Russia’s Kazan aircraft plant to build next generation bomber

Umm… what?

in an ideal world you should wait for Gripen, but it seems you dont have the time or money

The general thrust of my earlier post was that while the Serbian AF may not have the money, they do have the time. So no need to do anything rash like purchasing second-hand, second-rate fighters that won’t provide anything in terms of capability* beyond what is already there but would bolster the numbers. Don’t get me wrong, I have nothing against the F-7 but it is certainly not the right choice of aircraft for Serbia.

* I know it is a potent aircraft in its own right but a “quantum leap” in capability it is not.

There is one thing we have to clear up once and for all. Serbia cannot plan her security and defence policy with a conflict against NATO in mind. This is ridiculous on a number of levels and I shouldn’t even have to say it. Furthermore, the current state of neutrality is probably the best foreign policy move of any government (Yugoslav or Serbian) since the death of Tito. Understandably, considering the recent history of the region, nobody is taking this stance seriously – not the Russians and not the West. However, this is just a matter of overcoming collective political memories and of Serbia sticking to her guns (so to speak). Neutrality carries with it a number of benefits, the main one which is that it helps Serbia to avoid being a target for anybody’s future sabre-rattling. Should Serbia join NATO she would be one of the Alliance’s weakest members and also the one which Russia would be most eager to teach a lesson. This is obviously unlikely to manifest itself as a military attack but could easily result in greater political instability (as Russia switches to supporting local political parties that would try to pull out of NATO or at least cease to cooperate fully – a la France in the late 50s). Russia would also almost certainly put economic pressure on the country, something Serbia is poorly positioned to withstand. Finally, espionage and subversive infiltration of Serbia would be another unfortunate side effect. All of these things hold true if Serbia attempts a swing in the other direction (simply switch NATO and Russia in the preceding sentences).

Now, assuming Serbia isn’t arming to fight another war against NATO and that her leaders remain clever enough to maintain a stout military neutrality, what then is the purpose of having fighter aircraft anyway? I would argue that retaining a credible air force is an important policy. My arguments would be as follows:

1. The primary role of fast jets in Serbia at the moment and for the foreseeable future is air policing. Now, clearly the MiG-29s operated now are too few in number to perform this role effectively and that’s why the ‘21s are still around – though they are in no state to soldier on. This, however, does not equate to a pressing need to purchase or lease new aircraft. Even if Serbia is forced to rely only on the Fulcrums in the near future this would not be the end of the world. Firstly, for a number of targets in the air policing role the G-4s and J-22s are sufficiently fast and can perform the duties required of them. Secondly, the air force is supplemented by the air defence units. This, in combination with a couple of Fulcrums is really enough to perform peacetime air policing in Serbia – especially considering the fact that all her neighbours are in NATO, resulting in a significantly reduced need for high intensity air policing. Basically, air policing alone is not enough of a reason for Serbia to purchase new combat aircraft but is an argument for hanging on to current capabilities.

2. The second important reason, and one which does perhaps suggest a need for the procurement of new jets, is the necessity of maintaining capability and know-how for a future threat environment. Serbia’s current situation, that of a small and relatively frail (militarily and politically) state smothered on all sides by NATO’s currently warm embrace, does not look like being a permanent one. As we saw in the early Autumn ‘08, states that perceive themselves to be militarily competent are capable of doing crazy things and taking on even those much more powerful than themselves. Serbia is in close proximity to several countries that are potential candidates for this kind of behaviour in the future (and that bear grudges that could easily resurface) and should maintain not only a deterrent but also a credible defensive capability. With that in mind, continuity of operation of fast jets is highly desirable and brings with it a number of benefits. The benefits include maintaining a cadre of pilots able to pass on their knowledge and to, potentially, export it (in the sense that foreign air forces may be willing to send their cadets to Serbia for training). This goes for the logistics and ground crews too. The obvious negative side of this is that it is a massive expense that Serbia cannot really afford and that the vast majority of this money is destined to go abroad without providing jobs or broadening the experience of local industry and manpower. Sure, Serbian companies could develop peripheral systems but this seems unlikely and is, in any case, a tiny fraction of the overall cost. This negative side is impossible to counter – it is simply something Serbia will have to put up with one day.

