I wouldn’t bother. Basically it was a series of extracts from Beamont’s autobiographical accounts, tarted-up with some dodgy sound effects and acting. The comedy voices for two Prime Ministers were just stupid – bit like Spitting Image but without the puppets or the humour.

It didn’t include any “facts” as such, nor did it explain why the programme was cancelled. It was just a dramatic account of how the aircraft was assembled at Boscombe Down, flown and then cancelled – supposedly with no warning and for no plausible reason. That really was it – nothing more. I guess Radio 4 plays are not the place to delve into technicalities or politics but you have to wonder what the point of it was.

I had a small (very small) hope that maybe the writer had got some direct accounts which would give some insight into the story but there was nothing. It was simply extracts from books (some of them verbatim) which were mixed-up until they made little sense, and with no conclusion or explanation. The way it was portrayed it sounded as if the whole project was just some whimsical “wish list” from the Air Ministry which was the victim of two Prime Ministers who were portrayed as idiots. Silly really and pointless. Sad thing is that it wasn’t even funny!

He might well be right – that’s the only book I haven’t managed to track-down so I couldn’t say whether it’s good, bad or indifferent!

Yes indeed, thanks very much for finding the article and posting it for us all to read. It’s very interesting, if only to confirm that the story didn’t have much “meat” to it, and that it was merely a rather bizarre enquiry from some slightly crazed member of the “Conservative Aviation Committee” (whatever or whoever that is)!

The article makes brilliant reading though, if only for the hilarity of the muddled (if not plain bonkers) statements made by the author. For example, he seems to have completely failed to realise that the aircraft was already effectively in production (Weybridge were busily churning-out the pre-production batch). He then fails to grasp that the Olympus derivative which was unique to TSR2 would have to be re-developed and tested. Next, he claims that TSR2’s role was (and should still be) “carrying the nuclear deterrent to targets East of Moscow” – really? Then he really drifts-off into fantasy by claiming that TSR2 would make a good interceptor, presumably in preference to the Tornado ADV which was only three years away. The funniest line (and perhaps the most ironic) is where he claims that the US has “nothing in its (TSR2) class” … One assumes that Dennis Healey would disagree?!

Brilliant stuff. He seems to have made the assumption that a bunch of engineers could pop-over to Cosford with a tape measure, run back to Warton and assemble a fleet of TSR2’s over a couple of years. Even more remarkable is that there’s no obvious reason why anyone would want to do it, even if it had been remotely possible.

I’ll certainly make sure that the tale is mentioned in my TSR2 book if only for sheer amusement!

I think perhaps there’s a plausible case for roasting the chestnut properly, rather than merely toasting it repeatedly on just one side 😉

It’s back to what I said earlier. The TSR2’s cancellation did (in some ways) signal the end of British aviation industry, but only because of a co-incidence of timing and policy. It wasn’t the TSR2’s fault, it was just that the project was the catalyst. Likewise, as you’ve pointed-out, it wasn’t as if the industry was killed-of as such, it was just finally brought back to reality. As is so often the case with Britain, we were punching above our weight. In many respects, I guess the main effect was on Weybridge which dropped out of the military aircraft business and ultimately disappeared.

Aerodynamic performance-wise it was undoubtedly a success and on the basis if the limited test programme it looked as if it would easily meet (or surpass) all of the requirements which had been set. It was the aircraft’s systems which looked like being the problem, especially things like processing power which was already a headache even at the point of cancellation. It seemed inevitable that significant upgrades and improvements would be needed at some stage, and of course this would have opened-up another endless series of cost increases.

Fundamentally, too much was asked of the aircraft for the time in history at which it was developed. It’s true that most authors (including Beamont) have billed the aircraft as being “beyond compare” but this is unrealistic. There wasn’t much to choose between TSR2 and the F-111 in actual fact, and I think the real gripe was just that we could have produced an all-British machine which was just as good if not better. I’m sure we could have too, but at what cost?

Ultimately, the RAF got a TSR2 in the shape of Tornado which is in effect the same aircraft with a shorter range, but with AAR it’s much the same. Okay, it took another 12 years to enter service but by the time it did, the Tornado had the advantage of later systems and software technology and a much more practical production programme which wasn’t financially out of control.

So although the TSR2 story was certainly an example of great potential being wasted, it’s slightly unfair that the RAF is always portrayed as being the victim, when in actual fact they were not. When the Buccaneer was delivered the RAF was really no worse-off for the loss of TSR2 and had the RAF received TSR2 then Tornado would never have been developed and the RAF would probably be flying American-manufactured F-15E’s by now. One of the many problems in the TSR2’s story was that by the time the aircraft was approaching the production stage, it started to look as if it wasn’t the most suitable aircraft any longer – as Roy Jenkins intimated.

It’s a fascinating story though, but not quite the one which keeps getting churned-out again and again.