Related to insurances:

Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty and Lloyd’s of London unit Atrium, MH370’s insurers, already paid 300M$

The airline’s insurers – Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty and Lloyd’s of London unit Atrium – have already paid more than $300 million for claims related to the crash. Both companies have issued statements saying the discovery of part of the wreckage has not changed the situation, nor their willingness to pay valid claims

[…]

Currently, tenants of the international Montreal Convention limit liability payments from airlines at $175,000 per passenger regardless of whether the airline is at fault.

300M$ divided per 239 death leads to 1,255M$ paid per person onboard

Source:
Insurance Business of America

EU Increases Black Box Tracking Requirements

The regulations will go into effect by mid-2018, and by the end of that year, airlines will be required to track their aircraft over oceans, a provision added in response to Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. […]
Under the rules, the underwater locators in planes’ black boxes will have to work for 90 days instead of the current 30 days, Bloomberg reported Wednesday.

Source:
Bloomberg.com

Is there a copy of the report accessible online?

Everything is driven by profit, not only aviation!
However, I have just done Boeing 737-800 training at British Airway/Comair training facility in Johannesburg and I can say that they place a HIGH emphasis on safety and CRM to the extent that the airline will commend a pilot for any safety action he/she takes regardless of the cost. For instance a go-around or diversion in poor weather.

Obviously the above Press release is controversial. You are right to emphases that many are standing as real professional and safety is what drive them. Be ensured that it’s not my intention to put the discredit on all (and hence none).

WHat this press release show is that something (at least) is happening and gains a certain momentum. We see some moving forward calling cards for the next round.

QZ8501 as a stepping stone?

I am fed-up. Here is what we had to read today:

t was a mismanaged technical problem by the crew that caused the AirAsia Airbus A320 crash, almost a year ago (28 December 2014), in the Java Sea.

According to Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee’s final report, it was a a tiny soldered electrical connection in the top of the vertical stabilizer, or tail, that caused the triggering of an alarm, which in turn indicated a failure of the rudder movement control system.

The captain then actuated the on/off button to reset the system (Rudder Travel Limiter Units). The alarm stopped, but was set off again shortly after. Three times the pilot performed the same operation, but when the alarm sounded a fourth time, the captain tried something else. He attempted to reset the Flight Augmentation Computer that controls the aircraft, by removing and re-inserting its circuit breaker, however, in so doing, the captain inadvertently disengaged the autopilot, and the automatic stall protection.

At 38,000 feet, the aircraft stalled. For four minutes, inappropriate and contradictory actions (miscommunication) of both pilots, led to the non-recovery of the plane, and the AirAsia A320 crashing at sea.

The report points to shortcomings in the aircraft’s maintenance and lack of crew stall recovery training. The accident claimed the lives of the 162 people on board the A320.

The chain of events clearly show that at each step, a comprehensive analysis of the inherent fault of the design done long ago would have led to a different outcome.

Let’s review it briefly (all sourced from the very easily and understandable KNKT report linked above):
– The design of the rudder trim induces some divergence in case of a problem instead of being auto-centered in safe mode just like with a basic set of springs and pulley.

– You need both computer to center it correctly ( this is why they experienced 1.4deg rudder offset (see the BEA comment at the end of the report).

– While the crew did pull physically the circuit breakers correctly, you still need to reset the overhead connected display indicator manually by pulling them off then pushed back on ( yes, just our cheap Window OS devoid of any logics).

– That very low amount of deviation resulted in a 60deg bank in a very short period of time thanks to the inadequate aerodynamic configuration that is not stable in roll (there was no action from the second Pilot during that time).

– The actual “stick” time of that young pilot was so inadequate for him to be in charge of so many life that he over rolled twice attempting to correct with a 60 deg correction on the right and then on the left (~15deg) (Imagine the situation of panic in the cabin after that – poor souls, it is so horrible to think at it). Last time I checked any F16 pilot with half the flight hours and four time the roll rate can manage better (while having no passengers).

– Once it was clear that his second was not able to handle the situation, the Captain tried to maneuver the plane out of the stall. The Airbus dual and un-linked mini-sticks philosophy led to the deep stall and spin (the young pilot kept pulling full aft canceling the action of his captain thanks to the AVERAGING LAW governing the sticks input – this is total madness by the way and similar to AF447 nearly a decade ago showing clearly that nobody care much at Airbus about previous experiences).

– Once in an unrecoverable situation, both pilots were still acting under the LIMITATION of a flight computer that HAD NO VALID CONTROL LAWS to manage the situation since this flight SITUATION is not FLIGHT TESTED. I fail to understand Airbus logic here.

