Su-37? I’m confused…

Perhaps I’m being a bit harsh on the ol’ Super Flanker – it just left a decidedly “shabby” taste in my mouth.

(not on this site – or at least I don’t think so, mainly youtube)

Sadly it happens here too.

Nonetheless, I still think the Russians, generally, and Sukhoi, specifically, have something to prove here. Not everybody is a fanatical fan-boy or blinded by nationalism – there are plenty of people out there, and I’m thinking of Russians themselves, cynical enough to latch onto an obvious failure.

I wonder how much attention Sukhoi will pay to appearances. Do they realise the potential for causing what will be, in essence, a national disgrace if they roll out an obviously hastily put together, hand built prototype a la Su-37/MiG 1.44?

I’m hoping that they realise how much hype there has been around this aircraft and that they put as much effort as possible in making sure the thing looks right.

DISCLAIMER: Obviously I’m aware that, in the long run, how the PAK-FA looks is really not important at all but I hold firm that cosmetics are more important than just about anything else for the official public roll-out. In short, they have to be able to show the Russian aviation industry in the best possible light.

No problem to add the related timescale.
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm
The military planning did start in 1998, when the UN did decide about the real scope.

So what you’re saying is that NATO began detailed planning (including a build up of relevant assets) for a specific operation several months before the commencement of the campaign and Russia ‘should’ have had some sort of vague contingency plan because Georgia has been a problematic region since the 1920s. By your logic NATO should have had detailed plans for the Balkans because its been a hotspot since the first Serbian Uprising in 1804.

You just keep making my points for me.

You are correct about that. That conflict was lasting for years and every serious military in the world does have plans in his desk to cope with every unfolding situation normally. There are human shortcomings about that, when not all important details were given to the persons in need of that or no money for the related training in need was freed in time.
In the case of the Iraq, the US military had never the serious idea before 1990, that the Iraq could be an area of a full scale military conflict. Something similar with the NATO and the Balcans. In the Caucasus region the Russians had to decide, to have the political dominance by controlling the local conflicts or to become an occupying power again. The Russians did choose to stay in control of the situation.

Wait a second, so you’re saying that Iraq and Kosovo took the US and NATO by surprise but the Russians have been planning for what happened in Georgia last summer for years?

You make less and less sense each time you post.

At the moment the USA military are working to bring their military intel about the Iran to top level, just in case. Militarily the Iran is no real threat and military are not eager to waste their limited money on such minor threats.

Case in point.

Primate,

Both Clark’s and Rodriguez’s comments relate to the immense frustration NATO commanders felt due to the fact that many dual-use and civilian targets were off limits; they are not an expression of their hands being tied when it came to military targets such as the AD network.

The other comments are also not helping you to make a point that relates to Russian operations over Georgia.

In fact, it isn’t entirely clear what point you are trying to make.

Sens,

The NATO forces were in no need to destroy the Serbian armed forces, just to render that useless, what they did. They had the freedom to inflict damage to Serbia, wherever and whenever they want. The same NATO and EU did prevent the Serbian economy to crumble, when the Serbians did give in. There was no lack of firepower by the NATO airpower to bring Serbia into the “stone-age” in short notice. The limited goal of that air-campaign was to bring the Serbian leadership to its senses by inflicting the least possible damage. The Europeans were aware, that the cost of repairs were theirs as the financial help to prevent the Serbian crumble. Montenegro did realize that such EU money could be received directly and did split too. Nearly all Europeans had still in mind, that the Serbians did delay the attack on the former SU in 1941 for a critical month and by that the course of WW2. It was no war against Serbia, just the political pressure by limited military force.
Maybe it still has to take some time, before the Serbians will realize, that they missed a much better political solution, like ‘Dayton’: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dayton_Agreement

I disagree with almost everything you have said here but this is not the place to air my views.

On the other hand…

You are mixing different situations to make your point. The limited forces of Georgia did face two front-lines of minority forces supported by the Russians. The Georgian government did hope to break the political stalemate by a surprise raid on Tskinvali, when in reality that task force did run into a counter raid to Gori. Non was surprised to learn, that the Russian intel was informed about the Georgian intentions. The Tbilisi goverment and its armed forces were bounded by money and less by national feelings. Running into a counter attack that armed forces did crumble in short notice and the Russian ground forces had no problem to go wherever they want. External political pressure did prevent the total collapse of Georgia.
The main obstacle of the Russian air-support was the lack of proper IFF as the main cause of losses did show. There was no integrated AD over Georgia, just some assets in support of the local ground forces. Along-side the main road from Gori to Tbilisi nothing was left as there were no ground forces willing to resist a Russian raid on Tbilisi. Now,when the politics about that had settled down, the Russians are willing to look into the own ups and downs during that few days more critical. In every conflict some military lessons have to be learned and the related shortcomings are of main intrest.
The Russians did won and whatever the Georgians did claim, they lost.
The political solution to settle the conflict is another story.

… I agree with most of what you have said here. Although, I’m not sure it was external political pressure that stopped the Russians marching into Tbilisi – although that could well have been one of the deciding factors. I will also add that Russian intel may have been good with regards to Georgian intentions but it patently wasn’t very good with regards to Georgian air defence capabilities. Much has already been written about the fact that the efficiency and capabilities of the Georgian air defence units took the Russians by surprise (hence the loss of the Backfire).

pigeonracer,

Yet Russia lost more aircraft in a far shorter space of time than did NATO forces.

Yes but they also didn’t have months and months to build up their forces and prepare intelligence on the adversary. And their aircraft are older, the air force has had less experience of combat operations and the Georgian SAM systems (Buk-M1 in particular) were more advanced.

Its not hard to work out that had the conflict continued for a 3 month time period there would have undoubtably been more losses as Russia wasn’t able to hurt the tiny Georgian AD system apart from as SOC says destroying one EW radar

Had the conflict lasted another three months there would have been no Georgian military left to speak of – much less an air defence network. Obviously this would have been due to operations on the ground rather than an air campaign but that’s the point I’ve been trying to make all along. NATO, with all of the assets, technology, combat experience, resources etc etc it has at its disposal still had difficulties when trying to fight a war solely from the air. It should then come as no surprise that given less favourable conditions the Russian AF (with all of its disadvantages relative to NATO air forces working in concert) should suffer casualties and make errors that, on the face of it, look so much worse.

(and they had no targets off limits either such as civilian radars unlike NATO)

The civilian radars you speak of are almost completely useless in the air defence role. Had they been of any use whatsoever they would have been taken out without a moments hesitation. I shouldn’t even have to point that out.

Any UK readers know if Ladbrooks would let me put money on when the PAK-FA rollout will be?

Lol! 😀