PrimateBut even so it can be wise to pay attention to holdover times and such.
PrimateI haven’t studied these prints very closely myself, but the radar track corresponds with the planned route, according to an RNoAF official.
News article (in Norwegian):
PrimateThat’s OK, I didn’t see it as such. I just think it’s best for all of us to avoid speculation. A humble theory or two about possible causes might not be too harmful as long as we’re aware that it might not reflect the truth correctly and that the accident can be connected to a number of factors which may be unknown to us at this time, but I feel it’s better to be very careful and await the investigation with respect and patience.
PrimateCFIT is one of those things that as a pilot you learn about it, and you hear stories, but it still surprises you that it ever happens….you just find yourself thinking “Well, I’d never do that.”
Of course when an experienced crew can make a mistake you also find yourself thinking “Wow…how do I avoid making that same mistake?”
It’s a sad reminder that aviation is always dangerous no matter how modern the aircraft or experienced the crew…
I fully agree on what you’re saying, but I want to point out that no causal factors have been officially identified.
PrimateThe thought process is completely wrong, and it is completely wrong because too many pilots don’t think but blindly follow numbers. “Oh, thats too high, I need to reduce it” and visa versa. No thought of “why is that too high?”
I think you seem a bit judgemental based on how you think it works.
Depending on a number of situational factors such as the nature of the problem itself, the phase of the flight, the weather etc., one doesn’t always have the time and margins to think long and hard about problems when flying an aircraft.
A general example: Detection, identification, confirmation, conduct of by heart items and completion/follow-up using the QRH can form the initial steps taken to resolve an issue occurring during flight.
This might seem mechanical to you, but given e.g. sufficient training and mental resources, this way of doing things can have the desired quality of being more resilient to stress. The long-term memory plays an important part here. The process of trying to analyse and understand a problem can easily be more vulnerable.
Maybe there’s time and opportunity for a deeper problem analysis, discussion with the other crewmember and/or people on the ground etc. after the flight crew has attempted (and hopefully succeeded) to contain an immediate threat (if possible/relevant) and things have calmed down.
Also, perhaps the industry has a potential for improvement when it comes to preparing flight crews for dealing with problems outside the scope of existing SOP. As far as I know, this is a known issue.
PrimateWell spoken, Deano. I also had the coffin corner in mind, but I need to dust off some of my knowledge.
If pilots fail to react as they should in a given situation what else can be at fault except training?
An interesting and perhaps difficult question. SOP for the aircraft and/or the company is also an item which can form a slice in Reason’s swiss cheese model, for instance. Human factors can be a complex issue.
Amiga500,
I thought that you might be an engineer of some sort. You also claim that you have some pilot experience. The apparent fact that you at first didn’t seem to know a basic principle of VFR flying (using visual references outside the aircraft) makes me a bit puzzled, though.
Yep – with the implicit assumption what is ahead of you is the same ground height as what is to the side.
In my experience, it is of course easier to use the outside horizon as a reference when the surrounding terrain is flat, but it’s also fully possible (and often more fun) to fly VFR in e.g. mountainous areas. As I’ve been taught – if the outside horizon is “cluttered” by mountains and such, try to make it out yourself.
You seem to have a way of being very sure about things. Don’t you think a little humility would do you some good?
As I gather more and more experience and knowledge (or try to, anyway), one important thing I realise maybe more and more is that there is so much I don’t know.
PrimateIf you can accurately judge your attitude from the real horizon… then yes, I suppose there is no need for it.
In my experience, during normal VFR flying in a SEP plane, you rely primarily on the position of the upper edge of the instrument panel, windshield/canopy rails etc. in relation to the outside horizon in order to set the correct attitude for level flight, climbing turns and so on. Provided there is an AH installed it is often convenient for cross-checking the attitude. A key behaviour for VFR flying is to look outside the aircraft at almost all times, scanning the horizon, the surrounding airspace and the ground/surface.
If your instruments start playing up – AH and throttle. Thats it. Give yourself time to diagnose and work-around the problems. Till then – don’t make things worse by making half-assed guesses and focussing on items of secondary concern.
Depending on which instruments are failing. And yes, I’ve heard experienced pilots say things like “sit on your hands” and such.
EGTC mentions altitude for air traffic – yep. But thats not gonna kill you unless someone else crashes into you. Also, if your in an air traffic zone and they can track you – you have a completely independent source for ground speed and altitude.
ATS units which employ SSR rely on altitude-reporting transponders or pilot reports via radio for altitude information about flights being tracked, as far as I know. The transponders themselves use STD pressure as a reference datum and may have an error margin of up to +/- 300 feet (varies), if I remember correctly. A functioning altimeter is very handy even if a failure won’t necessarily ruin the day immediately.
