Why cant TIDLS and KEPD350 be used against sams?
A silent Gripen can fire from 500km away. all they need is GPS coordinates via link.
As i heared the S-400 can track targets at 400km, these are obviusly B-52.s at high altitudes. Not 0,1 RCS fighters. Maybe half that distance is viable for a 0,1 RCS fighter at altitude(at best).

Does the Swedish air force have any KEPD350 in stock right now?

Also, does the Swedish air force have ISR assets to produce GPS coordinates of the SAM battery for the Gripen to attack?

What SEED capbilities does Gripan has anyway?

HARM?
HARM guiding pod?
EW pod?

I’ve never seen a Gripen armed with the AGM-88 HARM or any other anti-radar missile.

Below is from “PATTERNS AND PREDICTABILITY: THE SOVIET EVALUATION OF OPERATION LINEBACKER II” written by Dana Drenkowski and Lester W. Grau.

The authors quoted Colonel-General Anatoliy Ivanovich Khyupenen’s after-action report “Combat Actions of the Air Defense Forces and Air Forces of the Vietnamese Peoples’ Army in December 1972”. Khyupenen arrived in Hanoi in 1972 to direct the Soviet air defense advisory effort and was present during Linebacker II.

” Analysis of bombing strikes conducted by the F-111A aircraft showed, on the average, that they were not very effective due to the low accuracy of their bombing and the high number of dud bombs. At the same time, the systematic night actions of these aircraft at 15-40 minute intervals during the first three days of the operation and their surprise strikes produced a significant psychological effect on the populace and exhausted the air defense forces and armed forces of the Vietnamese Peoples Army.41 “

41 Drenkowski: this confirms Drenkowski’s earlier report that virtually all the F-111 missions on the first night missed their targets. The report of many dud bombs would suggest that the standard fusing systems used for dive bombing and horizontal bombing from higher altitudes were not adequate for the newer requirements of the advanced low level bombers. Additionally, Khyupenen’s account confirms what was widely reported in US military circles at the time: that the F-111’s most effective–but unanticipated–contribution was its effect on enemy morale.

I would like to know how this report can fit with the operations in Vietnam, where with heavy ECM support, fighter support, and tactical advantages (a lor of fuel reserves) bombing campaigns were still a challenge.

During the Linebacker II in December 1972, B-52s went in at high altitude, hitting more or less the same target area again and again.

In a WW3 scenario in the 1960’s, B-52s and B-58s would have tried to penetrate defenses by flying low (below 1,000 feet) and rolling back defenses with nuclear-tipped stand-off missiles such as the AGM-28 Hound Dog.

The B-58, which was designed to penetrate enemy defenses at high speed & high altitude, could also do low-altitude penetration as well.

From page 207 of Bill Gunston’s 1973 book “Bombers of the West”:

… and on 18 September 1959 Erickson flew a B-58 on a mission I hope will long be remembered (anyone under the line of flight certainly will not forget). He took off from Carswell AFB, adjacent to Fort Worth plant, and flew over 1,400 miles to Edwards AFB, California, at the design sea-level limit of Mach 0.93 (a little over 600 knots) never more than 500 feet up. “We were travelling a little faster than a .45 pistol bullet”, he said, “no wonder people had trouble recognizing us.” This flight demonstrated structural strength, long sea-level range (more than at Mach 2 at optimum high altitude), and the ability to stay under the US radars of 1959 in crossing four states.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d221

221. National Intelligence Estimate1

Washington, October 31, 1968.

NIE 11–3–68

SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces through mid-1970, and general trends in these forces through 1978.2

Conclusions

A. Throughout the postwar period the USSR has devoted a major effort to strategic defense. This effort can be attributed primarily to the size and diversity of US strategic attack forces, although for the future the Soviets must consider the threat posed by third countries, particularly China.

B. We believe that the competition for resources in the USSR is likely to intensify, not only between civilian and military programs, but also within the military establishment. These pressures may exercise a restraining influence on the strategic defense effort, but are unlikely to reduce it below present levels. The trend for the longer term will depend heavily upon Soviet decisions concerning antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment and the related question of strategic arms control.

C. The Soviets have built a formidable system of air defenses, deployed in depth, which would be very effective against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes. The system is less effective against higher performance aircraft and standoff weapons; it has virtually no capability against low-altitude penetration below about 1,000 feet except in a few, limited areas. The Soviets recognize these shortcomings and are deploying new interceptors, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and radars in an effort to overcome them.

D. At present, the major effort is directed to counter the threat posed by high-performance aircraft and standoff weapons. Deployment of the SA–5 long-range SAM system is the largest single defensive weapon program now underway. This system represents a considerable improvement over older systems in terms of range, velocity, and firepower. It is being deployed as a barrier defense around the European USSR and for point defense of selected targets. We estimate that there are some 60 SA–5 complexes, and that nearly half are operational; we believe that some 100 complexes will be operational by 1973. The Soviets have also been testing an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) that will probably enter service soon. This system, deployed in coastal areas and used with long-range interceptors, could greatly extend the area in which incoming aircraft could be engaged.

E. The Soviets are also attempting to strengthen their air defenses against low-altitude attack, but their efforts of the past year have resulted in minor improvements rather than in any fundamental solution to the problem. They have deployed all-weather interceptors with improved capabilities for low-altitude attack, and they will probably introduce more advanced SAMs and interceptors better suited for low-altitude defense. The primary limitation on low-altitude defense, however, is surveillance and control. Deployment of new radars has improved tracking capabilities in limited areas down to altitudes of 500 feet and even below, but we expect little advance in ground-based continuous tracking capability at low altitudes during the period of this estimate.

(snip)

Discussion

I. Soviet Strategic Defense Policy

1. Soviet strategic defense forces have gone through several stages of development since World War II. Through the mid-1950’s the Soviets attempted to counter the large US strategic bomber force in being with large numbers of air surveillance radars and interceptor aircraft, reinforced at Moscow with large numbers of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). As the US force obtained higher performance intercontinental bombers, the Soviets in the late 1950’s developed and deployed Mach 2 interceptors and extended SAM defenses throughout the country. When the US, in the face of this extensive defense, began practicing low-altitude penetration tactics, the Soviets began in the early 1960’s deploying the Firebar interceptor and the SA–3, both possessing better capabilities for low-altitude intercept than earlier systems. The US deployment of a standoff capability with air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), was followed by Soviet development and the current deployment of the Fiddler interceptor and the SA–5 system, which have greater ranges than earlier systems.

(snip)

4. The Soviets probably believe that the massive air defense forces they have built and are building will provide an effective counter to the medium and high-altitude bomber threat, although they realize the problem of low-altitude defense is not yet satisfactorily solved. The most critical requirement of Soviet strategic defense, and the one most difficult to meet despite more than a decade of effort, however, is defense against ballistic missiles. The nature and extent of antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment is almost certainly one of the major questions of Soviet military policy.