I personally prefer girls who like sex…

BTW, besides bein beautiful and intelligent, my baby enjoys airshows pretty much.. We climb cockpits and talk to pilots together. She even recognizes a Fulcrum from F-16 and her favorite aircraft is F/A-22 and Harrier II. Can you really wish more? Talks about RM12 vs F404 are reserved for this forum, anyway.

Wow I want one like that. 🙁

21st Century Combined Arms Operations: Integrating an Air Component

The problem this paper attempts to address is that today’s battlefields heavily rely on an air-component and combined arms philosophy that has significant gaps both in theory and when applied in practice. CAS (Combat Air Support) aircraft and attack helicopters have shown themselves as highly crucial in the modern battlefield, clearly demonstrated over Iraq during the two Gulf Wars. However, they have been a major issue of concern on a number of fronts, from being too expensive, having separate logistic chains from other combined arms components, and having a fundamental delink in tactical communications because of differing operational radii. Another issue is that the role of CAS aircraft have tend to be a reactive rather than proactive, – the controller calls in air support, rather than CAS aircraft proactively fighting the battle. This paper describes the problem, attempts to bridge and define the doctrine, and design an aircraft that can fulfill that doctrine.

For the last 60 years we have not moved much further than Rommel’s North Africa campaign. Even with network centric warfare, the basic doctrine has not changed, the employment of armor, infantry, artillery and airpower are essentially the same. The goal of this paper is to attempt to build beyond this – beyond the combined arms operational concepts rehashed for the last 60 years to a new standard. The key salient is airpower. is not a reactive support force. In fact, the word “Combat Air Support” is inherently flawed – the airwar should be an arm onto itself of a combined arms military force, and a proactive force rather than ‘support’.

To conceptualize this, consider 4 elements – armor, motorized infantry, artillery and CA-AC (Combined Arms Air Component. NOTE: I shall from hence forth not use the term CAS but rather CA-AC for the reason outlined above). Now to explain the fundamental dynamics between the forces, consider a medieval army – one with:
1)foot soldiers
2)heavy armored knights / war elephants / Roman cataphracts
3)archers
4)Light cavalry

For the last 60 years we have assumed that the tank played the role of the cavalry, without distinguishing between the light and the heavy cavalry, creating a triad rather than a quadrate. Yet, light cavalry was employed differently from heavy cavalry for most of known military history.
Consider the employment of the medieval heavily armored knight – always moving in closed formation; often employed to charge and break enemy lines. Can be susceptible to well disciplined and well-formed infantry with pikes. Countering such infantry, heavy cavalry moved on to incorporate ever greater ranged assault and ever greater armor. Consider how well this fits the role that tanks have played and how they have evolved. How tanks, like their erstwhile predecessors also are best employed en mass and not individually. How they are used to drive a wedge into enemy lines, but can be devastated when well trained and well formed infantry can effectively deploy their anti-tank arsenal (i.e. pikes). Consider how ranged attack and greater armor have increasingly become important with the increasing lethality of anti-tank weapons.

However, if modern armor equates with heavy cavalry, then what can be considered as the light cavalry? What can optimize mobility and surprise rather than firepower and armor? Clearly, not the modern MBT. Perhaps the combined sequel of weapons in the modern battlefield made light cavalry obsolete. Or perhaps there is such a weapon system that is merely waiting to be found. This paper finds claims the latter and equates traditional light cavalry with what it calls Combined Arms Air Component ‘CA-AC’.

Let us now transpose our medieval army to the modern battlefield:

1) foot soldiers translate to motorized infantry
2) heavy cavalry armored knights / war elephants translate to tanks
3) Light cavalry translate to CA-AC
4) Archers translate to Artillery

These four components should, ideally be part of one integrated army and work with seamless operational unity. To be truly effective, they would need to be employed organically, and share the same logistics base and operational deployment.

The Modern Compromise

Today’s multi-role aircraft attempt to compromise between a fighter, a deep strike and a CAS aircraft. The disconnect between them is particularly stark vis-a-vis CAS, where a cheap, slow flying but agile aircraft is needed, which does not need to fly at anywhere near the sound barrier, or have a sophisticated radar. What is need is an aircraft that can fly low, maneuver at below tree top height, retain an ability to ‘hang in the air’ when needed, and land on the shortest strips or gravel or paddy field. Instead of this, what we see is that combat aircraft are increasingly becoming more complex, larger, poor performers at low altitudes and low speeds and able to land only on specialized runways.

Further, while in an overly mismatched battlefield, one side can dedicate a portion of its air force assets to CAS, in a more even battle, airforces focus almost all of their assets in winning the air-war first. Given the cost and value of fighter aircraft, this makes sense. However, given the need for a truly combined arms operation and a cheap CAS aircraft, it makes less sense to have the ground forces commander left without CAS, when CAS can be the difference between a defeat and a victory.

