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jessmo24

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  • in reply to: New F-35 News thread #2391550
    jessmo24
    Participant

    http://www.defencetalk.com/italian-navy-air-force-officials-visit-f-35-training-wing-25958/

    EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Fla.: Representatives from the Italian air force and navy visited the 33rd Fighter Wing here April 20 in an effort to check the progress of the first F-35 Lightning II integrated training center and learn more about this new coalition venture.

    “Things are moving, and this program is becoming real,” said Rear Admiral Paolo Treu, the Italian director of naval aviation department and commander of the Italian fleet air arm. “I’m grateful to Eglin (Air Force Base) for giving us this opportunity. A lot of work has been done. A lot of work has to be done.”

    Italy’s military is one of several partner nations that will be training joint strike fighter pilots and maintainers at the 33rd FW.

    “We are honored to host representatives from the Italian navy and air force,” said Col. David Hlatky, the 33rd FW commander. “We are all on the same JSF team, and it’s our privilege to share how the integrated training center is progressing. A lot of good things are coming together in the 33d Fighter Wing and the JSF program.”

    Admiral Treu said the timing of the visit serves two main purposes.

    “(The visit) was a good opportunity to see a lot of the requirements for the joint strike fighter,” he said. “The other reason is that we will be a part of the integrated training center.”

    The Italian military will send two F-35s to the center in 2014 and the country will receive its first 5th generation fighter in 2015, he said. The F-35 program is important to the Italian navy efforts to “maintain the capability of power projection from the sea to the ground.

    in reply to: New F-35 News thread #2391554
    jessmo24
    Participant

    I think the question is not if the F-18 is a decent weapon system.
    The question is does the navy like parity?
    If i had to face S-300, Su-27, Su-35, Mig 29OV, Export Rafales ( becaue soon there number will rule the world) T-50s or even a Iranian F-14 I would want to be in somthign stealthy and inherantly more survivable. Its very telling that the USN Needs entire fleets of escort jammers in order to escort the super hornets.
    You could argue that if you need 2 or more aircraft to do the mission of 1 F-35 then maybe it is worth it.

    in reply to: New F-35 News thread #2391596
    jessmo24
    Participant

    The problem with the F-35 is:

    1. even if you cut it you still need 3k + fighters

    2. If you say you dont need to repalce the fighters you have to accept a capability decrease from the U.S.

    3. If your forces arnt capabale then you have to forgo commitments to defend allied nations.

    4. This has serious geopolitical implications.

    5. To start up testing on a 3-5 new aircraft programs would be even more exspensive.

    6. Trying to go as cheap as possible and replacing every fighter in the U.S. inventory with a UAV or a F-18 isnt feasable.

    7. Cutting marine STOVl forces strongly implies that you will gut the small carriers as well.

    8. Are you willing to cede the western pacific to growing Chinese naval power? Are you willing to stick to a outdated superhornet force when potential enemies are producing 5th generation types?

    in reply to: Typhoon VS F-22 VS Rafale part II #2392470
    jessmo24
    Participant

    I thought the whole reason for putting a strike ability on the F-22 was to fill the F-117 deep strike, deep penetration,DEAD strike role?
    Wasnt that (and maintenance costs) the reason the F-117 was retired?
    I dont recall F-15C or Es flying over bagdad in GW1 in the 1st hour 1st night!
    The point was never that the F-15 couldnt match the F-22 speed for speed.
    The point was that if both are going 600 miles then then F-15 will run out of gas traveling at mach 1.8 the entire way.

    F-22 roles
    1. Air dominance
    2. Advanced SEAD/DEAD missions
    3. Mini Awacs force multiplyer
    4. Intercept, advanced escort of B-2s ect.
    5. Advanced first day of the war strike (hitting bejing for instance on the 1st day)

    in reply to: Taiwan's growing fighter gap with China #2392565
    jessmo24
    Participant

    When the chinese screw up a copy of the su-27 that they stole, and cant even build somthig as simple as an engine to save there lives, I am not concenred about them catching us tech wise. I will only worry when the Chinese learn what quality controll means. I got a crib for the new baby a few years ago and I was nervous when I discovered it was made in China. Im not saying to to offend a nationality but the Chinese have a bad bad badd track record with QC.

