More on the UK’s JSF qunadarry.

MoD sets out ultimatum to US over joint strike fighter

Defence procurement minister Lord Drayson will tell the powerful US Senate Armed Services Committee next week that the UK must receive critical technical data about the F-35 joint strike fighter if it is to proceed with the project.
Drayson will say that the UK is committed to the $200bn programme – it has made a preliminary order for 150 of the vertical take-off variants of the aircraft – but that it must have the capability to upgrade the aircraft and be allowed ‘operational sovereignty’.

The JSF is crucial to the Ministry of Defence’s strategy of ‘expeditionary warfare’, based on air power from two new aircraft carriers currently being designed by a team led by BAE Systems.

The MoD is locked in a struggle with the Pentagon to secure an agreement on technology transfer that would allow UK contractors to carry out upgrades and servicing on the planes. This would mean the US revealing details of software used in the aircraft’s design that it has hitherto refused to divulge.

The MoD has submitted a list of requirements to the US Department of Defence and requires an answer before 6 December, when it aims to sign a memorandum of understanding to move from the development phase to the manufacturing phase of the project. Drayson has said the MoD is also developing a ‘Plan B’ option that would involve prolonging the life of RAF Harriers, eventually replacing them with either Eurofighter Typhoons or French Rafale aircraft

http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,1728787,00.html

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Unhappy about the extent of work its industry is garnering on the Joint Strike Fighter, Norway is considering pulling out of the Lockheed Martin-led program in the next few weeks.

With an Apr. 1 deadline looming over the country’s status in JSF, Norwegian officials last week went to the U.S. to visit with Pentagon and State Dept. representatives, as well as Lockheed Martin officials, to voice their concerns and urge improvements in the situation. At issue is not just the amount of work, but also the quality of the work packages, Norwegian Defense State Secretary Espen Barth Eide tells Aviation Week & Space Technology. [u]Norway wants its companies to work on high-technology elements, such as system integration or advanced materials, and not be relegated to building commodity items to specifications. [/u]

The left-leaning coalition of Labor, Socialist Left and Center parties now in power does not feel wedded to the previous government’s commitment, and also brings with it a more interventionist industrial policy. To that extent, the issue of JSF work share–which has been raised before as a Norwegian concern–has been elevated as an issue. The government is also conducting a wide-reaching defense review, which could have implications for JSF even if the country, for now, remains in the project.

The stakes are high for both the U.S. and Norway in the coming weeks, although the actual value of commitment Oslo has to make later this year–142 million kroner ($21 million)–is tiny compared with the overall $19-billion JSF development bill; in Norwegian defense spending terms, however, it constitutes a significant outlay. The money is due July 1, but if Norway wants to withdraw, it must give three months’ notice.

The big issue is not the near-term financial obligation, says Eide. But Norwegian government and industry officials recognize that if they stay in JSF, it will consume a hefty portion of the country’s defense investment budget for the next decade. If the return on investment for Norway’s industry is inadequate, companies could face a 10-year drought from which they may not be able to recover.

For the U.S., the stakes are high, too, particularly at a political level. Other countries also have voiced unhappiness about their industrial return. But having one nation pull out of the project would be a major embarrassment, particularly since program officials this year are trying to sign up partners to commit to the production phase. JSF managers have given themselves until year-end to try to work out those issues and nail down deals on production and in-service logistics support. The first production contracts are to be let next year.

The Norwegian situation comes on top of outspoken displeasure in the U.K. over how industrial matters have deteriorated with JSF–such as the recent decision to cancel the General Electric/ Rolls-Royce F136 alternative engine program as part of the Fiscal 2007 Pentagon budget submission. Concerns have also been voiced over technology access that would allow the U.K. to maintain and upgrade its fleet independently.

A U.S. industry official concedes this is a delicate time for JSF. He notes that what’s playing out now is a mix of real unhappiness–particularly as related to the engine activity–and negotiating ploys. He argues that some of the clamoring is merely designed to obtain more work for local industry.

