ChoxNo I haven’t – any idea where a copy might be lurking?
PS- thanks to the two gentlemen concerned (to whom I’m most grateful) I now have a copy of Stephen Hastings’ book to look through. It looks interesting but as I suspected, it looks like his view was shamelessly biased! I’ll read through it in detail though as it does look as if he raises some very interesting points.
ChoxThanks for the link:)
ChoxNaturally, personal preferences tend to colour one’s views of air shows. Personally, I’d agree with Hornchurch that the Coventry-style show was magnificent. Noratlas, Pembroke duo, Canberra, Hunter, Electra… magnificent stuff! But I guess the WWII fanatics would rather settle for Flying Legends, whereas I’d probably doze-off at the very idea! Clearly, you can’t please all the people, all the time.
I don’t think there’s even any question as to “putting-right” the major shows like Biggin, because there’s nothing wrong with them as they are. They make a profit, attract many thousands of spectators, and most of them go away happy. The only down-side is that many others (myself included) just don’t bother going to many shows like that now, because there’s nothing much to see, and even that which remains to be seen has been seen many times before. Unfortunately, it’s a view which more and more people are adopting.
I can only refer to my previous post. There doesn’t seem to be any way in which the typical show format can be tinkered-with. It is what it is and we’re obliged to either seek entertainment from what we do have, or just stay home. The only possible means of bringing-back the many people who have lost interest in air shows would be to create something completely new which isn’t an “air show” at all, but more of a means of bringing aviation (and particularly military operations) to the public. I’ve already explained in my previous post that I think there is a way that it could be done, but I doubt if anyone will consider such radical thinking until the show’s profit levels begin to dwindle. Doubtless this will happen – it’s just a question of how long it takes. The only sad aspect of all this is that we have to sit-back and watch the major shows get worse and worse, until somebody has enough wisdom and initiative to stop and re-think.
ChoxI’ve been busy this afternoon trying to find more information, and there are indeed some released papers that confirm that Macmillan (or at least his Cabinet) did make this decision. The in-service date for WE177C looks about right too so maybe it was just my clouded memory that had convinced me that it was slightly earlier (or maybe I confused it with WE177B).
This information on the 10kt limit is certainly very interesting though, particularly the way that it altered the TSR2’s delivery/carriage requirements. The strange aspect of all this is how WE177B was produced primarily for the Vulcan force although it would have obviously been more suitable to TSR2. There doesn’t seem to be any explanation (at least not one that has been released yet) of why there was a 10kt limit on WE177A, but the development of WE177B continued (ostensibly for Vulcans) and the weapon was subsequently used on Vulcans, Buccaneers, Jaguars, Tornado, and so on. This would suggest that if TSR2 has entered service, it too would have carried WE177B which begs the question as to why there was any limit on the yield of WE177A! As ever, it seems to be the continual political confusion over the TSR2’s role which caused so much difficulty. It seems to have flipped-flopped between being a tactical or strategic aircraft almost on a daily basis!
ChoxIndeed, it does have a very direct bearing on TSR2 but I’m just a little intrigued to know more about the reasoning behind the decision (although it looks like most of the story is still classified), and why it was subsequently (but only partially) contradicted in order to produce a “stop gap” pre-Polaris programme.
It evidently did affect TSR2 as the lower-yield bomb inspired the development of stick delivery of up to four WE177’s (in order to ensure that the target would be destroyed) and the inference is that this reduced capability made TSR2 look rather less credible to the incoming labour government… and we all know what happened subsequently… 😉
ChoxThanks for the suggestions. The main thing I was looking for was any indication of how and when the project actually started. All the articles and snippets I’ve read are pretty vague about this and it’s difficult to work-out the origins of the design. It seems to have started somewhere in 1964 or 1965 but precisely when, how or why… not so sure!
