A dead program, died a long, long time ago.
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1980/1980%20-%202059.html

Flight tests were sucessfully carried in 1987 then the wall came crumbling down, and sudenly the Exocet was more than good enough.

Thanks.

From Wiki:

Franco-German ANS/ANF

What’s that?

Datapoint on the 117 Engine for PAK-FA

Source?

I’m not as sure about that, because one would probably also need a more powerful (and consequently more expensive) radar.

Or better passive detection of enemies using ground-based systems or advanced RWR, or active VHF ground-based systems.

Well here (AN/ALR-94, and AN/ASQ-239 are far more than detection systems):

[I]”BAE Systems’ AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda system is derived from the F-22 Raptor’s AN/ALR-94 EW suite and provides Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and high sensitivity electronic surveillance capabilities, full-spectrum situational awareness and multi-spectral missile countermeasures. According to certain sources, the Barracuda offers precise geo-location and targeting of potential hostile emitters, without the need for triangulation .and thus other networked aircraft. The Barracuda is also integrated with Northrop Grumman’s Communications, Navigation and Intelligence (CNI) suite data links for real-time data sharing as well as the APG-8.1 AESA radar, which is reported to have RF surveillance and jamming, in addition to cyberwarfare capabilities.

The technology refresh program is reported to be connected to the hardware modules only and will not affect the countermeasures systems and antenna arrays. The enhancements are reported to be introduced with aircraft belonging to Low Rate Initial Production 7, based on Block 3 baseline software and capabilities. To be applied to all F-35 versions belonging to American and international customers, work is expected to be completed by March 2018.

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Presidential budget request, however, provides a deeper knowledge of F-35 EW suite, specifically the expandable countermeasures equipping the stealth aircraft. The description for air expandable countermeasures request by US Navy groups together “all unique countermeasures that provide self-protection for the JSF, specifically ALE-70, MJU-68, MJU-69 and CCU-168”. While contracts for specifically tailored MJU-68/69 flares and CCU-168 impulse cartridge have already been assigned to BAE Systems for the F-35, the Department of Defence for the first time unveils the existence of the ALE-70 expandable countermeasure. According to collected data on the same system, the ALE-70 is reported to be an RF towed decoy. In the latter case, the FOTD is to be driven by a technique generator on board the F-35, which could imply the use of an RF jammer”
[/I]http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Aircraft+self-protection+against+sophistication.-a0363687470

I’ll let others debunk the rest of your post with the exception of this:

exactly how many aircraft with AESA capable of jamming enemy radar do you think are in service right now? Hint, there’s not one typhoon with an AESA flying, and perhaps 2-3 rafale.[/QUOTE]
The latest article from that same source describes it as just an RWR. I’ve seen other sources confuse it with the DAS FWIW.

March 2010
http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/19/Electronic-Warfare-Australias-mixed-record

April 2012
http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/217/Electronic-Warfare

The AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda is based on the F-22 Raptor’s AN/ALR-94 suite, but is reportedly many times more sensitive than previous generations of RWR. The ten sets of RF antennae are distributed on the both wing leading and trailing edges and rear edges of the horizontal tail surfaces of the aircraft to collectively provide forward and aft Band 2,3,4 coverage. These locations provide excellent, almost spherical, spatial coverage allowing detection and geolocation of threats. Public data about this system is limited.

I can’t find anything about the cyberwarfare capabilities for the APG-81. ISR goes hand-in-hand with the cyberwarfare, since it essentially uses the same process except for transmitting valid information to friendlies.

A TRD isn’t really an expandable countermeasure in the sense I’m talking about, it’s expensive and less are carried. I was thinking more about something like BriteCloud.
http://www.selex-es.com/-/britecloudlaunch

Flares are useless against modern IIR seekers.

More than one isn’t unique and, as mentioned, the F-35 isn’t in service yet, Rafale is and Typhoon will have that capability, plus wider cyberwarfare capabilities for interfering with data-links (comms, GPS, missile INS guidance etc.) and passive RF detection systems by the time the F-35 enters service (2016).
http://www.armada.ch/aircraft-self-protection-sophistication/

I do not think that there has been much in the way of confirmation that the F-22 can use its radar in jam mode. And just to remind FBW and the other fans, the JSF is not operational.

Also, the ALR-94 was certainly hot stuff in its day in terms of ESM-like capability, and the ASQ-239 is also (no doubt) capable, the ROW has not been idle since the -239 spec was written.

I believe the -239 uses interferometry (sources state high accuracy without triangulation), like SPECTRA and Tranche 3 DASS, the -94 I’m not so sure, the 2deg accuracy stated on wiki suggests it doesn’t but who knows.

By all accounts the radar was intermittently broadcasting throughout the night. If the F-117 was carrying a decent RWR & datalinks then it would have marked the source and it would be avoided by all.

