If if was a deterrent, then it did not have a lasting effect, because of course they tried again. In fact by sending only one vessel, mostly underwater, it could be said that it was a sign of weakness and vacilation.
How come that the Argentines knew all about the submarine, but that it was kept secret from our own people? Why would Callaghan hide the fact that there was a threat? Surely if we had known about the extent of the threat, he would have been confident that the British public would be with him on a visible response?
So, weak response and hiding it from the public, sounds typical Callaghan.
Steven
Well only you could call a nuclear hunter-killer submarine weak–have you no idea of how high a perceived threat one of those is?
Why do you think the Belgrano was sunk–the Argentinian navy were terrified of them and that was a ratcheting up of a threat. You obviously don’t understand that fleets in being offer a greater threat than fleets in action.
I might suggest you read the thoughts of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who although long dead, provides much strategic thinking for navies still.
And the British public did know, it was in the papers at the time.
It was a measured threat–instead of talking cr*p, why don’t you contact me by PM and I’ll arrange a visit to Bedfordshire so you can see for yourself.
Actually there’s no need, the documents have been in the public domain since 2005.
Operation Journeyman even has it’s Wiki page.
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