AbhimanyuCorrect me if I am wrong, but did Saab not produce the aircraft on time and under budget? I would heap praise on any organisation that delivered a sophisticated jet on time and on budget. It seems Saab did better than that.
I may reiterate that SAAB was able to produce Gripen in estimated time, and ADA was not able to develop Tejas in time, only because SAAB had complete access to foreign technology like GE engines, FBW from Lockheed, and AESA radar from Selex. You are aware that the Indian team working on Tejas’ FBW at Lockheed’s facilities were asked to leave after India’s nuclear tests, and that GE did not commit to supply more engines for further prototypes for the same reason (until a few years after 2000). This alone delayed the Tejas project by 2.5 years.
This, in addition to a total lack of experience in designing modern fighters, unlike SAAB, which had experience since WW2 atleast. It is precisely to speed up the pace of flight-tests, that ADA has only now contracted BaE.
And thats a very good argument.All are means to an end.What good are the tech specs if an aircraft hasnt put those to use for serving the country?Just comparing tech specs are just a theoretical exercise with no practical value when the aircraft has not even entered service.
See, the above argument of “not entered service” is of little use. We do not hesitate to claim that JSF is superior to a MiG-35 or Gripen, even though it has not an hour in operational service and the latter two have been in service since decades. This is precisely because of superior specifications of the JSF.
Similarly, Tejas Mk.1 as it flies today, matches the technical specs of Gripen C/D. That’s it, and that’s all. “Operational service”, “proven record”, “combat history” will come very soon.
Anyway, as per a news report in Vayu, Tejas has already reached IoC-level of flight specifications. Only radar integration remains.
What is this obsession if proving Tejas is >> than Gripen anyway?The Tejas has to achieve much more in terms of proving its operational capabilities to be comparable to Gripen.
The above is inaccurate. What was stated that Tejas Mk.1 as it flies today, is comparable to Gripen C/D. No one stated that it is superior.
AbhimanyuIt is extremely “heartening” to note that at Bharat Rakshak forums the current Tejas Mk.1 is being repositioned as an equivalent to the Gripen C/D in all respects, like avionics, weapos load, etc. It’s range has already been estimated to be equivalent to Mirage-2000 by some very senior members there.
However, the most important argument put forth has been the challenge to the conventional wisdom of, Tejas-cannot-be-compared-to-Gripen-coz-it’s-a-prototype-whereas-Gripen-has-so-many-years-of-“proven”-service-record.
The above point is totally inconsequential while comparing the technical specifications of Tejas Mk.1 vis-a-vis Gripen C/D ! A simple cursory look at the specifications will reveal that both fighter jets are matched in all respects, as shown by some senior members there. Besides, they also showed that Tejas really hasn’t had such a “long” time of development, as is made out to be by some Indian newspapers, considering India’s total lack of experience in making such a jet, foreign sanctions, denials, etc. “Heaping praise” on Gripen’s comparitively short development time is also pointless, considering the vast experience SAAB has had in addition to “unfettered” access to foreign technology, like engines and FBW from USA, landing gear from BaE, AESA radar from EU, etc.
AbhimanyuSee, the year at which Tejas project was started is variously stated as 1983 by “pessimists”, and 1988 by “optimists”. Without being “judgmental” the following are the factual timelines. One can later draw one’s own inference on the start date of Tejas :
1983 : “LCA” project is proposed by govt. A token amount is earmarked.
1985 : ADA is setup. Employees hired, buildings are constructed.
1986 : Continuation of activity begun in ’85.
1987 : Project Definition is begun with Dassault as consultant.
1988 : PD ends.
1990 : 1/7 scale mockup is tested.
In 1983 and 1985, we see mere formalities are executed like funding and setting up of ADA. The work on Tejas doesn’t begin before 1987. In the timeline of F-16, would one count the Congress fund-allocation and setting up of Lockheed Martin also in the timeline ?
You decide.
AbhimanyuThe above is “heartening” news. The best aspect of the news is that as per the DRDO press release, the trainer version has significant commonality with the naval version, and hence the naval version (PV-4) can also be developed fast. It’s fuselage and main body have already been reportedly completed.
A few days back, Times of India stated that, and I quote “With the development of the naval version of the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) floundering, the Navy has launched a hunt for a new fighter to operate from its aircraft carriers…”, end quote. In my view, the Times of India has “spoken too soon”. That it was inaccurate and unsubstantiated, is anyway but a characteristic of the newspaper. It may be observed that The Times of India reports about impending foreign imports only, even though they are just being “toyed with”, and nothing concrete has been decided upon.