So, if Serbia is to continue to operate a meaningful air force, what should this look like? Obviously it will need 12 – 24 modern fast jets eventually in order to perform in the roles mentioned in the above arguments and to provide some semblance of a precision deep-strike (in the very local, Balkan sense) capability*. Whether these end up being F-16s or Gripens or Fulcrums is almost irrelevant – the only important factor would be that they outperform (or at least outnumber) aircraft operated by potential local rivals (i.e. in all probability not including Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary or Greece). The only thing we can be sure of is that a purchase is not imminent. Neither should it be – it should, in my opinion be delayed as long as the economy is in such a fragile state.

As for ground attack or CAS capability, here something really does need to be done. This is why talk of procuring new aircraft really makes me angry. A much more urgent need would be the modernisation of existing ground attack assets. Specifically, I would like to see the following happen (in the order shown):

1. Helicopters, especially the Gazelles and Hinds, need to be upgraded with TI equipment and otherwise be made fully night capable. They should also be fitted with the best defensive suites money can buy/local industry can supply. This would enable them to operate alongside army and Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel in the Security Zone along the border with Kosovo and to provide crucial intelligence** about the movement of potentially subversive elements across the border – especially at night. They could also operate in a supporting combat role should hostilities escalate in this region.

2. Existing Serbian UAV programmes need to be significantly improved in order to support such operations. Israeli UAVs are okay but really Serbia should be looking to make them locally in as much as that is possible.

3. The ground attack component of the air force should be modernised to make it able to operate at night and to deliver precision munitions relevant to CAS. If what the air force top brass says is true, that the airframes and engines can soldier on for a good while longer, then a modernisation programme is critical. The G-4s should be relatively easy to modernise – a programme already exists and needs to be implemented faster even if this means delaying the purchase of a new combat aircraft. The only problem I can see with the existing G-4M programme (or whatever they’re calling it now) is that it doesn’t provide acceptable night-fighting capability. This should be addressed. As for the J-22s – these are a bit more difficult. The fantasies of Serbian fanboys aside, the Orao’s nose won’t take a radar but it might (with perhaps French or Israeli assistance) take a FLIR. If integrated with precision munitions this could keep the J-22s relevant to Serbia’s needs for the next decade or so. Any upgrade of J-22s or G-4s must include a comprehensive overhaul of the navigation and communication equipment – as this is currently woeful.

These upgrade programmes are more pressing than procurement of foreign kit as they represent an investment in the technology and know-how base of the country and also significantly improve Serbia’s ability to defend herself against both the unconventional threat or cross-border subversion (should that arise or increase) and of local conflicts with relatively evenly-matched neighbours.

* This is important, in my view, because Serbia is currently in unable to strike at valuable targets within a potentially hostile neighbour’s territory. In the event of open conflict with a local adversary, the ability to hit targets (such as, for example, munitions factories or fuel storage facilities) deep in the opponent’s territory could be a war-winning force multiplier.

** In a manner not necessarily too dissimilar to the operation of civilian police helicopters in urban areas.

I have to say, I thought I’d never see the day.

I’m impressed and definitely willing to second all those sentiments about how well Sukhoi have done. Good for them.

It’s been a good day.

She (He?) does look good, it has to be said. Also noticed that it looks like you could stuff about five of them in a Typhoon 😎

Secondly, US and Russian doctrine are different with regards to air defense, so if I didn’t include fighters, you’d only see part of the picture. Even including fighters, you’re not seeing the whole picture with regards to air defense philosophy. Suffice it to say, assuming a 250km shot could be made, it would require the Mig-25/31 to fly at altitudes that would cause them to be detected from much further out, which would result in them having to get through fighter CAPs in and out.

