Excatly, the notion that the US had some dark plot to kill-off TSR2 has floated around for decades but it doesn’t bear close scrutiny. It’s just another part of the tale which has been allowed to run unchecked, in order to maintain the idea that there was more to TSR2’s cancellation than there really was. As you say, there was never any serious prospect of exporting the TSR2 in significant numbers and I’m always amazed at how some well-informed commentators (especially Beamont) often hinted (sometimes more than hinted!) at American influence. Okay, he was one of TSR2’s strongest supporters of course, but it’s a little sad that he couldn’t simply accept that the aircraft’s demise was simply due to its cost. Even he was willing to acknowledge just how bad the over-complicated design and production process had become, but I guess that he was a man from an era when it was still believed that anything was possible and cost was never a consideration. As has been said before, TSR2’s fatal flaw was that it came along at the crucial moment when Britain was finally forced to accept that we couldn’t afford to punch above our weight any longer. As you also mention, if the idea of America killing-off supposedly competing designs was plausible, then why didn’t they do likewise with other projects? I don’t recall any dark plots to destroy the Comet – they simply forged-ahead with a better aircraft of their own (the 707). Likewise, when an aircraft has such a small export potential, there’s no reason why America would have any interest in destroying it. Beamont acknowledges that a delegation was sent to the UK to look at TSR2 with a view to possibly buying it, and while it may well be true that the US used knowledge gleaned during the visit to eventually develop their F-111 (albeit in very broad terms, as the two aircraft clearly share very little in common), it simply doesn’t follow that they also made any active attempt to kill-off TSR2. It simply wouldn’t be worth the effort.
It’s kinda like I mentioned before – if there was any foundation to any of the dark plot theories it’s very unlikely (almost impossible in my view) that after forty years, not so much as one person has come forward with any facts to support them. We know from experience that if anyone has any proverbial mud to sling, then they do it, and yet there’s been nothing. It was possibly understandable back in the ‘sixties that some writers promoted the “TSR2 Killed Off Scandal” when there was some political (and financial) mileage to milk out of the story, but surely by now we ought to be able to take a more balanced view and have the good sense to accept that its demise was down to our own industry’s deficiencies, not some external or internal political plot.
I would certainly be more inclined to take the word of the people who worked on or around warton
So would I, but what “word” is there? Surely, if there was any evidence to support any of this stuff, at least a bit (if not all) of it would have reached the public domain by now? People saying what they heard or saw is one thing, but any factual material to support their claims and/or memories? Nothing. So, you make your choice; you can believe the old stories or you can conclude that in the absence of anything other than talk (and very vague, unsubstantiated talk at that), it’s nonsense, born out of clouded memories, emotion, political motivation, sentiment, call it what you will. I’d be delighted to be proved wrong as it would make a great story if there was indeed more to it but there’s nothing to support so much as a word of it and, as I’ve said, if there was, you could be pretty certain that forty years on, we would have heard about it!
Some of the comments on that video are definitely interesting, but perhaps not for the more obvious reasons. It’s quite remarkable that even Beamont seems happy to make vague, throw-away comments about how “the Americans” were supposedly keen to kill-off TSR2 because they saw it “as a threat” but there’s no evidence to support this, and of course there was never any potentially huge market for the TSR2/F-111 in any case. So it’s very difficult to see why America would be particularly concerned about an aircraft which was never going to be manufactured in significant numbers other than for the RAF. The Aussie purchase was merely a potential source of an additional (and very welcome) sale, as Beamont later says. Once again, it’s an issue which is loaded with opinion and emotion, but where is any evidence to support this theory that America was determined to destroy this terrible “wonder plane” and more to the point, why would they bother? Just doesn’t add up.
Both airworthy prototypes is pushing it a bit
Not at all, there were two airworthy prototypes (although only one had flown) at the point of cancellation, so why is that pushing it a bit?
It wasnt just the destruction of the jigs and mockup. all of the technical drawings? (i know a chap who worked on the three axis machining used for the wing) and had said that government men came to his workspace, demanded all technical drawings, jigs and even the tools used to cut the parts.
Just the sort of thing I was getting at previously. Knowing a guy who says something happened doesn’t mean that it actually happened. I seriously doubt if someone who was employed on machining processes would be afforded any information on who was visiting the premises or why. Just wouldn’t make sense. Likewise, if anyone turned-up on the factory floor it would be management, not a “government man” – the story just doesn’t add-up and these stories never do. But you can see how this story drifts into conspiracy therories so easily.
