If memory serves me correctly Dowding was in receipt of Ultra decrypts during the Battle of Britain, these with many other factors helped shape fighter commands strategy for the Battle.
The early work on the German enigma ciphers had been carried out by code breakers in Poland prior to the German invasion in 1939, this pioneering work was destined to be continued at Bletchley Park.
A point you should remember is that versions of the Enigma coding machine were in use by all branches of German armed forces, not just the navy!
It’s been quite a while since I’ve read any books about Ultra, so I can’t be precise but, I don’t think it was of any major importance at that time.
IIRC, the BofB period was at the beginning of the decrypt successes. There was no guarantee the signals could be read in time to be of any use, rather than later in the war when there was a steady flow of intelligence from Ultra.
The naval signals in particular were more of a problem as the Kreigsmarine Enigma machines had an extra encoding wheel.
The contribution of the Poles was hugely important. They were the first to acquire a complete Enigma and copy it. Without referring to various books, I can’t remember now how far they got with decrypting the signals before Poland was overrun.
I’ve just re-read your original post while waiting for the forum to refresh. Is it me or is it REALLY SLOW tonight?
In my personal opinion, the biggest blunder the Luftwaffe (Goering) made was switching from attacking the airfields to cities. Although they (he) didn’t know, it was on the verge of bringing Fighter Command to its knees.
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