– The Trim circuit fault rooted from an incident report dated from 1993. No proper action were taken by Airbus to successfully tackle the source of the problem despite the relatively basic complexity of it. Could it be the sign of a deliberate choice to keep an outdated process in the loop only to increase the turnover rate of that part and increased its profitability (see cost/year of a typical CN). I wonder if this is specific to this A320 series. What about the A330 or the A380?!?

[ATTACH=CONFIG]242439[/ATTACH]

– The related maintenance manual is a mess with addition being piled up during the years without any deep rewriting. This imparted IMOHO the maintenance crew to have a deep understanding of what proper actions could have been taken before the event (read it by yourself in the annex, it’s full of loop, redundancies and non-specific instructions). At the age of high turnover in many industrial process (part related), any Technical documentation MUST put the emphasis in having a pedagogical content.

– there are some troubling confusion in the teaching material b/w what is a stall and how you might enter a spin during a stall recovery (you certain don’t need to take roll action to get out of a stall even if you are in a bank turn). Coincidentally, the FAA issued a revision of its “Stall Prevention and Recover Training ” on the 24th of November:

[ATTACH=CONFIG]242450[/ATTACH]

To conclude, AirAsia crash reflects a systemic failure (design, SOP, maintenance and formation) and this ONLY should fill the content of a serious news article. Because the doubts raised today makes air traveling really scary…*

A thought for all the dead and their families. Once again, hundreds of people confident in a system that prized itself for its culture of safety died in an horrible agony after having to endure a 3min long terrifying plunges toward the ocean.

Note:

The above news article is extracted from http://www.aeronewstv.com/ but could have been from CNN or some other major media.
It’s a shame for the industry (and journalism perhaps) that we have to read this!

So yes, as we are reaching Christmas, let’s say that an Airbus should make for a nice toy for any fan of simulation with plenty of buttons to click-on with an automatic death sentence to fear in case the right sequence is not entered correctly…but not so much IMOHO in a real flight where the culture of safety is an integral part of performances.

Source:
FAA

*At least with planes designed by this manufacturer. But given the silence of the ICAO and the trend of outsourcing parts with identical subcontractor, this in effect, tarnish other.

As a side note to the topic handle:

FCTM – Side-stick and takeover Priority Button

When the Pilot Flying (PF) makes an input on the sidestick, an order (an
electrical signal) is sent to the fly-by-wire computer. If the Pilot Not Flying (PNF)
also acts on the stick, then both signals/orders are added.
Therefore, as on any other aircraft type, PF and PNF must not act on their
sidesticks at the same time. If the PNF (or Instructor) needs to take over, the PNF
must press the sidestick takeover pushbutton, and announce: “I have control”.
If a flight crewmember falls on a sidestick, or a mechanical failure leads to a
jammed stick (there is no associate ECAM caution), the “failed” sidestick order is
added to the “non-failed” sidestick order.
In this case, the other not affected flight crewmember must press the sidestick
takeover pushbutton for at least 40 s, in order to deactivate the “failed” sidestick.
A pilot can at any time reactivate a deactivated stick by momentarily pressing the
takeover pushbutton on either stick.
In case of a “SIDE STICK FAULT” ECAM warning, due to an electrical failure,
the affected sidestick order (sent to the computer) is forced to zero. This
automatically deactivates the affected sidestick. This explains why there is no
procedure associated with this warning

Source:
NTSC Final report QZ8501 p79

NTSC Final Report (KNKT)

Points Of Interest:

The aircraft operator advised the KNKT that the flight crew of PK-AXC had not
received the upset recovery training on Airbus A320 training simulator.

Extract from the NTSC regarding the faulty electronic module regulating the rudder travel:

According to the Airbus information, there were three Technical Follow-Ups (TFUs)
regarding the AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1(2) (SYS) problems that were issued
since 1993. TFU No. 27.23.51.004 was opened in 1993 regarding the problem of
fatigue rupture of solder and closed on 1996. The problem found was “fatigue
rupture of soldering” and the improvement made was “new electronic module”.
Another TFU 27.23.00.004 was opened in 2000 with the same problem of “Rupture
of soldering” and closed in 2014 with the improvement of the “Electronic board
process” which was available since 2002. The third TFU (number 27.23.00.007)
“Mechanical stop failure” was opened in January 2015 following this accident.
Airbus informed that the installed RTLU on PK-AXC had been improved with both
Technical Follow-Ups (TFUs).