It may be hoped that the Navy — unlike the “aloof” IAF — dedicates itself much more to the naval Tejas, as it always has previously. If the development of the naval Tejas progresses in tandem with the trainer, there may be no need to import foreign naval fighter jets.
Reference :-
AbhimanyuYour lack of awareness regards this topic speaks volumes here. What you should first determine, is who owns HAL, and who decides its fate.
The Govt of India.
The GOI decided that HAL would not and should not bother about anything beyond assembling imports, since there was no money for local development – a stupid & illogical decision. That was what doomed HAL’s post Marut attempts. A similar decision doomed an attempt to make a jet engine for the Marut. Similar decisions doomed any Marut follow ons.
The above is inaccurate. Marut was an exception only, but throughout from the Gnats, to cold-war MiGs, to Su-30 MKI and PAK-FA now, HAL’s product portfolio has been one of licence-products only.
It is inaccurate that a 70 year old public sector company with $2 billion (and rapidly growing) revenues does not have any descretion over it’s funds and decision making. It always has had. The defence ministry only decides which imported jet or helicopter or engine to licence produce. It only has to give approval for indigenous projects, which it did for the successful Dhruv and IJT.
It’s recent Ashoks, Mr. Baweja and Mr. Nayak have publicly espoused a policy of only entering JV’s to manufacture aircraft with foreign firms. Note that Baweja has never said that the FGFA will be designed in India; he only said that the workshare will be equally divided. By workshare, he means local assembly and manufacture only — NOT R&D and design.
If you are interested, try and look up HALs attempts to make Marut derivatives, its attempts to make India’s civil airliner, all of which were shot down by the MOD & its civilian bureaucracy. Even what it had was stripped from it via ad hoc decisions.
The above is inaccurate. After unsuccessful attempts to get a new engine for Marut, there was no attempt to design a new fighter jet. The next attempt was only the then-called “LCA”, by setting up an incubator like ADA, which would be the designer, and HAL which would be the manufacturer. HAL was majorly upset that “LCA” was handed to an incubator like ADA, and not to itself. This was done because had it been given to HAL, they would’ve gone their usual route of inviting licence tenders, whereas a main aim was to build a technology base.
FYI, since you are clearly unaware, that NAL Saras, which you were touting as an example of how “small NAL” can do things and not HAL- was the brainchild of Dr Raj Mahindra, ex HAL design chief, who was turfed out since the GOI was not really interested in keeping design capability alive at HAL. And so it goes..
Arey, you may read here how NAL failed to “scour” funds, first from Myasischev, then from Taneja Aerospace. Finally it did “wriggle” some funds from an unlikely source to get the Saras going. This, from a small and relatively unknown entity; why couldn’t Big Brother HAL have done any of this in 7 decades ? It is also state-run like NAL.
Dr. Raj Mahindra resigned in protest from ADA along with Mr. Valluri, because the MoD had doubts over Dr. Raj’s citizenship status. That is an entirely different issue. All throughout Mr. Valluri and his “protege” Dr. Mahindra were of the opinion that HAL’s (defunct) design wing should’ve reported to DRDO. They were instead made heads of the ADA, precisely because HAL wouldn’t want that structure changed. What was true in 1984 was corroborated very recently by Mr. Baweja, when he said HAL — and not DRDO — would be the prime developers of aircraft.
It is well documented that ADA’s creation in 1985 “riled” the HAL. It has always been uncomfortable with the NAL, the ADA and it’s Tejas. Even today, ADA has blamed the HAL for not utilizing funds, for not deputing enough test-pilots etc.
There are far too many stories to tell, and one feels like telling it only if you stop your incessant flame baiting viz HAL or the IAF or whichever organization you have decided is the new face of evil and has to be attacked non stop.
Arey Mr.JCage, er… I mean Nick76,…er…Teer — or whatever pseudonym you’d like to get known by — it has been your trademark flaming, that has led you to get banned time and again from these fora.
Besides, I criticize the procurement policies of IAF and HAL. I don’t criticize the border jawan or the pilot or sailor.
FWIW, HAL undertook a series of measures to shake off the sloth of the late70’s mid-80’s when it had no clear direction from the GOI. It fought for the independence to do these steps as well.
