“But why are the Army and USMC behaving like they are from two completely different contries?

If the US government bought only Cobras (for example) then surely that would save the country millions in seperate purchase costs, logistics, spares, training etc?”

Because they had two different sets of operational and design requirements, that’s why.

The USMC needed a helo that was optimised for CAS, to protect their own soldiers from enemy light armour & infantry, with only a secondary anti-tank role (also as part of CAS). This emphasizes maneuverability and point-point speed. Keeping the Cobra and upgrading it fit the requirements perfectly.

When the Army was looking at what became the Apache, they were looking for a helo optimized for the full-European-war, mass tank battle scenario.

Thus they wanted a large armoured helo designed to carry as many anti-tank missiles as possible over the Warsaw Pact/USSR front lines. This had to be able to withstand a hit from a Soviet 23mm round, and to carry the battle away from the battlefront. This emphasizes armor and payload weight.

An upgraded Cobra would have not been considered sufficient for this role, as even the Z-Cobra is still less armoured than the Apache, so a new aircraft was needed.

Their remaining light Cobras were perfect for their own CAS and troop helo/SAR escort roles, so they were kept until the late 1990s.

This means that the two requirements were actually different enough to require two different aircraft.

The progressive development of the Cobra has preserved the maneuverability and point-point speed while increasing the payload.

The AH-1Z contract was to “convert 180 Sea Cobras/Cobras to AH-1Z”, but as the conversion cost is not much less than new-builds would be, there is an increasing push to have most of the 180 be new-builds.

At this time, it is planned for 40 new-builds ~half-way through the program.

The original UH-1Y plan was “convert 100 UH-1Ns to UH-1Y”, but with the heavy tasking in Iraq and the similar costs, that was changed to “90 new, 10 conversions”.

ok, 24 days before I was born, then.

The USMC considered a navalized Apache in the early years of the AH-64 program.

Their determination was that upgrading the AH-1J to the AH-1T (many were new-build, I believe) was more cost-effective when considering payload, range, acquisition costs and life-cycle costs.

The AH-1W has the same engines as the AH-64, but the 2-blade rotor does not produce the same lift.

The AH-1T to AH-1W upgrade produced an aircraft with ~3/4 the payload, nearly identical range, better speed, and a slightly lower maintenance load… at ~2/3 the cost per aircraft.

The AH-1Z offers the same payload as the AH-64 (due to the new 4-blade rotor and new transmission), the same weapons set (but with AIM-9 Sidewinders for “self-defense” vs the AH-64’s modified Stingers… which are shorter-ranged and slower than the AIM-9), and an avionics suite at least as advanced and complete as the AH-64… and still flies faster and fully as far.

No, the AH-1Z does not have a radar like the AH-64 does… but in the modern low-intensity battlefield, that radar is less of an advantage than it would have been in the large-scale battle with lots of target armored vehicles environment the radar was designed for.

It is much more a matter of testing and de-bugging the new radar, data-links, operator interfaces, and signal processing avionics than anything to do with the airframe.

Yes, they do need to make sure their wind tunnel etc. work was correct for the new engines, propellors, and radome, but that shouldn’t take long.

I know that all of the avionics have been bench-tested, but for some reason modern computer-managed electronics always seems to generate lots of bugs and flaws after being installed in the airframe.

The Red Baron’s body was, however, examined by medical personnel… who wrote up their examination for the records.

They described the bullet path in detail, and when recently pieced together with all existing descriptions of his aircraft’s flight path and maneuvers, very strongly supports the “lone rifleman” as the only one who could have put a bullet into the recorded wound track. The other candidates were all in the wrong positions to do it.

One round from a bolt-action rifle is ~90% probable for the immediate cause of death, although the other factors and persons all worked together to put him in that place at that time.

But was it really designated “XB-58”?

On Joe Baugher’s site, http://home.att.net/~jbaugher2/b58.html
it is listed as:

“The first B-58, at that time officially designated YB/RB-58 and serialed 55-0660, was completed in late August, and was rolled out of the factory on September 4, 1956. It had little in the way of operational equipment fitted, the available space being taken up primarily by test equipment. 55-0660 made its maiden flight on November 11, 1956, taking off from the Convair Fort Worth facilities at Carswell AFB, Texas. The crew of three consisted of B. A. Erickson, pilot, John. D. McEachern systems specialist, and Charles P. Harrison as flight test engineer. The underfuselage pod was not fitted. The maximum speed reached on the first flight was Mach 0.9. Supersonic flight was first attained on December 30, at which time Mach 1.17 was attained.”

As he lists all serial numbers, and gives detailed write-ups on each version, I suspect that he did a bit of research in the USAF files, which might indicate that there never was a “XB-58″… at least not until the 1962 redesignation occurred.

I’m not sure, but I think I see F4D Skyray, the one with the short nose and a flat windscreen-center behind & to the right of the piano player.

I believe I also see a TV-1/TV-2/T2V-1 (USN T-33 Shooting Star trainer) behind & to the left of the piano player:

The US Navy used the T-33 as a land-based trainer starting in 1949. It was designated the TV-2, but was redesignated the T-33B in 1962. The Navy operated some ex-USAF P-80Cs as the TO-1, changed to the TV-1 about a year later. A carrier capable version of the P-80/T-33 family was subsequently developed by Lockheed, eventually leading to the late 1950s to 1970s T2V-1/T-1A SeaStar.

The T2V-1 never worked well, and the USN ordered a large number of 2-seat trainer versions of the swept-wing F9F-8 Cougar, designated F9F-8T (later TF-9J). The F9F-8T was a two-seat trainer version of the F9F-8.

Work on a two-seat trainer version of the Cougar began in November of 1953 under the company designation of Design 105. This was a company-initiated project intended to meet anticipated future Navy requirements for a combat-capable two-seat trainer to serve in fleet squadrons alongside single-seat Cougars. It was anticipated by Grumman that the two-seat Cougar could also serve as a carrier-landing trainer and as a trainer to familiarize crews with inflight refuelling. It was to retain the same armament as the single-seat version.

Initially, the Navy envisaged no requirement for the Grumman Design 105, believing that the Lockheed T2V-1 SeaStar would fill all its requirements for a carrier-capable two-seat trainer. Nevertheless, Grumman was authorized to complete an F9F-8 airframe (BuNo 141667) as a two seater under the designation YF9F-8T. To provide space for the second cockpit, the forward fuselage was extended by 34 inches. The two crew members (student in front, instructor in rear) sat in tandem under a large rearward-sliding canopy. An auxiliary windshield was provided internally ahead of the instructor’s seat, which enabled the aircraft to be flown with a partially-open canopy. To save weight, two cannon were removed and the ammunition capacity was reduced. The first flight of the YF9F-8T took place on April 4, 1956.

In the meantime, the T2V-1 Sea Star had run into lots of problems with its boundary-layer control system, a feature which was in the mid-1950s still a relatively new innovation. In addition, the T2V-1 was unarmed and could not be used as a weapons delivery trainer. This led the Navy to take a fresh look at the two-seat Cougar, and they eventually acquired 399 production F9F-8Ts between July 1956 and February 1960.