Two books below describe an actual engagement between the F-4J and MiG-21 over North Vietnam in 1972.
The F-4J locked up on one of four MiG-21s at 25 nautical miles, but lost lock soon. Then at 15 nautical miles it reacquired the target.
But note that at 25 and 15 nautical miles the F-4J had no positive ID of the approaching aircraft, so no BVR shot.
Scream of Eagles: The Dramatic Account of the U.S. Navy’s Top Gun Fighter – Page 311
When advised of the MiGs, Pettigrew thought of dropping their wingboard fuel tanks, but decided to wait until one of them had spotted the bandits. They nosed down and gunned north at 500 knots. Almost immediately, Hughes’ RIO, LTJG Joe Cruz, got a lock on one of the MiGs. It was an unsual lock given their radars: velocity only, a tough one to hold. Since McCabe, Pettigrew’s RIO, didn’t have one, Pettigrew gave the lead to Hughes, becoming – as he’d taught so often at Top Gun – Hughes’ wingman. The bandits were about 25 miles away, closing swiftly. Suddenly, Cruz lost lock.
US Navy F-4 Phantom II MiG killers: 1972-73 – Page 21
He locked-up the return and called a 900-knot closing velocity before the radar broke lock when the MiG went to beam. At about 15 nautical miles Lt Hughes reacquired the contact and secured another radar lock-up. Pettigrew immediately called his wingman. ‘I’ll go shooter. You’ve got the VID (visual identification)’,
http://media.daum.net/foreign/view.html?cateid=1046&newsid=20120128013512322&p=segye
Seems like SAAB has responded to Korean F-X3 tender with Gripen.
The Korean agent of SAAB wants to attend the F-X briefing, that’s all.
Let’s wait & see whether SAAB submits its proposal, which is unlikely.
I think the pattern here is that all three of your accounts describe Continuous-Wave illumination.
With more modern missiles such as R-77 and AMRAAM that use a data link, the doppler notch is less effective, but i might be wrong.
In case of an F-15C armed with the AMRAAM, I guess the situation would be more or less the same before the AMRAAM’s own active radar seeker acquires its target?
I believe that’s what KAI trying to do. Find the best off the shelf available in the market. For the engine, J-20 still used Russian based engine yes ?
Anyway, I suspect unless the US willing to give F-35 engine to the project, twin engine configuration will be the final choices.
Although an old one, GE’s 32,000lb F110-GE-132 is available to power single-engined designs. It’s like IAI Kfir came out with the 1950’s-era J79 in the 1970’s when the F-16 came out with the latest F100 then.
will the plane have internal bay or not ?
It may, or it may not. We don’t know yet.
I think it’s his personal interest. DI people that I meet already said they will follow KAI preferential of twin engine, since realistically 2 Eurojet (as front runner possible contender) will be needed to give the planned sufficient thrust.
Two EJ200s could make it a Typhoon-sized fighter, with a comparable price tag.
That scenario I think will always be a scenario. Since realistically I don’t think South Korea will ever faced a nuclear power alone. Off course unless if that nuclear power is North Korea.
And if ROK will have to face DPRK alone (say China and US will stay out from any armed conflict in peninsula and let the two Korea’s faced each other alone), than whatever DPRK has can be match easily with KF-X or even with existing F-16 or even the aging F-5 and F-4.
Besides if the situation happen, with nuclear technology that ROK has right now, ROK will have no much trouble to become nuclear power it self in short time right ?
In short, if KF-X can come out as something as stealthier twin engine FA-50 which in theory can surpass current F-16 block 50, Flankers or PRC J-10B, it will be in trouble only if facing USAF with both F-35 and F-22.
I just point out unless your scenario put USAF or USN as potential adversary for ROKAF, then KF-X seems will be enough for ROK need. After all again ROKAF seems not plan to make KF-X their most advance fighters in the future. Just the most numerous one right ?
A PTDI director I met told me he prefers single-engine designs. Don’t know whether it’s his personal opinion or the company’s official one.