As for why only a couple of TSR2’s survived, I think it’s quite an achievement to have saved both airworthy prototypes – that’s a much better record than many other aircraft, and if you look into the history of many other significant aircraft, you find that quite a few of them only survived destruction by very slim margins.
There’s nothing mysterious or sinister about the TSR2 project. It’s just that writers have encouraged this notion, largely because they lazily rely on re-used information from earlier accounts and because many of these early stories on the saga had political agendas which they shamelessly painted into the story even though they were specious. Consequently, the conspiracy theories have been allowed to continue and develop but ultimately they’ve all been without foundation.
Nashio, the story about the way in which the existing TSR2 artefacts were destroyed is one of the key areas that gets mis-reported time and time again in books, magazines and web material.
Clearly, as has been said above, once the project was cancelled, the material would all be removed as quickly as possible in order to make way for other lucrative projects. English Electric and Vickers (BAC) were both very busy around that period therefore they would have had absolutely no interest in keeping anything which wasn’t necessary. Likewise, it’s common practise to dispose of unwanted items – manufacturers don’t hold-on to construction jigs forever just in case they might need them again sometime in the future. As for burning the mock-ups well of course they did – they were made of wood. What else would they do with them?! I always chuckle when I read emotive tales of how the mock-up was burned as if this was some sort of crime. For heavens sake, what did these writers imagine they’d do with a useless mock-up? Hang it from the factory roof?!
The way in which this story is often portrayed, you think that car loads of mysterious Men in Black raced around the country demanding that every trace of the TSR2 was eradicated overnight. That simply didn’t happen and any suggestion that anything like that ever happened is just fantasy. I’ve followed-up various stories about this kind of thing and they never lead anywhere. They’ve all been based on gossip, “Chinese whispers” and second-hand information.
In any case, the remarkable aspect of this particular rumour is that nobody has had the sense to follow the logic of the idea to a conclusion. Of course, if all the jigs, equipment and prototypes had somehow been saved (heaven-knows where, or why) then what would this have achieved? Would it mean that there was some risk of a bunch of employees assembling an aircraft overnight and flying it out through the factory door? Nope, course not. So the only possible motive for destroying everything would have been if the Labour government wanted to ensure that a Conservative government couldn’t restart the programme. But why would they want to do that? Surely, if a new Conservative government wanted to bankrupt the country on a point of principle and re-start the TSR2 programme years later, then the Labour Party would have been delighted to sit-back and watch them do it.
As ever, the reality was rather more mundane – the whole lot was junked because that was the practical thing to do, once the programme was cancelled. The problem is that far too many romanticist writers have continually tried to make the story into an exciting conspiracy tale when it just isn’t one, simple as that.
Proctor – it’s an interesting point that you raise. I guess one aspect is that there’s something in the psyche of older people that recognises the crucial value of warplanes (largely because of the Battle of Britain) and maybe that has something to do with it, but then there’s also a wider sentiment for the loss of projects which clearly held a great deal of potential. I think this is something to do with a sympathy for Britain’s gradual “loss of Empire” and a certain sadness when an ambitious programme cannot be pursued because the country is no longer in a position to support it. It’s that old “what might have been” attitude. However I think this point only applies to older people. Why youngsters also seem to be fascinated by the TSR2 is probably simply because it looks impressive, and in that sense I don’t think Britain’s any different to other countries – you get just as much interest in the Avro Arrow in Canada for example. I suppose the situation with the space industry in Australia is a tad different because it was largely derived from overseas and its loss was essentially a financial set-back, whereas the TSR2 was an indigenous project which reflected the skills and expertise of the people who created it, therefore it’s probably all the more disheartening when it is abandoned?
Thanks for the feedback guys – much appreciated. I think the folks who designed the Airfix kit must have had some eyesight problems. Although the kit looks like a Canberra from a distance, the closer you look, the worse it is. The tailplane-to-fuselage joint is totally mis-placed (it touches the base of the fin at one point), and these photos help to establish its proper location.
Sadly, they’ve screwed-up on the wing tip shape too, the forward portion of the engine fairings, the lower nose, the nose glazed section, the base of the fin, the tip tanks, and the canopy. They’re just the main faults! Oh well, nothing like a challenge… 😀
Thanks for those, they are a big help!
Hope the magnificent beats is keeping well and we will see her at a few shows this year.
