Naturally you can have all kinds of views on the subject but the “accepted wisdom” which I and other authors have seen no reason to dispute, is that the Vulcan raids were (at least overall) a great success. They did have an effect on Argentine fast jet disposition, indeed that was the first and most direct result of the first Black Buck mission. Likewise the runway was continually operational but not capable of supporting fast jets and that (at least as far as any official word on the subject goes) was the intention. As I’ve already said (and as you intimated) the runway could have been rendered completely unuseable if there had been any will do do so, but there evidently wasn’t.

As for having any effect on the Argentine troops on the islands, one would assume that this was never a primary intention. The Vulcan, as always, was essentially a strategic weapon and was intended to have an effect on overall Argentine planning, rather than the localised operations on the islands themselves. The Vulcan missions were all about disabling the runway for fast jets, degrading radar capability, and convincing the Argentines that the mainland was not invunerable from attack too (although in reality there was no practical possibility of mounting attacks directly on the mainland).

It’s a bit unfair to ever suggest that the Navy was “doing all of the work” because of course that’s simply not true in any way. The Army, Navy, Marines and RAF all played different parts in the conflict and it would be unfair (and wrong) to suggest that any particular branch of the armed forces did any more than any other. It would also be wrong to suggest that any of the conflict should be looked at in terms of giving the RAF “a boost” as if the operation was some sort of media circus. There was no competition for the limelight, indeed the whole conflict was subject to suffocating MoD control which prevented a great deal of reporting from getting-back to the UK until long after the actual events. The Black Buck missions were hurredly put-together in response to a requirement, not because the RAF wanted some newspaper headlines.

As for the Harrier, it was of course fundamental to the success of the operation but this was largely by accident rather than design. Contrary to Sharkey Ward’s ramblings, the Harrier wasn’t an ideal aircraft for the theatre but it was the only suitable aircraft available with which to mount an air campaign. Had it not been available (and of course it wouldn’t have been, had the conflict taken place a few years later) then we would have been forced to rely upon the use of a US carrier (and presumably the air assets carried on it), although quite how this could have been put into practise (both logistically and politically) is still unclear. But the offer was certainly made and in different circumstances we may well have needed it as without air superiority the operation would never have succeeded, regardless of the Navy’s involvement, significant or otherwise.

I was merely eliminating any confusion between fact and your unsupported conjecture

I’m inclined to suggest that if you’re somehow in the posession of any “facts” which contradict the accepted wisdom on this subject, then maybe you should write a few books on the subject then? I’m sure we’d be delighted to be furnished with a more accurate appraisal;)

I’ll put my Vulcan Books Author hat on and say that the Black Buck missions were rather more effective than they have often been given credit for. The chief aim of the exercise was to convince Argentina that Britain had the ability (and possibly the intention, although in fact no such intention ever existed) to bomb the Argentine mainland. This served not only as a “wake up call” that Britain was deadly serious about retaking the Falklands, but (more importantly) prompted the Argentines to move some of their assets in order to defend the mainland, thus removing them from the Falklands theatre completely. In reality there was never any serious effort to destroy the runway completely as of course it was to become a vital asset for British forces.

The much-used supposition that the first raid was a disappointment is of course nonsense. The runway was attacked at an oblique angle so that one bomb was almost certain to hit it, but this also meant that no more than one bomb was ever likely to hit it – and that’s precisely what happened. The notion that the mission was less-than successful was largely due to the usual hype being spewed-out by Sharkey Ward who, for obvious reasons, seemed to think that the entire campaign could have been handled by the FAA, bless him.

As ever, the Vulcan’s effectiveness was in demonstrating what could be achieved without necessarily doing it – and that, in a nutshell, is what the Vulcan was designed for in the first place!