datafuserSo now your assuming that the APG-77 could not get a lock at WVR ranges thereby allowing you to take an IIR shot?
Now your taking this well into the range of “not gonna happen” 😉
No I am assuming a very fast, passive imaging “BVR” missile.
If you put the same APG-77 and ALR-94 (and an IRST too) on the F-15C or Su-35S, and arm it with hypersonic, passive imaging BVR missiles, what advantages does the F-22 have?
datafuserYou’re assuming a lot:
1. If your close enough to get a fix on the F-22 by it’s radar signals, then why don’t you have a AIM-120 inbound already?
My assumption was that the ESM would establish a firing solution first, giving the 4th-gen fighter a first shot opportunity.
3. The killbox for any active missile against the F-22 will be MUCH smaller than for the AMRAAM headed your way.
What if the missile is a very fast, passive ‘imaging’ one?
4. Technology does not stand still. Just as ESMs are getting better, so is the F-22/35’s ability to create better LPI signals.
Yes it’s back to ECM, ECCM, ECCCM, ECCCCM race.
My intention in starting this thread is to identify technologies that have the potential to negate stealth in air-to-air, and applicable to existing 4th-gen fighters.
datafuserIf anything has a chance, it’s the F-22 in detecting itself.
Let’s assume an ESM that can establish a firing solution against the F-22 – before getting shot at – already exists on non-stealthy 4th-gen fighters. Then what particular advantage does the F-22 have over those non-stealthy 4th-gen fighters with a “super” ESM?
datafuserNot only does the ESM have to “receive” the radar signal, but also:
1. Recognize it as such.
2. Intercept enough of it in order to get a bearing to the F-22.
3. Get even more of it in order to get a 3D positional fix.
4. Be painted long enough in order to get a vector to the F-22 in order to use your own AAMs against it.A break in any of the above and you will not be able to prosecute a missile shot against the F-22. There is also the issue of networking to deal with. While you may “intercept” the radar from the F-22 going active 150nm away, you will never hear from the F-22 that is only 50nm away that got updated with your position.
So what is your take on the original question: can the ALR-94 do #1, 2, 3, 4 described above against the APG-77?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
What’s your take?
datafuserEqually equipped enemy is anyone who owns sufficient assets to attack the forward bases where F-22s would be deployed. It would be plain stupid to concentrate effort on targeting the F-22s while they are flying whern you can comfortably blow them to pieces while on the ground.
Yes it’s always better to destroy enemy air power on the ground as the Israelis did in 1967.
datafuserIMO; the primary sensors for future A2A engagements will have to be either offboard or passive.
Active on-board is gonna be like a submarine running around with active sonar on full blast.
A poster at another forum says “The LO characteristics of the F-22s act against the seekers of the weapons launched by the OPFOR as much as they do against the search sensors and the smaller and lower power sensors on the missiles will have a much more difficult time achieving lock on their own.”
If true, future BVR missiles should also be infra-red imaging ones or something else.
datafuserModern IRST can see an approaching fighter from about 30-50nm away. This is well short of what the latest radar/AAMs can do. The IRST has a LONG way to go before it supplants radar as the primary sensor for A2A engagements.
What about ESM? ESM only needs to pick up emissions, while radar has to send out emissions and RECEIVE them back. If a radar can see a target at 100 NM, an ESM may “hear” that radar over 200 NM away.
datafuserInteresting question along the lines of “if you tape some buttered toast to a cats back and drop them which side lands on the ground?”
As everyone knows that buttered toast always lands buttered side down and cats always land on their feet the answer is simple – they will rotate 10cm off the ground until the cat dies or the butter flies off the toast.
Source :- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buttered_cat_paradox
The real answer should be that the F-22 would be able to detect another F-22 radar as it knows the exact algorithms that make the LPI radar a LPI radar and would predictively look in the right bands.
Cheers
PS no toast, cats or tape was harmed in this post..
OK, let’s suppose the Su-35S has an ESM that can detect the F-22’s APG-77 radar at long ranges. What would be tactical implications?
datafuserBelow is part of what Robert Gates said, especially about lack of ISR capabilities.
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4839
” In particular, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are lacking that would allow more allies to be involved and make an impact. The most advanced fighter aircraft are little use if allies do not have the means to identify, process, and strike targets as part of an integrated campaign. To run the air campaign, the NATO air operations center in Italy required a major augmentation of targeting specialists, mainly from the U.S., to do the job – a just in time infusion of personnel that may not always be available in future contingencies. We have the spectacle of an air operations center designed to handle more than 300 sorties a day struggling to launch about 150. Furthermore, the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.
