Something about the newer Flankers visually put me off. Best phrase I can use is aesthetically unbalanced. The twin-seat Flanker cockpit simply looks bulky and ungainly to me, as is the Su-35’s enlarged nose. The original Su-27 looks more pleasing, as is the T-50.
agreed. the pinnacle in terms of looks for all flanker variants is the Su-27M. The single seat, canard, square tipped variant
especially bort 701s scheme
The X-32B was _not_ inferior to the X-35B for the following reasons:
1. Neither of the X-32 prototypes were built with production quality materials. Lack of autolayup looms meant their experimental shops had to hand-lay the thermoplastic composite skins which led to problems with differential heating in the autoclave which bubbled up ridges along the panel overlays. Buying an autowinder for an experimental prototype (i.e. paying for tooling, twice) was not affordable and thus, after multiple failures, the jet’s wing skins were redone in a thermoset composite which was 20% heavier. Add to this that the X-32 used ‘unibody’ techniques by which the wing skins were mechanically fastened to the airframe and you have major problems with the design weight tolerances as well as fabrication and assembly using things like longer screws on the thicker skins (and we are talking about 1,500 of them so it’s not a minor thing).
2. The X-32 didn’t meet other specs which the USN, as they often do to sabotage particular designs they don’t like, changed, halfway through the prototype manufacturing process. The original specs were within the capabilities of the X-32, even as _both_ specs for WOD and control power were beyond those of the X-35C, a fact which, in hindsight is obvious (I like to brag that I saw it ahead of time as one of the earliest critics of the JSF) in the design of the Lockheed prototype without such things as a working weapons bay or full length landing gears, mounted in the wingroots.
These were NOT engineering impossibilities which required ‘advanced technology’ to model or create. Rather they were explicit weight savings and manufacturing simplification approaches which allowed the X-35A/B and C to avoid such issues as the four-times-fixed wingroot lap joints whose later integration with particularly the STOVL model’s roll posts ended up costing the jet, not just so much weight in the PWSC variant as to be functionally non-CDR passable, but also the entire concept of easy manufacture using quickmate joints between pre-built subassemblies.
The point here being that the Boeing Preferred Weapons System Concept design would have had production quality skins, directly bonded to the structure, and a cropped-swept, supercritical wing design which would have traded about 1/3rd of the delta’s total area for a lighter, deeper, tighter, airfoil without as much wetted area but with far more fuel space as well as a slightly longer span and more lowspeed lift enhancement droops on the TE to solve approach speed and adverse sink rate/attitude problems behind the boat.
All of which would have made the short-span STOVL jet more than adequately able to meet it’s direct thrust STOVL requirements as it would have been half the wingspan.
i.e. The F-35 is what it is because the X-35 was a façade built around a fraud which included NONE of the operational engineering features that would have made the jet unable to pass even it’s X-jet evaluation phase, particularly the STOVL metrics, had they been suitably ‘productionized’ (as indeed they were on the preceeding YF-22). The F-32 was what it was because the Feds decided to change the specs to make it fail (and even then it was a close run thing with BOTH companies ‘passing’ minimum threshold requirements to prove their concepts…).
3. The X-32 had massive amounts of spare power. To support STOVL, the F119-PW-614 engine had an ENORMOUS fan on it. Even bigger than that which went on the eventual F135 to try and make up for the piggish qualities of the Lockheed aircraft. This resulted in up and away subsonic performance that was closer to the F-22 (admittedly IRT vs. Burner) than the F-16, as a function of subsonic acceleration and instantaneous vs. sustained turn. The F119-PW-611 was indeed a 28,000lbf/43,000lbf engine with just enough thrust on the front post to look pretty in STOVL. But the F119-PW-614 was a 33,000lbf/54,000lbf engine which absolutely blew the socks off the sexier X-35 where it counted as a turn and burn EM platform.