ChoxThanks for that Paul. You’re right that AFVG was intended as a replacement/partial replacement for TSR2 but the reason I was (am!) trying to establish the origins of the programme is to clarify whether it had any direct influence on TSR2. The implication seems to be that the project emerged after TSR2’s cancellation but it evidently came into being before that, therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that AFVG was yet another nail in TSR2’s proverbial coffin.
Interesting that you mention ECAT – it would appear that the two projects were associated so I’ll follow that lead!
TSRJoe – you still not talking to me?!
ChoxBeen a while since this matter has popped-up but the last gossip I heard was that the one at Pima had been virtually abandoned and/or gutted? Not seen any information to confirm this though. As for bringing the aircraft back here, I believe the story was that Mr Collett claimed the CAA simply wouldn’t allow it, even for a one-off pre-restoration ferry flight. I believe he also said that although the CAA have made their usual noises about being “happy to co-operate” it actually means all the usual red tape (design authority responsibility and so on) which plagued the Vulcan’s restoration, so much so that Collett didn’t think there was any viable way of bringing the aircraft back to the UK. Whatever the precise reasons, it was a very, very sad affair. The one magnificent remaining Shackleton which left the UK without fanfare and was never to return – and then left to rot in the desert.
As for the one still at Coventry, I guess the same problems arise. If the CAA are going to wrap the aircraft up in expensive red tape (as I’m sure they will – don’t they always?), it will never fly. You’d imagine that a four-engined piston wouldn’t be a particularly big deal though, especially when DC-6’s have been chugging in and out of Coventry for years. But no doubt the fact that the Shack is a military machine will cause the usual hysteria in the CAA’s offices. Likewise, I guess the chances of raising money must be slim when so many people have been worn-out by the Vulcan saga.
It’s even more sad that there’s a potentially flyable Shackleton sat out there in South Africa, rapidly becoming in danger of being pilot-less! If there’s no ability or will to fly it any longer, maybe some effort should be made to persuade the SAAF to bring the aircraft back to its country of origin while it is still technically a military aircraft – and therefore able to avoid the scrutiny of the CAA. Maybe this time the flight wouldn’t end in the desert?!
Anyway I wish the folks at Coventry good luck with their endeavours. I’d be truly delighted to see (and hear) the magnificent Shackleton lumbering around again. Truly, there was no other aircraft that sounded quite so impressive – that delicious moment as she sweeps by and the Griffons buzz and growl… truly memorable! Then again I once remember getting my ears de-sensitised on a very long ride out over the sea, with the rear fuselage window open – now that was just silly!
ChoxI’m still investigating. It does indeed look as though AFVG was already underway before TSR2 got the chop, at least in terms of dialogue with France. It suggests that the prospect of a “TSR2 replacement” on the horizon was another reason to simply abandon TSR2 – combined with cost, the cheaper (at the time) F-111K, a reluctance to remain in the Middle/Far East, anti-bomb sentiment, bitter Naval opposition, and an aircraft industry that was still mentally living in 1940.
ChoxThat report seems to cover part of the project’s steady decline – seemed to go sour from the day it started. The mystery seems to be establishing when it started and why/how.
ChoxWell yes, I’m more than aware of Pima, where it is, what they do, blah, blah. But I’m positive that I read somewhere not too many weeks ago, that the Shack appeared to have been abandoned and was indeed doing little more than rot. I honestly can’t recall where I saw the story so it may be wrong (certainly hope so) but that was what I heard, for what it’s worth.
ChoxThanks Joe – I’d definitely appreciate your thoughts/input on my book seen as you probably know more than the rest of us!