PrimateYou still need to know your altitude when flying VFR, especially when transiting through an ATZ, conversing with air traffic control, flying in the circuit, complying with the rules of the air regarding to height above specific obstacles etc.
Yes, of course. I was trying to follow Amiga500’s focus on some basic things as he/she tried to isolate them from the whole picture for the sake of this debate.
Primate‘Cos under VFR if, you can see you are not going to hit the ground, the altimeter is superfluous. You don’t need to know your altitude as long as you know you aren’t gonna hit the ground anytime soon. Nice-to-know and need-to-know.
I include the AH to prevent you trying to climb too quick and stalling. That is something you need-to-know.
Still no need (strictly speaking) for an artificial horizon when flying VFR. You seem to be making a contradiction here as far as VFR flying is concerned.
In a repeat of AF447 – when you cannot trust the readings of instruments, and you know your stall margin is preciously small due to altitude. The objective should be retaining control of the aircraft, everything else is second to that. Altitude, airspeed, heading – all secondary considerations.
(…)
From 35,000 ft that is over 15 minutes of descent time to get yourself sorted out (at -2deg).
Regaining control – yes. Stall recovery procedures may involve using airspeed readings once the initial attitude and power setting for recovery have been established, though (at least the ones I’ve done in smaller airplanes). Also, regardless of attitude (more or less), other factors such as vertical winds can affect the ROD.
I’ve read a little about some of the findings from the investigation so far. It seems strange at first glance, but at the same time I think it’s important to respect the possibility of other items in the causal chain which may be difficult to identify properly. I doubt that the flight crew went to work that day with the intention of doing a poor job. Some of e.g. Sidney Dekker’s work might be of relevance here.
PrimateAmiga500,
I think you are simplifying things a bit.
In the very basic frame of getting from A to B while airborne in OK weather, you can manage to a certain degree with control and indications of attitude, power setting and aircraft configuration. It seems as if you’re trying to apply this simple frame to explain how the AF447 flight crew should have been able to make a successful recovery (if that was the issue). I think that by doing that you risk missing a number of other factors which should be considered.
I think Deano’s answer to you has a few key points about reality as it can be, where a number things must be taken into account. I find your rejection of those points as “blind protection of pilots” to be utterly absurd.
To discuss your frame:
For daytime VFR you can even do fine without an artificial horizon and a compass (I don’t understand why you included the AH while excluding the altimeter). In a glider you can also do fine without engine thrust. I would however never fly even a glider without an ASI and an altimeter (and a VSI).
Again, flying attitude can be challenging if the turbulence is heavy enough.
PrimateLeaving aside the rest as blind protection of pilots.
I think this is a wee bit absurd. Deano has made a some relevant points which I think many pilots would agree with. Even if you do know something about e.g. FADEC (I have no problem admitting that I can learn a lot more about that topic), you seem to lack a certain understanding of cockpit work, potential threats, human factors etc.
If pilots are taught to rely on a pitot tube for primary flight, then the training is awful.
What?
May I ask about your professional background?
PrimateAgreed. I don’t know much about that particular accident, but I do know that keeping “the damn thing” straight and level can be quite difficult given enough turbulence, for instance.
PrimateThe CPL element is missing from the training, as is alot of the solo work.
Maybe, I don’t know all the details. I think the MPL students I know do much of the same as they would in the SEP phases of an integrated CPL/IR(A) programme, but I’m not quite sure.
Not based on how fat your wallet is
Agreed. Personally I have a thing for state FTOs which may rely on military screening of prospective students. Not too many of those around today, though.
PrimateWhen you see the market flooded with 70hr MPL pilots then I will start to worry.
I agree with most of what you’ve written in your post, but I’m not too sure about this one. I’m conscious about my own lack of experience and realise that I have my limitations and much to learn, but some things (especially signals coming from some airlines) tell me that there is more to proficiency and quality experience than hours logged.
I’m not familiar with the general state of MPL(A) training worldwide, however I have trained besides a number of such students. In the same way as us CPL(A) people, they also do their SEP phases, grab their PPL(A) and buzz around with stick and rudder for a while, including some aerobatics. I guess the way things are done might vary between different FTOs.
Also, to my knowledge, some companies which employ MPL pilots are quite pleased with the performance of their direct entry pilots/cadets. One example I can think of is City Airline in Sweden. I think Norwegian Air Shuttle is also working on something.
PrimateFlying on a partial panel (e.g. with a malfunctioning artificial horizon) is part of the training for an instrument rating. Coping with a total and concurrent loss of all instrumentation (i.e. all pitot-static systems, electrical power and gyro suction) however, is not. But how likely is that situation?
I don’t yet know how things are done when it comes to various type rating courses or company OPCs, though.
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