This is what I am talking about re: SA. The JSF carries a very robust ESM package and a LPI/Directional datalink which gives it the ability to share tracks and develop a precise location of all detected transmitters safely, long before they are in range.

Not if you’re up against an enemy with overlapping radar coverage and a variety of passive detection methods (e.g. Roke Manor anti-stealth system etc.):
http://tech.mit.edu/V121/N63/Stealth.63f.html
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2003-10-19/super-radar-done-dirt-cheap
http://www.cassidian.com/en_US/web/guest/Passive%20radar%20from%20CASSIDIAN%20remains%20invisible

I assume the other side has similar tech.

Here is the source where the pilot, Dale Zelko, talks about that night and the events that led up to , during, and after the shootdown.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JjbnyNGz4j8

Nice link, I’ll listen when I get time.

Its a somewhat risky strategy that Lukos…runways can be swept of submunitions within tens of minutes and small cratering repairs little longer. Digging up a runway means carving up the runway sub-base…its foundations…effectively. Knocking out air operations isnt the work of a couple of weapons with a sprinkling of bomblets. Its the work of a brigade targeting runway intersections, taxiways and aprons. One weapon from such an attack series going off course slightly, and I’m sure Russian weapons do just as much as everyone elses, hitting a residential block full of NATO personnel on a declared air-policing task and we have an immediate casus belli. Not very clever…unless the idea is deliberately to escalate into direct conflict.

I was assuming the conflict had already escalated, following on from previous page. Other warhead options include 700kg HE and EMP. Strike time 3-5 minutes. It’s my theory that in a theoretical escalated conflict, the Russian approach wouldn’t be to fight for air superiority, but rather prevent its use by platform elimination using long range missiles.

No aircraft is invisible to radar, the F-117 is optimised to work in a high threat environment but it isn’t impervious to risk. No he didn’t aim for the sky and an F-117 was just there. He worked his system effectively, used the data fed from the P-18 and then got lucky. The F-117 has had a hugely successful career, one shoot down under rather unique circumstances is not a sign of a failure in the system itself.

At 8nm an F-117 is not invisible to radar. That is the range that the aircraft was engaged by an Sa-3 battery, the second missile hit. During Desert Storm the L band 1022L radar on Royal Navy Type 42 destroyers were tracking the F-117A at over 150 miles out as they progressed down their strike corridors.

That doesn’t really sound like a hugely successful career. The enemies were hardly ‘top notch’ peer adversaries by any measure and the fact that last gen destroyers were seeing these things 150 miles away (if that’s true) is even more worrying for stealth aircraft. More accurate to say it had a very short career with limited success. No F-111Fs were lost in Desert Storm either and, over the same period, the far more heavily involved F-15E only suffered 2 losses in Desert Storm, and none in Allied Force or Iraqi Freedom. One of those 2 losses appears to have been a random wholesale AAA barrage (i.e. a fluke) and the other a more capable SA-2. Furthermore F-15Es were involved in SEAD, which is a far more dangerous role and the F-111 flew 4,000 sorties in Vietnam against concurrent technology SAMs with only 6 losses, as well as scoring 1,500 tank kills in DS, while also doubling up as an EW aircraft in later life. To me, those are far more successful careers.

Any reference for the 8nm range?

“The pilot of the F-117 visually saw both missiles that were launched at him but didn’t manoeuvre as per training as that would compromise what stealth he did have.”

I truly want a source, was this from the pilot ?
but guessing in the case of F-117, it is incapable of dodging anyway so he may indeed close his eyes and hope for the best,
or at least that it won’t be painful

It’s also common for stealth aircraft not to have very good ECM suites because it’s considered ‘unnecessary’. In either Air International or Combat Aircraft Monthly I read that the B-52H’s ECM suite is miles ahead of the B-2’s IBM 286-based counterpart. Similarly, F-35s and F-22s don’t have high-technology towed or expendable decoys. Nor do they have 360deg jamming AFAIK. They can only jam using the AESA radar across the frontal +/-60deg arc.

Information about radar modifications are false. You have official statements from Zoltan Dani and his crew about radar modifications being fabricated.

By the BBC???

Where did I mention Greek spies? Not once on this forum! Others have pointed out that the NATO airbase the jets were based at could be easily watched, add to that only a narrow choice of strike corridors and the NATO strike packages got predictable in the congested airspace.

There was a prowler and an RC-135, neither were able to help that night. The F-16CJ Wild Weasel were indeed not deployed that evening.

Doesn’t change the fact that it was a massive fluke by Zoltan’s radar battery got that shot home.

Well either the aircraft is invisible to radar, or it isn’t. If a radar guided the missile to the target, what’s your explanation, he aimed for the sky and there just happened to be an F-117 passing in exactly the right spot at exactly the right time?????