AFVG is obviously a bit of a side issue as far as TSR2 is concerned but I think it’s important to put everything into context. I’ve tried to get to the roots of the whole saga as best I can and my conclusion (at the moment) is that there was no political conspiracy to kill-off TSR2, even though this notion is churned-out time and time again in books and articles. The more you look at the facts, the more it becomes clear that the Conservative Government was already less-than fully supportive of TSR2 and they should have had the guts to cancel the project at an earlier stage when costs began to run out of control. Labour effectively took the decision that had been needed for some time. Healey is always accused as the man who “murdered” TSR2 but it wasn’t quite this simple. Okay, he did want to cancel the project but not through any political motivation. He clearly believed (with good reason) that F-111K was a cheaper option and it clearly was at the time. The fact that F-111K subsequently hit difficulties and the UK’s dire financial situation forced the aircraft’s price to rise was simply unforseen. It’s also clear that the US did not have any part in TSR2’s cancellation. Likewise, they cannot be accused of trying to force F-111K onto us, indeed they appear to have been surprised at how keen we were to buy it, and made every effort to enable the UK to get the aircraft even when it began to look increasingly difficult.
Healey was not hell-bent on destroying the RAF’s capabilities, indeed he fought hard for the F-111. AFVG comes into the story because it was originally seen as a long-term replacement for the F-111 (and therefore the ultimate replacement for TSR2), and the mystery (at least as far as I’m concerned) is trying to establish just what the projected policy for the 1970’s actually was. Healey clearly believed that F-111 was necessary in order to maintain an East of Suez capability (given that the carriers were unaffordable and less effective) and the US was keen to enable the UK to maintain an East of Suez capability as a means of providing them with token international support – hence their efforts to ensure that we got F-111. AFVG seems to simply cloud the issue. From the information I can find, it would seem that AFVG didn’t have any direct effect on TSR2 and didn’t directly contribute to its cancellation, but it does seem to have been regarded as a longer-term project which would provide a good replacement for both TSR2 and F-111 whether they be purchased or not. Consequently, it looks as if AFVG contributed towards the growing appetite for cancellation of F-111K, before it too was cancelled after France withdrew.
The are many odd points to consider. With regard to AFVG, it’s difficult to establish how the project got started. It just seems to have emerged and then became a projected TSR2/F-111 replacement for the mid-1970’s. On the face of it this seems quite absurd as the TSR2/F-111 would have been in service for only five years or so, therefore the prospect of rapidly replacing/supplementing the existing fleet with an aircraft which was hardly a drastic improvement, seems bizarre. It’s even more hard to swallow when it had clearly been stated during the TSR2’s troubles, that there would not be sufficient resources to fund the design/manufacture of a replacement… and yet…
It’s a very complicated and cloudy story and I’m still not sure that I’ve got it sorted-out!
ChoxChox, I am rather dismayed and surprised at your remarks regarding Pima’s preservation of Mr Grumpy, or the fact that it had to be sent to the USA to be kept in the air
Not quite sure what you’re getting at. I don’t recall expressing any objection to the Shack going overseas – I was merely lamenting the fact that it had to, and having gone, be unable to return. As for Pima, I did say that I had seen a story somewhere about the aircraft’s condition but if it’s not true then that’s a good thing, although, if the aircraft is simply going to be left to sit baking in the sun (and one assumes that it’s never going to move again now), then it’s just as sad – it may as well have been sitting in the UK where we could at least see it.
I believe Mr Collett’s original plan was to restore the aircraft to display standards in the US and then bring it back here, but the CAA effectively made this impossible. Before another argument ensues, I accept that Mr C may have a different view but that was how I understood things to have been.
As for the current project at Coventry, I do wish them every success but somehow I think they’re fighting a battle they can’t win. Surely, if the Shack in the US (which was already flyable) couldn’t be successfully returned and operated here, then how can another Shack be brought up to flyable standard and sustained?
Maybe someone could ask Mr Collett for his thoughts? He must have all the answers?!
ChoxFirebird – I thought the whole point of the aircraft going to the US was to have the work done over there and then return the aircraft for minor work over here?
ChoxLove the video link Hurn – that unforgettable growl just as the aircraft heads away from you – stirs the soul!
Magnificent!
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