It is fairly ok (according to LM) in the subsonic region. But accelerating from m 0,8-1,2 takes ~68 seconds for the F35A, the under powered Gripen A/C accelerates (clean) from mach 0,5 to mach 1,15 in 30 seconds. The Typhoon is a bit faster than Gripen A/C and both are more than twice as fast as the F35 in acceleration with light AA load (Gripen E will get 20-25% more thrust than C).

Now, the longer time the chase takes and the slower the missile is the greater impact will kinematics have.

Oh, I surely believe bad in the transsonic regime and okayish in the supersonic regime.

Fancy graphic. I just wonder how an Typhoon achieves double the engagement range compared to a F-35 using the same missile.

Being able to detect a plane does not mean you can target that plane.

And what interest would Russia have in a conflict with those countries sitting (and paying) at the end of all those gas pipelines built? US military presence in Europe will be gone within the next 2 decades or reduced to a purely symbolic capability any way.

OK, I understand. Top-Gun graduates and their real numbers in the period 1969-72 – you are in the same dark like me 😎 I appreciate that you don’t guessing.

Taking a wild guess, we know that each course did take 4 weeks. 9-15 graduates, running over 2-3 years. Say around 240-300 frontline pilots. Which would fit rather well with the notion that every Sqn had at least one graduate by 1972.

I didn’t say the opposite. Never…
If you read-back objectively – my older posts here or on acig – you can see, the basic problem is:
20 years after the collaps of the ‘Wall’, when any kind of data became public about the WP’s pilot-training, weapons, exercises etc. the first reaction is: people are trying to deny the existence of it. Just because that wasn’t public earlier, just because that isn’t fitting perfectly in his previous opinion about that topic…
Just a good sample when I wrote first: ‘500s’ was a widespread unit-level training program. It’s not = ‘Russian Top-Gun’

Back in those days we did not disagree on the existence of “500”, we disagreed on the training level of Western pilots in comparison. A significant part of the 500 training could be described as BFM training, which I still call daily routine for NATO forces by the mid 1970ies, including dissimilar fights. (the typical “bounce” was a daily occurrence – and if I say if you where a kid and taken to the training areas, it was awesome to watch Lightnings / F-4s playing with Jaguars and Starfighters at low level over the forests of Germany)
In the meantime however I got a deeper insight into the unit levle training of the 500s. This was by all means very effective and perfectly tailored to fit the Soviet Union´s tactical doctrine.

With these words it’s a fair statement. But I was talking about Top-Gun graduates only:

Other ‘sources’ say: ” By the time aerial activity over the North resumed, most Navy squadrons had a TOPGUN graduate. “
Do you know any reliable source which gives the real numbers? The number of all Top-Gun graduates by years? At least at the beginning, to 1972?
Or we must to guess by these ‘sources’ and by the words of Top-Gun instructors? >
” April 15, 1972 Air combat resumes in Vietnam with improved results; all but two kills are by Top Gun graduates. “
” First graduate who was under 30′ arrived to Miramar with a class in 1976 only. “

Also: How many US Navy pilots served in 1972? That was a really large force then…

Top-Gun graduate means a pilot who has been trained to a level that allows him to teach the tactics learned at Top Gun to the “Normal” fleet pilots. By 1972 the training schedule for the normal squadrons had changed and reflected lessons and tactics learned and created by Top Gun. This meant that DACT training against A-4s (mostly) was standard pre-deployment training by 1972.

By the way there was no sarcasm about the “500” training. It was a very far reaching and complex training fitted to the Soviet system of air operations. Within the Soviet Unions operational approach it seems to be highly effective. We just disagreed on a hypothetical one vs. one fight without any support of the system. There I stand by my opinion that the average western pilot was better trained to make the most out of his plane. In a WW3 scenario however this would be of minor importance due to the high number of planes in the air.

Soviet pilots had 60 hours mandatory but in practice it wasn’t uncommon for pilots to fly 20 annual. NATO pilots were four times the Soviet standard and there was a penalty – although similar in the Soviet rules yet not used – for them to not fly the mandatory number of hours. Different certs for different planes and duties, but we’re talking combat training AFAIK. Failure to fly washed them out, and having quals in the USAF is prestigious. Not very many officers reach the top of the line without the quals for flying. So in practice, NATO pilots often trained more in a month than their counterparts did in a calendar year.

You might want ot educate yourself on the “500” series of exercises. It was the most demanding and challenging series of air-toair combat training in existence. And every Soviet Pilot had to pass this training. The Soviet pilots were generally superior to any NATO pilot.

The MiG-23 fighter variants got three different wings alone labled from 1-3. The USAF used the ground attack variant the BN from Egypt which had a weak augemented control no longer an issue with the MiG-27 variant a.s.o.
Despite of some experiences with the real thing, like view from the cockpit or pilots workload it was about procedures of a MiG-21 or MiG-23 that were operated in the end. For that purpose it is enough to have some fighters with a similar flying performance, which got the simulated radar data from an AWACS f.e.. None will use real MiG-29s or Su-27s for dissimlar training within the USAF. Just high cost for little gains.

But if you go by the series production, this was the problem of the MiG-23 as a fighter. The first good solution was the MiG-23ML, while the MiG-23 was not handling well, the epxort versions (especially the MS) had old avionics, but even the VVS version put a way too high workload on the pilot. When the ultimate MiG-23 MLD was ready, so was the MiG-29.

And while test reports vary widely (from being better than an F-16A by the Dutch) to being challenged by an F-5 (by the Soviets) to being similar to the Kfir and F-4 (in the manual), user feedback was generally not good. Surely because many pilots transitioned from the nimble MiG-21 (or even MiG-17) to the less nimble MiG-23 which required a completely different approach to air combat (more like the F-104), the overall reception was not too good and was surely not helped by technical problems. Early versions often suffered from cracks in the airframe, so they where often retired early, while the MiG-21 airframe was sturdy.