It’s all about BRAND

@ Daz … it’s the story of the Conglomerate and it’s brands. Vickers-Armstrongs was indeed the owner and builder of the Spitfire, by its (acquired) brand Supermarine. I guess either name is correct.

@ Moggy … settle down. As James points out, everything is said by one person or the other. This book, for all it’s undoubted censorship and editing (aircraft are “thought” to be capable of this or that performance etc.) reads as a reasonably well balanced piece [well after the fact].

@ Beermat and JDK … when did Churchill make that speech? Clearly it is rhetorical and I find it interesting that the book I’m referencing talks of the air battles in various months, not a “Battle of Britain”. I would guess that in the UK in 1941 you wouldn’t really think of a/the Battle of Britain as having been concluded or won? But see Mark 12.

@ JDK … the Hurricane. I was taken by the line “will for ever be linked …” which signals just how top of mind the Hurricane must have been at that time, as you say on every school boy’s lips. We have a big task to educate today’s young ‘uns. But we have the benefit of the Historian’s wider view.

@ Rocketeer … you have it too! Can you access a scanner so we can pop the cover and maybe a page or two up on the thread? I’ll have a go at work too.

@ Mark-12 … thank you for that. Certainly looks like a Battle with start and end dates! I wonder when in 1941 these various publications came out? I doubt (until proven otherwise) that the engagements of summer/autumn 1940were referred to as the BoB as they unfolded. Or were they? Was Churchill’s political rhetoric top of mind? To Moggy’s journalist quip, sooner or later someone brands a thing and it sticks.

Cheers D

Thank you both

Creaking Door … I don’t have Chorley, I’ll see if my library has it. Sounds fascinating but as you say, sobering.

Eddie … sounds fine to me, but on reflection this tells us the Battle of Berlin was a hard campaign. Maybe I should side with Kev on this one?

Clearly, figuring out what I want to know (how “safe” was the ultimate form of Halifax [MkIII] vs its stablemate the Lancaster) will require a bit more digging on my part.

cheers D

Thank you everyone

Wow everybody, thank you! I love this forum.

Creaking Door
Those data in Chorley’s Bomber Command Losses, are they perhaps in tabular form and/or in some other way relatively easily worked with?

I have Middlebrook’s BCWD, and whilst I agree that will supply some aggregates, it doesn’t include a breakdown of aircraft by mark or sqdn (thinking here of Halifax II, III, V etc.).

BTW I don’t share your memory of BCWD re. “most likely to die”, I thought Middlebrook said it was the pilot (typically last out after trying to hold the aircraft stable for as long as possible). Hmmm … or it may have been Hinchcliffe’s “The Other Battle” that makes that observation.

Paul
Thanks for those “survey” data. Yes, maybe unscientific, but then again the surveyed population was certainly a sample of the survivors, only issue is how many in the sample.

At face value that survey indicates the Halifax was nearly 3 times as survivable as the Lancaster.

Eddie
You’re noting Halifax losses in the order of 1.5 to 2 times the Lancaster loss rate. If the Halifax was 3 times as survivable, I know which one I’d rather be in!

J Boyle
I did look into US aircraft in similar vein some years ago, the data were more readily accessible online. IIRC the survivability rate was many times better than the UK bomber counterparts.

Again IIRC, the B17 was “built strong”, would take a lot of punishment, and when damaged was often a stable platform to exit from. Bear in mind also 12x 50cal but only 4,000 pound bomb-load. Contrast this to the UK aircraft.

And the B24 was, I think, faster? For example, it didn’t/couldn’t formate with the B17’s.

I’ll see if I can track down my prior analysis.

Air Ministry
Thanks for that. RAF Bomber Command’s primary criterion seems to have been the relative offensive capability of its weapons. Hence the natural preference for the Lancaster, well supported by your data observations.

In my view it would be safe to assert that BC relied on darkness (and to lesser extent electronic warfare) for defence/survival rather than demand more rugged aircraft.

Kev
Yes … BUT
(a) sudden loss of an entire airframe would be egually lethal no matter what therefore I feel can be taken out of the picture (it will have a levelling effect on the findings)
(b) agree on losses over the sea etc., but I still contend that an analysis can be conducted in the aggregate and it will tell us something.

I won’t be at all surprised if we arrive at something along the lines of Chuck Adams’ survey (via Paul above)

Creaking Door and Air Ministry
Is there any chance you can post here, or email to me [PM for address] relevant/accessible data you may have? I’m more than happy to analyse the data and post the results here.

ALL
Thanks again, this (topic) has intrigued me for years and I’m chuffed to think we may see an answer.

D

One other thing I seem to see about losses is a lot of the time crews delayed in bailing out – the aircraft would be attacked, and either by the account of the nightfighter crew or isolated survivors, there was a significant amount of time that often elapsed between the aircraft being initially hit and breaking up. I assume this was because crews did not realise how serious the damage to their aircraft was and that every second spent trying to save the aircraft was a second less that would be available to bail out.

Hi Eddie, nice to cross paths again. I “believe” your and others’ point about the Lanc being more difficult to get out of, but as yet we are being subjective. As is my question in the first instance.

And like you I find this issue of how much time crews had to exit fascinating. You’re wondering why aircrew delayed (bailing out) when they seemingly had time? But from what I can tell from various accounts, this varied enormously. There are perhaps as many (primarily nachtjager) accounts of the attacked aircraft going out of control very quickly – indeed nachtjager SOP was to break away ASAP. Obviously (but again subjectively) if the aircraft was out of control, any complication in exiting would be a major problem – for example, there are accounts of survivors being blown (or falling) out of aircraft that broke up, but they had been unable to exit up until then. Conversely, the longer the aircraft remained in control the more the crew may have thought they would get away with it?

Speculation! It’s where I’ve ended up every time on this one.

Surely the facts must be right in front of someone with the right access? I feel we can safely assert that aircrew KIA/MIA and aircraft losses by type and serial [=> mark] were recorded, and therefore must exist, in Bomber Command’s files. If we align that with how many of each type operated, perhaps sample data on one operation or period of operations (Battle of Berlin, etc.), we will have the answer. I wonder if one of our “regulars” here has such data? I’m not too shabby with a spreadsheet if a spot of analysis is required.

Many thanks all, Don