When RAC MiG refused to deliver, for various reasons, it was HAL that stepped up and made design mods to the MiG-23, 27 and 21 families and increased spares indigenization so that the IAF could keep them flying @ high utilization.
When MiG-29s et al and the other non license manufactured airplanes became affected by the soviet union collapse, it was the HAL which again worked with the IAF to build up spares capabilities along with the IAF’s Base Repair Depots.
HAL has suffered as much thanks to bone headed GOI policies than benefited as some monopoly. That it exists is thanks to the stubbornness of those who realized India needs indigenous aircraft manufacturing capability.
The above is what Mr. Barbora has warned against. You’re “hawking” tinkering as major design achievements, which even PAC Kamra can claim vis-a-vis their Mirages and J-7s. A door and spare parts for Airbus are claimed to be great achievements. I think HAL needs to be told that Airbus is also just about as old as HAL itself.
Second, you seem to assume that private firms are by nature dodgy and will circumvent the system for the profit motive. That is wrong. There are many firms who have worked heart and soul for DRDO et al on wafer thin margins and deserve to have the ability to scale up their operations.
There is nothing stopping the private firms from cutting corners. When state-run HAL does not hesitate to call a licence engagement like PAK-FA as a JV, then small and medium private firms will also not hesitate. Their “conscience” will be clear : armed forces get the best foreign-made-with-Indian-sticker equipment, and we get profits. Indigenization will be seen later.
Third, the private sector is far more aware than the PSUs et al are, about how to survive in a dog eat dog environment. They can deal with foreign OEMs just fine & will compete as fiercely with them the next day. Its a given & has already occurred as matter of fact.
The above demonstrates that you are a “daisy in the woods”. No foreign partner will “shoot itself in the foot” by giving it’s low-cost Indian partner it’s core technology today, only to become it’s competitor tomorrow. An example is the Barak JV, in which the Indian and Israeli roles are clearly demarcated. Israel’s role is that of contributing the seeker and Not giving the seeker production technology to DRDO.
Similarly, a foreign firm will set up assembly and manufacture of some non-critical components in it’s Indian partner’s facilities, but not give it the technology to manufacture core components.
I am quite aware about how technology is developed, shared and productionized. You are in the above post, really confused about applied engineering versus research. There is no reason why the Indian industry should not take up more and more R&D in applied engineering which is where most of the work is required, and that is the point.
Samtel India has a 3 year tie-up with IIT Kanpur to research and develop OLEDs, which will replace current types of cockpit display systems in the future. All it’s other technologies have been acquired more by global acquisitions of sick units of Thales, than by any R&D. To obtain technology and IP, these firms inevitably have to turn to the academia.
What you are unaware of, is that the private sector has already designed and created high value items on its own for both the DRDO & clients abroad, and it serves India well by getting them abroad full time in an organized fashion. The more money they have, the more sustainability they have, the greater the number of partners for DRDO et al, bar the handful of PSUs and the smaller SMEs who have to be handheld.
“Engineering design” services are increasingly being outsourced by foreign firms to Indian companies like Taneja Aerospace, TCS, etc. These do not amount to any “innovation”, as it has increasingly become more and more a well documented task. It is a trained service only. Just as IC design was once a “preserve of a few”, but is today a widely sold service by many companies in developing nations, so is design of defence components etc.
Your “must” part of the statement shows a regrettable lack of business awareness. What you dont seem to get at all, is that the DRDO cannot help these companies survive yet it needs them. Do you get that? The Army will order a handful of systems and conduct trials for donkeys years & it becomes the DRDOs problem of keeping these guys alive for that period on low orders, till series production is cleared.
Serial production is the main purpose of the private firms. The actual competition is between DRDO and the foreign firms, on who will get the SME private companies to manufacture and market their products to the armed forces. It is an opportunity for DRDO to get as many private firms as possible to assemble /manufacture their products to the armed forces. Private firms can be “dextrous” for bribery all, so at least in this way DRDO products can find their way to the armed forces.
AbhimanyuI am not quite sure why you keep quoting Fire-dome, Abhimanyu.
Fire-dome was used in Buk-M1. Current Buk-M2 uses NIIP 9S36 phased array radar which tracks 4 targets. And this is per TEL.What I did not know is how many targets are engaged simultaneously per TEL.
