That is what is meant by “the B-29 was “too late” for European war”.
If I may be allowed to throw something into the put here – I think I can shed some light on the first B-29 to visit Europe…. to quote myself:
As a result of superhuman efforts on the part of all concerned, 150 B-29s had been handed over to the 20th Bomber Command by 15 April 1944. Such was the urgency that the aircraft left Kansas with spare engines and a kit of spare parts in each of their bomb-bays.
First away, flying 41-36963, was Col Frank Cook, the former production engineering officer at Wright Field. Colonel Harman was next; he taxied his YB-29 to the end of the concrete ribbon at Salina, and took off for the wars. With the coming of April, more and more Superfortresses departed for the battle zones – four or five B-29s every dawn. Before each aircraft left, an engineering officer signed a statement saying the work ordered on this aircraft had been completed satisfactorily.
Colonel Frank Cook’s flight plan from Salina took him non-stop to Miami. Taking off at night, under secret orders, Colonel Cook flew south for one hour over the Atlantic, then he changed course and flew north, while still over the sea, on to Newfoundland. From there ‘963’ flew non-stop at twenty thousand feet to a base in the UK. All this was according to plan. The appearance was supposedly to allow 8th Air Force Technical and Tactical staff to evalulate the machine, but in reality it was an attempt to mislead German Intelligence into believing that the B-29 was to be based in the UK. For the next two weeks, one thousand citizens, persons with vital war roles, inspected ‘963 at both Glatton and Knettishall. It was a feint and it worked, for at no time did enemy aircraft seek out and interfere with the ‘air train’ of Superfortresses which was to follow Colonel Harman across the Atlantic to Africa and on into India. Colonel Harman landed his Superfortress on the hot, dusty runway of his India base on 2 April. More B-29s were to follow him.
Thanks…. that gets me two years closer
For what it’s worth, I published published Rearsby Recalled, and was still in touch with Les Leetham up until a short while ago – he lives/lived less that 2 straight miles from me. I seem to remember that there is a lot of Auster info in the Leicester County Archives.
Looks to me sort of like a M14A Hawk Trainer Coupe – G-AJRT looked similar to these picts, but with cut-down canopies and rear decking for racing.
To answer some of the earlier points raised, Walker in the 104 got airborne at 1502 GMT (08:02 local – I think) At 1526 he was vectored to the B-170 formation and flew with then for an hour before the collision. This apparent long time was possible because this F-104N was a ‘long range’ version as we shall see.
The Lear Jet remained with the disintegrating formation for approximately two minutes after the collision. As far as I can tell, all the images of the accident were taken from the Lear. The radio transcript shows this:
0929:40 -601 (COTTON): Tell that Learjet to get out of here. Zeke, tell the Learjet to please get out of here.
0929:56 989: RAPCON, nine eight nine.
RAPCON: Nine eight nine, say again,
989: Requesting vector for the base and ah, get the Learjet out also.
At one stage I considered including this in the book, but space and the very technical nature of the report decided against it. In the past I have seen some pretty wild speculation about all of this – some of the items cleared or otherwise are of particular interest and may relate to later speculation or 3rd party reporting seen here or elsewhere.
I hope the length of these posts cause no offence, but it is virtually impossible to edit them down any smaller. Perhaps I should’ve made this into an article for Flypast?
As part of the investigation all pertinent records, logs and documents relating to the F-10N were studied to see if maintenance or inspection inadequacies caused or contributed to the accident. This section of the report describes in detail exactly WHAT the NASA F-104N was – it also describes the maintenance state, which I record here without comment.
B. Pertinent Airframe Data:
F-104 N-LO, Serial Number NASA 813, (Lockheed #4058) was delivered to the NASA Flight Research Center (FRC) on 22 October 1966 with 4:45 hours on the airframe. This aircraft was never assigned a USAF serial number. This aircraft was basically the F-104G with the weapons system removed, additional fuel tanks installed in the gun and ammunition hays, and the MH-97 autopilot and LN-3 navigational system installed. The last periodic inspection (#3) was completed on 2 May 1966 with airframe time of 601.4 hours. Periodic inspections were accomplished under contract by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The last flight of this aircraft was the 409th since delivery and the airframe had accumulated a total of 627.7 hours. There were 22 aircraft technical orders not complied with, which are listed under TAB K, A 25 hourly post flight was due prior to last take-off, and aircraft was flown on a red dash status symbol.