The trade however was fuel consumption and weight/balance issues. STOVL on the X-32 put the engine at a midpoint like an Airacobra which meant an overly long jetpipe, rather like you see on F-86s or MiG-15s. This was useless dead weight behind the CG in the design which, combined with the dual instead of quadpost, direct thrust, STOVL (very weak pitch control nozzle/liftscreen/roll-ducts) meant that the aircraft was not as stable in the hover. Yet that massive VL thrust requirement had to be there, leaving the jet’s TSFCs sucking down JP like a drunk locked overnight in a distillery as a function of stochimetrics necessary to keep sufficient rpms on the core to torque the spools on that big fan. Fan thrust which was actually pretty useless in the cruise part of the envelope as the jet approached transonics (this is the case with every turbofan and is nothing new, pilots of the then-new F-14 complained that the TF30 engines with almost 1,500lbf more thrust than the J79s they were used to on the Phantom were in fact ‘weak kneed’ as they crossed the .9 Mach threshold).
CONCLUSION:
If common sense rather than aesthetic sensibilities had prevailed, two readily identifiable conclusions would have been reached on the X-Plane contest:A. The economics of ‘one winner’ political greed were utterly incompatible with national needs as the proper sustainment of the industrial base as _competitive_ sellers of modern fighters to the services. Particularly the USAF which had a huge requirement to replace the F-16 fleet could as easily have bought different airframes as engines when that requirement further spilled over into the F-15 and A-10 mission areas with drastically different performance requirements to the Viper followon.
Lack of competition has led to the total corruption of the F-35 acquisition process, from the dropping of the ‘unnecessary’ redundant engine to the failure to hold to the rigors of the law (Nunn McCurdy, the F-35 is _not_ ‘absolutely necessary’ to the modern defense posture, there are multiple alternative options) and even to the honesty with which other, fill force and Congressionally compliant, unmanned programs were actively sabotaged to remove them from consideration as JSF replacements (J-UCAS the ‘too expensive’ program which the USAF cancelled on the eve of the GWOT because it was a perfect match to COIN CAS loitering flight in SWA, something which the F-35 is not).
B. Neither jet was production representative.
The Boeing PWSC design would have been entirely competitive with the STOVL and a likely overmatch to the CTOL and CVTOL requirements with a new flying configuration and production level composites. The Lockheed JSF is as you now see it. Three different airplanes masquerading under the same name, each with sufficiently different design metrics to sabotage the other in terms of acceptable weight bloat vs. structural and weapons carriage restrictions, each stealing engineering design time from the others, greatly prolonging the delay before service due to LM’s simple inability (say: greed as the refusal to pay for and train up, despite record profits) to provide adequate engineering support to each individual airframe as it’s own unique development pathway. Things like the weapons bay, relocation of AMAD auxiliaries, wingroot support and avionics integration all suffered because the X-jet was designed without these gallon-in-pint-pot features included.PWSC would have made these differences obvious and given Boeing the clear edge as the simpler design (it truly is one airplane, despite having different wingspans and a strap-on STOVL module) with better mass-manufacturing production experience base as well as Boeing’s HUGE overall engineering base.
Whether the JSF, as a subsonic, <550nm, strike fighter that is more F-117 than F-16/18 is what this country needs is another question. But it was a fool’s errand to choose such a large production commitment based on preliminary design constructs which were neither production representative for configuration nor anywhere’s near (materials, avionics, structures) complete in their supporting systems development. CBO and GAO both warned of this, starting as early as 1997, stating that concurrency was an risk that was not simply overarching but largely undefined as the jets detail design itself was incomplete before about 2002-2003.
Finally, a question in trade: Does anyone have any imagery of the proposed F-32 targeting FLIR? I have been told it was in an extendible fairing on the fuselage bottom, rather like that of the F-106 IRST but would like to know if any engineering drawings were made up or if the FLIR thimble that is sometimes seen in early photos of the 737 AFL is production representative? I am after pictures.
Thanks- Lop Eared Galoot.
Hi Kurt
ATD-X says hi
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