Link : Fire-dome and NIIP 9S36
See, Buk’s NIIP 9S36 radar can track 4 simultaneous targets, whereas the corresponding figure for Rajendra-3D is 64. The Rajendra can engage 4 targets simultaneously, whereas for the NIIP 9S36, the corresponding figure is apparently 1 (thus, 1 radar per TELAR and so, 1 target per TELAR).
Besides, there is no mention of NIIP 9S36 being a 3D radar, unlike the Rajendra, which is.
And you are still quoting 3 missiles for Buk per target while SOC pointed out that it was two.
Note that a maximum of 3 missiles can be guided per target. It is very likely there might be a tradeoff in kill probability, otherwise this max. limit may not have been needed. It may probably be due ease of evasive maneuvers because the incoming missile vector can be determined more easily than Akash, where the radar and TEL are situated at different places.
About Rajendra’s engagement capability, Bharat-rakshak site says its surveillance radar range is 60km. Its engagement radar’s range is however not specified.
So it might be the case that Akash has range more than 27km or might not.
Fine, but if Akash and Buk missiles have the same dimensions, then Akash’s engagement range must definitely be constrained by the radar, and not the missile’s propulsion.
AbhimanyuSecond. The Akash-sam site lists the single kill probability of Buk-M2 as being 0.88 while Carlo Kopp’s (sorry..:() lists kill probability as being 0.9+ only for a non-maneuvering F-15.
Is that a significant enough difference?
See, Buk needs 3 missiles per target to achieve 100% kill, whereas Akash needs only 2. The reason for this may be that Akash’s engagement radar, the Rajendra is a 3D phased array radar, compared to the monopulse Fire Dome radar, that is on each TELAR of Buk. This may result in better guidance and accuracy. Besides, the vector of the incoming Akash missiles is largely unknown to the target as already mentioned earlier, 2 missiles from 2 different TELs can engage the same target.
The akashsam website also lists various operational deployment plans for a Akash group. Is it the case that this is a generic SAM thing and is nothing special to Akash?
The only difference between Buk and Akash is that in Buk, each TELAR as it’s own guidance radar, the Fire Dome, that can engage only 1 target at a time. So, a battery of 6 TELARs enage 6 targets simultaneously. In Akash, a battery of 4 TELs share a common guidance radar, the powerful Rajendra 3D, that can engage 4 targets simultaneously.
BUK-M2’s 9K317 missile seems to be pretty capable given that it seems to have virtually the same physical specifications as Akash and yet has higher range while carry a semi-active seeker.
Note that the 27 kms is Akash’s engagement range, and NOT how far the missile can fly on it’s own before fuel runs out. That’s due to the engagement capability of the Rajendra radar and not the physical dimensions and fuel carried by the flying missile. If just fired like an aimless dart, I’m sure an Akash missile wll fly to over 50 kms.
AbhimanyuSOC, I was mistaken earlier that the Akash has 4 missiles per TEL, whereas it carries 3 only. So, to achieve 100% kill by firing 2 missiles per target, a Akash battery will have engaged 6 targets before a single TEL reload.
This figure is the same as that of Buk’s, which has 4 missiles per TELAR and 6 TELARs per battery. One can discount the loader which you mentioned, because it takes 15 minutes to load the loader itself and many minutes to load the TELARs. Such delay is high. They are probably used in emergencies only.
It is true that Buk has a higher range than Akash, i.e. 42 kms vs 27 kms. However, as per a recent news report, the Akash’s range may be extended to 50 kms for the Army. Buk can also engage 6 targets simultaneously (1 per TELAR), whereas Akash can engage 4 simultaneous targets only.
One feature of Akash, of which I’m not aware is present on Buk or not, is the track-on-jam and lock-on-jam features. This means that any attempt to jam will result in the jammer entity itself being tracked and locked onto by Akash — a sort of counter-HARM.
A flexibility of Akash is that 2 missiles from different TELArs can be guided to a single target; and 2 or more missiles from the same TELAR can be guided to different targets. The latter is impossible in Buk.
I agree that both have their positive points.
AbhimanyuWikipedia? Seriously? Russian (i.e. the people who built it, not the people who have never seen it) export information describes the Buk system as possessing six TELARs controlled by an engagement radar and associated components. A brigade control unit can control up to four of those systems. If you want to place two TELARs per battery, or treat the system as a whole as a single battery, its up to the user, although Jane’s Land-based Air Defence claims that the battery is composed of the SNOW DRIFT radar and the 6 TELARs.
