BUFFALO, N.Y. Officials at the Amherst Systems business unit of Northrop Grumman Corp. delivered a Combat Electromagnetic Environment Simulator (CEESIM) to SAAB AB, Surveillance in Jarfalla, Sweden. CEESIM will perform aircraft testing on the Gripen JAS 39 multirole fighter.
This marks the first international delivery of a CEESIM system with APG technology, officials say.
What is Dassault and Eurofighter using…?
LIMA 2017: MRCA contenders jockey for pole position
https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/lima-2017-mrca-contenders-jockey-pole-position/
Why is not LM in this race with the F-35?
If they are really considering the Rafale and Typhoon, they should IMHO also be able to consider the F-35, which is already in the same price range.
It can’t be because they will avoid US a/c for political reasons because SH seems to be in the race.
So what is the reason?
The Air Force’s first F-35 was delivered in 2011, production is set to last through 2038, and the plane is projected to operate through 2070. This is akin to operating and maintaining a fleet of P-51 Mustangs from 1940 through the opening operations in Afghanistan in 2001. This is the plan, not a byproduct of unforeseen circumstances. Forty years from now, one can imagine a senior Air Force leader pandering a vignette comparable to the one with the B-17 *in Desert Storm, as if we hadn’t planned to use current aircraft through 2060 or beyond.
Previously, we discussed one of Norman Augustine’s laws, which succinctly describes the complexity acquisition death spiral with which large segments of the U.S. military now grapple. Unaffordability predicted by Augustine is driving the U.S. Air Force to make “once in a generation” purchasing decisions that tilt toward overly ambitious and overly complex systems. Two important outcomes from Augustine’s law fuel this self-reinforcing cycle.
First, new acquisition programs are so expensive, time-consuming, and fraught with risk that the Air Force would rather modify existing aircraft to increase performance in certain areas or to enable new missions. If we could channel the thoughts of both Norm Augustine and Yogi Berra, we might say, “New aircraft programs are so rare, customers can’t afford to do one anymore.” The irony is that the customer should have the power to dictate precisely when new programs start, but the prevailing conditions have instead created a broken environment wherein market forces are no longer at work.
Second, modifying existing aircraft for new missions and capabilities inevitably pushes them toward the high end of the mix. They become more complex and expensive, but may lose their performance edge in the narrow slices for which they were originally designed. Further, this complexity may make them less reliable, and legacy platforms no longer in production are much harder to replace in the event of attrition.
https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/rethinking-the-high-low-mix-part-ii-complexitys-death-spiral/
Interesting thoughts — perhaps one counter-argument can be that development of systems like the F-35 is forcing any opponents to go through the same expensive process to catch up (or try to catch up, witness PAK FA and J-20). OTOH 2070 is into the deep future and who knows what will be flying by then! Perhaps some small drones that work together in swarms and cannot be handled easily at all by the traditional fighter jet?
For the foreseable future the F-35 no doubt will be very effective, but after that, who knows?
The Gripen’s AoA limit, as per multiple authentic sources (FG for instance) is 26 deg. In the Region II of the FCS (past 26 deg AoA), the Gripen’s FCS would basically auto-recover the airplane to prevent further departure from controlled flight.
So it’s clear that in normal controlled flight, the Gripen cannot exceed 26 deg AoA. That is part of the care-free handling of the Gripen and all other FBW controlled airplanes.
True, however in “normal flight” Gripen is also limited to 9g; in the article linked to above, it says that the pilot can override the 9g limit and go up to 12g. This is of course not normal, and is normally never done. However this does not mean that the capability is not there.
My question was if something similar was possible also for AOA.
The aircraft is still statically unstable in this region and a non-linear prediction of AOA (alpha-dot) and an increasing feedback is used to recover the a/c. In the last region III, from AOA above 55° (45° on re-entry) or below -25° (-20° on re-entry), the aircraft is statically stable and the basic control law is full feed back, with auto-recovery from out of control.
“an increasing feedback is used to recover the a/c”. What does this mean?
Also note in the other article I linked to it says:
With a pitch stick command to the softstop, the pilot commands load factor to the load factor limit, when the aircraft speed is above corner speed (corner speed is approximately 600 km/h). Below corner speed a pilot command to the soft stop means an angle of attack command to the angle of attack limit. When the control stick is pushed max forward, the pilot commands normal load factor to the negative load factor limit and below corner speed negative angle of attack to the negative angle of attack limit. The maximum stick forward position is -7 degrees. There is a possibility for the pilot to override the soft stop in an emergency situation and pull the control stick back to the hard stop and thus get an extra 3g, when aircraft speed is above 600 km/h. This requires an extra stick force of approximately 135 N.
So below corner speed moving the stick to the soft stop means an angle of attack command to the angle of attack limit. In an emergency situation the soft stop can be overriden and above corner speed this will give an extra 3g (bringing max g to 12); however it does not say what will happen if the pilot overrides the soft stop below the corner speed.