Incidentally, when the time comes for a repaint, can we have it back in the old silver finish? Looked so much nicer back then!
I was under the impression that it’s still at Leuchars somewhere. The display pilot who used to fly Black Mike (Archie Liggot) was flying the photo ship from which the photo of XV570 is taken in the shots above.
With all respect, I think you are putting a bias on the events which while admirable in terms of forgiving the imperfect knowledge of the AM Mandarins … fails actually to recognise that they actually made the right decision
er… well no, that’s what I did say, or at least I thought I did! The right decision was made – TSR2 had to be dumped no matter how good it was, for the reasons which I mentioned previously.
The “obsession” with TSR2 is certainly partly due to the aircraft’s aesthetic appeal (as alertken says) but the other significant factor was that it was one of only a few ambitious projects which got very close to the production stage, which gave the aircraft even more mystique and charisma – the “what might have been” syndrome. If you combine that with the endless books and magazine features which try to paint the project as a dark political scandal, you can see how it would (and does) attract plenty of fascination.
Depends how you look at it. The Spey was the best engine for the FAA’s Phantoms as it enabled the aircraft to be operated from the existing carrier. The down-side was that it was inferior to the J-79 at higher levels; the F-4K/M had slightly greater drag thanks to the wider and deeper (at the back) fuselage, in order to accommodate the larger engines. Accordingly, it could be argued that the RAF would have been better-off without the Spey but naturally it would have been impractical to order a mixed fleet – even though that’s what the RAF ended-up with many years later! In actual fact there wasn’t a whole lot to choose between the engines.
Some interesting points there. I’d be inclined to add that:-
It’s largely irrelevant whether the Soviet threat was real or not. Point is, it was perceived as being very real at the time.
It would be foolish to assume that Britain’s defence expenditure was significantly increased because of any industry pressure. If anything, the reverse was the case.
Nuclear bombs are cheap if you accept the “bang for buck” theory. However the basics of nuclear weaponry is not cheap to develop. The British Government spent a huge amount on the programmes which they could ill afford, such was the Soviet threat (real or otherwise).
As has been said, the fact that four V-Bomber designs were created does not mean that any one could have been chosen at the time. The Sperrin and Valiant were essentially separate generations as mentioned, therefore the only choice could ultimately have been between Vulcan and Victor, but having already financed their development (because there was no guarantee that both would perform as predicted), there was no major financial advantage in making the choice. It would be wrong to assume that the Air Ministry was lazily ordering unnecessary equipment. Quite the contrary was the case – the country was virtually bankrupt and faced with the Soviet threat which might seem a tad unreal and unlikely now in retrospect, but it was very real at the time.
TSR2 didn’t have a “limited tactical capability” – it wasn’t limited at all. It did have a future but it was simply unaffordable. Ultimately we opted for the Buccaneer which, if anything, was even more limited, but performed admirably.
No definitive news on my Canberra book yet I’m afraid. The Lightning book’s finished – should be out by August and it seems to be okay but it’s far from perfect – at least it’s been a learning exercise for the next one. I’m getting favourable noises from the publisher about Canberra though so hopefully I’ll have some good news pretty soon and I can get to work on a really good all-colour book on Canberras… oh dear, where would I start? Oh yeah, that garage in Preston…:D
Yup, I gave permission for Tony Thornborough to use it for the book. Long time ago now!
Taken from the cold and windy ramp of a Hercules:D
some of mine:-




I agree – the TSR2’s significance has always been traditionally over-inflated. A great design for sure but as has been said many times subsequently, the Buccaneer was just as good for the role.
I think the reasons why the TSR2 has earned a sort of pseudo-legendary status is largely because of books and magazine features, many of which have simply been repetitions of previous works, and the natural inclination to exclude the mundane in order to add a bit of mystery and intrigue to the story, has meant that the simple facts of the story have often been overlooked in order to dwell upon the dark conspiracy theories and to confirm one’s political beliefs.
Likewise, I have to say that much as the late Roland Beamont was undoubtedly a great guy, he did more than his own fair share of over-inflating, never resisting the opportunity to paint the TSR2 as some magnificent design which had supposedly been killed by politics. As his own accounts show, it was more complicated than that, but it’s become a sort of accepted wisdom to simply conclude that TSR2 was destroyed by evil political manoeuvring. Naturally, it sounds much more exciting than the truth but the result is that the aircraft becomes rather more than it actually was.
