This old study. I am sure there more combat plans like this ready for sell.
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The Su-27 and the Falklands war lessons
Below we present a discourse by Vladimir Babich, Col. (Ret.) Russian Air Force, 1st class military pilot, master of military sciences, on the possible scenario of events during one of the regional conflicts in 1980s should a party in defence had had Su-27 fighters in service.
When researching and analysing events and developments that took place in the past, the restorative modelling provides for conceptual replacement of an aircraft that participated in air combat in the past with another aircraft belonging a newer generation. For instance, at our disposal we had schemes and recordings of actual air combats of MiG-23s with the F-15 and F-16 fighters. During the modelling experiment, a similar situation was recreated where the MiG-23 was replaced with the MiG-29. After multiple replays of the aerial combats, new results were compared with the old ones. The comparison allowed us to discover and establish performances and capabilities of the aircraft and weaponry in actual aerial combat.
We “borrowed” this method from avionics developers who used it for creation of various on-board systems. The electronic “assistant” to the pilot “analogises” through the pre-set number of images taken from the past experience and selects several combat variants that fit the existing situation best. Then a logic scheme “IF – THEN” is triggered into action. Let’s try to apply such “cybernetics” to the recent regional conflict in The Southern Atlantic – the Falklands war. Let’s assume that conditions and circumstances of the conflict have not lost their importance. So we have the following condition: “IF the Su-27 participated in the combat activities, THEN…”.
The pre-crisis situation in the region was characterised by concentration of 80 Royal Navy ships in the Southern Atlantic which ensured disembarking of the landing force while supported by the Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft and low-level air defense systems. This operation involved 10 Vulcan strategic bombers, 15 Victor tanker aircraft, 43 Harrier vertical take-off/landing (VTOL) aircraft and 30 Sea King helicopters. The Harrier attack aircraft participated in the real combat for the first time though their weaponry – first-generation Shrike antiradiation missiles – were used by American Phantoms during the Vietnam war.
Argentina had 278 aircraft, including six Super Etandard fighter-bombers which sent to the bottom the HMS Sheffield, a British destroyer, with an Exoset antiship missile purchased from France six months prior to the conflict. It also had 20 Mirage III fighters (earlier these fighters were used by Israel in Middle East conflicts), 76 Skyhawk attack helicopter (veteran of the Vietnam war and Middle East wars). As one might notice, all aircraft participating in the conflict were representatives of the previous generations though the Argentinean aircraft involved in the conflict outnumbered their British counterparts 7 to 1.
Britain commenced hostilities by launching a classic offensive operation intended to win air superiority despite their being outnumbered by the Argentinean Air Force. Air superiority can be gained through implementation of three traditional approaches: mounting the strikes against the enemy airfields, suppression of the enemy air defences and destruction of the enemy aircraft in aerial combat. Strikes against the Argentinean airfields yielded an expected effect. The RAF did not succeed in blocking enemy’s airfields and runways through mining from the air using Vulcan bombers. When on the attack course over the target, the heavy bombers still remained at high altitude and outside the effective range of the Roland air defence systems employed by Argentina for airfield protection. Evasive manoeuvring resurrected in the next decade during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox in the Persian Gulf, when the Allied strike aircraft pilots preferred avoiding unnecessary risk. Safety had a priority over the precision of the strikes. In order to “place” a required amount of free-fall bombs on a peculiar target, the Allied command used to allocate an excessive number of aircraft for the strike force. Still they failed to squeeze more than six Vulcan bombers into a single strike force, thus damage done to the enemy airfields was not sufficient to write them off from as operational facilities.
The Harrier attack planes which during the Falkland war were tasked with destroying the Argentinean air defence system and the aircraft stationed in the open were more successful in accomplishing the mission. During those operations, a situation once encountered during the Six Day War in the Middle East was repeated. Groups of British VTOL aircraft defying the Roland air defence systems destroyed 30 enemy aircraft positioned in a single line on the ground. Resistance of the point air defences was reduced by employment of a new weapon – the Shrike antiradiation missiles. The RAF lost only three aircraft.
Air-to-ground strikes intended to facilitate air superiority did not equal the hopes. Air-to-air strikes carried by the Harrier VTOL fighters were more impressive: 23 mid-air kills of the Argentinean aircraft compared with only two aircraft lost by the RAF.
Later, Argentinean experts and researchers gave these disappointing results of air encountering during the conflict a thorough consideration and came out with the following conclusions.
Firstly, the Falklands hostilities were not part of the Argentinean military doctrine which determined formation and inventory of the Argentinean Air Force. Capabilities of aircraft in service with the Argentinean Air Force were sufficient for “close defence” purposes only. Close air support (CAS) and attack aircraft making the backbone of the aircraft fleet were intended for operations in the tactical zone in close contact with the ground troops. Operational depth which included the islands remained not covered by the Argentinean Air Force.
Secondly, the nature of air operations during the conflict resembled American air raids on Hanoi and Haifong during the Vietnam war. Then, tactical attack aircraft based in Thailand went for bombing targets located at a range of up to 600-800 km from the friendly air bases. Self-sustained sorties without guidance from the ground control and its informational support, along with two in-flight refuellings and independent search for the assigned targets, were not easily negotiable “obstacles”, which affected survivability statistics. Argentinean aircraft were based on the continental airfields far away from the area of operation. For Mirage III fighters and Skyhawk attack aircraft, the Falkland Islands were located at the edge of their fuel endurance range, even if the aircraft followed the most favourable fuel-saving routes and altitudes.
