Russia & CIS Observer / Archive / №4 (23) November 2008 / DEFENSE / Second Su-35 fighter to join flight trials /

The second Su-35 prototype makes its maiden flight from Sukhoi’s production facility in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
Russia’s Sukhoi is speeding up the testing of its new Su-35 multirole fighter – which is one of the company’s major development programs. On October 2, the second Su-35 prototype performed its maiden flight at the company’s production facility in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. According to Sukhoi, the aircraft spent around one hour in the air checking various engine and flight control modes.

The single-seat Su-35 (or Su-27M2) is considered in Russia as a generation 4++ fighter, and combines the proven Su-27 Flanker airframe, more powerful 117S engines and a completely revamped onboard equipment complement, as well as the modernization solution for existing Flankers with some developments for the future T-50 (Russia’s fifth generation fighter).

The no. 1 Su-35 prototype took off for the first time in February of this year. Sukhoi reports that as of the beginning of October, it already had completed more than 40 test missions. According to the company’s representatives, one of the first surprises during the test flights was that the aircraft was able to reach supercruise speed – a distinct feature of the fifth generation aircraft.
Sukhoi believes that with the second prototype, the company will be able to speed up the flight trials, which is to be further expanded with the no. 3 Su-35, being assembled at Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

The Su-35’s flight trials are expected to be finished in 2009, while the first deliveries are planned for 2011. Sukhoi is actively promoting the Su-35 as an intermediate solution for the Russian Air Force before the T-50 is ready for service (which is not earlier than 2015-2017). The marketing efforts also are focused on foreign markets. Sukhoi CEO Mikhail Pogosyan expects to sell up to 200 Su-35 aircraft through 2020.

However, the Su-35 failed to join the Brazilian Air Force’s short list for a tender on 36 new combat aircraft. The Brazilian short-listed aircraft are Boeing’s F-18E/F, the Dassault Rafale and Saab’s Gripen NG. A source from Sukhoi complained to the Russia & CIS Observer that the Brazilian choice was affected by political reasons; while the tender’s offset requirements also were categorized as unrealistic for the Russian side.

Russia & CIS Observer / Archive / №4 (23) November 2008 / DEFENSE / Air farce /

The Russian Air Force didn’t perform well during the conflict in South Ossetia

Konstantin Makienko

With the inability of the Russian Air Force to gain air superiority over the battlefield, the Russian military convoys advancing along narrow mountainous roads were totally exposed to air raids by Georgian aviation.

The role of aviation in armed conflicts increased steadily over the past few decades and culminated in NATO’s Yugoslavia campaign of 1999, which was won exclusively with air strikes. By contrast, the success of Russia’s five-day operation in South Ossetia in August 2008 was secured by the decisive actions of airborne units and ground troops. The Russian Air Force, for its part, performed quite poorly and suffered losses that were too heavy for such a brief campaign. This resulted from both the weakness of the Russian Air Force and the fact that Georgia deployed relatively dense, modern air defenses in the conflict zone.

The general plan of Georgia’s operation in South Ossetia called for a rapid destruction of the Ossetian armed forces and a lightning capture of the republic’s capital city of Tskhinvali — well before the Russian army could have a chance to intervene. It appears that during the night from August 7 to 8, Tbilisi intended to deliver strikes on the positions of the Russian peacekeepers and the South Ossetian army in order to paralyze the chain of command. The next objective was to take Tskhinvali during August 8, install a puppet government chaired by Dmitry Sanakoyev (the former South Ossetian prime minister, appointed by the Georgian president in May 2007 as the head of the South Ossetian Provisional Administrative Entity], and bring residents of Georgian enclaves in the republic onto the streets during pro-Georgia mass rallies.

Tbilisi had a good chance of attaining these goals. Even if Moscow was quick enough to react (which proved to be the case), the build-up of Russian troops would proceed very slowly due to the region’s complex terrain. Indeed, Russian military convoys were filtering into the conflict zone through the narrow Roki Tunnel, so their strength and firepower were increasing at an extremely slow pace. In this situation, the Russian Air Force — with its quick reaction times and powerful strike capability — was to provide immediate support to the surrounded peacekeepers and the weak South Ossetian armed groups. Ideally, Russian aviation should have suppressed the Georgian artillery and multiple-launch rocket system positions before the end of August 8. Another urgent task was to deliver air strikes on the Georgian 4th Infantry Brigade, which was storming Tskhinvali.