Eide says several issues are complicating efforts to address Norway’s concerns. One is that U.S. technology transfer restrictions make it difficult for Norwegian industry to be involved in systems integration, where some of the most sensitive aspects of JSF reside. In addition, much of the work already has been apportioned.

For Norway, the focus is basically on trying to secure a position on JSF for the Naval Strike Missile, a stealthy standoff weapon, and high-end composites work that could serve to make drop-tanks or structural elements of the aircraft. In both cases, Kongsberg would be the main industrial partner.

Marrying a stealthy missile to the stealthy JSF would have operational benefits, says Eide, and would help satisfy Norwegian system integration interests. The missile itself would likely require a wing modification to allow internal carriage on the F-35 (AW&ST Sept. 26, 2005, p. 44). Australia, another JSF customer, has also expressed interest in the weapon.

Norway insists that even if it remains in the JSF development program, it’s not a foregone conclusion that it will buy the fighter to replace its fleet of F-16s. The Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Aviation Rafale and Saab Gripen are also contenders. Likewise, Eide notes, Norway could decide not to participate in JSF development and later end up buying the aircraft.

Norway will first complete the larger defense review, which is just getting started. Conclusions from that assessment will likely be drawn next year, with a fighter production decision to be made around 2008. Notionally, Norway would buy 48 fighters, but that number is subject to change depending on the findings of the defense review, Eide notes.

http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id=news/022706p2.xml

Et tu Denmark ?

http://www.primezone.com/newsroom/news.html?d=90596
http://www.gripen.com/articles/5.64dd79107d26d21d58000207.html

Not to mention, the NORA (& several of the Gripen’s components) might well fit into the Tejas as well. 🙂

Gripen eyes Indian jet fighter order

Swedish fighter jet manufacturer Gripen is agressively pitching itself to bag the estimated $10 billion deal.

“We have 30 years of future to offer to India through our product,” Bob Kemp, the company’s vice president (international marketing and sales), said Wednesday at the four-day Defexpo that began here Jan 31. But amidst concerns as to whether Washington would allow US firms to make the sale to New Delhi, Gripen has taken the opportunity to showcase its jets – “the true new generation fighters”.

“While some of the aircraft offered are outdated and already being phased out in various parts of the world, many are not even sure what they can offer to India,” Kemp told IANS.Kemp markets his product as a multi-role easy operational aircraft, which is flexible in terms of manoeuvrability as well as for carrying arms.

“It can even land on a road moving away from high risk bases and can take off within 600 metres in 10 minutes after touching down and arming itself,” he said. “It can carry weapons of your choice irrespective of who manufactures them, really simple and yet sophisticated.”

Observing that India already has a wide variety in its inventory, Kemp said: “Gripen can offer a perfect force mix to complement the existing IAF (Indian Air Force) Sukhoi fleet.“

Gripen has been keenly observing the requirements of the Indian fleet and its problems. “While our fighters operate at least at 50 percent low operational cost than nearest rivals, our contracts would also ensure a steady supply of spares,” Kemp asserted.

Full Article >>

However sea-ll, i doubt BAe will throw its weight behind the Gripen consedering that the Eurofighter is participating as well.

India’s quest for fighter could cost losers dearly

By Reuben F. Johnson / Asian Aerospace February 2006

The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) medium multirole combat aircraft (M-MRCA) tender is beginning to resemble a free-for-all that shows no signs of abating and will continue for several years. What makes this tender an unusual one, however, is that the type of radar and onboard systems which will be included in the deal, the co-production arrangements to provide work for local Indian industry and geopolitical considerations are going to carry far more weight in the decision process than the actual choice of the aircraft itself.

When it is finally released, one the most important technical requirements that is expected to figure in the tender’s official request for proposals (RFP)–now delayed until as late as June–is [u]the requirement that any fighter participating in the competition be equipped with an active electronically scanning array (AESA) radar.[/u] “We are ninety-five percent or better confident that having an AESA onboard is going to be a make-or-break condition of bidding on this program–it is the price of admission,” said one Western industry representative familiar with the program.

