OK, look at the F-15 victories in Isreali service. Isreal has done quite well with a small number of F-15s, and I believe Isreal has more F-15 kills that USAF or Saudi F-15’s. Numerous kills, mostly MiG 21 and 23, which I’m sure some here will say “so what, those are older planes”. I say the record speaks for itself, and is impressive by any means. Isreal uses a western doctrine, but does not have the same level of support from E-3 or E-2 that the US does.

They actually did operate E-2s which were a key to the success (among other factors, of course) the F-15s and 16s enjoyed over the Bekaa in 1982. with the Syrian GCI sites destroyed and/or jammed.

So SARH missiles cannot engage maneuvering targets? ROFL. If you are strictly comparing ARH vs SARH, by which I mean excluding INS or mid course updates, SARH missiles are FAR more suited to engage maneuvering targets at long range.

If you’d care to actually read my post, you’d notice that I was referring only to R-33, not the SARH missiles in general. The MiG-31 uses a passive phased array radar which can guide missiles to four different targets, but it guides SARH missiles (unlike Western radars which would guide ARH missiles via mid-course updates) and this method of target illumination is supposedly not really fast enough to illuminate maneuvering targets with sufficient frequency so the missile’s seeker can stay ahead of the target when it gets close to it. Then there is also the size and the weight of the missile which would probably cause the missile to bleed most of its energy trying to stay ahead of the maneuvering target, but OK, the target would have to know it’s under the attack in the first place. These limitations were probably acceptable as the MiG-31’s primary targets are only bombers and cruise missiles.

And I do say supposedly as this is what I’ve understood from what I’ve read. Some missile guidance engineer with the knowledge of the R-33 seeker’s guidance logic and the details of the Zaslon radar could probably give a much more precise and valid explanation..

There are multiple reasons why Russia is already wanting a replacement of the Foxhound.

The main reason is fleet’s age and thus limited flight hours remaining. The rest can probably be solved via updates.

A better question is, how vulnerable is the MiG 31 to modern air defences.

It’s a pure interceptor for RuAF, not an air-superiority platform so this is not relevant at all.

Ljozic, not sure what you are trying to say. IR missiles can be launched blind, with the seeker slaved to where the radar expects the target to be. The problem is the seeker may not track the intended target. And you realize semi active and active radar homing seekers operate completely different. The missile seeker on SARH has to be locked on before launch to be effective. The seeker on ARH requires mid course updates near its apex or it will have a tiny chance of interception.

The quoted part is the hint that the context is clearly limited to the R-23/24 family of missiles. I did in fact misuse the quoted LOAL term in my post, but from what I’ve read on some forums, the R-23R SARH seeker RGS-23 (maybe R-24R, too) seems to be technically locked on to the target three seconds after launch to avoid interference from the radar, albeit the seeker is turned to the direction of the target before the launch.

Regarding the IR variants, the seeker can be slaved to the radar so that the proper target is locked on, but still needs to be locked on before the launch.

It would be safe to assume that most of the Ukrainian air force was there prior to split, as you can’t exactly train people to fly modern fighters in 3 months from scratch. As such they trained with Russian counterparts, therefore not entirely incompetent and perhaps more competent than the Serbian pilots during Operation Allied Force. Probably with functional aircraft too. I believe that covers 1,2,3,5 and 6. At least one Su-25 and one MiG-29 were flying fairly high. Kiev thought the Su-25 had been shot down by a Russian jet until the Buk story broke. That covers 4.

Wow, nice coverage, not. You provide no relevant data to base your conclusions on. The fact Ukraine was a part of USSR 25 years ago doesn’t mean anything for their CURRENT pilot skill level. IIRC, most of their planes are not in flyable state as the budget is pretty tight. Probably same goes for the number of flying hours the pilots get.

And you still don’t know what missions and mission parts the planes were flying on when they were shot down (e.g. was it a low-level CAS) and how skillfully were they employed. Besides, since the Ukrainian Air Force has only a few somewhat modernized Su-25s, the ones shot down were probably basic old models whose RWS system is old, has no jamming equipment and has no way of detecting IR missiles, unlike the current A-10C discussed here.

Despite early apprehension about the impact of Soviet-era Stingers in Taliban hands, very few ve hashown up during the US campaign in Afghanistan. Consequently while the ISAF did take some casualties to MANPADS, the scale has been relatively small. Put a substantial number in the hands of professional or even semi-professional army and the A-10s are going to take a hammering. Limited utility on the modern battlefield.

Well, there are certainly a few or more in Taliban hands and the A-10s didn’t get hammered after all those years. So, excuse me if I doubt the nullifying effect of that old system (Strela 2M or its copies) with its limited engagement capabilities and low flare resistance.

Agreed. Afghanistan-style strafing runs can be thwarted by Iglas and Strelas

Why didn’t it happen in Afghanistan then?