Russian aviation attempted to accomplish these objectives, but immediately lost three Sukhoi Su-25 ground-attack aircraft to Georgian anti-air fire. After that, according to eyewitness accounts, there were no Russian aircraft over Tskhinvali on August 8 or the following day — that is, during the most critical period of the conflict. In effect, the Russian military command was forced to bring motor-rifle units into battle from the march, without first gaining superiority in numbers and firepower.

The Georgian troops maintained the tactical initiative on the outskirts of Tskhinvali throughout August 9 and even during August 10. What thwarted the Georgian operation in the end was not the Russian Air Force, but the resistance offered by peacekeepers and lightly armed, poorly organized South Ossetian units that stayed behind to defend the capital. (The main armed forces of South Ossetia were at that time concentrated in the settlement of Java to the north of Tskhinvali). Essentially, the Georgian troops failed to take Tskhinvali because they were not prepared psychologically for severe urban fighting.

The Russian Air Force’s failure to provide efficient fire support to the ground troops was not just due to the surprisingly strong Georgian air defenses, but also because there was no proper interaction between the Russian air and ground forces, and no modern target indication equipment was available. Both these limitations were later mentioned as some of the conflict’s key lessons by Lt. Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, chief of the Russian Armed Forces Directorate of Combat Training and Service of Troops, who had served as a top military commander in Chechnya during the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 campaigns. Most likely, technological inadequacies and insufficient tactical readiness were not the only factors in the poor performance of Russian military aviation. The ineffectual reforms of the Russian armed forces, which saw army aviation transferred under the Air Force command in 2003-2004, must also have played a role.

On the very first day of war, Georgian air defense units shot down up to four Russian warplanes — one Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bomber and three Su-25 ground-attack aircraft (on the photo).

One other deficiency of the Russian Air Force demonstrated during the South Ossetian operation was its inability to gain and sustain air superiority over the battlefield. Russian military convoys advancing along narrow mountainous roads were totally exposed to air raids by Georgian ground-attack aviation. There is no evidence that Russian fighters provided air protection for the ground troops. Numerous reports assert that Georgian Su-25 attacks were countered with the help of tactical air defense assets, i.e. self-propelled AA guns and man-portable air defense systems. The low efficiency of the Georgian air raids can be put down exclusively to inadequate pilot training. That said, Georgian Su-25s continued attempted attacks on the Russian troops even on August 11, the last day of combat actions. It is totally unbelievable that the Russian Air Force was unable to establish air superiority almost to the end of the five-day war, despite the fact that the enemy had no fighter aviation.

In the course of the conflict, the Russian Air Force demonstrated a complete inability to suppress enemy air defenses. To be fair, Russian aviation had never before faced such a task. The Georgian troops had at least one battalion (according to some sources, two battalions) of relatively modern Buk-M1 (SA-11) self-propelled SAM systems, at least two battalions (a total of eight units) of Osa-AK (SA-8B) self-propelled SAM systems, and six to 10 of the upgraded Osa-AKM version. They managed to deploy dense air defenses right in the conflict zone, as well as near the Georgian cities of Gori and Tbilisi. On the very first day of combat action, Georgian air defense units inflicted heavy losses on Russian aviation. They shot down up to four warplanes — one Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bomber and three Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. By the end of the conflict Russia, had lost at least seven warplanes; the figure could exceed 10 if we count the aircraft that returned to base but were damaged beyond repair.

The Georgian air defenses were eventually destroyed by Russian infantry detachments. After the Georgian army’s collapse on August 11-12, the Russian troops seized at least six serviceable Buk-M1 systems and up to five intact examples of the Osa-AK/Osa-AKM. One possible explanation for the Russian Air Force’s failure to suppress Georgian air defense is that its pilots most likely had not been practicing such missions — as this kind of training had proved irrelevant in both Chechen campaigns. On the other hand, the Russian Air Force found itself pitted against much more advanced air defense systems in Georgia (mostly Buk-M1s) than NATO pilots had in Iraq and Yugoslavia (obsolete Kub/Kvadrat (SA-6) and even S-125 (SA-3) SAM systems). Although Georgian anti-aircraft weapons ended up in the hands of Russian infantry, there have been reports indicating that the Russian Air Force did manage to suppress Georgian air defense radar stations by the second half of the day on August 11.