Thirdly, the Argentinean Air Force fighters were prepared for a classic warfare consistent with capabilities of jet aircraft of the second generation (Mirage, MiG-21, Phantom). Those aircraft were equipped with radar sights, heat-seeking homing missiles and cannons and were capable of flying at supersonic speeds. Nevertheless, air combat techniques for engaging VTOL fighters possessing a number of unique capabilities had not been developed by the Argentinean Air Force command (which its true for some other countries as well).
Fourthly, the psychological aspect of present day combat which is often ignored when planning military operations affects the outcome of aerial warfare too. When a pilot is to engage enemy at fuel endurance limits of his aircraft, his eyes will inevitably stay on the fuel gauge readings longer than on the enemy aircraft. Due to the strain and stress, the pilot’s alertness gets blunted and reaction to the emerging threat slows down.
Fifthly, it was obvious that Argentina lacked an aircraft capable of changing course of the conflict, delivering effective fire on the enemy force during the enemy landing operations, depriving the enemy of air superiority, blocking the progress of the enemy’s bombers heading for strategic inland facilities. The above mentioned missions could be completed by the Su-27.
Military experts are not professors of economy but still they do understand that purchasing the Su-27-class fighters requires considerable expense since aircraft of each subsequent generation is much more expensive piece of hardware than that of the previous generation. The money invested should return back in a form of the Air Force’s higher combat effectiveness, in other words, in greater damage to the enemy force. If acquired efficiency covers all costs of the new equipment, such purchase is worth making.
Hypothetical incorporation of the Su-27 fighter into the model of the Falkland Islands conflict makes it possible to come out with a couple of conclusions. Firstly, the Su-27 would eliminate deficiencies of the Argentinean Air Force related to aircraft operations at the combat range limits. This aircraft would have had enough fuel both for a long trip to the area of operation and for operating there. The aircraft “saturation” with a variety of weapons would allow the pilot to make several runs on different aerial, ground or naval targets. The amphibious force protection element would not have been able to render any serious counteraction against this fast and manoeuvrable aircraft. What way would the landing operation have gone on, if the Su-27 had interfered with the landing operation from the very beginning? The probability modelling technique would give us a more precise picture of the situation but, to my mind, this operation would, most probably, be very close to being botched, provided the optimum number of the Su-27 had been allocated for the mission).
Undoubted advantages gained from the group air strike preparation and tailoring combat flight formations of attack and escort elements can not be left unmentioned. The striking flight aircraft carry air-to-surface weaponry while the escort flight is armed with air-to-air missiles. Such tactical distribution of tasks in line with a properly arranged mutual support provides more effective self-defence and strike capability. Pre-flight servicing procedures of single-type aircraft become easier due uniform ground service equipment, ground control of airborne aircraft becomes simpler, steady and flexible, which is consistent with requirements of Air Force field manual requirements in many countries.
Defeat in dogfights hurt the prestige of the defending party in the most sensitive way. Why could the supersonic all-weather Mirages not match the subsonic VTOL Harriers? The Mirage’s organic weapons make it a close combat fighter. Short-range heat-seeking missiles and cannon dictate tactical behaviour during the combat which includes mandatory positioning of the aircraft in the rear hemisphere of the enemy’s aircraft with subsequent launch of missiles (gunfire) from a short distance. Dogfight is held at subsonic speeds corresponding to M=0.8. At subsonic speeds, the Harrier aircraft which has swivelling nozzle and thrust vector control (TVC) system had significant advantages in manoeuvrability. During an aerial combat which started on equal terms, on head-on approach due to a shorter turn radius and time, the VTOL aircraft managed to outrun enemy aircraft in taking a better position for attack.
The Su-27 drastically changes tactics of aerial combat due to its integral long-range radar and radar-guided missiles. This tactics is based on the head-on missile attack which, if successful, does not require any further close combat. Detection and identification of targets at long ranges enables the aircraft to take the most favourable attack position prior to closing is on the enemy and to seize the initiative, i.e. to pre-empt the enemy in any other subsequent step. The Su-27 simply does not allow the enemy to close up for a long and exhaustive manoeuvre-related challenge. This situation is similar to the encounter between Israeli F-15s and Syrian MiG-21s during the Lebanon war in the Middle East. The truth of a saying that came to us from the past “He who sees first – wins” is confirmed one more time.
Possible disruption of the head-on attack due to timely employment of evasive manoeuvre by the enemy or jamming activated to hide target appearance on the radar display does not necessarily mean the end of combat. The Su-27 never gives up. Being the only aircraft in the world capable of the “cobra” manoeuvre, it can engage the enemy with a short-range missile after getting behind the enemy aircraft.
After gaining air superiority due to employment of its superior fighter capabilities, the Su-27 can switch over its priorities to the next classic mission of the present day combat – interdiction. Deep interdiction means disruption of enemy lines of communication, strikes against the enemy’s reserves, command centres, fuel and ammunition dumps. The long reach, effective warload delivery and survivability of the Su-27 fighter provides successful accomplishment of this complex mission.
The above scenario, of course, is purely hypothetical. The Su-27 was not and could not be in service with the Argentinean Air Force during the Falklands conflict. Nevertheless, the previous decade war still remains a worthy example, and Latin America countries planning to upgrade their air forces should give a thorough consideration to what modern fighters could serve their purposes the best way possible early in next millennium.
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