C. Pertinent Engine Data:
The J-79-GE-11A engine, Serial Number 411-722, had accumulated a total of 227.8 hours. Last installation was accomplished on 2 May 1966 with 26,3 hours accrued since installation. Prior to this installation a 200 hour periodic inspection was accomplished. Periodic inspection was accomplished under contract by the General Electric Company. There were ten engine technical orders not complied with, which are listed under TAB K.
D. Pertinent Discrepancy History:
1. Uncleared Discrepancies (AFTO Form 781)
a. Date discovered -31 May 1966
When in NAV mode of autopilot, aircraft oscillates in roll about plus and minus 5 degrees. Symbol – red diagonal.
b. Date discovered – 3 June 1966
Drag chute deployment is overdue. Symbol • red dash.
c. Date discovered – 6 June 1966
Request flight check of OMNI – NAV equipment. Unable to fully check out system on ground with present test equipment. Symbol – red dash.
d. Date discovered – 7 June 1966
25-hour post flight due. Symbol – red dash.
e. Mr. J. A. Walker had signed the exceptional release on the AFFTO .
form 781, Part II, prior to the flight on 8 June 1966.
2. Cleared Discrepancies.
a. Date discovered – 22 April 1965
Pilot complained of extreme sensitivity in pitch axis during high “Q” condition. Error indicated in scheduling from air data computer. To compensate for this condition, the pitch rate pot on the AFSC computer has been set to a lower value. Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective Action – 25 May 1965, Reset pitch auto gain in ADC computer Mach Channel, made full ground operation O.K.
b. Date discovered – 22 April 1965
Both R/H elevator protective cable covering worn from rubbing. Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective Action – 7 May 1965
New cables installed.
c. Date discovered -19 April 1965
Pitch attitude signal from LN-3 jerky particularly in turns. Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective Action – 26 May 1965
Repaired pitch motor and shaft in LN-3 adapter in LAB. Made drift run operation O.K.
NOTE: ‘A functional check flight, IAW T.O. 1-1-300 was accomplished to complete the 2rd periodic inspection on 27 May 1965, and was signed off O.K. by J.A. Walker.
d. Date discovered – 26 August 1965
Pitch oscillations occurred at 550K, 2800 feet, inducing +6 and -5G on aircraft. Dampers engaged and autopilot off at time of incident. Was flying in wake of another aircraft at the time. It is believed that wake turbulence activated kicker causing pitch oscillation. 1000 lbs. internal – empty tips. Symbol – red X.
Corrective action – 22 September 1965
C/W WO #30, change stabilizer actuator servo and re-rigged, and 500-hour post-flight inspection.
e. Date discovered – 26 August 1965.
Structure post-flight inspection required for above condition (see Item d) per T.O. 1F-104G-3. Symbol – red X.
Corrective action – 20 September 1965
C/W WO #30 (See Item d).
f. Date discovered – 30 September 1965
1-1-300 check flight due flap rig, aileron, rudder and stabilizer servo replaced and rigged. Symbol – red dash.
Corrective action – 30 September 1965
O.K. – J. A. Walker.
g. Date discovered – 30 September 1965
Autopilot roll bias to right approximately 1/2 magnitude as to left previously. Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective action – 31 January 1966
Fabricated and installed a bias compensation box per W.O.
F-104N-813-0-37 and sketch 1691.
h. Date discovered – 30 September 1965
Excess yaw damper cycling after fuel load comes down to 4000#
Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective action – 30 September 1965
Bled yaw damper thoroughly.
i. Date discovered – 3 November 1965
Aborted take-off at 170-180 KIAS due to what was felt as lack of proper longitudinal control power. At this point had in full aft stick and the rose was barely starting to rotate. Symbol -Red X.
Corrective action – 3 November 1965
(1) Made airspeed check
(2) Wheels rotated
(3) Checked flaps
(4) Operated flight system hydraulically for full throws
(5) Nose wheel height O.K.
(6) Hydraulic system bled
j. Date discovered – 3 November 1965
Request flight check for nose wheel lift off problem (See Item i)
Symbol – red dash.
Corrective action – no date.
Took weight off nose gear at 150 KIAS, rotated at 180 KIAS and was airborne at 195 KIAS. All seemed quite normal.
NOTE: Same pilot flew aircraft for corrective action in item j, that wrote discrepancy in item i.
k. Date discovered – 2 December 1965
ARC light illuminated after electrical outage after start.