    in reply to: U.S. AF, U.S. Navy Air sea battle concept! #2393480
    jessmo24
    Participant

    From what I can gather from the article the key to destroy is the chinese C4 assets if you cant see you cant hit the carrier. I think space will become increasingly important. Also while I can agree the the F-35 is somewhat short legged, You need a platform at the same time that can self escort. and entire force of stealthy but lumbering A-12s could be countered by CAP. At least the F-35 can fight from BVR. Again by pokeing out the eyes of the Chinese you can bring in short range fighters.

    in reply to: Taiwan's growing fighter gap with China #2393520
    jessmo24
    Participant

    The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA; Pub.L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, enacted April 10, 1979; H.R. 2479) is an act of the United States Congress passed in 1979 after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the breaking of relations between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan by President Jimmy Carter. It more clearly defines the American position on Taiwan and its cross-strait relationship with Beijing. It was drafted by Harvey Feldman.[1]
    Contents
    [hide]

    * 1 Provisions
    * 2 Reactions
    * 3 See also
    * 4 References
    * 5 External links

    [edit] Provisions

    The act authorizes quasi-diplomatic relations with the “governing authorities on Taiwan” (the Republic of China government) by giving special powers to the American Institute in Taiwan to the level that it is the de facto embassy, and states that any international obligations previously made between the ROC and U.S. before 1979 are still valid unless otherwise terminated. One agreement that was unilaterally terminated by President Carter upon the establishment of relations was the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty; that termination was the subject of the Supreme Court case Goldwater v. Carter.

    The act provides for Taiwan to be treated under U.S. laws the same as “foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities”. The act provides that for most practical purposes of the U.S. government, the absence of diplomatic relations and recognition will have no effect.[2]

    The act does not recognize the terminology of “Republic of China” after Jan. 1, 1979. It defines the term “Taiwan” to include, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan (the main Island) and Penghu, which form the Taiwan Province and Taipei and Kaohsiung cities. The act does not apply to Jinmen, the Matsus, the Pratas or Taiping Island.

    The act stipulates that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States”.

    This act also requires the United States “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”, and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” Successive U.S. administrations have sold arms to the ROC in compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act despite demands from the PRC that the U.S. following legally non-binding Three Joint Communiques and the U.S. government’s proclaimed One-China policy (which differs from the PRC’s One-China Policy). The Taiwan Relations Act does not require the U.S. to intervene militarily if the PRC attacks or invades Taiwan, and the U.S. has adopted a policy of “strategic ambiguity” in which the U.S. neither confirms nor denies that it would intervene in such a scenario.
    [edit]

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_Relations_Act

    in reply to: Taiwan's growing fighter gap with China #2393537
    jessmo24
    Participant

    1. Like I mentioned before the U.S. is bound by LAW to defend Taiwan.

    2. The U.S. is working on mounting convential warheads on tridents for quick strikes against chinese bases

    3. The invasions has to be fast probably within hours if not a day or 2. Once U.S. Bomber forces and carrier strike groups arrive things get bad.

    4. Sinking 1 carrier or even the 7th fleet will not make Americans go away. if you think so you dont understand Americans.

    5. 1 single B-2 can deploy over 200 small diameter bombs. can you Imagine what that would do to a landing force?

    6. The 1st day of the war stirkes wont come from Kadena or guam, they will come from alaska and conus just 4 B-2s is over 200 aim points. Ohio class subs can launch 100 tomohawks each. throw in B-1s firing jassmer, raptors escorting or defending a cruise missile backet, and B-52s firing air launched cruise missiles and you could easily have over 1200-1500 Chinese assets gone in the 1st 24 hours. and this is before the carrier groups even arrive.

    in reply to: Typhoon VS F-22 VS Rafale part II #2393543
    jessmo24
    Participant

    Yes. I expect a shift from BVR back to WVR due to stealth and advanced ECM. This would, again put greater emphasis on flying abilities.

    Su-35 is not likely to receive major upgrades in 10-15 years therefore it will start to lose against AESAed Typhoons and Rafales. This is the logic I used, right or wrong, I cannot tell.

