The next question is what does the Aussie navy do now?

Party! :diablo:

I’m with the bigger tanker. Note that even “small fighters” in the U.S. military will need more fuel to top-off than in the past. Super Hornet E has over 14k of gas vs a legacy Hornets 10k or so (not counting drop tanks).

JSF USN will be doing close to 20k of gas. Where USAF tankers support a lot of USN carrier ops.

JSF CTOL will be doing around 18k of gas which is still way more than an F-16 with drop tanks.

JSF STOVL vs. Harrier etc etc…

Plus I’ll take more palleted cargo and personnel if given a choice.

I would have been happy with either as I was more afraid the decision would get delayed again, however the Northrop/EADS deal should give USAF/U.S. military some extra airlift/tanking ability that will be welcome.

It all sounds good. Just remember that using the jets on-board radar to do things like this means that you will be limited by the band that that radar is in: Usually X band. This is probably OK for most of the stuff that will kill you. Lower band radars like S band etc won’t be affected. This is why the G Growler is pressing ahead as an EA-6 replacement and of course why there is a need for the B-52 SOJ ability so as to have a wider band electronic attack ability.

Here is some interesting reading:

The combination of all these modes (radar, communications jamming) on a GaAs radar is also possible. In the US, trials have been performed using the Northrop Grumman APG-77 radar on the F-22 and the Raytheon APG-79 on the F/A-18E/F Block 2. However, local media reports have highlighted the limits of what can be achieved. First-generation APG-77s reached their temperature limits already in radar mode. This problem seems to have been resolved on more recent versions, but in jamming mode the APG-77 cannot transmit for more than one second without damaging the radar. Also, experts have commented that jamming is effective over a frequency band that is too narrow to effectively counter all airborne threats.

Dupont, Jean. “Radar revolution: the arrival of gallium nitride components opens up new applications for radars, including jamming and telecommunications.(DEFENCE)”, Interavia Business & Technology, June 22, 2007.

An uprated GE Super Hornet was an unfunded idea of GE, where if it is still up on their website (been awhile), they stated that an upgrade could either increase the thrust a bit at reduced reliability or stay with the same thrust rating and increase reliability and lower support costs. Telling a USN PowerPoint warrior that you can lower support costs on an upgrade spiral would make their eyes light up. The article below also hints at an either/or for GE improvements.

Also too, GAO found that the power output wasn’t all that great given the design of the jet ( intakes ) and weight of the jet. Those engines might do 22k on a test stand at sea level… but…

Some years ago PW pitched an engine for the Super, trying to cash in on an alternate engine gravy train sales job.. It didn’t take. The obvious that it would cost money in an already thin budget and the real obvious: Drop in engine or not, goof up the logistics system where USN doesn’t want to manage two engine types for a carrier jet. I mean what would you do? Assign GEs to certain carriers and PWs to others? Etc….

The sales pitch on the PW motor for Super claimed everything of course: More thrust, more fuel economy etc….

If one really wanted to make a Block III Super Hornet awesome they would redesign the POS wing the jet has. Thats what happens when you don’t prototype something and try and slide one by Congress.

Paul Lewis, USN urged to re-engine F/A-18E/F, Flight International, April 24, 2001

The PW7000 would use the combustor, high-pressure turbine and compressor from the commercial PW6000 along with a scaled low-pressure turbine and fan from the JSF119 engine. The engine is sized as a F414 drop-in replacement, with a 5:1 bypass ratio and up to 25% more thrust. P&W claims it would extend F/A-18E/F range by 31%, increase acceleration by 27% and boost meantime between overhaul to 1,000h.

Full article here:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2001/04/24/129128/usn-urged-to-re-engine-fa-18ef.html

Although never done, you can fly a E without the conformal tanks. (one of the depot test pilots favorite rides is the big motor E without conformals).. One of the Korea demos was without conformals and the big motors. An animal. So with a K, SG whatever, you can get better performance with no conformals attached compared to any C.

However no one is likely to do that at an operational squadron.

Here though a Super Hornet will never be an air domination jet. Especially a family model…And yes Block II avionics are awesome and adding ALE-55 is a huge leap over ALE-50…. but no real dash speed gives you a nice strike jet with some defensive fangs to deal with.

Here is some fun reading from Bill Sweetman.

-Bill Sweetman, Just How Super is the F/A-18E/F?, Interavia Business & Technology, April 1, 2000-

-The Navy and Boeing have intensified a propaganda campaign. Unfortunately, the campaign is likely to damage their credibility in the long term, because it focuses on a few basic statements which don’t mean anything like as much as the casual reader is meant to think.

For example: “The airplane meets all its key performance parameters.” This is true. In 1998 — as it became clear that the Super Hornet was slower, and less agile at transonic speeds than the C/D — the Navy issued an “administrative clarification” which declared that speed, acceleration and sustained turn rate were not, and had never been, Key Performance Parameters (KPP) for the Super Hornet. Apparently, some misguided people thought that those were important attributes for a fighter.-

-Bill Sweetman, Watch Your Six Maverick, Interavia Business & Technology, February 1, 2000-

-The Navy’s operational evaluation (Opeval) of the Super Hornet ended in November, and the report is expected late in February. It will probably find the Super Hornet to be operationally effective and suitable, because the impact of any other recommendation would be devastating, but the Navy will have to do some deft manoeuvring to avoid charges that the report is a whitewash.-

-Bill Sweetman, Super Hornet gathers speed, but critics keep pressure on, Interavia Business & Technology, March 1, 1999-

-The Pentagon has conceded that the MiG-29 and Su-27 can out-accelerate and out-turn all variants of the F/A-18 in most operating regimes, and that the E/F in turn cannot stay up with the older C/D through much of the envelope.