In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between members who specialize in “soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.
Part of this predicament stems from a lack of will, much of it from a lack of resources in an era of austerity. For all but a handful of allies, defense budgets – in absolute terms, as a share of economic output – have been chronically starved for adequate funding for a long time, with the shortfalls compounding on themselves each year. Despite the demands of mission in Afghanistan – the first ‘hot’ ground war fought in NATO history – total European defense spending declined, by one estimate, by nearly 15 percent in the decade following 9/11. Furthermore, rising personnel costs combined with the demands of training and equipping for Afghan deployments has consumed an ever growing share of already meager defense budgets. The result is that investment accounts for future modernization and other capabilities not directly related to Afghanistan are being squeezed out – as we are seeing today over Libya.
I am the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending. However, fiscal, political and demographic realities make this unlikely to happen anytime soon, as even military stalwarts like the U.K have been forced to ratchet back with major cuts to force structure. Today, just five of 28 allies – the U.S., U.K., France, Greece, along with Albania – exceed the agreed 2% of GDP spending on defense.
Regrettably, but realistically, this situation is highly unlikely to change. The relevant challenge for us today, therefore, is no longer the total level of defense spending by allies, but how these limited (and dwindling) resources are allocated and for what priorities. For example, though some smaller NATO members have modestly sized and funded militaries that do not meet the 2 percent threshold, several of these allies have managed to punch well above their weight because of the way they use the resources they have.
In the Libya operation, Norway and Denmark, have provided 12 percent of allied strike aircraft yet have struck about one third of the targets. Belgium and Canada are also making major contributions to the strike mission. These countries have, with their constrained resources, found ways to do the training, buy the equipment, and field the platforms necessary to make a credible military contribution.
These examples are the exceptions. Despite the pressing need to spend more on vital equipment and the right personnel to support ongoing missions – needs that have been evident for the past two decades – too many allies been unwilling to fundamentally change how they set priorities and allocate resources. The non-U.S. NATO members collectively spend more than $300 billion U.S. dollars on defense annually which, if allocated wisely and strategically, could buy a significant amount of usable military capability. Instead, the results are significantly less than the sum of the parts. This has both shortchanged current operations but also bodes ill for ensuring NATO has the key common alliance capabilities of the future.”
datafuserBelow is part of what Robert Gates said, especially about lack of ISR capabilities.
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4839
” In particular, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are lacking that would allow more allies to be involved and make an impact. The most advanced fighter aircraft are little use if allies do not have the means to identify, process, and strike targets as part of an integrated campaign. To run the air campaign, the NATO air operations center in Italy required a major augmentation of targeting specialists, mainly from the U.S., to do the job – a just in time infusion of personnel that may not always be available in future contingencies. We have the spectacle of an air operations center designed to handle more than 300 sorties a day struggling to launch about 150. Furthermore, the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.
In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between members who specialize in “soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.
Part of this predicament stems from a lack of will, much of it from a lack of resources in an era of austerity. For all but a handful of allies, defense budgets – in absolute terms, as a share of economic output – have been chronically starved for adequate funding for a long time, with the shortfalls compounding on themselves each year. Despite the demands of mission in Afghanistan – the first ‘hot’ ground war fought in NATO history – total European defense spending declined, by one estimate, by nearly 15 percent in the decade following 9/11. Furthermore, rising personnel costs combined with the demands of training and equipping for Afghan deployments has consumed an ever growing share of already meager defense budgets. The result is that investment accounts for future modernization and other capabilities not directly related to Afghanistan are being squeezed out – as we are seeing today over Libya.
I am the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending. However, fiscal, political and demographic realities make this unlikely to happen anytime soon, as even military stalwarts like the U.K have been forced to ratchet back with major cuts to force structure. Today, just five of 28 allies – the U.S., U.K., France, Greece, along with Albania – exceed the agreed 2% of GDP spending on defense.
Regrettably, but realistically, this situation is highly unlikely to change. The relevant challenge for us today, therefore, is no longer the total level of defense spending by allies, but how these limited (and dwindling) resources are allocated and for what priorities. For example, though some smaller NATO members have modestly sized and funded militaries that do not meet the 2 percent threshold, several of these allies have managed to punch well above their weight because of the way they use the resources they have.
In the Libya operation, Norway and Denmark, have provided 12 percent of allied strike aircraft yet have struck about one third of the targets. Belgium and Canada are also making major contributions to the strike mission. These countries have, with their constrained resources, found ways to do the training, buy the equipment, and field the platforms necessary to make a credible military contribution.