    With the advent of HOBs capability WVR combat will nearly always become a mutual kill type of sittuation.
    The F-35 will mitgate concerns over WVr manuvering with not only HOBs ( high off bore sight missiles) but DIRCM ( small lasers that fire from the fuselage and jam incoming IR missiles) I would rather have a DIRM, HObs combination, over TV nozzles.

    in reply to: Typhoon VS F-22 VS Rafale part II #2393732
    jessmo24
    Participant

    My rank for A-A is

    F-22
    F-15SG
    Su-35
    F-18E/F
    Rafale
    F-16E/F
    Typhoon
    Sukhoi Su-30MKI
    Gripen (NG)

    In 10-15 years:
    F-22
    T-50/Su-50
    Typhoon
    Rafale
    F-35
    Su-35
    F-15SE
    F-18F

    Sometimes it’s really hard to decide….

    Wow you put the Rafale above both the Su-35 and the F-35? even in bvr?

    in reply to: Typhoon VS F-22 VS Rafale part II #2393788
    jessmo24
    Participant

    So Id like to ask the rapid anti-F22 haters how THEY would rank the worlds fighters?
    My rank for a2a is

    F-22
    Su-35
    Sukhoi Su-30MKI
    F-18E/F ( jammers AESA)
    French Rafale
    Typhoon
    F-15SG ( Aesa)
    Block 50+ F-16
    griphen

    In 10-15 years it will be
    F-22
    T-50/Su-50
    F-35
    F-15SE ( If its gets orders)
    SU-35
    F-18F
    Rafale with meteor
    Typhoon with meteor

    in reply to: Taiwan's growing fighter gap with China #2394280
    jessmo24
    Participant

    Isnt the U.S. bound by LAW to defend Taiwan? Any administration would have to defend or face impeachment! So hoping the U.S. wont come to Taiwans aid is a mistake. Also the geopolitical rafications of a Chinese land grab with no response would be BAD for the region.

    in reply to: Taiwan's growing fighter gap with China #2395030
    jessmo24
    Participant

    Taiwan might be interested in F-35Bs

    http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4626494&c=ASI&s=AIR

    Taiwan Sends Mixed Message on Fighters
    BY WENDELL MINNICK
    Published: 14 May 2010 11:02
    Print Print | Print Email

    TAIPEI – Comments made by Taiwan’s Air Force chief of staff have confused the issue over whether Taiwan actually wants F-16s.

    On May 13, Air Chief Ger Hsi-hsiung told members of the legislature that F-16s would meet Taiwan’s immediate requirements, but the F-16 lacks the stealth and short-takeoff and vertical-landing (STOVL) capabilities that will be needed in the future.
    Related Topics

    * Americas
    * Asia & Pacific Rim
    * Air Warfare

    When asked by the legislature to identify the fighter better suited to meet Taiwan’s long-term needs, Ger identified the F-35B Lightening II.

    Taiwan first requested 66 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters from the United States in 2006, but Washington has been hesitant to release the aircraft due to pressure from China.

    Ger’s response sends the wrong signal to Washington at a time when the government is pushing hard for the release of F-16s, said a Taiwan defense official.

    “He is downplaying the utility of the F-16 and that the F-16 is not appropriate for our future needs.” The result is “confusion at a time when there should be one voice on the F-16 procurement,” he said.

    Taiwan’s Air Force faces 1,300 short-range ballistic missiles and a Chinese land-based air defense network that can target aircraft over the northwestern portion of the island. Runways are expected to be destroyed within the first salvo of ballistic missiles. Therefore, the Air Force has a requirement for a stealthy fighter with STOVL capabilities that can operate from damaged runways and avoid Chinese radar.

    Taiwan had looked at procuring used Boeing AV-8B Harriers to fill the STOVL requirement, but the matter was dropped when the F-35s became an option.

    A Taiwan defense analyst said the F-35 would give Taiwan control of the air at a tactical and even at a strategic level that it has not had since the 1980s. The F-35 would also enhance survivability against ballistic missile attack and radar targeting by China.

    Though Ger acknowledged it was government policy to pursue procurement of new F-16s, the fighters do not “satisfy” the Air Force requirements. He said Chinese fighters can cross the Taiwan Strait in five-to-seven minutes, leaving little time to react.

