I had come across the comment about using the wing-tips to keep the aircraft stable when I was researching the book – however, a series of reasons stopped me from including it.

Please allow me to try and explain. Firstly, it was post-event speculation, secondly I was unable to check the accuracy of the statement and thirdly, I am no aerodynamicist or pilot to say it if was possible or not. I looked as what was available in Primary Source Documentation and what was available from those directly involved, hence the location of the crash reports and Reports from Colonel Al White.

The ‘Wing Tip Fold Switch’ – in fact called the ‘Wing Tip Position Selector Switch’ – and indeed, the entire wing folding procedure is covered in detail in the Aircraft’s Flight Manual.
Obviously, for take-off the wings are set ‘level’, but once established in the cruise there was a specific item in the checklist for wing folding.

Wing tips 1/2 at Mach 0.95 or 400 knots ISA whichever is lower. Wing tip fold mode switch check NORMAL. NOTE – do not use ALTR to lower the wing tips. Note a slight nose-up trim change occurs when the tips are lowered.*

In an earlier report on the aircraft handling, Colonel Al White went into specific detail on what occurred when the tips were moved:
The main difficulty in flying the XB-70 was caused by a combination of characteristics in the lateral-directional sense. These characteristics were: First, that the period of the short-period oscillation was very long as compared to most other airplanes, secondly, the side force per degree of sideslip was low in this airplane. This combination made it difficult for the pilot to sense inadvertent sideslips. In addition to those characteristics, the airplane had a marked positive dihedral effect (particularly #2 A/V) and it had excessive adverse yaw due to ailerons.
Considering these four characteristics together, if an inadvertent side-slip occurred without the pilot’s knowledge (who was busy with other system operations), the airplane rolled due to the dihedral effect. Instinctive reaction of the pilot was to counteract the roll with aileron; however, the aileron input increased the sideslip because of the high adverse yaw due to aileron. This increased sideslip caused more roll away from the aileron input and aggravated the situation. The solution was that the pilot had to fly the sideslip or yaw indicator religiously throughout the flight regime. This general characteristic of the XB-70 was most predominant with the wing tips up. Cooper Rating of 4.5.
Placing the wingtips in the one-half position reduced the tendency for the situation explained in the previous paragraph, because lowering the wing-tips reduced the roll power by approximately 50%, therefore reducing yaw due to aileron. In addition, the tips down configuration reduced the positive dihedral effect. Cooper Rating of 4.0.

We must then go to the radio log to get the timings for the sequence of events. AV2 is the XB-70:
09:26:06 RAPCON: Two zero seven, he’s off your left wing now ah, below the clouds.
AV 2 (White): Roger, thank you.
RAPCON: The B-58’s speed run is now one five miles east of your position westbound three zero zero or above.
AV 2 (White): I have him, thank you.
09:26:26 ??: At this time there was one carrier burst followed by a longer carrier, of one second maximum duration, sounding like a live microphone in an open cockpit.
09:26:28 ??: There were two or more carriers on the frequency with resultant signal clash, followed by
#601 (Hoag): Mid-air, mid-air, stand by for—
#601 (Cotton): You got the verticals, this is Cotton, you got the verticals—came off left and right. We’re staying with ya, no sweat, now you’re holding good, Al.

It was at this point when the NASA F-104 collided with the XB-70. The first contact was with the left horizontal stabilizer and the canted right wingtip of the XB-70. The F-104 then pitched up, rolled to the left, and hit the right leading edge of the XB-70’s wing. The F-104 continued its roll inverted into the XB-70’s top right vertical stabilizer and took the top off the left vertical stabilizer. The F-104 was cut just aft of the cockpit, its nose hit the XB-70’s left wing, and the fuselage of the F-104 went streaking aft in flames.

09:26:40 #601 (Hoag): Joe Walker ran into him and I think he’s had it.
(Cotton): The B-70 went upside down, it’s rolling now, the left wing—
#601 (Hoag): Bailout, bailout, bailout—
#601 (Cotton): Bailout, bailout, bailout.
09:27:09 #601 (Cotton): OK, the B-70 is spinning to the right—
#601 (Hoag): Something came out, it looks like—
#601 (Cotton): Looks like a capsule came out. It’s spinning to the right, the nose is slightly down.
09:27:23 #601 (Hoag): No chute—
#601 (Cotton): . . . see no chute yet. The main gear is down, the nose gear is up.
09:27:28 #601 (Hoag): Chute, chute, good chute.

After the incident Colonel White described what happened from his perspective:
“I heard a good loud thump – an explosion – and I heard somebody yell ‘Mid-air’ But with all that length and mass behind me, I didn’t know it was us. My immediate impression was that two other planes had collided. Even when I heard Cotton call about a vertical being gone, I still wasn’t sure it was us. If I had heard the plural. I’d have understood.”
“The airplane yawed abruptly and very violently to the right. It was so violent I thought the nose would break off. Then it was upside down and nose down, and then right side up and nose up. It did this twice and the second time around a big piece of the left wing broke off.
These were unstabilized rolls and the G forces were fierce. It was probably the Gs that finally tore the wing off after it had been weakened when Walker fell on it. The force on me was violent, throwing me ahead and to the left. I couldn’t move against the Gs. But then it settled into a flat spin. This gave it a more or less fixed axis somewhere back along the fuselage and it was more stable but out of control, of course. Centrifugal force was still shoving me forward, but at least I could move a little.
When it nosed up out of the second tumble, I began trying to encapsulate”

So – that is what happened as far as I can report. At the time of the collision the XB-70’s wings were in the half down position, which was correct for the speed the formation was flying.

I have included a page from the book – and indeed, a page from the Flight Manual – that shows the position of the three wing switches/indicators. Item 20 is the switch in question – the ‘Wing Tip Position Selector Switch’ which was low down on the Captain’s side of the centre panel.

Now even if putting the wings full down would have helped – and of that I am by no means certain – having read the above, I have to wonder if the crew – in particular Col White would have had time or even been able react to do it.

Oh – and yes, the book is no longer called ‘Ride of the Valkyries’!

Just stumbled across this…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kAVDOBWtBuU&feature=related

Having read about the article in this thread I’ve now managed to locate a copy of the magazine.

The author is very clear that he was not inexperienced on the aircraft, but I can’t remember reading where and when he would have gained that experience.

I have it in my mind that Gibson’s Log Book was reproduced a good number of years back – I want to say the mid -1970s. If it’s still available, I would’ve thought that would have explained how experienced or otherwise he was.

It was in a DH 86 that he had his first flight, so he always wanted to see one fly again.

Dave

Mike could be a strange person at times – very multi-faceted. Sometimes he was very open, sometimes very secretive. I remember when he and I took the RAeS Sir Frederick Tymns Memorial Lecture that we put together about Capt Ted Fresson up to the Highlands and Islands of Scotland there was much talk about the ’86 and the associated ‘Project X’ as it was called. Out would come his wallet and the picture of him as a child with his father in front of one of the Air Council Express’ – then he would then suddenly clam up and dissapear, only showing up just as the lecture was about to start!