The present response to fill this widening gap is to increase the component of attack helicopters. However, helicopters fundamentally are more complex, have far less range and are more expensive to build on a payload delivered basis. Moreover, as we shall later see, todays helicopters cannot fulfill a complete vision of a seamless combined arms operation. They have separate logistics chains, separate tactical deployment requirements and are very low on endurance.

The cost of an Apache AH-64D is exorbitant – Greece paid as much as $56.25 million per piece. Whether this includes training, logistics and support or not, it illustrates an ever increasing cost of creating a platform that can, in essence, deliver an anti-tank missile to the battlefield. The best candidates out there today are the A-10, the Su-25, and the AH-1 Cobra. The A-10 cannot be employed organically with a battalion because of the complex logistics and necessity of a landing strip. The Su-25 is less complex and can land on worse terrain but again, it would be a stretch to consider it to be deployed organically with a brigade size force. The AH-1 fits the bill on landing capabilities as well as simple logistics (but could be better, i.e. Fuel) but becomes problematic in terms of endurance.

If we look at smaller aircraft like the Tucano and arm it with anti-tank missiles, it would lack armor, and it is not optimized for short takeoffs and landings. However, it is too complex and expensive and uses jet fuel rather than diesel, and therefore would not integrate well into a battalion. To really fill this role, we would in essence, need to design a new aircraft. But before we do that, let us consider what Combined arms operation is, and what the role of CA-AC would be.

Defining the Role of the Combined Arms Air Component, CA-AC

True Combined arms operation is not about calling in air support. In my opinion, it is about having a military force, one arm of which is CAS aircraft, or as we shall call it, CA-AC. Thus we would have Armor, Motorized Infantry, Artillery and Air Cavalry. All shall share one logistics base and one tactical deployment basis. In other words, an aircraft designed for this role will run on diesel, take-off and land from ordinary fields and road strips, and fire the same ammunition (say tow missiles and 12.5mm) that the logistics supply chain provides to the other components. This at least is the doctrinal ideal that we wish to reach.

To further elaborate, flight endurance, flying below / at tree top level, the ability to fly slow when necessary and maneuver rapidly are also key characteristics. Flight endurance is necessary because, if the air arm is to stay with a rapidly moving armored force, constant preparation of landing and refueling is not possible. Flight endurance must approximately be aimed at between 5-6 hours at cruise speeds.

Low flight profiles will help evade enemy fire as well as keep the battle ground-bound rather than attracting enemy fighters. A slow and low flying small aircraft is more likely than not, to even show up on a fighter aircaft’s radar. This will be key in staying out of the air campaign. The ability to fly slow will help on a number of fronts: enable short take-offs and landings, help stay with the pace of the armor and other ground components, identify and attack enemy units, and help with endurance by being a more fuel efficient method of staying up in the air. The aircraft must also be able to maneuver rapidly and be nimble enough to shoot and evade enemy fire. Designing such an aircraft should not be beyond the realm of possibility. One possible solution is outlined below.

Concept Design of a CA-AC Aircraft

The following key characteristics / roles have been identified:

1. Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (VTOL/STOL).
2. Be able to withstand a short burst of up to 12.7 caliber weapons in vital areas. Be invulnerable to small arms fire. Kevlar panels used for armoring.
3. Be able to carry up to 6 TOW or Hellfire or similar weapons for a stand-off anti-armour role.
4. Have a 12.7 mm main gun with about 50 rounds of ammunition.
5. Capable of flying at exceedingly low speeds and maintaining high manoeuvrability at such speeds. Speed range of 10 mph to 200 mph.
6. Ability to operate at night. FLIR, nose mounted.
7. Engine Runs on diesel. Turbo Prop single engined aircraft.
8. Ease of maintenance and a basic low-cost solution.

To make Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) possible from unprepared strips, we propose that the aircraft have a an angled wing and an angled engine.

Another proposition is to have large, very low aspect ratio, thick and slightly forward sweeping wings (by about 5 degrees). This has shown to decrease take offs and landings as well as enable even slower flight (while maintaining agility and maneuver). This will also help towards condition 5, particularly towards the kind of agility required for Nap of the Earth flight. Lastly, the aircraft should have a strengthened under carriage, landing gear with large low pressure tires and air brakes.

Mounting the wings high would give great visibility for the ground attack role and will aerodynamically provide better streamlining for cruising flight, more lift at less drag for climb and glide efficiency. Clearance will also be better and a useful attribute in semi/unprepared landing strips.

The use of composite armor and new materials like Kevlar should make protection against up to .50 caliber weapons easier. The wing design characteristics of thick, low-aspect ratio wings should also ensure greater survivability.

The attached diagrams illustrate sketches of such an aircraft.

**** More later. Note: none of this is final in anyway, but a work in progress.