    Ger’s comments are not new. Taiwan submitted a letter of intent (LoI) to the U.S. Department of Defense in 2002 requesting a briefing on the F-35, which was subsequently granted.

    “Strikes on Taiwan airbases would neutralize existing aircraft due to their inability to perform short take-offs and landings,” the LoI said. “Requirement: capability to engage enemy forces from air, after initial strikes against conventional ROCAF [Republic of China Air Force] airbases render the bases temporarily inoperative. Our forces are designed to absorb an initial strike and provide a full defense from ongoing air attacks from the PRC [People’s Republic of China].”

    A Taiwan government adviser said the military will be “lucky to afford” new F-16s, let alone more expensive F-35s. He said the military budget was shrinking at the same time it was taking delivery of $13 billion worth of new arms and equipment from the United States.

    He doubts the military can afford the new arms and a costly streamlining and reorganization program now underway. The military is moving from conscription to a volunteer military within the next five years. It is also decreasing the number of personnel and consolidating commands.

    Arms in the pipeline include 60 UH-60M Black Hawk utility helicopters, 30 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, 12 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, two Osprey minesweepers and more than 300 Patriot PAC-3 missile systems.

    in reply to: Typhoon VS F-22 VS Rafale part II #2395336
    jessmo24
    Participant

    I think it’s just a matter of time and money.

    Once upon a time, a guy came on the field with a an armor. It then became very hard to kill him. But a bit later, etc etc.

    It’s beeing underconfident in progress to believe that AESA is just “very hard to jam”. I can’t believe anyone here can tell us “Spectra/DASS/anything new gen cannot jam the APG-77, and will never be able to do so”.

    @ djcross :
    Thanks for trying to help a bit, but I’m afraid that ROCAF never saw a Mica IR, and that this missile was not available in early 90s.
    http://www.taiwanairpower.org/af/mirage.html

    DGA, which manages all defense related programmes in France, saies the Mica’s range is >80km. For M2000-5 pilots, BVR fight begins at 20 Nm up to 40 Nm. There are some conditions under which Mica might be launched at 80km, but 60-70 km must be a more reliable range. In addition, the strengh of Rafale is the ability to identify its targets at 40km allowing it to shoot before WVR range. RoE are important.

    High-priority emitters — such as fighter aircraft at close range — can be tracked in real time by the ALR-94. In this mode, called narrowband interleaved search and track (NBILST), the radar is used only to provide precise range and velocity data to set up a missile attack. If a hostile aircraft is injudicious in its use of radar, the ALR-94 may provide nearly all the information necessary to launch an AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile (AAM) and guide it to impact, making it virtually an anti-radiation AAM. Of course, there are some targets that do not emit signals. “We prefer it that way, because he’s dumb,” remarked one Boeing engineer. In this case, the F-22 can use its LPI features to track the target — which is not a threat unless another radar is tracking the F-22 and datalinking information to the “quiet” aircraft — and can, if necessary, identify it.

    NCTR is a highly classified area. One of the few known techniques is jet-engine modulation, which involves analyzing the raw radar return for the characteristic beat produced by a combination of the radar-pulse frequency and the rotating blades of the engine. This technique is already used on operational radars (including the APG-70 in the F-15) but is vulnerable to countermeasures and dependent on target aspect.

    Other NCTR techniques involve very precise range measurements. If the target’s orientation is known, the distribution of the signature over very small range bins can yield a range profile which is characteristic of a certain aircraft type. It is possible that the F-22, which has a great deal of onboard processing power — as well as a flexible, frequency-agile radar — is designed to use an NCTR technique of this kind.

    Unlike the Eurofighter Typhoon , the F-22 does not have an electro-optical (EO) system for target identification. F-22 program managers have said consistently that they believe that the F-22 pilot will be able to identify any target — emitting or not — beyond visual range (BVR). “We are confident that we can demonstrate to our leadership that we know what’s out there, and that we will operate with rules of engagement that reflect that fact,” USAF program manager Gen Mike Mushala remarked at a conference in 1997. The ALR-94 drives the F-22’s defensive displays. The system determines the bearing, range and type of the threat, and then computes the distance at which the enemy radar can detect the F-22. The pilot is the decision-maker and is provided with timely, graphic information to guide defensive maneuvers.