A book written by a Norwegian author (on the F-35) claims that max AOA for Gripen is 50; also an F-16 pilot has said he as been told Gripen can go up to 50. However you are right that official sources do state max AOA is 26 degrees, so probably nothing happens if the pilot moves the stick from softstop to hardstop below corner speed?
Danske Bank (“Danish Bank”) analysts have been in India, and conclude that they believe Saab has a real possibility of sales in India:
Danske Bank is still very optimistic set to Saab’s opportunities in India, after like a year ago have been in the country and investigated the matter, and continue to see upside potential in the share.
It appears from the bank’s customer letter on Tuesday.
This time based conclusions including that the bank has entered Saab’s advisor (“Special Advisor”) in India following an air show.
“We believe that the opportunities for Saab in the country is very positive, with several mega orders on the table and with unusually high probability of Saab to land more orders,” writes Danish, and mentions that Brazil Gripen Order seems to be a strong support for the Swedish defense group in India .
Google translated from: http://www.di.se/nyheter/danske-megaorder-hagrar-for-saab/
Gripen FCS limits
I found this interesting article on the FCS of Gripen:
http://www.icas.org/ICAS_ARCHIVE/ICAS2000/PAPERS/ICA3113.PDF
The high AOA Flight Control Laws (FCL) are divided into three different AOA regions as shown in figure 2.
Region I is the normal flight envelope where the limits depend on external stores, flight condition and fuel weight. All information is automatically sensed and the FCS adjusts the FCL between three different values of AOAlimit and four levels of maximum roll rate. The second region (II) is divided into two separate AOA segments. The segment on the positive side is between the positive AOA limit up to 55°. The segment on the negative side is between the negative AOA limit down to -25°. The aircraft is still statically unstable in this region and a non-linear prediction of AOA (alpha-dot) and an increasing feedback is used to recover the a/c. In the last region III, from AOA above 55° (45° on re-entry) or below -25° (-20° on re-entry), the aircraft is statically stable and the basic control law is full feed back, with auto-recovery from out of control.
What does this actually mean? Is the (positive) AOA limit 26 or 55? Or both?
I found also this:
With a pitch stick command to the softstop, the pilot commands load factor to the load factor limit, when the aircraft speed is above corner speed (corner speed is approximately 600 km/h). Below corner speed a pilot command to the soft stop means an angle of attack command to the angle of attack limit. When the control stick is pushed max forward, the pilot commands normal load factor to the negative load factor limit and below corner speed negative angle of attack to the negative angle of attack limit. The maximum stick forward position is -7 degrees. There is a possibility for the pilot to override the soft stop in an emergency situation and pull the control stick back to the hard stop and thus get an extra 3g, when aircraft speed is above 600 km/h. This requires an extra stick force of approximately 135 N.
An extra 3g that is quite a lot!
The angle of attack limiter is active below corner speed (corner speed is approximately 600 km/h). It will keep the aircraft from going out of control to a high angle of attack situation. For full pitch stick aft to the soft stop the pilot commands angle of attack to the angle of attack limit and for full pitch stick forward, the pilot commands angle of attack to the negative angle of attack limit. The control laws for the angle of attack limiter is similar to the control laws for the load factor limit (see figure 1.4.2).
The JAS 39 Gripen is a 26 degree angle of attack aircraft for the light external store configurations and 20 degrees for the most heavy external store configurations. The variation of angle of attack with roll stick position is used to give roll command priority, when the pilot demands roll rate.
So it seems the “soft stop” AOA is 26 degrees; does this then imply there is a “hard stop” AOA, as there is for the g above corner speed?
Belgium wants a concrete offer of new fighter aircraft from Sweden. Will it be a business buys Belgium 34 plan of the new version of Gripen and the price tag is estimated to be around 40 billion.
Google translated from https://www.svd.se/belgien-spanar-pa-gripen–vill-ha-offert-pa-storaffar/om/naringsliv
Belgium no doubt will go for F-35; the real reason why they are asking Sweden to send an offer is of probably because they want to create some competition for the F-35; Gripen can compete with the F-35 on cost, however the others (in particular Typhoon and Rafale) cannot do so anymore.
Belgium has a close collaboration with the Netherlands on fighter aircraft I believe, so F-35 is no doubt the most likely selection.
That was less the IAF and more the MoD with its ‘Make-in-India’ directives for which the ‘free’ F-16 assembly line was a particularly attractive idea.
That was exactly my point; this is about politics.
Vishnu Som, thanks for posting. It will be interesting to see how this develops.
Do you know anything about the timelines for this process?
You’re looking at this with the benefit of hindsight at a time when the F-35A has achieved IOC, ironed out most development problems and is racking up outstanding performances in training exercises.
This is a relevant point for the original MMRCA but cannot explain why the IAF seems not to be much interested in the F-35 for the “single-engine” fighter, where LM is offering the F-16 not the F-35.
Why is the MoD/IAF considering the F-16 or Gripen instead of ordering more Rafale, Tejas & Su-30s fighters? Why is the Gripen M & SH in contention for the naval order? The MoD operates in weird, mysterious and quite often idiotic ways.