Well, if you’re including CAPs in the scenario, it would only be fair to include fighter escorts for the SEAD package… And EW support… And diversionary Spetznas attacks… Basically, if you’re hell bent on expanding a hypothetical scenario like this* you may as well start talking about ICBMs and MAD. Like Sean said, Patriot batteries are intended to be able to operate autonomously:

Patriot batteries are assigned to certain sectors and the radar array, deployed as a fixed asset, scans 120 degrees in azimuth. As they are dual-hatted as ATBM systems, they will rarely not be emitting. Yes, you’ll have to deal with fighter caps to get to a site in some cases, but the system is meant to operate autonomously.

* which, remember, started off with a single Su-24 firing a Kh-58.

MOSCOW, July 23 (RIA Novosti) – Further development of Russia’s failure-prone Bulava ballistic missile could be assigned to another design bureau if the project remains in the works, a Russian military expert said on Thursday.

“For 15 years the money [for the project] has been thrown down the drain. I think [work on] the missile will be ultimately given to another firm,” said Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Moscow-based Military Forecast Center.

The missile, which is being developed by the Moscow-based Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), has had six failures in 11 tests, and the general director of the institute resigned on Tuesday over what is believed to be a serious setback in the development of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Yury Solomonov, who occupied the posts of MITT general director and general designer, is the most senior official to date to take responsibility for a series of failures in the development of the project.

Tsyganyk said that Solomonov would most likely retain his job as the chief designer of ballistic missiles, and the decision to separate administrative and R&D responsibilities at MITT was long overdue.

“However, it is hard to say who will carry on the Bulava’s development,” the analyst said in an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti.

The MITT got the task to develop Bulava after the Makeyev Design Bureau in the city of Miass in the Urals, which specialized in designing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), failed to produce a prototype of its own Bark SLBM.

The MITT, on the contrary, had just produced a winner in the mobile, land-based, single-warhead Topol-M. But the Solomonov-led institute had little or no experience in SLBM development.

“At present, the Makeyev design bureau is practically nonexistent. The average age of the staff is 55-60 years, and it poses a big problem,” Tsyganok said.

In addition, the expert confirmed reports that the future development of the Bulava has been questioned by some lawmakers and defense industry officials.

“I heard that some lawmakers have been mulling folding the Bulava project and focusing on the existing Sineva SLBM,” he said.

The RSM-54 Sineva (SS-N-23 Skiff) is a third-generation liquid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that entered service with the Russian Navy in July 2007. It can carry four or 10 nuclear warheads, depending on the modification, and has a maximum range of over 11,500 kilometers (about 7,100 miles).

Russia carried out successful test launches of two Sineva missiles from two Delta IV class nuclear-powered submarines in service with the Northern Fleet, located under an ice floe near the North Pole, on July 13-14.

The results of the tests confirmed that the Sineva would stay in service with the Russian Navy until at least 2015.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has an estimated range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile is designed for deployment on new Borey class nuclear-powered strategic submarines.

The Russian military expects the Bulava, along with Topol-M land-based ballistic missiles, to become the core of Russia’s nuclear triad.

Since the latest failure, the Russian Navy has reiterated that the Bulava tests will continue and the missile will inevitably be deployed on Borey class submarines.

Could somebody who understands the ins and outs of Russian missile design bureaus explain the significance of this (to someone who doesn’t understand the ins and outs of Russian missile design bureaus at all)?

SAROV (central Russia), July 22 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s Security Council will discuss a series of projects on the development of supercomputers to test the effectiveness of the country’s nuclear deterrent, President Dmitry Medvedev said on Wednesday.

“Under the global ban on nuclear tests, we can only use computer-assisted simulations to ensure the reliability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent,” Medvedev said at a meeting of a commission on the modernization of Russian economy.

“Therefore, the most powerful supercomputers will be placed in federal nuclear centers,” he said.

Medvedev said the All-Russia Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Sarov, where the meeting took place, will develop by 2011 a computer capable of simultaneously conducting one quadrillion operations.

“We have allocated the necessary sum of over 2.5 billion rubles [about $80 mln], which is no small sum of money, and we are planning to develop this direction along with technological advancements in computer sciences,” the president said.

As long as they don’t put them in control…