If we assume as you say, that a Buk battery consists of 6 TELARs, it seems “wasteful” that each TELAR has it’s own guidance radar. This radar can guide 3 missiles to one target at a time.
In Akash, a battery of 4 TELARs has one common guidance radar, that can guide 8 missiles to 4 targets in the air at once. The Akash’s battery size of 4 seems to be limited by this radar’s ability to guide 8 missiles simultaneously (i.e. 2 from each TELAR).
One may argue that if Akash’s engagement radar goes down to HARM-type missiles, then the entire battery goes down; unlike in case of Buk, where only one TELAR will be down. But this provides Akash TELARs greater flexibility :- the enemy jet cannot easily determine from where the missile is following it, and can’t perform evasive manouevers easily.
This is probably the reason why a Buk needs to fire 3 missiles per target for sure success, whereas an Akash can achieve the same with only 2 missiles for 99% kill rate (per DRDO official statement). So, a Buk’s TELAR needs a reload after 1 kill, whereas an Akash TELAR needs one only after 2 kills. Thus, in an extended time, an Akash battery with 4 TELARs will have engaged 8 targets before a single reload of a TELAR. In contrast a Buk battery of 6 TELARs, would have engaged only 6 targets before the first reload.
Anyway, a Buk battery consists of 2 TELARs only. The 6 TELAR arrangement may be some another scenario with some tradeoffs.
Buk-M1-2 system with the 9M317 missile has a range capability of between 3 and 42 kilometers, and an altitude capability of between 0.015 and 25 kilometers. Still failing to see how Akash is superior. It might fit India’s needs or budgetary restrictions or whatever better, but in terms of capabilities the Akash is not superior to the Buk-M1, Buk-M1-2, Buk-M2, or Buk-M3.
See, as both are command-guided missiles, reaction times will differ inversely to engagement range. Akash’s reaction time is 22 seconds.
AbhimanyuBuk batteries can be composed of up to six TELARs. That’s six targets per battery, and I’m pretty sure its only two missiles per target, which is usually basic Russian firing doctrine regardless of the system.
Based on your logic, Buk is superior at battery level. For a more logical comparison, have any hard figures been released about Akash’s range and altitude capability?
The above is inaccurate. As per wikipedia, a Buk battalion consists of 6 TELARs. But a battery consists of 2 TELARs only. So, the total number of batteries in a batallion is unclear.
In case of Akash, a batallion can consist of 4 batteries, and each battery consists of 4 TELAR equivalents. So, the total TELARs in a batallion is 16.
Besides, Akash has been perfected upto as late as 2006, whereas Buk has had the same configuration since mid-1990s. The range of Akash is 27 kms, and max. altitude is 15 kms.
AbhimanyuBTW,
With respect to successor to Sa-6 Kvadrat in Indian Army service, does anyone know why we did not buy Buk system.
After all Buk was the soviet successor to Kvadrat and apparently a successful one.
The question is with regards to DRDO’s claims that the Akash systems mobility is its primary selling point.
But the overall architecture of Akash seems (to me) to be pretty similar to the Kvadrat system.
Whereas in Buk, each TEL has its own track-illumination radar (an advancement over SA-6).So where exactly does Akash score over it, other than the indigenous factor?
Buk has a surveillance radar, a detection radar called Snow leopard (which operates at battery level), and a Target Acquisition Radar (TAR), which is on each TEL. The Akash has a Target Acquisition Radar for each battery, and NOT for each TEL. Each TEL of Buk as well as Akash have 4 missiles ready to fire.
So, initially it may appear that a Battery of Buk can engage more targets than a battery of Akash. But herein lies the difference :- A Buk battery consists of only 2 TELs, whereas an Akash battery consists of 4 TELs. In Buk, each TEL specific TAR guides 3 missiles to each target. So, each battery can engage only 2 targets at a time. But in Akash, the battery specific TAR can guide 2 missiles from each TEL to a target. This means 4 targets can be engaged simultaneously by each battery.
Thus, Akash is a superior system at the battery level than the Buk. The Indian Army has finally made a “sane” choice by ordering the Akash, instead of importing yet another Russian or Israeli SAM.
AbhimanyuArmy warms up to Akash missile
The IAF’s order last year for two Akash squadrons — dismissed by sceptics as a face-saving burial for the Akash programme — has just been doubled with a fresh IAF order for 16 more launchers that will be stationed in northeast India. And now, Business Standard has accessed even better news for the Akash programme: the Indian Army is considering ordering several Akash squadrons for its ground forces.