APC ground check O.K., but light still on. Suspect, indicating system. Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective action – 7 December 1965
Replaced No. 2 and 3 APC relays, ground check O.K. OK J.A. Walker.
l. Date discovered – 11 January 1966
Oxygen regulator feeds oxygen with selector on normal on ground.
Symbol. – Red X
Corrective action – 12 January 1966
Replaced regulator and tested with MH2 Testor.
m. Date discovered – 7 Dec 1965
Inertial platform drifts continuously 1 mile in 2 seconds with heading on north. NAV MODE. Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective action – 27 January 1966
Changed the LN-3 computer and ran biasing checks and stationary inertial run and shuler run.
n. Date discovered – 10 December 1965
INFO: Due to the above squawk (see item M) it is requested, auto-pilot be kept in standby until LN-3 system is changed (LN-3 computer). Symbol – red diagonal.
Corrective action – 27 January 1966
Above squawk has been corrected and the autopilot may now be used in the normal manner.
What a fascinating sight!
WHat a wonderful job done by all!
I have looked at the site you provided the link for, and referred back to the Primary Source Documentation records I have.
Of the transcripts, the first from the FAA entitled ‘Edwards Rapcon’ presented by William C Cable, Facility Operations Officer. It covers a timeframe from 1622 to 1635 hours GMT. Walker was operating as ‘NASA 813’, and the accident happened at 1626. At no point is there ANY reference here of any turbulance from anyone.
The second transcript is From the Flight Test Project Tape; against there is no reference to any form of turbulance.
The third transcript is the Air/Ground Communications and Interphone recording. This starts at 0908:24 and goes through to 0932:15 and is Pacific time. Again, no reference to any form of turbulance.
The fourth set of transcripts come from the FBI and detail three sets of fragments of tape recovered from the aircraft wreckage and sent to the FBI in Washington. From what was recovered, again no turbulance references.
I also have this:
FAA CHRONOLOGICAL SUMM
ARY OF FLIGHT
1416 GMT Air Force 20207, a North American B-70 departed Edwards AFB on a local VFR flight plan to perform a flight test mission and return to Edwards AFB.
1418 GMT Air Force 20207 was radar-identified 8 miles north of Edwards VOR; flight following and traffic information were provided throughout the remainder of the flights The initial portion of the flight the aircraft remained in the area near the airport and performed airspeed calibration runs over the airport.
1502 GMT NASA 813, on F-104, departed Edwards AFB on a local VFR flight plan to perform a mission with the B-70 and return to Edwards AFB.
1504 GMT Air Force 20207 departed the airport area to make a supersonic flight from a point approximately 30 miles northeast of Daggett VORTAC to 25 miles southwest of Edwards AFB at Flight Level 310.
1510 GMT NASA 813 was radar-identified 6 miles east of Mojave, California and requested a radar vector to the B-70.
1520 GMT Air Force 20207 completed the supersonic portion of the test flight and proceeded toward Mojave, California to rendezvous with several other aircraft for a photography mission.
1526 GMT NASA 813 was radar-vectored to the B-70 formation and was instructed to resume normal navigation.
1627 GMT An unidentified voice on the B-70 flight test frequency reported a mid air. Further conversation on the frequency verified that the B-70 had been involved in a mid-air collision with NASA 813.
As you can see, there is no reference to a NASA tracking station ‘Beatty’. Also, I would question the comment “that he opposed this mission as it was to dangerous & had no scientific value.” Whilst that is correct about the latter stage of the XB0-70 flight which was purely for General Electric promotional purposes, the main part of the XB-70 flight was a supersonic run over sound measuring equipment as part of the tests for the American SST programme.
I cannot comment with any degree of certainty about anything that appears on any ‘Area 51’ website. All I will say again is that nothing of this nature appears on any Primary Source Documents I have.
Army Air Forces ‘Report Of Major Accident YB-49 42-102368 near Muroc AFB 5 June 1948’
Keith passed away earlier this year. I remember him as a regular at the British Aircraft Preservation Council Meetings around the country.
I know how many here love the Daily Mail – so I’ll post a link here to his obituary.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1371339/Keith-Fordyce-host-Ready-Steady-Go-dies-aged-83.html
if you dont like that one… try the Independent:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/keith-fordyce-unflappable-host-of-lsquoready-steady-gorsquo-2255628.html
2. Found this picture from the accident area of the tail of the F-104N. Plz note that the left stab area shows minimum damage to the upper/lower surfaces.