The only operations by Russian aviation during the South Ossetian conflict that could be described as moderately successful were strikes on Georgian military and administrative targets. The damage caused by the air strikes was negligible, but they considerably demoralized the enemy. There is no doubt that political considerations restricted the scale of bombardments. For example, Russia abstained from striking on Tbilisi International Airport, which Georgia was using to receive flights bringing servicemen of the 1st Infantry Brigade from Iraq.

Overall, the operation in South Ossetia highlighted the need for profound modernization of the Russian Air Force. Apart from the procurement of new aircraft (primarily multirole types) and modernization of the existing fleet, the service needs to intensify its combat training, with a special focus on practicing the suppression of enemy air defenses.

🙂

‘BrahMos 2’ research trends:

http://missiles.ru/BRAMOS-2.htm

To ‘V’, or not to ‘V’?

[ATTACH]166767[/ATTACH]

Russia & CIS Observer / Archive / №3 (22) August 2008 / DEFENSE / Sukhoi Su-35 Achieves Supercruise Flight /

Vladimir Karnozov
Russia’s new Sukhoi Su-35 fighter is already showing its high-performance capabilities. This new single-seat aircraft — which combines the proven Su-27 Flanker airframe, 16% more powerful engines and a totally new set of onboard systems — is said to have reached supercruise speed, a distinct feature of fifth-generation fighters.
According to Sukhoi’s strategy, the introduction of its single-seat Su-35 multirole fighter as a “4++” generation of combat jets will help maintain sales of the Flanker aircraft series until an exportable fifth-generation fighter becomes available. The Su-35 also will serve as a platform for testing the onboard systems of is intended next-generation successor.
The importance of this new aircraft in the Russian defense doctrine is so high that on the day after its 55-minute maiden flight in February 2008, the Su-35 prototype was inspected by the country’s President Vladimir Putin and his successor Dmitry Medvedev. Sukhoi test pilot Sergei Bogdan briefed the Kremlin guests on the fighter. He recalls that the first question Vladimir Putin asked was: “Will the fifth generation fighter differ in appearance to this one?” The answer was: “Yes, it will. The fifth generation fighter is to have a totally redesigned airframe, while keeping [the Su-35’s] onboard systems.”

Surplus power

During the test flight at the highest thrust regime without the use of afterburner the Su-35 achieved Mach 1.1 speed and was still accelerating
By late June, the no. 1 flying prototype had completed 13 test missions. These were devoted to assessment of the airplane’s stability and controllability, maneuvering characteristics and powerplant performance. In addition, the operation of onboard systems was closely monitored. Having received a generally positive assessment of the aircraft, Sukhoi sent it into the supersonic regime. On mission 12, the airplane accelerated to Mach 1.2 at medium altitudes (up to 6,000 meters). The next flight went as high as 11,000 meters and reached speeds of Mach 1.3.
Importantly, the airplane demonstrated its ability to maintain supersonic speed at military power (the highest thrust regime without the use of afterburner). Sergei Bogdan selected his words carefully, but did state: “At medium altitudes and with military power, the airplane was making a moderate supersonic speed and still accelerating. In one of the flights, I achieved Mach 1.1, and while the aircraft could accelerate further, I had to slow down because I was approaching the end of our supersonic flight zone.”
Sukhoi continues assessments of the recorded parameters in order to determine whether the airplane had actually attained supercruise. Additionally, the company continues to define altitudes, weights, external and internal loads at which the Su-35 can reach its supercruise performance. A number of additional missions shall be devoted to these assessments.
“The power reserve is clearly seen when the Su-35 is accompanied by a Su-30,” Bogdan says. “During the very first mission, I had the chance to assess how well the Su-35 responds to the throttle. When I was accelerating at combat power, the chase plane’s pilot had to use afterburner from time to time. And still, he was going slower.”
In afterburner, the Su-35 accelerates much faster than the original Flanker. This is due to the increase in engine power at full afterburner from 12,500 to 14,500 kgf. During takeoff, the ground run is shorter, as the pilot is given much more freedom in pulling back on the stick. The onboard computer takes responsibility for preventing tail strike and other unwanted consequences of over-rotation. With smart computer control over critical regimes, the Su-35 can become airborne much faster than legacy fighters, taking full advantage of excessive power and superagility.