But protecting fast-moving tank columns from enemy fighters is what the Akash does best. For years the DRDO laboured to fit the entire Akash system — including radars, missile launchers and command centres — into T-72 tanks. This provided the Akash with the cross-country mobility to advance deep into enemy territory along with Indian Army strike corps, shooting down enemy fighters at ranges as far out as 25 kilometres.
The above is excellent news. Finally, it took the recent upsurge in Chinese mischief in India’s northeast to get the IAF and the Army to purchase more squadrons of the Akash. Otherwise, they always had the “excuse” of range, or “next-generation” warfare to scuttle indigenous weapons and purchase anything and everything that the Israeli companies “doled out”.
The above article correctly mentions that the Akash’s primary strength is in it’s high mobility. For a large country like India, where troops, artillery columns, and brigades are highly mobile, a mobile SAM system that moves with the flanks is a necessity. Akash is the perfect solution for that.
In contrast, the Israli Barak series of missiles are highly immobile. Given that Israel is a very small country and the theatre of battle that it can face is very limited, such a missile suits it. But for the seventh largest country, with the 2nd largest army on the move, the static Barak is very ill-equipped. The Akash on the other hand can not only provide excellent mobile coverage, but also defend a greater area . This, coupled with the unique capabilities of being mounted on a tank chassis and the accuracy of western missiles like Patriot-2, makes Akash one of the most advanced medium-range SAMs in Asia.
AbhimanyuThere was a time when the basic web-pages were develoepd along with the HTTP protocol in the hallowed CERN experimental physics labs by Sir Tim Berners Lee.
Today, many 2nd rung web development firms offer services in web applications, content development etc. This does not amount to innovation of any kind; but it amply demonstrates the flow of knowldge from research labs to the industry.
AbhimanyuYou rant on and on about HAL- fact is you know diddly squat about what they have done and not done.
Without HAL, the IAF’s entire MiG fleet would have collapsed a long ways back. The number of design modifications, and improvements they have done would merit a book by itself in any “developed economy” where such things sell.
The above if done by HAL, is the least that one of Asia’s oldest aeronautics companies which enjoys state patronage, can do. By this time, it should have had it’s own couple of fighter jets, airliners and business jets. While it’s efforts in successful Dhruv and IJT Sitara are laudable, it is unfortunate that it has consciously embarked on a strategy of licence production only.
Nor do you have any clue of the amount of effort HAL spent in developing a local design & development capability only to have it frittered away by MOD bureaucracy who refused to fund it. If HALs plans had been suitably supported there would have been no need for a last moment LCA. But you dont even know this.
Then why don’t you tell us the complete (or even abridged) story, if you claim to know HAL’s “unsung” stories ? All members will certainly read it with interest. About Tejas, it has been documented that HAL has clearly not given it it’s 100% effort, partly due to some disagreement with ADA, and partly due to propagating it’s own initiatives like IJT.
This company HAL survives mainly due to state support and state monopoly. Had it been for other companies (private or even public), then it would have delivered far more than it has today.
You talk of L&T and Godrej-Boyce, ever talked to anyone from those organizations or have an idea of their programs? DRDO has delivered world class solutions thanks to the engineering contributions from teams at L&T Heavy Engr & G&B. These include EW, radars, mission avionics and tracked vehicle programs.
These companies must collaborate with DRDO, ISRO (Godrej & Boyce already does major business with ISRO), NAL and others to increase indigenous product development. These “tie-ups” with foreign firms will merely result in the foreign firms assembling/selling their equipment via a local agency.
Ergo statements like these:
Thus, in India the DRDO must remain as the lead designer and integrator of all systems ….never mind that DRDO is not even the lead integrator in many cases but the OEM is. And nor does DRDO have the resources to even address the vast indian defence market and that the DRDO itself fully supports private sector involvement to widen the pool for codevelopment as versus PSUs alone.
See, you must now understand how private component companies obtain technology. Organizations like BARC, after doing years of research in say, some manufacturing process involving lasers, perfect the procedure, assembly line debug etc. & etc. and invite small & medium enterprises that they see fit to sell the procedure and consultancy to them for a fee. The private firms having acquired this, go on to develop products (not necessarily defence) whose sales proceeds are likely to be shared with BARC.