You mention the Spitfire and it is a similar situation. The people who designed, built and flew the Hurricane probably never worked-out why the Spitfire always stole the public’s attention!
Hmm, interesting points – I’ll try my best – here goes! :-
Firstly, I don’t recall any question as to the TSR2’s potential capabilities. At the time of cancellation it held the promise of being an ideal aircraft. There was certainly no perceived shortfall of conventional capability but then the aircraft was primarily designed to carry Red Beard and WE.177 and conventional ordnance would have been a secondary consideration. The Buccaneer was also designed around an atomic bomb (Red Beard) although this fact was shrouded by euphamisms for many years, back in the days when the media was expected not to directly refer to nuclear capability.
There was very significant interest in TSR2 from Australia but ultimately the RAAF was simply offered a better deal by America. The papers in Australia’s Public Records Office confirm this. The oft-used story that Mountbatten effectively killed-off Australian interests seems to have been a red herring.
Ultimately, TSR2 was cancelled simply because it was unaffordable. Everything else which has been attached to the story is largely gossip, sentiment and speculation.
As for the V-Force, it’s true that the purchase of three aircraft types was a classic case of overkill, but at the time there was little choice. When the aircraft entered the design stage there was no confidence that any one of the aircraft would meet the Air Staff’s specifications therfore it was necessary to continue with all three – all four in fact for a while, as there was also the Sperrin in the initial stages. The Valiant was essentially an “interim” aircraft, therefore the only real choice which could have been made was to purchase either the Vulcan or Victor but with a great deal of industry and political pressure (and no significant advantages/deficiencies peculiar to either aircraft) a mixed fleet was the best compromise, bearing in mind that most of the design and development work had already been paid-for by this stage. Ultimately, the Vulcan proved to be the more versatile and suitable aircraft but the Victor eventually became a valuable asset in another role – as a tanker, when the Valiant fleet had to be withdrawn (thanks to the deterioration of the Valiant airframes which had been manufactured from an unsuitable alloy). With the benefit of hindsight the RAF’s strike needs could have been comfortably met by just one aircraft – the Valiant Mk.2 – but of course hindsight always enables us to see things more clearly!
I’m not sure that history confirms your view that the Soviet threat was not as strong as we believe. Indeed, the urgency with which the V-Force was developed was in direct response to a very serious perceived threat – not the wishes of the aerospace industry. The situation may have been slightly different in the US but as far as Britain was concerned, the Government was prepared to almost bankrupt itself in order to get a credible deterrent as quickly as possible. I don’t think anyone imagines for a minute that Britain would have spent such a huge amount of money (which we didn’t have!) in order to develop an atomic bomb, a thermonuclear bomb and no less than three (four, technically-speaking) aircraft with which to deliver it, unless the situation was perceived to be deadly serious. Clearly, they would have much preferred to spend the money on more politically-popular projects!
The TSR2 had the advantage of coming-along much later than the V-Force and with the benefits of more advanced technical knowledge and design expertise, as a Canberra replacement it was undoubtedly an ideal solution. The project was ultimately doomed to failure because:-
1/ Britain’s aerospace industry still thought the Government had a bottomless pocket and that development programmes could continue unchecked, regardless of their cost.
2/ The Government – for good reason – wanted to force Britain’s aerospace companies to merge in order to make the industry more manageable and competetive. The idea was sound but they didn’t make any serious attempt to manage the mergers, they simply forced it to happen. The result was an expensive and sorry mess of inter-company politics and red tape.
3/ The powerplant for the TSR2 (Olympus) was completely new and proved to be as big a headache as the development of the aircraft itself. Naturally, developing an all-new engine in parallel with an all-new aircraft was a recipe for disaster.
4/ The Government was already accepting that a significant reduction in Britain’s overseas committments was necessary and inevitable Consequently, part of the TSR2’s operational profile would soon no longer exist.
5/ The new Labour Government was politically set-against the project from the start, being disposed towards a less-confrontational attitude and inclined towards “off the shelf” purchases of American equipment, and when one considers the huge expense of the programme and the hideously bad management which had been exhibited, one can hardly blame them for hardening their attitude even before they were voted into power.
The combination of these factors was pretty-much guaranteed to kill-off the aircraft, no matter how good it might have been. Clearly, a “perfect” aircraft can always be created if there’s enough money to build it, but at the time of TSR2 Britain was still suffering the pain of accepting that the country was punching beyond her means.