Err…. not according to my records or the images taken at the time of the accident. The image you show is of one of the rocket-assisted 104s. Walker’s F-104N was not so equipped and had the letters ‘NASA’ on a stripe and the numbers 813 on the vertical very similar to post #12.
I have provided what I regard as the pertinent radio logs for the topic under discussion – of course there are more, but they are from before and after the impact.
a recreation of Manchester’s The Haçienda nightclub
complete with Es I suppose?
If the Science Museum (did any ever fly for UK airlines?) can keep a Connie, why not a 707 with UK engines?
Yeah – BOAC operated a number – Euravia and a number of independants did as well.
Some of the ad was also filmed at Old Warden…. and as far as I am aware there was never a Rapide that wore ‘Imperial Airways’ titles!
But yeah, overall it’s a good, very atmospheric ad!
As regards to the sequence of events, after the book went to press – as always happens – I received copy of the Structures Report relating to the accident as prepared by Lt Col Ray C Gordon Jnr of the Material Factors Group.
This report, as far as I can tell, definitively describes the sequence of events as uncovered.
1. The F-104 aircraft, left horizontal stabilizer tip upper surface contacted the XB-70 wing folding tip at the outboard aft end. The wing tip light fairing on the XB-70 failed in an upward direction, the leading edge of the XB-70 wing honeycomb and leading edge extrusion adjacent to the wing tip also failed in an upward direction.
2. The F-104 left wing contacted the XB-70 right wing folding tip leading edge approximately 30 inches inboard of the F-104 wing tip, and cut through the upper surface of the F-104 aileron near the inboard end. The F-104 wing moving upward through the XB-70 wing crushed and tore upward the steel honeycomb. Deposits of F-104 wing paint were found on the lower surface face sheet of the XB-70 wing folding tip. The F-104 left hand wing tip tank contacted the XB-70 leading edge forward of the hole cut into the XB-70 wing. The forward portion of the tip tank tore off, bending inboard and upward with respect to the F-104 airplane. This portion then separated and struck the leading edge of the F-104 wing and the leading edge of the F-104 vertical. The remainder of the F-104 left tip tank moved up through the XB-70 leading edge full depth honeycomb panel, rolled and moved aft embedding several portions of the lower F-104 tip tank to wing seal strip in the honeycomb at the aft end of the hole torn in the XB-70 wing.
3. The F-104 empennage contacted the XB-70 right hand movable vertical at approximately mid-span, the upper portion of the XB-70 movable vertical failed in twisting motion and bending aft. The F-104 right hand aft portion of the horizontal stabilizer was bent downward. A piece of steel honeycomb and attached face sheet of the XB-70 vertical and a portion of the F-104 right hand stabilizer skin was jammed into the aft face of the stabilizer main span. There was also a small piece of steel honeycomb jammed into the aft portion of the centerline rib of the F-104 horizontal stabilizer and another piece jammed into the outboard left hand tip section of the horizontal stabilizer. The left hand horizontal stabilizer was separated approximately twenty inches outboard of the F-104 centerline. The entire F-104 empennage failed in an upward and forward motion with a left to right motion.
4. The upper left side of the F-104 fuselage behind the cockpit section struck the leading edge of the left hand XB-70 movable vertical approximately at the hinge line failing it from right to left with respect to the hinge point. The F-104 cockpit and radome nose section struck the upper surface of the left hand inboard wing of the XB-70 just outboard of the left hand vertical and slid across and aft on the wing surface at approximately a 30° angle to the eleven hinge line. Deposits of paint, their relative Spacing, along with depression on the upper surface of the XB-70 wing match the left side of the F-104 fuselage and windshield mold line. This contact crushed and tore through the honeycomb panel of the upper cover in the XB-70 left wing. There was a two foot long crease in the XB-70 left hand wing upper surface perpendicular to the other marks and extended forward and outboard ending in a corner tear and cut in the aft inboard corner of the wing folding tip hinge inboard fairing door number 533. The XB-70 forward inboard upper corner of the first eleven just outboard of the wing fold hinge line was flattened and had F-104 paint deposits.
5. The upper honeycomb panel of the XB-70 left wing in the area of fuselage station 2084 was locally crushed and torn through, starting at the wing-to-fuselage stub joint extending outboard approximately five feet.
From the description of the damage to the XB-70 wing as stated in Paragraphs 4 and 5, I suspect that it would have been impossible to lower the wings from the moment the F-104N hit.
Ehm, does that make it “Vampire Bytes”?
Just in time for Halloween!
(I’ll get me coat!)