In fact, the main purpose of CSIR and IISc is to provide consultancy in manufacturing to SMEs and even large industries.
ISRO also has thousands of private SMEs in it’s roster whom it asks them what to manufacture and with what specifications. The best design wins the tender.
Similarly, DRDO and private sector must step up collaboration so that as far as manufacturing the various components is concerned, there are no delays.
the private sector is developing functional blocks and acting as the entire system integrator for system of system projects for the DRDO already, ranging from design development and integration. Your ignorance is astounding.
Look, as and how the process of manufacture becomes increasingly documented, packaged and commoditized, it is thrown open to private industry. If they come up with a design of their own of a component or integration of many components, it does NOT amount to any innovation, because they have been taught to do so by one or more of these sources : government organization like CSIR or BARC, hired consultants from academia or purchase of the process from elsewhere.
Why, the mere fact that its a JV means that the evil private sector would have done nothing.
This is an amazingly shallow remark, and remarks of this level dont even deserve a response.
See, I’ve already said my concern is not the private sector’s “emancipation”. For indigenization, the private sector must partner with DRDO and associated labs, rather than these “tie-ups” with foreign companies.
AbhimanyuThat single statement shows your total inability to understand the topic at hand.
Freeing the private sector is but a method to indigenize given the vast needs and requirements of the Indian armed forces & that the PSUs are able to meet only a fraction of them.
See, you may do well to comprehend a para in it’s entirity.
I said, the primary objective is to indigenize. I have no concern about the private sector. This policy in the name of “freeing the private sector” (or rather, “freeing the private sect to indigenize“) will not achieve any indigenization, because it will merely facilitate more licence production. The only difference is that earlier this activity was done by BEL and HAL, and now private players will do it.
So, only the players have changed : the policy hasn’t.
Earlier, after substantial delay, the MOD would earmark some unsuited PSU eg BHEL to take up license production of an absolutely new product – eg radars which the relevant PSU eg BEL could not take up because of capacity constraints.
Now thanks to this policy, the private industry puts up its own funds, co-develops the item in question & creates a parallel infrastructure which only adds DEPTH to the Indian defence industry, far beyond what already exists.
It is a good step overall & the 50% cut off expected from the private sector is the same as expected more or less from the public units in the earlier DPP “Make” section. Hence, your objections ring hollow.
“Co-develops” the item is exactly what is “bandied about” nowadays, to conceal what clearly is licence production.
An L&T or Godrej-Boyce will ask a foreign manufacturer to set up their manufacturing plant in India — pretty much similar to setting up a McDonald’s franchise — and call it a Joint Venture. Then they’ll contact the Defence Ministry and submit a long list of items, components, products and potential products that the foreign-plant-with-Godrej-sticker will or can make. This will help in “propping up” their name for consideration in future tenders.
Bhaisaheb, HAL has been licence producing Garett engines, Rolls-Royce engines and now starting with RD-33 engines since decades. How much have they been able to learn about engine design and manufacture ? China too licence produces various British and Russian fighter jet engines since the 1970s. Their WS-13 (for J-10) and WS-10 (for JF-17) have been spectacular ‘disasters’ for all to see. This shows really how much ToT is actually transferred in these “JV’s”.
ToT is only given when the company knows that the receiver country will develop the same anyway sooner or later. Under no other circumstances, is ToT given.
Another comment which shows how out of touch you are with actual affairs:Private sector is good at mass production.…as if that is all that is the private sector is good at. Ask DRDO labs et al about what they think of working with the private sector versus the OFB for design and delivery of subsystems.
The private sector is good at mass production and mundane tasks of testing, validation and routine low level design only.
As mentioned earlier, ISRO has literally hundreds of small to medium private players as contractors to manufacture various components for it’s rockets and satellites. If they “design” say even a valve or a casing or some component as per advertised tender specifications, it is not some innovation. It is standard manufacturing procedure being followed only.
Even in the US, only when most of the knowledge of sounding rockets and associated technology was packaged and commoditized as well documented after 7 decades, did Boeing enter into it. Space is still the preserve of tax-payer funded NASA.
Thus, in India the DRDO must remain as the lead designer and integrator of all systems — from radars and EW equipment to strategic systems like ABM and MCA. The private players can contribute like they do to ISRO. It is when they start becoming designers and integrators, then we can immediately conclude that they are merely “hawking” foreign equipment under the banner of a JV.
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