This creates a complicated scenario for some of the companies bidding, and has precipitated strange and previously unheard-of combinations of aircraft and radar suppliers.

Normally, integrating a new radar onto an airframe for the sake of just one customer is prohibitively expensive because of the nonrecurring costs, but the prospect of the unusually large sale of 126 aircraft to India–larger than any other export sale in more than 17 years–creates enough economies of scale that this issue is moot.
The good news is that the deal is so big there is a bonanza of a prize waiting for whichever firm is able to win the competition. The bad news is that the traditional features of Indian aircraft sales are an anathema to most of the firms vying for the tender. Those familiar with Indian defense procurements describe them as an arduous five years or more process that involve mountains of hand-written paperwork, fighting uphill battles against a stultifying bureaucracy, excessive regulations that tie companies in knots, labyrinthine cost and financial accounting requirements and all manner of other obstacles that seem designed to prevent a procurement from ever being successfully completed.

In the past, the major suppliers of weapons to India have been Russian defense enterprises, and a myriad of shadowy linkages between Russian and Indian middleman have normally been the mechanism by which these headaches are resolved, but this tack will not work if the Indians wish to retain the participation of most of the major Western firms on this tender.

The Line-Up
Provided the process can be made more user-friendly, there are several major players maneuvering for position in this competition.
Lockheed Martin’s venerable F-16 is the most popular aircraft in the region, but as of today only one model of the aircraft is equipped with an AESA, the Northrop Grumman (NG) AN/APG-80 that was developed for the F-16E/F Block 60. If Lockheed Martin were to sell some variant of the Block 60 to the IAF they would have to pay the United Arab Emirates (UAE) an approximate 7 percent per aircraft royalty, as the desert kingdom funded the development of this configuration and has resale commission rights.😮 Another solution would be for Northrup Grumman to retrofit the AN/APG-80 to the F-16C/D Block 50, making it a “Block 50 double plus” variant, but this involves costs and engineering problems that are not tackled lightly–most notably adding a liquid-cooling system.

The other U.S. competitor is the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which the Chicago-based planemaker is working hard to promote since there are no export customers yet for the new E/F configuration. “India is the largest fighter deal since the beginning of the 1990s,” said Boeing Asia/Pacific regional vice president Mark Kronenberg here at Changi. “It’s got everybody’s attention.”
The Super Hornet is equipped with the Raytheon AN/APG-79, which is currently undergoing some of its final operational testing.
Raytheon representatives explained that the APG-79 model is the embodiment of all of the technologies and design concepts developed for their bid on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Currently, Raytheon is contracted to build a total of 232 units, which also provides the economies of scale necessary to be a competitive bidder.

Several years ago the Saab JAS-39 Gripen was considered the odds-on favorite for the Indian tender:eek:, and was at one time the only Western competitor in the race. Gripen International officials told Aviation International News that they were briefed here at Changi this week by the visiting chief of the IAF as to the requirements of the soon-to-be-issued tender. Gripen representatives would not comment as to the details, except to say that–based on the chief’s comments–“the Gripen and the [IAF Sukhoi-made] Su-30MKI would be a nice combination for India.” [u]Ericsson, which supplies most of the electronics for the JAS-39, is bidding the Not Only a Radar (or NORA), which is supposed to contain some 1,000 transmit/receive (T/R) modules.[/u]

One of the real wild cards in the race is Dassault. A delegation accompanying French President Jacques Chirac on a three-day state visit to India this week included Dassault CEO Charles Edelstenne, who intimated what had been widely anticipated for some months now: that his firm would be following up its withdrawal of the Mirage 2000-5 from consideration in the M-MRCA tender with the offer of proposing the Rafale in its place.

