It really does make depressing reading. I get the distinct impression that there is still an all-embracing belief among museum people that collections should revolve around WWII exhibits, almost as if history ended in 1945. If the Shackleton wore brown/green camouflage and had dropped bombs over Germany it would be regarded as a vitally important treasure.

I look forward to the day when a younger generation takes control of our museums and we finally drift away from this bizarre notion that the past fifty years are somehow less significant to our history. Trouble is, I fear that an awful lot of magnificent aircraft will have gone by then.

This is not unique to BAE Systems or the MRA4 project it seems; haven’t there been similar issues with A400M, Typhoon and F-35?

Endless problems of course. It’s rare that any project runs as planned, or results in the equipment that was actually required in the first place. Seems to have always been thus. I had to laugh at this week’s political garbage-speak about how the MoD is going to be whipped into shape. I ain’t holding my breath.

I was under the impression that the P-3 went out of production in 1992 and that the only P-3 option considered by the MOD was for second-hand US Navy aircraft.
Second-hand airframes of course but refurbished and re-fitted. New aircraft in effect.

As for commonality with US equipment, isn’t that one of the main selling-points for the second-hand Rivet Joint?
Er, no, I don’t think there are any “selling points” at all, it is simply available that’s all.

build on the legacy of the ‘hugely successful’ MR2 with a more capable aircraft (new) built but with an identical design philosophy.
You’d imagine so but there was no “identical design philosophy” (whatever that is). MRA4 was simply a follow-on project and it seemed logical at the time – but not for very long.

The MOD should have been convinced by BAe that a new-build Nimrod would have been as cheap, if not actually cheaper, than a rebuild of MR2 airframes.
BAe made no attempt to propose that idea. Their concept was ostensibly all about simply modernising the existing aircraft. They were somewhat economical with their estimation of how simple this process would be, and failed to emphasise that MRA4 was in effect a completely new aircraft with only a token gesture towards the original Nimrod airframe.

One thing that I could never understand was why the Nimrod R1 replacement was never merged into the MRA4 programme?
It was to some extent, but only because the R1s role had shifted significantly.

Tragically the reputation of the Nimrod has been tarnished by what really are political failings; there was nothing wrong with the aircraft (or nothing that couldn’t have been solved) but politicians like to absolve themselves by casting about phrases such as ‘delayed’ and ‘over-budget’.
The key problems were that BAe disguised (deliberately or otherwise) the true cost and complexity of developing MRA4. The political failing was to have never secured a proper design and development contract in the first place which prevented BAe from continually delaying at the taxpayer’s expense. The second political failing was to not scrap the project when it clearly became too complex and expensive. The third political failing was to have foolishly cancelled it when the bulk of the spending and development had been done.

I doubt anybody’s first thought about the A380 or Concorde is ‘delayed and over-budget’ but they certainly are / were. Some of the most successful aviation products virtually bankrupted the companies that built them, Boeing 747 and the Rolls-Royce RB211 (did bankrupt R-R).
Concorde was indeed a fiasco. It only continued because there was no way our for our Government.

The A400M is ‘delayed and over-budget’ but since our European colleagues have a more forward-looking approach (and because engineering is valued by European politicians) it will certainly go-ahead and will probably end-up being very successful.
Maybe, maybe not. Depends who buys it. Either way the RAF patently doesn’t need it. C-17s would be far more practical.

Nimrod MRA4 (and a Nimrod R1 replacement) could have been afforded but the political will wasn’t there; ten years from now they’ll still be making the A400M at Seville in (bankrupt) Spain but Woodford will be a housing estate. Money may have been ‘saved’ in the short-term by cancelling MRA4 and buying Rivet Joint but something more valuable has been lost forever.
As usual. Political thinking on defence procurement has always been backward, jumbled, foolish or downright shameful. Nimrod is just the latest example.

The Hawker Hunter a Complete History by Tim McLelland

Glad to know my efforts are appreciated!:p

As mentioned above, the most detailed reference source by far is David Griffin’s book. Guess it depends what you want to know…

Oh indeed, one cannot expect the MoD to spend money on entertaining us. But at the same time, the act of retiring the last aircraft three days before a major event, when the aircraft will still be airworthy and the crew still current, is simply churlish. I think it says a lot about the way in which the RAF chiefs regard the show (ie- they don’t care about it one jot). I also think it’s vaguely insulting to the people who designed and built one of the RAF’s most successful aircraft, and an insult to all those who flew it and maintained it. Shabby business indeed!

My thoughts on Waddington’s air show are well known. The way in which the Nimrod, Tornado F3 and Jaguar were withdrawn without so much as a whimper is shabby, to say the least. It was doubtless only political manoeuvring (from the Navy I suspect) which enabled the Harrier to be given a semi-decent farewell.

One would think that the RAF’s chiefs would have more pride in a shining example of British engineering and technology. Or maybe they’re just too embarrassed at the way in which the hapless Nimrod was spirited away in a sorry effort to save a few pennies.

And if MRA4 was a stupid idea what were the alternatives

The whole MRA4 concept was flawed from the start. The notion of using parts of the original Nimrod sounded good in principle but in practise there was no merit in the idea at all. It didn’t save money, in fact it created more headaches and costs. In essence, MRA4 was a completely new Airbus design which simply used the original Comet fuselage. It would have been far simpler and much less troublesome to have simply purchased a P-3 derivative. The situation became even worse when more and more capabilities were attached to MRA4 as the programme developed.

Of course one could now claim that a P-3 wouldn’t have been a suitable replacement, either because the Nimrod’s systems wouldn’t have physically fitted into the P-3 easily, or that the P-3 wouldn’t have been as capable as MRA4. Both claims have some truth to them, but this is because the Nimrod became a very different aeroplane which performed tasks for which the aircraft was never designed. In reality the P-3 would have been a perfect replacement and an infinitely cheaper one which would have been delivered on time. If this had been done, the RAF would undoubtedly still have had an MR/SAR/ASW aircraft in service today.

We’ve now turned full circle and the MoD is looking at P-8 aircraft, whilst the rest of the Nimrod’s capabilities are effectively “on-hold” until RC-135 comes into service. It’s a ridiculous mess, and one which could have been avoided if the MRA4 programme had been abandoned much earlier – or not started at all.

the coroner who led the inquest into these deaths stated that the entire Nimrod fleet had “never been airworthy from the first time it was released to service” and urged that it should be grounded.

Ah yes, that guy should have been horse whipped. What utter nonsense. The only flaw that Nimrod had was a dodgy AAR system which had been thrown-together for the Falklands and never properly designed in the first place. The other issues (weapons bay fires, etc.) could have been resolved very easily if there had been any serious concerns. To suggest that Nimrod was ever non-airworthy was a load of claptrap.