Navy data from early 1996 (published in a General Accounting Office report) showed that the new aircraft was expected to have a lower thrust-to-weight ratio than the late-production (Lot XIX) F/A-18C/D with the General Electric F404-GE-402 engine. Its maximum speed in a typical air-to-air configuration would be Mach 1.6, versus Mach 1.8 for the smaller aircraft. In the heart of the air-combat envelope, between 15,000 and 20,000 feet and at transonic speed, the Lot XIX aircraft would hold a specific excess power (Ps) of 300 ft/sec out to Mach 1.2, while its larger descendant could not hold the same Ps above Mach 1.0.-

it’s not the first B-2 that has been lost. In the Broken Arrow movie the B-1 as they call it in the movie was actualy a b-2 😀

After that… pilot screening excluded Scientology people. 😀

Well, this should be interesting….

18 Feb 2008
MIN8/08

REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY

The Minister for Defence, the Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP, today announced the structure and details of the new Government’s promised review into the adequacy of current planning for Australia’s Air Combat Capability to 2045.

“This review will provide the Government with a timely opportunity to assess the strengths of our current plans and inform consideration of our future air combat capability in the context of the new Defence White Paper”, Mr Fitzgibbon said.

The review will be conducted in two stages. The first stage will assess:

A) Australia’s Air Combat Capability requirements in the period 2010 to 2015;

B) the feasibility of retaining the F-111 aircraft in service beyond 2010;

C) a comparative analysis of aircraft available to fill any gap that may be left by the withdrawal of the F-111; and

D) the status of plans to acquire the F/A-18 Super Hornet.

The second stage of the review will consider trends in Asia-Pacific air power until 2045 and the relative capabilities of current and projected fourth and fifth generation combat aircraft such as the Joint Strike Fighter. The review will also examine the case for and against acquiring the F-22. Public submissions will be called for in regard to stage two.

The review team will also consider industry issues relevant to the development of Australia’s future air combat capability.

The review will be led by a senior Defence civilian, Mr Neil Orme, First Assistant Secretary Policy Development. In addition to its Defence membership, the steering group will comprise senior executives from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation

“I have asked the review team to provide its report by the end of April 2008 in order that its findings can be considered by Government and incorporated into the development of the Defence White Paper”, Mr Fitzgibbon said.

An unclassified executive summary will be publicly released after Government has considered the classified report.

Process for public submissions:

The review welcomes submissions for stage two of up to 10,000 words from interested groups and individuals. The deadline for submissions is Friday 28 March 2008. Submissions should be made through [email]ACC.Review@defence.gov.au[/email]

The Terms of Reference are attached.

Media contacts:

Christian Taubenschlag (Joel Fitzgibbon): 02 6277 7800 or 0438 595 567

Defence Media Liaison: 02 6265 3343 or 0408 498 664

Review of the Adequacy of Extant Plans for the Development of Australia’s Air Combat Capability to 2045

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Review Lead

Mr Neil Orme, First Assistant Secretary Policy Development, Department of Defence.

Scope of the Review

The review team will report in two parts.

Part A

1. The review team will report on:

a. Australia’s Air Combat Capability requirements in the period 2010 to 2015;

b. the feasibility of retaining the F-111 aircraft in service beyond 2010;

c. a comparative analysis of aircraft available to fill any gap that may be left by withdrawal of the F-111; and

d. the status of plans to acquire the F/A-18 Super Hornet.

Part B

2. The review team will report on:

a. trends in Asia-Pacific air power until 2045;

b. the relative capabilities of current and projected 4th and 5th generation combat aircraft;

c. the relative capabilities of Australia’s current and planned air combat systems in light of (a) and (b), identifying key risks;

d. the cost and budgetary implications of planned air combat acquisitions;

e. the status of plans to acquire the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the status of the JSF project, including:

i) the implications of the F/A-18 Super Hornet acquisition for the planned JSF acquisition;

ii) options to achieve an all-JSF fleet should that prove desirable, including advice on the optimum numbers of aircraft in the context of the overall air combat system; and

iii) an assessment of complementary options, including unmanned aerial combat vehicles;

f. the case for and against acquiring the F-22;

g. The robustness of the plans for transition from the current F-111/F/A-18 fleets to the future fleets, including;

i) weapons systems;

ii) personnel; and

iii) enabling systems and infrastructure; and

h. industry issues relevant to the development of Australia’s air combat capability, both in the manufacturing and sustainment domains.

3. The review team will seek and consider public submissions on Part B of this review.

4. The review team will also provide:

a. an unclassified executive summary of the report (to be delivered following Government consideration of the classified report); and

b. a report on the public submissions made to the review (to be annexed to both the classified and public versions of the report).

Steering Group

Mr Mike Pezzullo, Deputy Secretary (Defence) (Chair);

Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Chief of Air Force;

Vice Admiral Matt Tripovich, Chief Capability Development Group;

Dr Steve Gumley, Chief Executive Officer Defence Materiel Organisation;

Dr Roger Lough, Chief Defence Scientist;

Mr Duncan Lewis, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet;

Mr David Tune, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Treasury; and

Mr Paul Grimes, Deputy Secretary, Department of Finance and Deregulation.

Timing

The full report is to be submitted to the Minister for Defence by 30 April 2008.