There is some kind of reasoning behind it; the reason why they don’t get more Rafale is because it’s too expensive. The reason why they consider F-16 and Gripen is because they need something that is less expensive than the Rafale, and at the same time can be assembled in India, with some ToT. This is what is callled “politics” (and yes the result is often not very good for the IAF/IN).
Technology is technology – whether its packaged through the F-16, SH or F-35, its content does not necessarily change.
I would think that the technology in the F-16 is actually quite different from what is in the F-35? — I may be wrong of course…
Assembly in contrast is no big deal. LM already has two assembly lines overseas – a third will not materially change the status quo – and would still remain within the bounds of the joint statement signed in Dec 16 that designated India as a Major Defense Partner to “facilitate defense trade and technology sharing with India to a level at par with that of the United States’ closest allies and partners” (sic).
There are a lot of political developments over the last few years that have generally gone under radar. The is one of them. The bigger hurdle to such a sale is actually the Trump administration and the political symbolism of any apparent ‘off-shoring’ of work (which doesn’t actually apply in this case here but there’s a strong constituency for alternative facts nowadays).
I am not sure if assembly is no deal for a country like India
If tech transfer is no big deal, and if assembly is no big deal, why on earth is the IAF not pushing for the F-35A?
The IAF has never expressed any formal interest in the F-35 to date. Tech transfer comes under the purview of the DoD, the State Dept only looks at the political implications of any dealing, and in general the SD’s position has never been a barrier to military deals with India.
Don’t you find it strange that the IAF has never expressed formal interest in the F-35, the by far most advanced and most capable multi-role fighter on the planet? I believe they have not expressed formal interest because they know the politicians will stop such a deal…
Where is the political barrier to a sale to India? Keep in mind, the IN already operates P-8s as its primary ASW aircraft and is ordering Sikorsky S-70s for shipborne ops & looking at MQ-9C drones for maritime patrol. Also the US is providing design assistance for the aircraft carrier in development, will be delivering EMALS & AAG for it as well as E-2Ds for early warning.
The political barrier was in my post above: India wants local assembly and also expects some ToT. Sure, they can get that with e.g. the F-16. But not with the F-35. Of course LM want to sell the F-35 to India. However they can only do this if India is willing to accept US “rules” on the sales of F-35 to a “not-so-close” ally; no assembly and definitely no ToT.
Costs for all variants are dropping though the F-35A is obviously the cheapest. ToT & local MRO options are at least equivalent to that offered with the SH.
Costs are dropping however the B and C remains quite expensive. ToT at least equivalent to that offered with the SH? What is the evidence to that?
You are wrong; F-35 will not be offered — or if it is offered it will not be accepted. F-35 cannot meet requirements in terms of local assembly in India, and in terms of ToT.
Perhaps they do offer the F-35 just to make a point. However as you will see it will not be accepted in spite of being far superior from a technical POV.
‘The F-35 is the only US aircraft that has a viable shot at the contract.
Is it really?
I did not see any announcements that LM has responded to the RFI…
Don’t forget that politics is important, more so than technical specifications.
The government also wants to manufacture these planes in India and tender has asked the original equipment manufacturers to respond to it. It also sought to know at what level of Transfer of Technology (ToT) and deep repair expertise the company is willing to share with India.
That does not sound like F-35 to me… Also, although the F-35A seems to becoming affordable, the question for India will be whether F-35C (not to mention the B!) will become affordable.
Perhaps this is why most news reports suggest that the two front runners are SH and Rafale, with Sea Gripen having a small chance of winning. I think the only thing that could strengthen the chances of Gripen M would be if Gripen won the single-engine contract for the IAF; there will be a lot of commonality and India would not have to build a dedicated assembly line for 57 jets for the Indian Navy, as would be the case if their Navy goes for the SH.
However, deputy defense minister Dr. Tomasz Szatkowski and others have said more than once that the U.S. might not be the ideal partner for cooperative efforts like this.*“Our problem with U.S. industry is that prices are good, but U.S. firms are so large that they are not interested in cooperation,” said Szatkowski at a presentation in December for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Warsaw.
This view may have a major impact on Poland’s next decision for a new fighter aircraft.*The Polish air force has a requirement for 160 modern combat aircraft but currently has only 48 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 aircraft, leaving a requirement for more than 100 new fighters.
*“The size of the requirement makes it a good possibility for some assembly or local manufacturing in Poland,” said a former MND official who spoke to AIN.*“Since there are few possibilities for that kind of industrial participation on programs like the F-35, Poland’s military may decide to look at other options, like the [Saab JAS-39] Gripen.”
http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2017-03-16/poland-rethinks-defense-procurement
I doubt this is going to happen — OTOH Poland does spend quite a lot on defence, and the current government is also very much focused on ToT and job creation, seems that’s why they cancelled the chopper deal?
One alternative to assembling new a/c would be to buy second-hand F-16 and refurbirsh them in Poland.
On verra.