    This is getting pointless

    in reply to: Typhoon VS F-22 VS Rafale part II #2395421
    jessmo24
    Participant

    Who talked about air superiority as such? I just spoke about AA and according your logic the F-35 is a duck because of “size” and an inferior kinematic performance. And let’s not start on comparing TWRs with F-35s half fuel vs other aircraft fully loaded…

    The fight is lost if the missile kills the target, if it can’t then the fight isn’t lost!

    Well if the Rafale’s radar isn’t emitting there is nothing an F-22 could detect by passive means, if the F-22 is radiating and the SPECTRA can detect and jam it where is your guarantee that the F-22s INEWS is capable to detect and track the jamming signals to generate target coordinates to fire a missile?

    They shouldn’t be to concerned until such a threat is in fact proliferated in sufficient numbers and threatening specifically France. France is a member of both NATO and EU so everyone threatening France is also threatening the NATO/EU and will be treated accordingly! And you are going to show us now the country which is able to do so! And who can guarantee that newer sensors or even a new generation of stealth technologies won’t render the current means if stealth obsolete?

    http://www.highbeam.com/

    THE NEXT GENERATION

    The fourth Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, aircraft 4004. Is due to make its first flight from Marietta. GA, in late July. As the first F-22 to carry offensive avionics. Its task is to demonstrate that a stealthy aircraft can be a fighter. Under a deal struck with Congress last year, the F-22 has to prove this key technology by the end of this year if the next ten aircraft are to be authorized.

    The F-22 represents a radical departure from the traditional approach to EW. Passive systems, once considered to be defensive in nature, are now critical to detecting, tracking and even attacking the target. The active radar, while still a primary sensor, is used sparingly for specific tasks. Active jamming in the traditional sense has disappeared. The F-22 approach is echoed to some extent in most of today’s advanced fighter programs, including the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter typhoon and Saab JAS Gripen. It is also fundamental to the future of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

    The F-22’s EW philosophy is rooted in some of the earliest work on stealth. As the US Air Force (USAF) defined requirements and operational doctrine for the F-117 stealth strike aircraft and B-2 bomber, in 1980-81, A “Red Team” headed by Dr. Paul Kaminski was charged with looking for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in stealth technology. One of the Red Team’s Most important conclusions was that a stealth aircraft could not survive by low radar cross-section (RCS) alone, but by stealth and tactics.

    In the case of the F-117 the Red Team’s recommendation resulted in the development of one of the first automated mission-planning systems, but this left the aircraft dependent on a pre-programmed flight plan. The B-2 was designed to feature a sophisticated defensive management system (DMS) which would allow the crew to respond to threat radars not anticipated by the mission plan. The initial DMS was abandoned in the late 1980s. Its successor is the APR-50, developed by IBM Federal Systems (later acquired by Loral and now part of Lockheed Martin).
    The USAF’s Advanced Tactical Fighter project, which led to the F-22, presented greater challenges. In the air-to-air regime, the primary threats are airborne and move rapidly, making identification, location and tracking more complex. The F-22’s sustained speed also shortens engagement timelines by as much as 40 percent.
    At the same time, the fighter’s classic tool for situational awareness — a powerful search radar — can render its stealth characteristics moot. Low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) techniques are not very compatible with continuous searches over a large volume. The fighter’s stealth is also of little use if it has to close to visual range in order to identify its targets. Passive search and track and non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) are not luxuries for a stealthy air-superiority fighter.
    The solution to this problem on the F-22 is sensor fusion. The principal sensors are the Northrop Grumman APG-77 radar and the Sanders ALR-94 passive receiver system. The fighter also has two datalink systems: one using the standard VHF/UHF radio frequencies and the other, the intraflight datalink (IFDL), a low-power LPI link which connects two or more F-22s at close range. The sensors are apertures connected to the fighter’s Common Integrated Processor (CIP) banks in the forward fuselage.

    The data from the APG-77, ALR-94 and the datalinks are correlated according to their azimuth, elevation and range. Data is combined into a track file, and the final target picture is obtained by choosing the read-out from the most accurate sensor. For example, the passive system may provide the best azimuth data, while the radar produces the most accurate range.