“Artificial intellect”
Generally speaking, an “artificial intellect” takes care of everything in the Su-35, easing the pilot’s job. “In the air, the aircraft feels smooth and comfortable, obedient and highly responsive at the same time,” one program designer said. “The computers also care for the airplane’s ‘crisp reaction’ to a pilot’s input. For example, the computer activates the rudder to automatically compensate for any yaw effects that can originate from pilot deflecting the stick sideways for banking with the ailerons. In ‘classic’ airplanes, it is the pilot’s job to compensate for cross-channel influence, a skill he amasses as his flight experience grows.”
Powerful onboard computers significantly improve the Su-35’s responsiveness and reaction time compared to the original Su-27. Experienced pilots flying both the MiG-29 with its mechanical linkage and the “fly-by-wire” Su-27 routinely praise the MiG’s better responsiveness. They also feel a short delay in the Flanker’s response to control inputs. Even when pilots prefer the Su-27 over the MiG, they’d like to eliminate the Su-27’s flight control delays — something that will be a reality on the Su-35. Bogdan claims Sukhoi achieved a real breakthrough in the field of controllability with the Su-30MKI — a follow-on version to the Su-27. Most of the new algorithms for the successor Su-35 were successfully evaluated on the Su-30MKI. The Su-35 builds on the Su-30MKI’s experience, and goes even further in the area of computer-aided flight controls. In part, this improvement is due to the use of an all-new system for the measurement of airborne parameters, employing latest technology.
The newest Sukhoi jet does not have canards, reducing the drag generated by these forward fuselage-mounted control surfaces (which are used on the Su-30). However, canards do provide improved performance and controllability at high angles of attack. Since the size of the wing remains the same, removing the canards from the Su-35 results in a smaller total area for the horizontal surfaces. However, by reworking the airframe for lower weights (with the use of more composites, for example), removing the canards and deleting the aircraft’s large upper air brake along with the activators, Sukhoi designers managed to reduce Su-35’s structural weight to that of the original Su-27. Choosing a more classic layout for the Su-35, its designers were also driven by the super cruise considerations.

Controlling the thrust
Sukhoi designers have no doubts that thrust vector control is a must for modern fighters
What the Su-30MKI and the Su-35 do share is their thrust vector control. Sukhoi has no doubts that thrust vector control is a must for modern fighters. With the Su-30MKI now operational in India, the Su-30MKM in Malaysia and the Su-30MKA in Algeria, vectored thrust has now earned its place in the history of supersonic combat aircraft.
Sukhoi pilot Sergei Bogdan underscores the benefits of vectored thrust at slow speeds. “We can fly slow, keeping a high angular speed during a bank. Inertial forces try to increase the angle of attack when the airplane rotates with the ailerons, but we use vectored thrust to create a compensating force generating a pitch-down motion,” he explains. “Thereby we keep the angle of attack under control. In the end, the airplane remains controllable in a much wider flight envelope. Besides, it can demonstrate faster angular speed in bank.”
Thrust vector control provides a maneuvering advantage in air combat, with the pilot having the ability to get the enemy in sight faster than its opponent to shoot first. Bogdan acknowledges, however, that air-to-air combat is more and more rare, leading to some skepticism within military circles about the value of investing in thrust vector control.
Admittedly, thrust vectoring is not completely useful at low speeds. A small nozzle deflection helps in supersonic flight as well and it also can provide stand-by control functions in case of failure with the primary flight controls.
For air combat involving long-range missile engagements, the Su-35’s high climb and acceleration rates, plus super cruise regime, modern missiles and extended-range electronically-scanned radar are considered as clear advantages for the new Russian-developed fighter. The aircraft’s Irbis-E radar, developed by the V.V. Tikhomirov Scientific-Research Institute of Instrument Design (NIIP), is a follow-on to the Su-30MKI’s N-011M Bars radar.
By combining “something old, something new,” Sukhoi hopes to be able to offer the Russian military and overseas customers a highly capable combat jet with good “out of the box” reliability from its entry into service.

Q: What does an original Su-27 (reliably) weigh?