Shark & Swordish same spec.

I think it’s a bit too easy to let hindsight affect our judgement here.

Firstly the Fairey Swordfish was designed to replace the Fairey Seal in service, but far more importantly is that the Swordfish design was offered to the same S.15/33 (related to S.9/30) Air Ministry spec (not FAA or Admiralty at that stage) as the Blackburn Shark was, so they were both designed and built to the same requirements and first flew within eight months of each other.
Interestingly both started out as private ventures, the Fairey as the TSR.II and the Blackburn as the B-6, Gloster also submitted its TSR.38 design to the spec.
Both types replaced Blackburn Baffins, Fairey IIIFs and Seals in service.

So really it was a case of the Swordfish outlasting the Shark, comparing specifications is useful but doesn’t always paint the full picture, especially when it comes to the day to day operations of an aircraft in severe conditions. For instance could it be that the Swordfish was easier to operate off carriers, or was more durable/reliable is service? Certainly its operational history would suggest high durability of design with few vices in use.

The Shark had the misfortune to be powered by the Armstrong Siddeley Tiger, which had both poor reliability and didn’t develop the power that was promised, indeed some Canadian Sharks had the Bristol Pegasus, in common with the Swordfish.

It seems to me that the Swordfish was just one of those outstanding designs, and although old fashioned in 1939, it was used along side two of its replacements (Albacore & Barracuda), and that the Shark had problems, not very desirable on a a pitching carrier deck in the N.Atlantic, there was good logic in just having the one good design (with the appropriate stores/logistics involved) in service and fulfilling the torpedo/spotter role.

As for the Roc and Skua, when they were first tendered to the spec they were seen as very advanced aircraft, but like many other just pre-war types became rapidly obsolete.

It was a Coastal policy pushed-through by Group Captain Richardson in 1943 on the basis that the Nav had better situational awareness ( through charting, radar and the fact that he was often the only chap awake on long flights ) and was therefore by default the crewman in command, since he was the one giving the instructions and waking the pilot to make course changes.

Yes and this policy survived through Coastal Commands’ existence and into the Nimrod era, certainly in the early 2000s, when my last flight was with a Nav as crew Captain.
This is essentially because the mission is controlled by the Nav (usually TACNAV), the pilots are there to ensure the aircraft in the right place and doing the right thing.

Was there any continued immediate post-war training for interceptor pilots/navs specifically to counter missiles and flying bombs?
Or was the threat essentially non existent until later into the 1960s?

I think your recollections are probably correct, but that there was possibly a crew secondment, change of unit, or A/C swap (none of which would be that unusual).
Thanks for getting back.

According to Yefim Gordon’s ‘Lavochkin’s Piston-engined Fighters’ it was “del’ta-drevesina” – (delta timber) composite or wood impregnated with phenol formaldehyde resin.

Sounds like a wood based version of Paxolin as used for instrument panels and seats?

Would limited Hercules C.4/5 availability for MR work become more possible as the A400 comes into service and releases some airframes from the transport role?

I think my main worry about the Herc (or indeed ATR42, Dash8 etc) in this role would be the high wing layout, it offers poor crew ditching survivability (I am aware of the Columbia AF ditching) for a type that spends the majority of its time over the sea. It is a consideration as various P-3, Nimrod, and Atlantic accidents have shown.

Thanks for that Yak11, I can spot subtle differences between the two airframes now aswel.
Be nice to see the KC-97 at Duxford!

Can anyone share the histories of the two N.Weald DC-4/C-54s with us?

As I said there, I recall Flt Lt JB Stephens telling us about his time with 7 Sqd in Kenya. I don’t think it was a figment of my imagination, but until I find proof, I have to wait and see.

I’m not disputing yours, or indeed Jims, recollections for one minute, but could it be that JB Stephens was seconded from one unit to another, or indeed a 7 sqn aircraft loaned (possibly with crew) to one of the other Lincoln sqns?
Just seems odd to dispatch one unit aircraft to a combat situation, when it was already heavily involved in another theatre (ie Malaya).
the Lincoln book goes into good squadron details with personal recollections, be surprised if that was left out?