    CIP software controls the APG-77 according to emission-control principles. The radar’s signals are managed in intensity, duration and space to maintain the pilot’s situational awareness while minimizing the chance that its signals will be intercepted. More distant targets get less radar attention; as they get closer to the F-22, they will be identified and prioritized; and when they are close enough to be engaged or avoided, they are continuously tracked.

    Sensor fusion and emission control are closely linked. The more the datalinks and ALR-94 can be used to build and update the tactical picture, the less the system needs to use the radar. The IFDL provides another layer of protection against tracking, because any one F-22 in a flight can provide radar data to the others.
    The APG-77 and ALR-94 are unique, high-performance sensors. The APG-77 has an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) comprising some 1,200 transmitter and receiver modules. One vital difference between an AESA and any other radar that has a single transmitter (including a passive electronically steered array) is that the AESA is capable of operating as several separate radars simultaneously. An AESA can change its beamform very readily, and its receiver segments can operate in a passive or receive-only mode. Unlike a mechanical antenna, too, its revisit rates are not constrained by the antenna drive, and it can concurrently revisit different points within its field of regard at different rates. The F-22 has space, weight and cooling provision for auxiliary side arrays on either side of the nose. If installed, these would provide radar coverage over almost 270[degrees]. The ALR-94, meanwhile, is the most effective passive system ever installed on a fighter. Tom Burbage, former head of the F-22 program at Lockheed Martin, has described it as “the most technically complex piece of equipment on the aircraft.”

    The F-22 has been described as an antenna farm. Indeed, it would resemble a signals-intelligence (SIGINT) platform were it not for the fact that the 30-plus antennas are all smoothly blended into the wings and fuselage. The ALR-94 provides 360[degrees] coverage in all bands, with both azimuth and elevation coverage in the forward sector.

    A target which is using radar to search for the F-22 or other friendly aircraft can be detected, tracked and identified by the ALR-94 long before its radar can see anything, at ranges of 250 nm or more. As the range closes, but still above 100 nm, the APG-77 can be cued by the ALR-94 to search for other aircraft in the hostile flight. The system uses techniques such as cued tracking: since the track file, updated by the ALR-94, can tell the radar where to look, it can detect and track the target with a very narrow beam, measuring as little as 2[degrees] by 2[degrees] in azimuth and elevation. One engineer calls it “a laser beam, not a searchlight. We want to use our resources on the high-value targets. We don’t track targets that are too far away to be a threat.”

    The system also automatically increases revisit rates according to the threat posed by the targets. Another technique is “closed-loop tracking,” in which the radar constantly adjusts the power and number of pulses to retain a lock on its target while using the smallest possible amount of energy.

    High-priority emitters — such as fighter aircraft at close range — can be tracked in real time by the ALR-94. In this mode, called narrowband interleaved search and track (NBILST), the radar is used only to provide precise range and velocity data to set up a missile attack. If a hostile aircraft is injudicious in its use of radar, the ALR-94 may provide nearly all the information necessary to launch an AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile (AAM) and guide it to impact, making it virtually an anti-radiation AAM. Of course, there are some targets that do not emit signals. “We prefer it that way, because he’s dumb,” remarked one Boeing engineer. In this case, the F-22 can use its LPI features to track the target — which is not a threat unless another radar is tracking the F-22 and datalinking information to the “quiet” aircraft — and can, if necessary, identify it.

    NCTR is a highly classified area. One of the few known techniques is jet-engine modulation, which involves analyzing the raw radar return for the characteristic beat produced by a combination of the radar-pulse frequency and the rotating blades of the engine. This technique is already used on operational radars (including the APG-70 in the F-15) but is vulnerable to countermeasures and dependent on target aspect.

    Other NCTR techniques involve very precise range measurements. If the target’s orientation is known, the distribution of the signature over very small range bins can yield a range profile which is characteristic of a certain aircraft type. It is possible that the F-22, which has a great deal of onboard processing power — as well as a flexible, frequency-agile radar — is designed to use an NCTR technique of this kind.