To be numerous enough, lift-cycle costs should be as low as possible, and generally single-engine fighters are cheaper than twin-engine ones (the twin J85-powered F-5 is a rare exception).
Is the threat will use extensive F-22, F-35, or PAKFA ? If not, then it’s good enough I think. Afterall, none of the participating Nations on this program will use KF-X as their most sophisticated fighters after 2020 +. In such if most adversaries will use what exist in the market so far, then more stealthier twin engined and evolved FA-50 will be good enough.
KF-X will be (if the program come to fruition) most numerous fighter in ROK and Indonesian inventory after 2020. But not the most sophisticated ones I believe. ROK still looking for F-35, and Russian already put present Flankers users like Vietnam and Indonesia as possible market for PAKFA, even on much less number compared to their main partner in PAKFA program (India).
To answer that question, I need to know what kind of war South Korea has to be prepared to fight from 2020 to 2050. There are so many possibilities and I haven’t had time to think through every aspects of those possibilities.
For example, in an extreme scenario where South Korea has to fight a major, nuclear-armed power alone, what would be good enough? This extreme scenario is something similar to the Winter War of 1939-1940 between Finland and the Soviet Union.
That’s what I heard from DI team in here after they being briefed by KAI team. I will not be surprised if KF-X final design will be some kind more stealthy twin engined FA-50.
And nothing wrong with that, since it will be sophisticated enough from 2020 + environment.
If an affordable and stealthier FA-50 or whatever derivative is good enough against future threats from the 2020’s to 2040’s, I would heartily endorse the program.
Would it really be good enough? That’s a ten billion dollar question.
In aerospace, we Koreans tend to play safe, perhaps too much, to avoid risks because nobody wants to take responsibility for something that may go wrong.
That’s why we are still seeking foreign development partners – I am not talking about Indonesia or Turkey, but Western companies like EADS, Boeing, etc – despite all the experiences we had from the KT-1, T-50 and KUH.
The KUH, as you can see below, was supposed to be an all-new clean-sheet design. But it ended up as the latest incarnation of the venerable Puma because of this “play safe/avoid risks” mentality.
I suspect the KF-X may end up as another derivative of something we’ve already seen somewhere.
Yes I am. Why? Do you don’t trust the Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI) doing their job? Or maybe you believe they’re lying?
Btw, that is about as official it can get under the circumstances. RCS is a very sensitive issue, you know that right?
From what I have heard from Gripen pilots, I have no reason not to trust the FOI.
That “Radarmalarea 0,1m2” cited in the FOI paper is just an assumption taken for the purpose of modeling and simulation.
There is no indication at all that it is an actual test result by flying a Gripen with useful load against real airborne and ground radars.
They have the assets to get a fix on the radar/radars at least. A threat to Sweden from a S-300/400 would be in Kaliningrad. I guess you could get coordinates from a covert op on the ground for the SAMs.
What assets do they have right now? Could you please elaborate?
Yep. And I believe that is for the old Gripen, the NG will have less. But I guess that is for a clean configuration.
Can you back it up with some official sources?
Please, don’t quote that FOI paper about modeling and simulation.
Yes. 1946-1990 their hypothetical surface targets were 1.) A Soviet amphibious force coming across the Baltic. The Lansen and attack Viggen had the radar guided Rb 04 anti-ship missile, some versions also with a home on jam mode.
And 2.) Soviet armour. AGM-65 and various dumb munitions for this purpose. Attack profile was tree-level.
How about 1990-2011? I guess SEAD is still none of the Swedish air force’s business…
Not 0,1 RCS fighters. Maybe half that distance is viable for a 0,1 RCS fighter at altitude(at best).
I am still not convinced about that RCS figure.
I believe “Radarmalarea 0,1m2” cited in the FOI paper is just an assumption taken for the purpose of modeling and simulation, not an actual test result by flying a Gripen with useful load against real airborne and ground radars.