could think of that could be done by terrorists, there will be hundreds that we couldn’t think of that might ultimately threaten aviation. That’s the real crux of the issue. The current restrictions aren’t even logical based on the threat to which which was discovered last week, let alone any new threat that might emerge.

You dont hear Willie Walsh,Richard Branson or Sir Micheal Bishop queuing up to sue the government, and there businesses were probably affected more, because of the Heathrow factor.

Willie Walsh is going after the BAA rather than the goverment. It amounts to the same thing. Both he and Michael O’Leary recognise the damage that’s being done to their business and want recompense for it.

Andy

OK Dantheman, I’ll tell you why I think what happened was an over-reaction and why I think Michael O’Leary is right (oh, and by the way, I saw him on the news this evening and it hasn’t changed the fact I respect MO’L for saying what he did):

1. I fully accept the need to ramp up security checks in the wake of last week’s events. However, the way it has been done places a greater priority on the convenience of airport operators (i.e. the BAA) than it does on the convenience of passengers. Sadly, this failure to ensure air travel remains convenient and easy to use will ultimately damage the airline industry and the prospects of those who work within it.

2. To follow on from the above, no one can justify why a bag that is 21″ long is any more of a security risk that one that is 18″ long. The new size rules have been introduced not to increase passenger security, but as a deliberate cynical attempt to reduce the number of checked bags by the back door because many previously legal carry on bags have suddenly become too big. And the reason why they want to cut the number of carry on bags is not to increase security, but to reduce the screening work which in turn means airports have to use less resources to screen passengers.

3. Rules are a nonsense if they are only implemented one way on a journey. What is in effect in place “supposedly” (if you believe the hype) makes outbound travel more secure, but it doesn’t make the inbound travel any more secure because other countries haven’t introduced the same checks and restrictions – in effect, it seems that its not OK to get blown up on the outbound flight but it is OK to be blown up coming back into the UK. Actually its just the UK government covering its own ass. Sadly, I see the UK government is now trying to impose its new rules on the rest of the EU – hopefully the EU will resist.

4. Again, whilst there may be logic in restricting some items (e.g fluids), restricting such items doesn’t make airline travel safe. Terrorists will move onto the next item that can threaten air travel. The new restrictions are thus merely a placebo aimed at curbing the anxiety of the casual and un-aware traveller, rather than actually solving the problem. Almost all, if not all, regular travellers accept that there is a risk to air travel and that all that’s happened is that we’ve forced the terrorists to move onto their next idea.

5. Security needs to move one step ahead of the threat, not continually follow one step behind it. That means profiling passengers and scruitinising closely those who fit a threat profile, rather than inhibiting whatever happens to be the terrorist’s flavour of the month.

6. Finally, the damage that is being done to the industry right now needs to be balanced against the threat. Yes, we need to do what’s reasonable but we cannot go as far as choking the industry, as we were in danger of doing last week (and still might do). Just as no one will make an economic case for making road travel so safe that no one gets killed in cars (we could do a lot more to make car travel safer but we don’t because it would cost too much), so we need to accept that the cost and consequence of securing the airline industry may well soon be outwayed by the economic damage it does to the industry and to the country.

Andy

Well done O’Leary! For the first time ever, I find myself 100% supporting the guy. Its about time someone spoke up about the incompetence.

BAA are a shambles and the government should order them to get their act together. Whilst I accept it is the government’s role to assess the threat level (or more accurately it is the JIC’s), what restrictions are put in place as a result of the threat are decided by the DfT. It is the government/DfT who have imposed these asinine restrictions on the size of carry-on bags – O’Leary is right that a bag that is 21″ across is no more threat than one that is 18″ across – it is the government who’s foreign policy is partly responsible for the threat, and it is the government that should sort out the mess and make reparations to the likes of Ryanair when their business is damaged by these mindless restrictions.

In the end, its not just Ryanair and the likes that are being damaged by government stupidity, it will be the UK economy. Again, well said Michael O’Leary – I’m so pleased someone with strong presence in the industry has had the guts to stand up and say what really needs to be said.

Andy

First, important to realise that there is a difference between working hours and flying hours.

There are rules associated with the maximum length of each duty period (which will vary according to start time, number of sectors flown, and whether the crew member is acclimitised to local time or not), and for the rest period following each duty and for days off following several days duty. Then there are are also rules covering the number of flying hours that may be operated over seven days (rolling), 28 days (again, rolling) and annually. The 900 hours quoted above is flying hours, not duty hours.

There are a number of specialist computer based air crew scheduling systems on the market – normal staff rostering systems will do not support the complexity of air crew scheduling. Some airlines just allocate work to crews usually trying to allocated it fairly and in a balanced way, whilst others operate bid systems where crews can bid on specific work which is then allocated according to seniority.

Andy