    Unlike the Eurofighter Typhoon , the F-22 does not have an electro-optical (EO) system for target identification. F-22 program managers have said consistently that they believe that the F-22 pilot will be able to identify any target — emitting or not — beyond visual range (BVR). “We are confident that we can demonstrate to our leadership that we know what’s out there, and that we will operate with rules of engagement that reflect that fact,” USAF program manager Gen Mike Mushala remarked at a conference in 1997. The ALR-94 drives the F-22’s defensive displays. The system determines the bearing, range and type of the threat, and then computes the distance at which the enemy radar can detect the F-22. The pilot is the decision-maker and is provided with timely, graphic information to guide defensive maneuvers. On the main defense display, usually shown on the left-hand screen in the cockpit, threat surface-to-air missile (SAM) and airborne early warning (AEW) radars are surrounded by circles that show their computed effective range. On the right-hand attack display, fighter radars are shown as blue beams extending towards the F-22’s position.

    The F-22 has no dedicated jamming systems. However, the APG-77 array can be used to generate powerful jamming beams over a certain frequency range.
    Developing such a system has been a tremendous challenge. The F-22 avionics-development program is methodical and has learned from the experiences of other projects. From the outset, all of the software was designed on the same hardware with the same compilers and operating systems. “It was a tremendous advance,” comments Boeing F-22 avionics deputy manager Gherry Bender. “We got beyond the hardware integration problems.”

    The complete system is being tested in three stages, starting with the ground-based avionics integration laboratory (AIL), then moving to the Boeing 757 flying test bed (FTB) and completing its tests on the F-22 prototypes. The AIL, located at Boeing Field in Seattle, WA, includes a tower-mounted sensor suite. The FTB is fitted with a sensor wing above and behind the cockpit, which accommodates the F-22’s full-size wing-mounted antennas in their proper orientation. Internally, it features a complete CIP bank, an F-22 cockpit — both the AIL and FTB support pilot-in-the-loop tests — and multiple engineering workstations. The FTB has worked with Navy aircraft out of NAS Whidbey Island, WA, and with Air National Guard F-16s based at Albuquerque, NM.

    The goal is to make the testing as realistic and repeatable as possible at each stage and, thereby, to minimize surprises at each succeeding stage. “The problem with integration is fault isolation,” says Bender. “To do that, we need repeatability, combined with data gathering and reduction to get answers rapidly. If we can isolate faults on the FTB, it’s a lot cheaper than doing the same on the F-22.”
    The first elements of the engineering-and-manufacturing-development (EMD) sensor suite for the F-22 were installed on the 757 in 1998, and powered up for the first time in December of that year. These first tests used Block-i software, which comprised the basic operating system, navigation and some radar modes. Its primary goal was to unearth any basic problems “so that we wouldn’t have to rewrite a lot of software later,” says Bender. The Block-2 software, which integrates some EW and communication, navigation and identification (CNI) functions, has been operating on the FTB since October 1999, and will be loaded on to the fourth F-22 for its first flight.

    Block 3.0 is the most crucial step forward, because it introduces sensor fusion among the radar, EW and CNI subsystems. A development version of Block 3.0, called Block 3S, has been flying on the FTB since April. Block 3S was added to the development program in early 1999, and includes sensor functions but not sensor fusion. “It is a risk-reduction tool,” says Bender. “With the software controlling the sensors and fusion in the feedback loop, it’s sometimes hard to unravel what happened. Did the sensor fail, or did it do what it did because we commanded it to do it?”

    The real Block 3.0 is due to fly on the FTB in August before being loaded on Raptor 4004 in October or November. “It will be a challenge,” says David Anderson of the F-22 Plans and Programs Division at Wright-Patterson AFB. “There is some risk there, depending on the availability of the aircraft and the software. The degree of risk depends on who you talk to.” One area which is receiving some special attention, though, is throughput in the main computer. “We can’t afford too much delay between the collection of the signal and the point where it is displayed to the pilot. We’re overcoming that,” says Anderson. But, he says, the team is confident that they will pass the milestone on schedule.

    The schedule appears to be tight, with two to three months between the first flight of Block 3.0 on the FTB and its first flight aboard the F-22. “The current avionics schedule,” notes a disapproving General Accounting Office (GAO) in its latest F-22 report, “shows Block 3…being completed five months before the completion dates the Air Force considered realistic in 1997.” The first flight of 4004 slipped from February to May 2000 in the course of 1999, further delaying the flight testing of Block 2 aboard the fighter, and that date has since slipped to July. So far, however, the program has avoided disasters, and key changes (such as the implementation of Block 3S) have been implemented in time to avert problems.