“We explained that keeping the Mirage 2000 production line waiting [for five more years] would be too costly, but the Indian authorities obviously are not certain about this yet,” he told the French financial daily Les Echos. He told local Indian and international media that he is in New Delhi to “clarify the situation.” Although Edelstenne made no formal offer for an aircraft in place of the Mirage he did say that “we are waiting for the tender to be issued and to see whether we can bid with some other aircraft,” which could only be the Rafale.

The Russian Legacy:
The biggest contender of all, however, may still be RSK-MiG in Russia. Over the last several decades, Russia has been India’s reliable and most consistent arms provider. India received massive technical assistance from Russia–including setting up a series production line at the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) plant in Nasik. The IAF was one of the first foreign customers to receive export versions of the MiG-29 fighter in the 1980s.

Most notable among all of Russia’s cooperative programs with India has been the Su-30MKI that was designed and manufactured for New Delhi in the second half of the 1990s. Former Irkut general director Aleksei Fedorov masterminded this development and he is now the general director of RSK-MiG which is now offering India the MiG-35.

The MiG-35 is to be an ambitious leap. It takes the MiG-29 and redesigns its structure, giving the aircraft an all-new digital internal infrastructure, and engines with a thrust-vector control package similar to that of the Su-30MKI. Press releases and public statements on the MiG-35 have also stated that the Russians will not be outdone and will offer an AESA. The question is whose AESA, since none of the Russian radar design bureaus plan to have a model ready in the time frame that the Indian RFP is anticipated to dictate.

The dark horse candidate in this case is the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Elta EL/M-2052. IAI is showing this radar for the first time at Changi and although its spokesman will not confirm that the company is bidding with MiG on the Indian tender, it does state that the MiG-29/35 is one of the more near-term possibilities. The model seen here at the airshow is set up for a liquid-cooling system like most other AESAs, but IAI engineers claim that a version of this radar for the MiG-29 would be a smaller array, small enough that it could use an air-cooling system. Liquid-cooling systems can be a maintenance headache, so this is not a small accomplishment on the Israeli’s part.

Technology versus Politics:
Technology is not the only issue involved. Politically, the current administration in Washington wants to cement closer relations with India. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force would like to have HAL and other Indian firms in the business of operating and supporting U.S.-made aircraft. Having a huge F-16 base in India would allow Lockheed Martin to outsource much of its F-16 after-sales support and free up its engineering workforce to focus on the F-35 JSF.

But can India really afford to turn its back on its long-time friend Russia without so much as a by-your-leave? Additionally, the costs of adding a modern, U.S.-made aircraft into the Indian logistics and maintenance system (which is well-equipped to handle the Mirage and MiG-29 fighters that are currently operated in the IAF) would be a huge, on-going expense. India’s military and political leaders would have to weigh the political and technological benefits against these considerable costs.

One predicted version of events has the Indians upping their buy from 126 to 200 fighters and then buying 100 MiG-29s to keep in good stead with the Russians, plus 100 F-16s or some other Western aircraft in order to provide their industry with a new infusion of technology. This solves a number of political problems for the Indians, and would also give the IAF one of the most powerful fighter forces in the region.

The problem with this “deciding not to decide” option is that it means another 74 aircraft must be purchased, which is not a small sum. Officially, none of the Western firms vying for this contract have been told that the finances for this tender have been increased to allow for this 60-plus percent increase in the buy, so for the moment the contract still appears to be a winner-take-all 126 aircraft deal. Much of this remains speculation until the official request for proposal from the Indian government is released.

“Five–maybe seven–years might be the full scale of this procurement,” said one industry insider with knowledge of Indian defense buying. “And after all of this the answer may still be ‘no, we will not buy anything but will instead keep trying to build our own aircraft.’” The outcome is almost entirely unpredictable–just as a year or more ago the idea that the F-16 or F/A-18 would ever be sold to India was unthinkable.

http://www.ainonline.com/Publications/asian/asian_06/d2indias1.htm