These examples are the exceptions. Despite the pressing need to spend more on vital equipment and the right personnel to support ongoing missions – needs that have been evident for the past two decades – too many allies been unwilling to fundamentally change how they set priorities and allocate resources. The non-U.S. NATO members collectively spend more than $300 billion U.S. dollars on defense annually which, if allocated wisely and strategically, could buy a significant amount of usable military capability. Instead, the results are significantly less than the sum of the parts. This has both shortchanged current operations but also bodes ill for ensuring NATO has the key common alliance capabilities of the future.”
datafuserIn terms of 1978 they may have been speaking of 1m² as “low signature”. I can’t tell, but there may be edge alignment and RAM involved.
Perhaps “low signature” in this context may mean the B3LA would emit very little RF energy?
datafuserand was relevant enough that it was published as a positive feature in a public domain journal….
to an extent you have to ask the older contributors amongst us, when they remember reading about radar reduction features…
also what is the darker shading on the airframe supposed to denote? composites?
This is an attack aircraft that looks like a Hawk is it?
The darker shading denotes composites. The B3LA was supposed to be a Hawk-sized two-seat light attack/trainer powered by a non-afterburning RB199 or F404.
datafuserI’ve attached a link to an archive with many Standard Aircraft Characteristics sheets, including one for the F-104C. If you look at Page 6, upper right hand corner, you will see a climb performance chart. What the chart shows for the Starfighter is climb to 35,000 feet at Mach 0.925, acceleration to Mach 2.0 at 35,000 feet, then continuing climb to a sustained ceiling of about 58,000 feet. Looking over at the “Speed” chart in the lower left corner of the same page, it shows that the F-104C could still sustain Mach 2.0 at this altitude. The curve in the upper left of the “Climb” chart shows F-104C climb performance in a “zoom” climb initiated at Mach 2.0 and 58,000 feet. Maximum vertical climb rate would be achieved at about 73,000 feet with a rate of climb of about 36,000 feet/minute. At this point in the zoom climb, referring back to the “Speed” chart, tha F-104C would still be cooking along nicely at about Mach 1.45. Not too bad if you want to swat someone flying higher than you in the face with a SARH missile….
The climb rates for the F-104S might be expected to be a bit lower due to the weight and drag penalty of the two AIM-7E missiles, but again the J79-PW-19 engine will offset this to a large degree. Also, the F-104S had a higher top speed of Mach 2.2. If you remember the formula for kinetic energy from high school physics, since kinetic energy is proportional to the square of velocity, this would have the effect of imparting somewhat higher zoom performance and more kinetic energy to the missile at launch, which will translate into higher altitude and greater maneuverability after motor burnout. So the performance numbers support that a F-104S should be capable of doing its part to conduct a successful intercept of a Foxbat-type target at Mach 2.5 and 75,000 feet. The other variables that remain to be considered are ability to maintain proper intercept geometry, radar tracking ability, and the missile iteself, in this case the baseline AIM-7E (as opposed to the AIM-7E2 “dogfight” version developed as a result of USAF and USN expereicnces in Vietnam).
http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F-104C_Starfighter_SAC_-_8_December_1958.pdf
Thanks a lot for your detailed analysis.
From what you wrote based on the Standard Aircraft Characteristics chart, it looks like the F-104S could be capable of flying high enough to touch a Foxbat-type target at Mach 2.5 and 75,000 feet.
However, as to the effectiveness of its weapon system, Commander Adrian Orchard of the Royal Navy who flew the Sea Harrier FRS1/FA2, AV-8B Harrier II, F/A-18C/D Hornet, F/A-18F Super Hornet & Harrier GR7 from 1990 to 2009, wrote an interesting anecdote about the duel between the SHAR FRS1 and F-104S in the 1990’s.
Below is what he wrote in the January 2011 AFM.
“The radar on the Starfighter was so poor they rarely attempted to utilise their AIM-7 Sparrow semi-active missile – easily defeated by use of manoeuvre and simple chaff programmes – relying on a ‘hit and run’ style using the more reliable AIM-9L in the head sector.”
I don’t know whether he is talking about the AIM-7E or Aspide, but it gives me an impression that the radar/missile combination could have been the weakest link.
datafuserBut then it’s not an F-104S anymore.
Yes it would have been a ‘modernized’ F-104S.
datafuserThe Mirage 2K has more SA than the F-104S. Even though the Zipper could technically fly higher and faster it wouldn’t necessarily be able to line up for a shot. Plus it takes special fusing to hit such a high speed target. The French missiles supported the necessary fusing from the get-go.
So with a better radar and more modern missiles, it can be doable for the F-104S?
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