    UP NEXT: THE JSF

    Both Lockheed Martin and Boeing are closely involved with the integration of the F-22 avionics, so it is not surprising that the proposed offensive avionics system for both JSF candidates takes the F-22 as a baseline. Sensor fusion, including the ability to detect, identify and locate pop-up threats quickly and accurately enough to attack them, is basic to the JSF. Both teams plan to fuse data on large-format displays and to use AESA radars in an LPI mode.

    In many ways, JSF’s goals are more advanced than those of the F-22. They include the fusion of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical systems in both the offensive and defensive modes. The JSF system is also intended to cost and weigh less than the F-22 hardware and to make extensive use of commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) technology.

    The JSF is planned to have five basic sets of sensors which, as on the F-22, will be entirely integrated into the central processor. Two of these form the Multi-Function Integrated Radio-Frequency System (MIRFS). The MIRFS/Multifunction Forward Looking Array (MFA) is the functional equivalent of the APG-77 radar and is being developed, under a separate competition, by Raytheon and Northrop Grumman; neither company is specifically teamed with either of the prime contractors on this part of the JSF program.

    The MIRFS/Electronic Warfare System (EWS) is the all-around passive element of the RE system. The MIRFS/EWS will use its own dedicated antennas and the MFA. Sanders is the MIRFS/EWS supplier to both teams, basing its work on its experience with low-observable (LO) apertures for the F-22.
    Two sensor packages make up the EO system. The forward-looking BO targeting system (EOTS) is an infrared (IR) system to locate and help identify targets. The objective is to fuse JR and SAR imagery to detect and identify targets automatically with the minimum emission level. The EOTS will also function as a long-range IR search-and-track (IRST) system to detect airborne targets and as an EO system for airborne target identification.

    The Distributed Aperture Infrared System (DAIRS) comprises a set of staring focal-plane-array (FPA) sensors covering a complete sphere around the aircraft and will combine three functions: it will feed a video signal to the pilot’s binocular, day-night helmet-mounted display (HMD); will act as a missile-warning system, and will serve as an IRST to detect airborne threats.

    The DAIRS and EOTS are the subject of a parallel competition, like the MIRFS/MFA. Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control form one team, with Northrop Grumman being responsible for the DAIRS and Lockheed Martin taking the lead on the EOTS. Boeing is presumably working with Raytheon.
    Both teams are using FTBs in the current demonstration and validation stage of the JSF program. Boeing began testing the JSF’s integrated avionics on its 737-based Avionics Flying Laboratory (AEL) in December 1999 and plans a total of 50 missions. Lockheed Martin is using the BAG One-Eleven, which has served as an FTB for many Westinghouse and Northrop Grumman radars.

    Although the teams have common suppliers in some areas (e.g., Sanders is the contractor for the MIRFS/EWS in both cases), there are detail differences. For example, Lockheed Martin has chosen Litton Advanced Systems to team with Sanders on the EWS, providing its unique expertise in electronic-support-measures (ESM) technology. In particular, Litton is applying its long-baseline interferometry processing to the Lockheed Martin JSF, providing the aircraft with twice the receiver capability of the ICAP-III Prowler to the Lockheed Martin JSF at half the size, weight and cost. BAB Systems is also a member of the team.

    The EW and sensor systems proposed for the JSF would not be affordable using today’s technology. One of the most costly aspects of the F-22 system is the need to provide separate antennas for all wavebands and aspects and to make those apertures compatible with stealth. F-22 antennas are installed in cavities lined with radar-absorbent material and covered with specially formulated materials which allow the signals of interest to pass through, while absorbing hostile signals. On the JSF, the goal is to reduce the cost and complexity of the antenna systems by making the antennas simpler and using a single antenna or aperture for many tasks.

    Although Boeing and Lockheed Martin have demonstrated some key JSF functions on their test-bed aircraft, it is worth remembering that the F-22’s avionics functions were demonstrated on the same level during the demonstration and validation phase of the ATF program in 1989-90. The GAO has said that several unspecified aspects of the JSF program are still not ready for EMD, and it is more than likely that the very sophisticated, yet low-cost technology proposed for the aircraft is among them.

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