Sorry, but i fail to see the logic behind your question regarding Snecma and Rafale.

so without Rafale engine license money and possible future upgradation market for next 40 years. why would Snecma help Kaveri which will be Indian product at the end.

As for overdependence, if around 60% of IAF’s fleet (not to mention the better part of it) is composed of fighters from a single source, i would call it overdependence. Cosidering, India’s rising stature in world, increasing importance of military power to safeguard her intersts at home and abroad, deep desire to keep her policies independent, and ever changing geopolitical situation, i dont think India would want to be overdependent on any country in any way. Having said, here is an interesting thought. Both India and Russia have signed IPR agreement. Would joint ventures like Pak-FA/Mig-35 (if it happens) fall under IPR, i.e. wouldn’t India require Russian permission to upgrade them further from third sources?

u can also add AWACS/Airtanker/transport/Ajt to ur overdependence category. and India is prefectly allowed to install third party systems on platforms provided it is with consultation with OEM. IPR is more related to sharing technology with third parties.

another interesting point Kaveri RFP is only sent to Saturn and Snecma. why would Snecma help unless Rafale is chosen and there is big engine order. and overdependence question does not arise when u want 100% in house.

Here is the problem. At a high altitude you really cannot image a moving ship, and by the time you do, you’re descending too fast. A higher speed means less time to do corrections, less time and opportunity for maneuver. Let’s also talk about what reentry speeds can do against conventional radomes.

what speed u have in mind here.? I really gave example of light bulb. or insurgent in jungle.think about modern.

As a rule, the killing device has to be faster than the target device, not the other way around

Again self established rule. not surprizing.

How is the engine above described looks like an RD-33?

Design

axial compressor
WS-13 3 fan
RD-93 4 fan

secondary supercharging compressor
WS-13 8 stage
RD-33 9 stage

Bypass Ratio
WS-13 0.57
RD-33 0.49

Inlet temperature
WS-13 1650c
RD-33 1953c

Pressure ratio
WS-13 23
RD-33 20

Dimensions

Diameter
WS-13 1.02
RD-33 1.04

Dry weight
WS-13 1135kg
RD-33 1055kg

Length
WS-13 4144mm
RD-33 4250mm

Afterburner Thrust
WS-13 8630kg
RD-33 8300kg

Dry Thrust
WS-13 5675kg
RD-33 5098kg

from where this figures comes from? RD-133 has 5600KG thrust, 1145 kg weight. and 40 degree more temp. but not at 1930. It looks some one has superimposed those figures and created a speculation sheet.

Hitting something in the ground is definitely easier than hitting something in the air, much less in space at orbital speeds.

orbital speeds are known. try hit the unknown speed.( which u cannot see with IR, Radio spectrums on ground). and on ground it is sharply reduced range and speed.

No, they haven’t. Russia scraped its dozen or so IS-M anti-satellite missiles (based on SS-9) in 1993 because of their age. This system wasn’t replaced by “Contact” and “Naryad-V” due to lack of money. You know, Yeltsin bought only vodka at those days rejoicing US! 😀

ever thought about there Laser system.

http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1996/druma189_s96005.htm
In those days I was preparing a detailed report for the Minister of Defense on means being used to track the Shuttle flight and on results of Outer Space Monitoring System operation. Then, some time in the autumn of 1983, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Ustinov called me on the Kremlin phone [kremlevka]: I have before me your report on work on the Shuttle. Tell me, why hasn’t the experimental laser complex of General Designer Nikolay Ustinov been used?’ Dmitriy Fedorovich was excited over his son’s creation. At that time a team of 300 specialists was performing modifications on the complex, and I reported this to the Minister of Defense. And the experiment took place on 10 October 1984, during the Challenger’s 13th flight, when its orbital revolutions were passing in the vicinity of the National Air Defense Troops state range near Lake Balkhash, with the laser unit operating in a detection mode with minimum emissive power. The craft’s orbital altitude at that time was 365 km and the slant range of acquisition and tracking was 400-800 km. A precise target designation was issued to the laser unit by General Designer Grigoriy Kisunko’s Argun radar measurement complex.

“The Challenger crew later reported that as they were flying over the vicinity of Balkhash, communications on the craft suddenly shut down, malfunctions appeared in operation of gear, and the astronauts themselves did not feel quite well. The Americans began to investigate and soon realized that the crew had been subjected to some kind of artificial effect from our side and lodged an official protest with the USSR. Based on humane considerations, the laser unit as well as a portion of the range’s radiotechnical complexes having a high energy potential subsequently were not employed to track the Shuttles.”

The ASAT ‘stick.’ (military officers oppose antisatellite weapons), 1985
The ASAT “Stick’

One of the best-kept secrets in Washington is the military’s opposition to antisatellite weapons. Unfortunately, Congress has not been listening to what the generals and admirals are saying.

One of the first to voice his reservations was Gen. Charles Gabriel, the Air Force Chief of Staff. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations in March 1984, Gabriel said he favored a verifiable treaty banning ASATs. “Because we are an open society,’ he said, “we need our space capabilities more than the Soviets do.’ To understand this point fully, one must realize that current ASATs can destroy only low-altitude satellites. Should a race to develop them continue, however, the Soviet Union and the United States would surely achieve the capability to destroy high-altitude “birds.’ That would hurt the U.S. side far more than it would the Soviet because of America’s greater dependence on satellites for military command, control and communications. Also, “technical means’ (another term for satellites) enable U.S. intelligence to monitor the Soviet Union’s every military move, which includes tracking its nuclear missiles.

Gabriel is not alone. In August of that year several admirals anonymously told The New York Times that they shared his reservations. The Navy relies on satellites for precise navigation and position-finding, which are crucial to the accuracy of Trident sea-launched missiles. And naval communications would be vulnerable to Soviet satellite destroyers, says Adm. Noel Gayler, retired, the only highranking Navy officer to speak for the record.
The big push for ASAT tests has come from civilians in the Pentagon and in the White House. The Reaganites want a successful ASAT test before the November summit talks between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev so that the President won’t be forced to “negotiate from weakness.’ True, a single test–especially one that is three years behind schedule–does not prove the system is workable

US deficit is no larger (in relative terms — % of its GDP) than UE’s and even smaller than Japan’s. Irak is another matter, it really sucks money. But if US air power is death, what about the rest of the world?

It is not the size of deficit but Savings to finance Public/Private consumption that matters. so u have to accept cheap goods from China and not extend war on terror to house of saud.

some thing about T/R module origin for MIG-35

http://mfit.ru/defensive/obzor/ob18-02-05-2.html
A.Kanashchenkov has informed, that elements of a radar with АФАР are created in cooperation with the several enterprises. « The technology — three firms participating in the project is now fulfilled , have organized coproduction which is modernized so that on its(his) base to form a ruler of creation of modules », — A.Kanashchenkov has told.

As he said, manufacture is created on the basis of Tomsk institute ” МИКРАН ” at which there is large enough manufacture making a modern communication facility. According to A.Kanashchenkova, one firm involved in cooperation, specializes in the field of semi-conductor technology, and another has manufacturing techniques of monolithic elements in structure of the receiving-transferring module.

« Corporation ” Phasotron-¡¿¿Ó ” defines(determines) ideology of leaded and perspective works », — A.Kanashchenkov has told.

The Interfax, 15.02.05